Short Note : 1. The plaintiff instituted a suit for specific performance of a contract of sale in respect of Khasra No. 52 area 14.83 acres belonging to Raghunath respondent No. 1. The sale agreement was made on August 22, 1961 for a sum of Rs 2,500 out of which Rs. 1,500 were paid as earnest money. According to the plaintiff it was agreed that the rest of the amount would be paid at the time of registration and that the sale-deed would be executed on April 19, 1962. Since no such deed was executed till 19th April 1962, a further agreement was made extending the time upto June 18, 1962. The defendant No. 1 did not execute the sale-deed. Therefore, the plaintiff served a notice on June 15, 1962 calling upon him to perform his part of the contract. On July 16, 1962 the present suit was filed. The plaintiff claimed that the subsequent sale is surreptitious and has been brought about on a date subsequent to his sale. The subsequent sale was thus inoperative. During the pendency of the suit, the defendant No. 1 executed a sale-deed on August 30, 1962 transferring the suit land for a sum of Rs. 8,000 to defendants Nos. 2 and 3. According to the defendants Nos. 2 and 3, they had entered into an agreement to purchase the suit land on March 18, 1961 and paid Rs. 4,000 as earnest money. Their sale was prior in point of time. They also contended that the plaintiff was not really the purchaser of the land but had advanced some money to the defendant No. 1 and the writing was merely a collateral security. Held : Before me, it was contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the lower appellate Court had to decide the case on preponderance of probabilities and then take into consideration the two important circumstances which went to the root of the findings as to the genuineness of sale in favour of defendants 2 and 3. The trial Court first failed to see that if the sale in favour of defendants 2 and 3 is a genuine there was no occasion for defendant No. 1 to make a subsequent sale for a lesser amount. The trial Court first failed to see that if the sale in favour of defendants 2 and 3 is a genuine there was no occasion for defendant No. 1 to make a subsequent sale for a lesser amount. The circumstance was so preposterously improbable against natural course of human conduct that it could not be explained except on the hypothesis that the sale in favour of defendants 2 and 3 was an afterthought and made to defraud him of the bargain. Submission was also made that the plea taken by the defendant that the agreement dated August 22, 1961 was for the purpose of borrowing the amount would be patently false in view of the fact that on the assertion of the defendant No. 1, he had accepted Rs 4,000 as earnest money from other defendants. The vendors had in their possession a stamp paper purchased earlier by them and an agreement could be written over it ante-dating it to the date of its purchase. Therefore, this circumstance should not have weighed before the Court. 2. I have, therefore, to consider this aspect of the case that when the Courts below did not consider the circumstance that the common course of conduct militated against the possibility of a sale to defendants 2 and 3 then what would be the effect. The Courts below may have ignored the circumstance when they positively came to the conclusion as to the genuineness of the sale and that it was prior in point of time. It is difficult to explain the conduct of the respondent No. 1 in making the sale to the plaintiff for a paltry amount of Rs. 2,500 when he could really obtain a much larger amount for the same. The explanation that this was merely a loan transaction and the writing was executed as a collateral security also does not fully explain the defendant No. 1’s conduct for if he was already in possession of Rs. 4,000 why would he after accepting Rs. 1,500 take the risk of selling the valuable property. Be that as it may, having considered all the circumstances, I am not impressed by the fact that the circumstances alone could outweigh the findings arrived at by the two Courts. It seems that the subsequent transaction of sale to the plaintiff is not genuine. 1,500 take the risk of selling the valuable property. Be that as it may, having considered all the circumstances, I am not impressed by the fact that the circumstances alone could outweigh the findings arrived at by the two Courts. It seems that the subsequent transaction of sale to the plaintiff is not genuine. This may have been made for obtaining some more amount which the borrower must have promised to repay when he was able to receive the entire consideration from the defendants Nos. 2 and 3. Having gone through the evidence on record. I think the findings arrived at are proper and appear to be correct. Merely because the circumstance cannot be adequately explained, it would be no ground to set aside the findings of both the Courts below. 3. Coming to the next point the transfer pendente lite is neither illegal nor void. It is only voidable to the extent it affects the rights of the party who obtains the decree or order in the pending litigation and at the instance of that party only and not of any other party. The effect of section 52 of the transfer of property Act is not to wipe out a sale pendente lite altogether but to subordinate it to the rights based on the decree in the suit. Since the plaintiff's claim in the suit fails it would have no effect on the sale transaction between defendants 2 and 3 and defendant No. 1. Appeal dismissed.