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1976 DIGILAW 155 (RAJ)

Kaloo Singh v. Assistant Mining Engineer (Recovery) Mines and Geological Department

1976-05-12

KUDAL

body1976
KUDAL, J.—This is a revision petition under Section 115, C.P.C against the order of the learned Addl. District Judge No. 2, Jodhpur dated March 15, 1973. 2. The plaintiff-applicant Kaloo Singh filed a suit against the Assistant Mining Engineer (Recovery) and the Mining Engineer, Mines and Geological Department, Jodhpur on April 12, 1971 before the learned District Judge, Jodhpur. The plaintiff prayed that the defendant is not entitled to recover the balance of the "theka" amount either under the provisions of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, or under the Rajas-than Public Demands Recovery Act, 1952. The plaintiff also prayed for issue of injunction restraining the defendants from effecting the recovery of the balance of the "theka" amount. On the pleadings of the parties, issues were struck by the learned District Judge. 3. Issue No. 6 reads as follows : — "Whether the court-fee paid by the plaintiff is insufficient ?" 4. The case was transferred to the Court of the learned Additional District Judge No. 2, Jodhpur, who decided issue No. 6 on March 15, 1973. The learned Additional District Judge held that the court-fee paid by the plaintiff was insufficient, and he was directed to make good the deficiency in the court-fee within a month. 5. The plaintiff-applicant feeling aggrieved by the order of the learned Additional District Judge has filed the present revision petition. 6. On behalf of the plaintiff-applicant, it was contended that the court fee paid by the plaintiff was sufficient in view of the provisions of Section 39 2) of the Rajasthan Court Fees & Suits Valuation Act, 1961. It was also contended that when the representations filed on behalf of the plaintiff applicant were rejected by the Assistant Mining Engineer such rejection amounted to a summary decision as envisaged in Section 39(2) of the said Act. It was also contended that the word "decision" used in Section 39(2) of the said Act deserves to be interpreted in the context in which it has been used. It was also contended that the word "decision" used in Section 39(2) of the said Act deserves to be interpreted in the context in which it has been used. It was also contended that any decision by a revenue authority either under the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act or under the Rajasthan Public Demands Recovery Act pertaining to recovery of any amount as arrears of land revenue is subject to the decision of a civil suit, and as such, such a decision by the revenue authority shall only be a summary decision It was also contended that even the decision to issue a notice for recovery of a certain amount as arrears of land revenue shall constitute a summary decision. 7. On behalf of the State, it was contended that the Assistant Mining Engineer (Recovery) did not constitute a Court and as such, the present civil suit filed by the plaintiff-applicant is totally misconceived. It was also contended that the order of the A sistant Mining Engineer for recovory of the arrears as land revenue does not amount to a summary decision and the suit, therefore, is per see not maintainable. It was further argued that at any rate the plaintiff should pay ad valorem court-fee on the amount claimed by him. It was further contended that the suit filed by the plaintiff is a suit for declaration and injunction, and is not for setting aside a summary decision as envisaged in section 39(2) of the Rajasthan Court-Fees & Suits Valuation Act, 1961. It was also contended that under the provisions of Section 257B of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act the entire money has first to be deposited with the Department concerned, and thereafter a suit may be filed for setting aside the summary decision of the recovery and for refund of the amount so deposited. It was also contended on behalf of the State that there is no decision muchless a summary decision and that the plaintiff applicant has not filed any copy of such summary decision. It was, therefore, contended on behalf of the State that the suit filed by the plaintiff is totally misconceived, and that it is not covered under the provisions of Section 39(2) of the Rajasthan Court Fees & Suits Valuation Act, 1961. It was, therefore, contended that the plaintiff has been rightly directed by the learned Additional District Judge to pay ad valorem court-fee. It was, therefore, contended that the plaintiff has been rightly directed by the learned Additional District Judge to pay ad valorem court-fee. It was also contended that there is no case for interference on the revisional side. 8. The respective contentions of the learned counsel for the parties have been considered and the record of the case carefully perused. 9. The learned counsel for the plaintiff applicant relied on Kapoor Chand vs. The State (1), wherein it has been held that suit for cancellation of certificate under Section 20 of the Public Demands Recovery Act was in substance a suit for getting aside the decision of the Collector, which was that of a revenue Court, and the decision of the Collector was held to be a summary decision. In this case this Court differentiated the decision taken in Samdu Khan vs. The State of Rajasthan (1957 RLW I26= AIR 1957 Raj. 277 ). 10. Reliance was placed on Kallianikutti Amma vs. Kunhilakshmi Amma (2), wherein it has been held that where a decree holder institutes a suit under 0.21, R. 63, Civil P.G. to set aside an order in favour of the claimant, the fact that to the claim to set aside such an order is added some other relief, for example, a declaration that mortgage and a deed of assignment in favour of the claimant are void as against the plaintiff, does not necessarily affect the substantial character of the suit and the appropriate Article which applies to the suit is Art. 17(1) and not Art. 17A. 11. Reliance was placed on Udaichand vs. Firm Pannalal Champalal (3), wherein it was held that a suit under O. 21, R.63 by the claimant who was defeated in proceedings under O. 21, R. 58, Civil P.C., for a declaration of his title and a permanent injunction restraining the defendant from taking delivery of possession of the suit property and preventing him from taking any illegal action to the detriment of the plaintiff falls within the purview of Sche. 2, Art. 17(1), Court-fees Act. No ad valorem court-fee is necessary. 12. Reliance was placed on Mahabir Prasad vs. Shyam Behari Singh (4) holding that a consequential relief can be insisted upon only when the plaintiff wilt not get any redress by having merely a declaratory decree. 2, Art. 17(1), Court-fees Act. No ad valorem court-fee is necessary. 12. Reliance was placed on Mahabir Prasad vs. Shyam Behari Singh (4) holding that a consequential relief can be insisted upon only when the plaintiff wilt not get any redress by having merely a declaratory decree. For instance, when the property is in possession of the defendant, the plaintiff will not be allowed to seek merely a declaration of his title but must pray for recovery of possession as consequential relief But where a mere declaration is sufficient to give the plaintiff full relief, a further declaration will be deemed to be redundant, and the fact that the plaintiff asked for a redundant relief will not alter the nature and scope of the suit and make the suit one for a declaration with consequential relief. 13. Reliance was placed on Venkataramaiyas Law Lexicon, 1971 Edition. wherein the word "decision" has been explained as under :— "The word "decision" is not a word of art. It is a word having bread connotation. It may include a decree or an order within the meaning of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure; it may also include an award in some cases. In some cases it may include neither of them. Whether it includes any one of them in sub-sec. (1) of sec 381 of the Nagar Mahapalika Act will depend not merely upon that expression, but upon its collocation." 14. In Strouds Judicial Dictionary of Words and Phrases, the word "decision" has been explained as under:— "Decision" is a popular, and not a technical word and means little more than a concluded opinion. It does not, by itself, amount to JUDGMENT or ORDER." 15. Reliance was also placed on Purushottamdas vs. The Collector, Jhun-jhunu (5), wherein it has been held that before the stringant provisions of this section can be properly called into application, the particular demand must fall within the four walls of Sec. 256 or Sec 257, and where such a foundation is lacking, the provisions of Sac. 257-B cannot possibly be availed of. 257-B cannot possibly be availed of. Where it is impossible to hold on the material which has been placed on this record that the demand notice issued against the petitioners falls under any clause of Sec. 256 there is no alternative but to allow this application and quash the order and the further proceedings by which the petitioners abjection repudiating their liability was turned down. 16. "Court" has been defined in Section 3 (ii) of the Rajasthan Court-fees & Suits Valuation Act, 1961 as under:— "Court" means any Civil. Revenue or Crimi- or local law to decide questions affecting the nsl court and includes a Tribunal or other rights of parties." authority having jurisdiction under any special 17. The plaintiff-applicant filed objections on March 25, 1971. The learned counsel for the plaintiff-applicatn has not filed any certified copy of the order showing what action was taken by the Assistant Mining Engineer on that representation. The learned Addl Government Advocate, when called upon, has shown the order which the Assistant Mining Engineer has passed. He has simply stated disagree" on the margin of the objection petition. In Kapoor Ghand vs. The State (1), it was contended that issue of certificate amounts to a summary decision of a Revenue Court, and falls within the terms of Art. 17 (1) of Schedule 2 of the Court-fees Act. The learned Divisional Bench held that the contention is well-founded, and the court-fee payable by the appellant is sufficient for the purposes of this appeal. In Purushottamdas v. The Collector, Jhunjhunu (5), this Court held that unless the demand falls within the four corners of section 256 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, the recovery proceedings are without Jurisdiction. The decision of the Revenue Court for making recoveries of certain amount as land revenue is subject to a Civil suit as contemplated in sub clause (3) of Section 257B. This right to institute a suit is further subject to a right as contained in section 257-B (4). The learned Additional Government Advocate has, however, argued that the suit is prima facie barred by section 257-B (3) of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, as the amount due against the defaulter has not been deposited. 18. At the moment, we are only concerned to see whether the court-fee as paid by the plaintiff was sufficient, or not ? The learned Additional Government Advocate has, however, argued that the suit is prima facie barred by section 257-B (3) of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, as the amount due against the defaulter has not been deposited. 18. At the moment, we are only concerned to see whether the court-fee as paid by the plaintiff was sufficient, or not ? Section 39 (2) of the Rajasthan Court Fees & Suits Valuation Act, 1961 reads as under:— "39 (2). In a suit to set aside any summary decision or order of a Civil or Revenue Court, if the subject-matter of the suit has a market value, fee shall be computed on one-fourth of such value, and in other cases, fee shall be payable at the rates specified in section 45. 19. This section provided that in a suit to set aside any other summary decision or order of a Civil or Revenue Court, the court-fees payable shall be at the rate of 1/4 of the value of the subject-matter of the suit. 20. In Section 257A, it has been provided that the application, certificate, statement of account or other document referred to in sub-section (1) shall, for the purpose of recovery in accordance with the previsions of this chapter, be conclusive evidence of the existence of the arrear payable to the officer or authority signing the same, of the amount of such arrears and of the person who is she defaulter. 21. In Purushottamdas vs. The Collector, Jhunjhunu (5), it has been held that the demand must fall within the four walls of section 256 or section 257 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act. In view of these circumstances and keeping in view the ratio decidendi laid clown in Kapoor Chand vs. The State (1) and Purushottamdas v. The Collector, Jhunjhunu (5) I have no hesitation in holding that the decision to make recovery tantamounts to a summary decision within Section 39 (2) of the Rajasthan Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1961. 22. For the reasons stated above, the revision petition filed by the plaintiff-applicant is hereby allowed, and the order of the learned Additional District Judge under revision is hereby set aside. The court-fee paid by the plaintiff-applicant is found to be sufficient. 23. 22. For the reasons stated above, the revision petition filed by the plaintiff-applicant is hereby allowed, and the order of the learned Additional District Judge under revision is hereby set aside. The court-fee paid by the plaintiff-applicant is found to be sufficient. 23. The State shall, however, be free to raise an objection about the maintainability of the suit as the plaintiff applicant (defaulter) has not first deposited the amount which was due against him as contemplated in sub-clause (3) of Section 257B of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act. Looking to the facts and circumstances of this case, the partias are left to bear their own costs.