JUDGMENT H.N. Agarwal, Member. - This is a revision against the order dated July 20, 1974 passed by the Addl. Commissioner, Faizabad Division on a substitution application in appeal No. 877 of the 1971 arising out of suit No. 524 of 1969-70 under Section 229-B of U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. 2. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties and have gone through the record. 3. The facts of the case are that during the pendency of the appeal before the lower appellate court the appellant died and his son Vinay Kumar Misra moved an application on October 19, 1973 praying that he may be substituted as his heir. The learned Addl. Commissioner allowed the substitution on March 27, 1974. Subsequently Radhey Krishna defendant-revisionist moved an application on May 3, 1974 for the abatement of the appeal and cancellation of the earlier order dated March 27, 1974 by his order dated July 20, 1974 for learned Addl. Commissioner rejected this application. The defendant-revisionist had now come up in revision. 4. The learned counsel for the revisionist has argued that the sole appellant had died on July 14, 1973 and the substitution application was moved beyond the statutory period and as such the appeal had abated. His ground for putting the date of the death of the appellant as July 14, 1973 is the extract of the death register of the Municipal Board. The learned counsel for the O.P. has however, argued that the date of death was on July 14, 1973, but July 24, 1973. In support of this he had filed two receipts dated July 24, 1973 relating to the carriage of the dead-body of the appellant from Pratapgarh to Allahabad and a certificate from the Nagar Mahapalika Allahabad dated May 21, 1974 to the effect that in the register of the Samshan Ghat, Daraganj the entry with regard to Gangadin Misra, S/o Ram Sahai Misra, Hadiganj, Pratapgarh was made on July 24, 1973 at 7'O Clock. Further the deceased was a pensioner and his pension was drawn from the Government treasury till July 24, 197. The documentary evidence regarding the date of the death is therefore, weightier in favour of the appellant-O.P. It cannot be argued that the extract from the register of Pratapgarh Municipal Board should be considered more reliable than the certificate of the Nagar Swastha Adhikari of Nagar Mahapalika, Allahabad. The documentary evidence regarding the date of the death is therefore, weightier in favour of the appellant-O.P. It cannot be argued that the extract from the register of Pratapgarh Municipal Board should be considered more reliable than the certificate of the Nagar Swastha Adhikari of Nagar Mahapalika, Allahabad. What is however, most significant is that Vinay Kumar Misra, plaintiff-O.P. had filed an affidavit along with his application for substitution dated October 19 , 1973 that his father Gangadin had died on July 24, 1973. The learned Addl. Commissioner had recorded the order on this application on March 27, 1974 as follows :- "The learned counsel for the appellant is present. The respondent Sri Radhey Krishna who is present agrees with this application. It is accordingly allowed." This admission on the part of the revisionist amounts to an estoppel. His subsequent application moved on May 3, 1974 is thus only on afterthought. The lower appellate court had thus not committed any illegality or irregularity in holding that the date of death was July 24, 1973 and the appeal had not abated. 5. Further under Section 5 of the Limitation Act a court may extend the prescribed period of the appellant or application satisfied the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. Thus on October 19, 1973 when the O.P. No. 1 had moved this substitution application, had the present revisionist raised the plea of bar of limitation, the O.P. would have got the opportunity to make an application for extension of the prescribed period under Section 5. The revisionist however, did not take the plea of bar of limitation and had instead expressed his agreement with the application of substitution on March 27, 1974 thereby giving no occasion to the O.P. to move an application under Section 5. By its order dated March 27, 1974 the lower appellate court has already allowed the substitution application. There is no illegality or other error apparent in this order and the lower appellate court was right in refusing to recall this order. 6. It would be relevant to observe here that the present revision is purely of technical nature. The purpose of a court is to accord justice which should not only be done, but also appear to have been done. 6. It would be relevant to observe here that the present revision is purely of technical nature. The purpose of a court is to accord justice which should not only be done, but also appear to have been done. The period of limitation provided for substitution of the heir of a deceased party in a suit or appeal is 90 days. If the death of the appellant occurred on July 24, 1973, the period for limitation for making an application for substitution of the heirs would expire on October 22, 1973. If on the other hand the death occurred on July 14, 1973 the period of limitation would be over on October 12, 1973. In the latter case the application moved for substitution of the heir on October 19, 1973 would be delayed by merely 7 days. The law is to my mind not an ass. It would be foolish to argue that a court should refuse to consider an appeal on merits and thereby deprive a person of available rights because of alleged delay of 7 days which itself had not been proved. In all such matters it is the bounded duty of the court to exercise it judicial discretion with a view that substantial justice is done. The learned Addl. Commissioner has exercised his jurisdiction properly and without any material irregularity in rejecting the application of May 3, 1974 and maintaining his earlier order dated March 27, 1974. 7. I find no force in the present revision and hereby dismiss it.