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1976 DIGILAW 154 (PAT)

Usha Lakshmi v. Anil Kumar Singh

1976-07-30

D.P.SINHA

body1976
D.P. SINHA J. This is an application wherein it has been prayed that the order dated 20-4-1973 of the Sub-divisional Officer, Aurangabad, by which he has taken cognizance of offences under Sections 336, 315 and 161 of the Indian Penal Code, be quashed. 2. The cognizance was taken on a complaint filed by the opposite party, namely, Anil Kumar Singh. It contains substantially the following allegations: Anil Kumar Singh took his sister to the Aurangabad Sub-divisional Hospital for delivery in a very precarious condition. The nurse on duty asked him to call the lady Doctor, namely the petitioner, as according to her, the condition of the patient was critical. Thereupon, he accompanied by his brother, Surendra Prasad Singh, an advocate, went to the residence of the petitioner and told her of the critical condition of the patient and requested her to see the patient for herself and do the needed treatment. In the meantime, the nurse on duty also sent a written requisition to the petitioner through the regular call book. The petitioner demanded a fee of Rs. 100/-to see and examine the patient. Having said so, the prescribed some injection on the call book and went inside her room saying that she would not go unless that fee was paid to her. In the circumstances, the opposite party returned to the Hospital feeling quite helplessness and found that the nurse was treating his sister and again he and his brother Surendra Prasad Singh went to the residence of the petitioner and told her that the condition of the patient was deteriorating and requested her to go and see the patient, but the petitioner refused to do so. At about 3. 45 P. M. the patient delivered a dead child. This according to the complainant, had happened on account of the utter negligence of the petitioner. After the complainant was examined on solemn affirmation, the complaint was referred to a Magistrate for inquiry and report. The Magistrate recorded the evidence of witnesses and submitted a report saying that no Prima facie Case had been made out against the petitioner. The learned Sub-divisional Officer perused the report and the evidence of the witnesses and same to the conclusion that the evidence of the witnesses examined by the Inquiry Magistrate disclosed a prima facie case and therefore he took cognizance of the offences under the sections already mentioned. 3. The learned Sub-divisional Officer perused the report and the evidence of the witnesses and same to the conclusion that the evidence of the witnesses examined by the Inquiry Magistrate disclosed a prima facie case and therefore he took cognizance of the offences under the sections already mentioned. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the learned sub-divisional Magistrate had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of an offence under Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code, without the previous sanction of, of the State Government as laid down in Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The contention of the learned counsel is correct in as much as Section 6 (1) of the Act, lays down as follows :-- "6 (1) No court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under s. 161 or S. 164 or S. 165 of the Indian Penal Code, or under sub-section (2) or subsection (3-A) of S. 5 of this Act, alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction, (a) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of the Union and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Central Government, of the Central Government; (b) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of a state and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government, or of the State Government. (c) x x x It is not in dispute that the petitioner, being a Gazetted Government servant is not removable from her office save by the State Government. In the circumstances, it is quite manifest from the express provision of subsection (1) of Section 6 of the Act, t hat the Sub-divisional Magistrate was debarred from taking cognizance of an offence under Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code against the petitioner, without the previous sanction of the State Government. Admittedly, no such sanction has been obtained. In the circumstances, the order of the learned Sub-divisional Officer taking cognizance of the offence under Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code which was the major offence alleged to have been committed was without jurisdiction and it can not be allowed to stand and must be quashed. 4. Admittedly, no such sanction has been obtained. In the circumstances, the order of the learned Sub-divisional Officer taking cognizance of the offence under Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code which was the major offence alleged to have been committed was without jurisdiction and it can not be allowed to stand and must be quashed. 4. So far as the offences under Section 315 and 336 of the Indian Penal Code are concerned, they appear to be only ancillary to that of Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code which constitutes the gravest of the allegations. In the circumstances, it is not open to the Sub-divisional Officer to take cognizance of the offences under the said sections in the absence of requisite sanction relating to the offence under Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code. 5. Accordingly, the order dated 20.4.1973 by which the learned Sub-divisional Magistrate took cognizance of the offences under Section 161, 315 and 336 of the Indian Penal Code, is hereby quashed, as being without jurisdiction. Application is allowed accordingly. 6. Learned Counsel for the opposite party has expressed a fear that if an order quashing the entire prosecution is passed, it may prejudice the opposite party in instituting a case again according to law. I do not think this is a reasonable fear. The prosecution is being quashed merely on the ground of want of sanction because of the prohibitory provisions of Section 6 of the Act. Application allowed.