Judgment :- 1. One Karuppanna Gounder, the grandfather of the petitioner was the permanent village headman of Keeranur village. Consequent on his death on 3rd October, 1970, applications were called for, for filling up the said vacancy on a permanent basis. There were altogether 10 applications, but the claims of all others except the petitioner and the fourth respondent were rejected. As between the petitioner and the fourth respondent, the third respondent, the appointing authority, preferred the fourth respondent for the appointment on the ground that though both satisfied all the requisite qualifications, the fourth respondent being younger and also jobless should be selected. 2. There was an appeal by the petitioner against the order of the third respondent to the District Revenue Officer, the second respondent herein. The said appeal was allowed by the District Revenue Officer on the ground that the fourth respondent was not shown to have sufficient property qualification and that the petitioner alone fulfilled all the requirements for appointments. The fourth respondent filed a revision before the first respondent contending that, the, second respondent has not considered properly his property qualification, The said revision was allowed and the first respondent remitted the matter to the second respondent for fresh disposal after giving a specific finding on the value of the property owned and possessed by the fourth respondent. 3. Subsequent to the order of remand, the second respondent held on the materials that the fourth respondent had the requisite property qualification. Having held that the fourth respondent also had the requisite qualification, he then proceeded to compare the claims of the petitioner as well as the fourth respondent. He held that though both are qualified to the post under the rules, the fourth respondent is to be preferred for the reason that he is younger and has better educational qualification. This order of the second respondent was taken in a revision before the Government, but without success. 4. The petitioner thereafter filed R.A. No. 404 of 1974 challenging the order of the second respondent preferring the fourth respondent for appointment as village officer. One of the grounds urged therein by the petitioner is that the second respondent failed to take into consideration the relationship of the petitioner, with the last office holder, which is a violation of R. 5(3) of the Tamil Nadu Village Offices Service Rules, 1970. One of the grounds urged therein by the petitioner is that the second respondent failed to take into consideration the relationship of the petitioner, with the last office holder, which is a violation of R. 5(3) of the Tamil Nadu Village Offices Service Rules, 1970. This ground was upheld by this Court on the ground that as admittedly the petitioner is the grandson of the last Office holder, his claim that he is the heir of the last office holder should be considered under the said R. 5(3). In that view this Court set aside the order of the second respondent with a direction to reconsider the matter after taking into account the claim made by the petitioner under R. 5(3). 5. Thereafter, the second respondent considered the matter afresh and again selected the fourth respondent for the post of the village headman on the ground that the petitioner being only the grand son of the last office holder, he cannot claim to be the heir while his father is alive, under R. 5(3), and that the qualifications of the fourth respondent being superior to the petitioner, his appointment needs no interference. The view taken by the second respondent may be stated in his own words: “I heard the arguments of the Advocate for the respondent. The Advocate for the respondent argued that the appellant. Is not heir of the last office holder, that he is the grandson of the last office holder and that when the appellants father and his 4 brothers are alive he cannot be considered to be the heir of the last office holder. According to Hindu Succession Act, schedule to Sec. 8, Cl. 1 the legal heirs are mentioned according to priority and according to that order of succession, the appellant cannot be considered as the heir of his grand father when his father and four other sons of his grandfather are alive”. From the above extract, it could be seen that the second respondent held that since the petitioner cannot claim to be a legal heir of his grand-father as per S. 8(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, while his father is alive, he cannot claim the benefit of R. 5(3). In this writ petition, the view of the second respondent that the petitioner is not a heir of the last office holder has been challenged. 6. Mr. In this writ petition, the view of the second respondent that the petitioner is not a heir of the last office holder has been challenged. 6. Mr. Parasaran, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the word “heir” occurring in R. 5(3) has to be understood in the light of the prior legislative history, that it has been held by Courts that the hereditary succession to a village office under the Hereditary Village Offices Act 1895 (Act 3 of 1895) devolves not only on the immediate heir but also on persons lower down in the line of succession if others in the line of succession are not either alive or not qualified, and that if persons nearer to the line of succession to the last office holder is not qualified on the date when the vacancy is to be filled up, the advantage can be taken by the persons lower in the line of heirs. Thus according to the learned counsel though a grand son may not strictly to be a heir as contemplated by the Hindu Succession Act while his father his alive, still for the purpose of succession to an office, he is entitled to claim a preferential right being in the line of heirs, and such a principle which was no really applied while the Hereditary Village Offices Act was in force should be applied in construing the word “heir” occurring in R. 5(3), Learned counsel refers to S. 10(2) of the Madras Act 3 of 1895 which provides for the law of primogeniture to be observed in making appointment to a Village Office. Sub S. (3) of S. 10 is also referred to as indicating that if the next immediate heir is not qualified, the appointing authority has to select the person next in the order of succession who is qualified f or appointment. Thus the attempt of the learned counsel is to show with reference to these provisions that the hereditary succession contemplates not only the immediate or next heir to the last office holder but also all the persons in the line of succession. According to the learned counsel, R. 5(3) can be invoked not only by the next heir but also the persons in the line of Succession, whether or not they succeed as a heir to the last office holder as per S. 8 of the Hindu Succession Act. According to the learned counsel, R. 5(3) can be invoked not only by the next heir but also the persons in the line of Succession, whether or not they succeed as a heir to the last office holder as per S. 8 of the Hindu Succession Act. Reference has also been made to the decision in Vishvesam Naiau v. Srinivasa Reddiar (1965) I M.L.J. 140: 77 L.W. 669 where a person who has not the immediate heir to the last office holder was appointed to an office governed by hereditary right, when the immediate heir was not duly qualified. 7. We are now concerned in this case with the scope of the R. 5 (3). In interpreting that rule, I am not able to see how the provisions of the Hereditary Village Offices Act are relevant. Acceptance of the contention of the learned counsel that the prior legislative history and the provisions of the Hereditary Village Offices Act have to be kept in mind when interpreting R. 5(3) and that the word ‘heir’ occurring in R. 5(3) should be understood as referring to all persons in the line of heirs to the last office holder will mean that the hereditary principle applied in making an appointment to a village office while Madras Act 3 of 1895 is even now kept intact, and such hereditary principles has to be followed notwithstanding the fact that the hereditary principle contained in S. 6 of that Act was held obnoxious to the provisions of the Constitution. Therefore, I am not inclined to hold that the hereditary principle in the matter of appointment to village offices contained in S. 6 of that Act still survives in the form of Rule 5(3) of the Madras Hereditary Village Offices Service Rules, 1970 which will be the position if the expression “the heir” occurring in S. 5(3) has to be understood in the light of the provisions of the Hereditary Village Offices Act. The scope of the word “heirs” came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in Arumuga Pillai v. Vijayyammal I.L.R. 4 Mad. 378 and it was construed as meaning persons who, in the event of death, would inherit from the proceeding incumbent. The scope of the word “heirs” came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in Arumuga Pillai v. Vijayyammal I.L.R. 4 Mad. 378 and it was construed as meaning persons who, in the event of death, would inherit from the proceeding incumbent. If that construction is to be applied, the petitioner not being a person entitled to inherit from the grand-father, the last office holder, while his father is alive, he cannot claim to be the heir’. If the word “heir” is to be understood as taking in all persons in the line of heirs, then it will practically mean that all descendants can claim to be “the heirs”. Having regard to the object of R. 5 (3), I cannot say that all descendants of the last office holder who may be in the line of succession can claim the benefit of the said rule on the ground that they are the ‘the heirs’ of the last office holder. 8. In Brooms Legal Maxims, Tenth Edition, page 337, while dealing with the rule ‘ Nemo Rst-Waeres Viventis ” (No one can be heir during the life of his ancestor), the author points out: “No inheritance could vest, nor could any person be the actual (sic) heir of another, till the ancestor was dead; before the happening of this event the person who would be heir, were the ancestor immediately to die, was called heir-apparent, or heir-presumative”. Thus, strictly speaking a man cannot claim to be a heir to another unless such another dies and heir ship opens. Of course, in this case, the last office holder, the grandfather, died on 3rd October 1972 and therefore, succession has opened., The petitioners father being alive the petitioner cannot claim to be strictly a heir of the grand-father though he may be in the line of succession. 9. S. 8(1) of the Hindu Succession Act sets out in clause (1) heirs who will exclude other heirs from succession. Whether the matter is looked at from the point of view of the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, or on general principles, the petitioner cannot claim to be ‘the heir’ of his grand father while his father is alive. S. 8(1) of the Hindu Succession Act sets out in clause (1) heirs who will exclude other heirs from succession. Whether the matter is looked at from the point of view of the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, or on general principles, the petitioner cannot claim to be ‘the heir’ of his grand father while his father is alive. It is stated by the learned counsel, though father is alive, since he is not qualified, the petitioner can claim to be the heir of grand-father., I do not think that such an ex tension is possible under R. 5(3). In my view, the Rule 5(3) gives the benefit only to the heir of the last office holder, i.e., the person who is the next heir entitled to succeed to him. I have to therefore agree with the conclusion arrived at by the second respondent. 10. On the merits the second respondent has held that the qualifications of the fourth respondent are superior to those of the petitioner. If the petitioner is not entitled to claim the benefit under R. 5(3) then the fourth respondent having been selected on the ground that he has got better academic qualification, the selection cannot be said to be erroneous. 11. The writ petition, therefore, tails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.