Judgment :- 1. The Taluk Land Board, Kunnathoor, by the order sought to be revised, found the excess land in the possession of the revision petitioner to be 12.23 acres and directed him, under the provisions of the Kerala Land Reforms Act,1 of 1964, to surrender the same. It is aggrieved by that order that he has filed this revision petition. 2. Only two contentions were pressed on his behalf here by his counsel. They were about exclusion of 5.50 acres of land in Sy. Nos. 884/442A and B in calculating the total extent of the lands in his possession and exemption of 21.70 acres of land in survey numbers 884/441 and 444 planted with rubber after 1 4 1964 but before 1-11970. 3. The land, 5.50 acres in extent, in respect of which exclusion is claimed, was purchased by him only after 1117970 This is a proceeding under S.83 of the Act. The crucial date under that section being 11 1970 acquisition of land after that date should not have been taken into account in calculating the total extent of the lands in the revision petitioner's possession. Hence 5.50 acres of land has to be deducted from the total extent of 12.23 acres of land now directed to be surrendered by him. 4. The 21.70 acres of land planted with rubber was purchased by him and his wife in 1966 from the Rajagiri Rubber and Produce Company. One ground on which exemption is claimed in respect of it is that it was not excess land in the possession of the company at the time of purchase. Act 1 of 1964 was amended by Act 35 of 1969 and the amendment took effect from 1-1-1970. S.83 of the Act prohibits all persons from holding after 1-1-1970 lands in excess of the ceiling area. According to S.2 (43) of the Act the word 'person' as used in the Act includes a company. S.82 of the Act prescribes the ceiling area. As the provisions of that section stood prior to 1-1-1970 no ceiling area had been fixed for companies but after 1-1-1970 by the amendment by Act 35 of 1969 ceiling area was fixed for companies also. So in 1966 when the Company sold 21.70 acres of land to the revision petitioner and his wife it was not a case of sale of excess land. So in 1966 when the Company sold 21.70 acres of land to the revision petitioner and his wife it was not a case of sale of excess land. As it was not excess land at that time, according to counsel for the revision petitioner, it cannot be excess land after 1-1-1970 in the possession of the revision petitioner, also. For the good of the society as a whole the Act provided for prevention of accumulation of lands in the hands of a few and in so providing, it took into account changes in situations from time to time also. The ceiling limit fixed in S.83 of the Act is as on 1-1-1970. It is open to persons holding lands within the ceiling limit to make valid transfers of them after 1-1-1970. As a result of such transfers there was the possibility of lands in excess of the ceiling area getting accumulated in the hands of a new class of people after 1-1-1970 also. That is sought to be prevented by S.87 of the Act. These provisions show that merely because a land was not excess land at some time in the past or in the possession of a particular person it need not be so on a later occasion or in the possession of another. Even in the possession of the same person it can be excess land on a later occasion. As ceiling limit was fixed for companies also from 1-1-1970 by S.82(1)(d) of the Act, even if the Rajagiri Rubber and Produce Company had not transferred the 21.70 acres of land to the revision petitioner and his wife, that land would still have been excess land in the possession of the company itself, if the total extent of the lands in its possession after 1-1-1970 was beyond the ceiling area. The transferee of the land from the company cannot be in a better position. To accept the argument of counsel for the revision petitioner would be to hold that if at some time in the past a land was not excess land in the possession of one person it should remain exempted from the operatic.! of the ceiling provisions of the Act for all time to come. That is not what is intended by and provided for in the Act. of the ceiling provisions of the Act for all time to come. That is not what is intended by and provided for in the Act. Therefore the argument that as the 21.70 acres of land was not on the date of purchase excess land in the possession of the predecessor-in-interest of the revision petitioner it cannot be treated as excess land in the possession of the revision petitioner also, cannot be accepted. 5. Another ground on which exemption is claimed is that this area is plantation exempted under S.81(1)(e) of the Act. The area was planted with rubber after the purchase in 1966. S.82(4) of the Act which reads thus: "Where after the commencement of this Act, any class of land specified in Schedule II has been converted into any other class of land specified to that Schedule or into a plantation, the extent of land liable to be surrendered by a person owning or holding such land shall be determined without taking into consideration such conversion." directs conversion of lands referred to there being ignored in determining the excess land A Full Bench of this court held in CRP. Nos. 1269, 1503 and 1642 of 1974 and 33 of 1975 (1976 KLT SN 44) that the date of "the commencement of the Act" referred to in S.82(4) of the Act is 1-4-1964. S.82(4) as it stood prior to 1-1-1970, that is, prior to amendment of Act 1 of 1964 by Act 35 of 1969 read as follows: "Where after the commencement of this Act, any class of land specified in Schedule II has been converted into any other class of land specified therein, the extent of land that may be owned or held by a family or adult unmarried person owning or holding such land at the lime of the conversion shall be determined without taking into account such conversion." According to counsel for the revision petitioner the 21.70 acres of land was cashew estate on 1-1-1964, cashew estate was not a class of land specified in Schedule.11 of the Act, so S.82(4) was not attracted at all and cashew estate was exempted under S.84(1)(f) of the Act as it stood prior to 1-1-1970. In this regard his argument was two fold. In this regard his argument was two fold. The first was that as cashew estate was not included in Schedule II of the Act the conversion in this case was not of a class of land included in that schedule and so the prohibition in S.82(4) did not apply. The second was that as cashew estates were exempted prior to 1-1-1970 from the ceiling provisions and as plantations were exempted from those provisions both before and after 1-1-1970, viewed either as cashew estate or as plantation, the land in this case had in any event to be exempted. 6. The Full Bench decision of this court already referred to is against the position taken up by counsel for the revision petitioner. CRP. 1642 of 1974 dealt with in that decision was a case of conversion in 1965 of 15 acres of cashew estate into rubber plantation. Dealing with that, that decision said: "The contention that was raised by counsel was that the land that was converted was also exempted and therefore even without the conversion it has to be left out of reckoning for the purpose of determining the ceiling area and for determining the area to be surrendered This argument failed to take note of the fact that the exemption had been omitted, and that the conversion has to be ignored because of the provisions in S.82(4) of the Art The combined effect of the omission of the exemption and the ignoring of the conversion by the compulsion of S.82(4) is to bring the converted land within the total area that had to be reckoned to determine the ceiling area as well as the land to be surrendered," Counsel for the revision petitioner submitted that that decision required reconsideration as the arguments he had advanced hire, and referred to above, were not considered in that decision. His arguments can now be considered in detail. 7. As the Act stood prior to 1-1-1970, that is, prior to its amendment by Act 35 of 1969, cashew estates were exempted under S.81(1) (f) of the Act and what was meant by cashew estates was mentioned in the Explanation. This was how it read: "(f) cashew estates existing at the commencement of this Act and having a contiguous extent of ten acres or more. This was how it read: "(f) cashew estates existing at the commencement of this Act and having a contiguous extent of ten acres or more. Explanation: For the purpose of this clause, "cashew estate" shall mean dry lands principally cultivated with cashew nut trees;" This exemption granted for cashew estates was taken away by Act 35 of 1969. Consequently sub-clause (f) in S.81(1) was omitted in the Act with effect from 1-1-1970. But the exemption for plantation under S.81(1)(e) of the Act continued to be in the Act even after 1-1-1970. It is true that the words "cashew estate" as such do not occur in Schedule II. But "dry land principally cultivated with cashew" is included in that schedule. The explanation to S.81(1)(f) of the Act shows that cashew estate is nothing but dry land principally planted with cashew trees. It is not for all cashew estates that exemption is granted under S.81(1)(f). Only those cashew estates having a contiguous extent of 10 acres or more are exempted. So "cashew estates" which fall under S.81(1)(f) of the Act is a category of land coming in the group of lands called "dry lands principally planted with cashew". In other words "cashew estate" is one of the species of the genus "dry land principally planted with cashew". The genus itself is included in Schedule II. Consequently the conversion in this case was of a class of land included in that schedule so as to attract the prohibition contained in S.82(4) of the Act. 8. The second argument that whether the land is viewed as a "cashew" estate before the conversion or as 'plantation' after the conversion, it was in any event an exempted category both according to the provisions as they stood prior to 1 11970 and as they stand after that, is equally without substance. The ceiling provisions of the Act took effect only from 1 11970 and by virtue of the amendments by Act 35 of 1969 and 25 of 1971 the moment they took effect the prohibition contained in S.82(4) of the Act applied and the exemption previously granted for 'cashew estates' ceased to be operative. The language of S.82(4) of the Act is clear and express. It admits of no exception, not even impliedly, in the case of any class of land previously exempted under the Act before the ceiling provisions took effect. The language of S.82(4) of the Act is clear and express. It admits of no exception, not even impliedly, in the case of any class of land previously exempted under the Act before the ceiling provisions took effect. The only limitations to the application of the prohibition in S.82(4) of the Act are the two conditions laid down there, namely that the conversion is after 141964 and that it is of a class of land specified in schedule II to another class of land specified in it or into a plantation and no other. As those conditions are satisfied here the second argument of counsel for revision petitioner also cannot be accepted. 9. No evidence was adduced by the revision petitioner to show that prior to conversion the land was principally cultivated with cashew trees on a contiguous extent of 10 acres or more. Therefore the fact that the land was really cashew estate before, has also not been proved. 10. After hearing counsel for the revision petitioner I am not persuaded to think that the Full Bench decision referred to above requires reconsideration. I follow that decision and hold that the revision petitioner is not entitled to the exemption claimed by him in respect of the 21.70 acres of land alleged to have been planted with rubber after 141964. 11. In the result the order of the Taluk Land Board is modified by reducing the extent of the land to be surrendered by the revision petitioner from 12.23 acres of land to 6 73 acres of land and. accepting the suggestion made in that respect by counsel for the revision petitioner, fixing the same on the southern portion in the 10 acres and 37 cents of land in Sy. No. 884/441-1412 in Koodal Village included in Part D statement. To the above extent alone this revision petition is allowed. In all other respects it shall stand dismissed. There h no order as to costs. Send the records to the concerned Taluk Land Board before September 4, 1976.