JUDGMENT Asthana, C. J. 1. THE principal contention raised on behalf of the appellant in the special appeal is that the learned Single Judge was in error in holding that the needs of the landlord and the tenant had not been compared in the orders passed by the State Government and the Additional Commissioner. It was contended that a perusal of the orders of these two authorities made it abundantly clear that they had considered the comparative needs of the landlord and the tenant. It was not necessary, it was urged, that the authorities should say in so many words that the need of the parties had been compared and that the need of the landlord was greater than that of the tenant. In order to appreciate the question raised by the learned counsel for the appellant, it will be necessary to set out briefly the undisputed facts. 2. THE appellant Massey is the landlord of an accommodation. He was formerly the tenant in the ground floor. Subsequently, he purchased the entire house. The respondent no. 1 is the tenant in the upper portion of the house. He is a tenant continuing from more than 17 or 18 years. After having purchased the house, the appellant moved an application seeking permission under the provisions of Section 3 of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 before the District Magistrate. The application was considered by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, who dismissed it. The revision against the above order by the landlord was allowed by the Additional Commissioner holding that the landlord had a bonafide and genuine need for additional accommodation. A representation to the State Government under Section 7-F of the Act by the tenant was dismissed. The view taken by the Additional Commissioner was affirmed. Thereupon, the tenant filed a writ petition in this court which was allowed by learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge has held that neither the Commissioner nor the State Government has considered and weighed the need of the tenant as against that of the landlord. Relying on the Full Bench decision in the case of Asa Singh v. B. D. Sanwal, 1968 AWR 572, the court held that the view taken by the two authorities was manifestly erroneous in law. We have perused the orders passed by the Commissioner as well as the State Government. Relying on the Full Bench decision in the case of Asa Singh v. B. D. Sanwal, 1968 AWR 572, the court held that the view taken by the two authorities was manifestly erroneous in law. We have perused the orders passed by the Commissioner as well as the State Government. We must record a finding that we are unable to agree with the view of the learned Single Judge that the respective needs of the parties have not been considered by the Commissioner and the State Government. The order of the Commissioner shows that he has taken into consideration the accommodation in possession of the two parties and the number of persons in the family of each party. He has also considered the requirement of the landlord for additional accommodation and has also considered the size of the rooms in possession of either party. The Commissioner has further taken into consideration that the landlord had purchased the house to meet the requirement for additional accommodation. All that the Full Bench in Asa Singh (Supra) decided was that the authorities concerned considered the needs of the two parties. In Asa Singh's case, the Full Bench referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in Shri Bhagwan v. Ram Chand, 1965 AWR 304 SC and then laid down the following law :- "It is clear from this passage that the District Magistrate, while considering the landlord's application, has to weigh the pros and cons of it, he has to hear the landlord as well as the tenant. It necessarily follows that he has to consider the application of the landlord as well as the version of the tenant. Naturally if the tenants case is that he needs the accommodation, the District Magistrate has to consider that case too. So the Act impliedly casts a duty on the District Magistrate to give consideration to the cases of both the landlord and the tenant." 3. IT would, therefore, be seen that the primary requirement under this rule of law is that the District Magistrate gives consideration to cases of both the landlord and the tenant. IT is also clarified in the above rule that while considering the landlord's application he has to weigh the pros and cons of it. Similarly, he has to consider the tenant's need as well. IT is also clarified in the above rule that while considering the landlord's application he has to weigh the pros and cons of it. Similarly, he has to consider the tenant's need as well. IT is, therefore, evident that the prime requirement under this rule of law is that the cases of both the parties be considered and weighed. In the present case, the Commissioner has considered the respective cases of the parties and ultimately he has found that the landlord requires the additional accommodation, and has given him the required permission. But, before doing so, he has taken into consideration the hardship of the tenant and has directed that the permission would only be effected after one year of the order. This order was passed on the 9th of August, 1971. IT was urged that the Commissioner does not state that the need of the landlord was greater than that of the tenant. IT is true that this expression does not find itself mentioned in so many words but a perusal of the order of the Additional Commissioner leaves us in no doubt that this is what weighed with the Commissioner. He has used the expression, "The need for additional accommodation appears to be obvious." We are, therefore, unable to agree with the learned Single Judge that the Commissioner has not complied with the requirement of law laid down in the Full Bench case of Asa Singh (Supra). 4. COMING to the order of the State Government, it must at once be noticed that this is an order of affirmance and the State Government was only to pass a speaking order. It was not necessary for the State Government to have elaborataley dealt with every circumstance. The order of the State Government also shows that the matter had been considered. The order shows that the respective needs of the parties were considered. There was a comparison of the strength of the families, the size of the accommodation in their possession, the need for additional accommodation. Ultimately, the order contains an expression to the following effect :- "When the need of the landlord is proved or established, then the rights of the tenant have to be sacrificed." This shows that the State Government concluded that need of the landlord had been established. Ultimately, the order contains an expression to the following effect :- "When the need of the landlord is proved or established, then the rights of the tenant have to be sacrificed." This shows that the State Government concluded that need of the landlord had been established. A perusal of this order also leaves us in no doubt that the order of the State Government is in substantial compliance with the requirement of law laid down in the case of Asa Singh. 5. LEARNED counsel for the respondent, however, raised three objections. The first objection was that the need of the parties had not been compared. This objection, in our opinion, has no substance. As seen above, the needs of the parties have been duly compared. There may be different ways of expressing the opinion or writing an order. So long the purport is clear, it would be a substantial compliance with the requirement of law. 6. THE second objection is that there is no finding in the order of the Commissioner or the State Government that the need of the landlord was greater than that of the tenant. It is true that neither the order of the Commissioner nor that of the State Government have expressed themselves using the expression that the landlord's need was greater than that of the tenant. The question is whether such an inference can be drawn from the impugned orders. It was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that that expression used by the State Government viz. where the requirement of the landlord is established, the rights of the tenant have to be sacrificed, falls short of the requirements of law stated above. It was contended that the tenant's interest could not be sacrificed merely because the landlord has been able to establish his requirement. What is required is that a clear finding should be given that the landlord's need is greater than that of the tenant. The question, therefore, would be whether such an inference can be deduced from the impugned' orders. It is true that both the Additional Commissioner and the State Government/have concluded that the landlord had been able to establish his need for additional accommodation. But none of them have stated categorically that the landlord's need is greater than that of the tenant. The question, therefore, would be whether such an inference can be deduced from the impugned' orders. It is true that both the Additional Commissioner and the State Government/have concluded that the landlord had been able to establish his need for additional accommodation. But none of them have stated categorically that the landlord's need is greater than that of the tenant. Even if the entire order of the Commissioner and the State Government is taken into consideration, it will only reveal that these authorities were considering the case of the parties in respect of the disputed accommodation. While both the authorities held that the landlord required it, none of them expressed an opinion that the tenant's need was lesser than the landlord. It cannot, therefore, be said that the requirement of the rule of law that the landlord's requirement was greater than the tenant has been held in any of the two impugned orders. It was necessary that the Commissioner and the State Government should have expressed themselves on this point. In the case of Roshan Lal v. Smt. Rama Devi, 1975 AWC 124, a learned Single Judge of this court laid down this rule that the need of the tenant has also to be considered and if on such comparison it is found that the need of the landlord is greater than the need of the tenant, it is only then that the landlord can be permitted to evict the tenant. This view was also taken by the learned Single Judge in the case of Cap. Ashok Kumar Kochar y. State of U. P., Civil Misc. Writ No. 5113 of 1971 decided on July 12, 1974. This view was also taken by the learned Single Judge in the case of Cap. Ashok Kumar Kochar y. State of U. P., Civil Misc. Writ No. 5113 of 1971 decided on July 12, 1974. In the Special Appeal No. 273 of 1974 arising out of the above decision, the Division Bench affirmed the above rule of law in the following words :- "Permission under Section 3 of the Act could be granted justifiably by the appropriate authority only by taking into consideration the comparative needs of the landlord and the tenant and recording a finding that if the permission was not granted the landlord would suffer greater hardship than the one suffered by the tenant if the permission was granted." The Division Bench held in that case that in the impugned order of the State Government there was no finding to the effect that the landlord would suffer greater hardship than the tenant if the permission was refused to him. It was further observed that there had been really speaking no application of the mind to the question whether the hardship suffered by the landlord would be greater in the event of refusal of permission than the one caused to the tenant in case of grant of permission. We are in agreement with the rule of law enunciated in the above case. This was a case under the provisions of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, No. Ill of 1947 and the rule of law referred to above would have application in a case governed by the provisions of U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, No. Ill of 1947. We are not expressing an opinion whether the said rule of law would be applicable to a case governed under the provisions of the U. P. Act XIII of 1972 for the provisions of this Act have no application to the facts of the present case. 7. IT is, therefore, clear that there is a rule of law that there must be a finding by the District Magistrate or the revising authority that the need of the landlord has been found to be greater than that of the tenant on a comparison of their respective needs for the disputed accommodation. As seen above, there is not a word in the impugned orders in this respect. 8. As seen above, there is not a word in the impugned orders in this respect. 8. THE third point urged by the learned counsel for the respondent is that a special consideration will weigh in respect of an accommodation which is occupied by a tenant whereas the remaining part of the building or accommodation was in possession of the landlord. In other words, it was contended that if the landlord was given a permission, the tenant would be thrown out on the street whereas the landlord would not face any such situation. Learned counsel further contended that it is the hardship of the parties on this account that has to be considered and this had not been done in the present case. There is nothing in Section 3 of U. P. Act 3 of 1947 in this regard nor has the Full Bench in Asa Singh's case (supra) made any such rule of law. Reliance was again placed on the case of Roshan Lal v. Smt. Rama Devi, 1975 AWG 124. A rule of law laid down in the case was that the authorities comparing the needs of the landlord and the tenant had to take into consideration the hardships of the respective parties in case a permission was granted to the landlord. In other words, it was urged that the order of the District Magistrate or that of the revising authority must show that it applied its mind to this aspect of the matter. There is no such discussion in the impugned order in the present case except that the Commissioner had in its mind the likely hardship that was to be suffered by the tenant in case he was to be evicted. A period of one year was, therefore, allowed to the tenant before the permission was made effective. Nevertheless it cannot be said that there was any discussion on this aspect of the matter. It is no doubt true that the Commissioner was alive to the question. The very fact that he deferred the effectiveness of the permission for a year was indicative of the circumstance that the tenant was likely to be thrown out on the streets. A year's time was, therefore, allowed for him to find out an alternative accommodation. It is no doubt true that the Commissioner was alive to the question. The very fact that he deferred the effectiveness of the permission for a year was indicative of the circumstance that the tenant was likely to be thrown out on the streets. A year's time was, therefore, allowed for him to find out an alternative accommodation. Although the order of the State Government shows no discussion on it but since it was an order of affirmance it will have to be treated as having affirmed the view taken by the Commissioner. We, therefore, conclude that the order passed by the Commissioner and the State Government have not satisfactorily dealt with the above two questions. In this view of the matter, we have considered the question as to whether the matter should be sent back to the State Government for reconsideration of the application under Section 7-F of the U. P. Act III of 1947. We do not think that it is necessary to do so. In view of the provisions of U. P. Act XIII of 1972, it is open to the landlord to move the District Magistrate under Section 21 of the Act for possession. We think it would be in the interest of justice not to interfere with the order passed by the learned Single Judge but for a different reason and leave the landlord to seek his remedy under the provisions of the new Act. 9. IN the result, therefore, the appeal fails and is dismissed. No order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.