Judgment :- 1. The applicant in O. P. No. 80 of 1974 (Pauper) on the file of the Sub Court, Quilon, is the revision petitioner. He applied for permission to sue informa pauperis. But on the ground that the petitioner did not mention all his movable assets in the schedule to the pauper application the lower court passed a conditional order that if the court fee payable on the plaint is paid on or before 2nd January 1976 the petition will be registered as an original suit. Dissatisfied with that the petitioner has filed this revision petition. 2. Before passing the impugned order the applicant has been allowed to amend his pauper application by incorporating a schedule of his properties and accordingly a schedule of the properties owned by the applicant was incorporated in the pauper application. In that schedule the immovable property belonging to the petitioner and the number of encumbrances thereon were mentioned. It was also stated that the only movable property of the petitioner, namely the fishing boat, has been utterly ruined and the wreck has been abandoned in favour of the defendants and that the plaintiff has no present means to pay the court fee for the plaint claim. The objection or the respondents was that the petitioner even after getting an opportunity to amend the application failed to mention all his assets movable and immovable and therefore the application is liable to be rejected under Order XXXIII R.5 (a) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Later the petitioner was examined in support of his application. In the course of his cross-examination he was asked whether there are any movables in his house like furniture. He admitted that there are some furniture in the house and that their value can be estimated at Rs. 500. On finally hearing the matter the lower court held that the petitioner failed to disclose such movables in the schedule to the pauper application and therefore the application to sue informa pauper is has not been framed and presented in the manner required by R.2 and 3 of Order XXXIII. Hence the application is not a bona fide one and consequently the plaint can be registered and numbered as a suit only on payment of the ad valorem court fee payable on the plaint claim. The plaint is valued at Rs. Hence the application is not a bona fide one and consequently the plaint can be registered and numbered as a suit only on payment of the ad valorem court fee payable on the plaint claim. The plaint is valued at Rs. 57,030 and the advalorem court fee payable thereon comes to Rs. 4,783. 3. The contention of the counsel for the petitioner is that the lower court acted without jurisdiction in holding that the application was not framed and presented in the manner required by R.2 and 3 of Order XXXIII. Order XXXIII. R.2 specifies the particulars which should be stated in every application for permission to sue as a pauper. It should contain all the particulars required in regard to plaints in suits: a schedule of any movable or immovable property belonging to the applicant with the estimated value thereof should also be annexed thereto and it should be signed and verified in the manner prescribed for the signing and verification of pleadings. R.3 requires that the application should be presented to the court by the applicant in person unless he is exempted from appearing in court. After the amendment of the pauper application by the petitioner it may not be right for the lower court to hold that the application is not framed and presented in the manner prescribed by the R.2 and 3. It was stated in the application that the only movable asset namely the fishing boat is valueless and has been abandoned in favour of the respondents. If during the course of the enquiry some other movables are proved it is not a case where the application is not framed and presented as required by Order XXXIII R.2. The value of such movables will also be taken into account in finding out whether the applicant is a pauper or not and the application will have to be dealt with not under Order XXXIII R.5 (a) but under R.5 (b). Decided cases on this point are in accordance with the above view. In Sundari Devi v. Rivers Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. A. I. R 1934 Calcutta 640 the Calcutta High Court had occasion to consider the effect of the omission to include some items in the schedule attached to the pauper application. Decided cases on this point are in accordance with the above view. In Sundari Devi v. Rivers Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. A. I. R 1934 Calcutta 640 the Calcutta High Court had occasion to consider the effect of the omission to include some items in the schedule attached to the pauper application. In that case it was disclosed from the cross-examination of the witness examined in connection with the pauperism that the applicant had inherited some property from a deceased son of hers. This had not been included in the schedule attached to the application. But every other detail required by the rule to be complied with had been complied with. The lower court refused an application for an amendment of the pauper application to include this item in the schedule. On revision the High Court observed as follows at page 641: "From what I have stated above it would appear that Bagala's original application for permission to sue as a pauper had all the particulars that are required with regard to a plaint in suit, it had been duly signed and verified and it had attached to it a schedule containing the name of some immovable properties with an estimated value thereof. That being so, there was in my opinion no defect in the form or frame of the application and the omission to include one solitary item of property was, in my judgment, not a non-compliance with the provisions of 0.33, R.2, Civil P. C. This view of mine is in agreement with the decision of the Patna High Court in the case of Biajr Ballab Lallji v. Benoy Krishna A. I. R.1928 Pat. 28 and also of the Madras High Court in Kuppuswamy Iyyar v. Muthuswamy Ayyar A. I. R.1915 Mad. 652. I am therefore of opinion that the order of the learned Subordinate Judge by which he refused to consider the application for amendment simply on the ground that he had no other alternative than to reject the application of 16th tune 1933 cannot therefore be sustained." Again, in Nirmal Kumar v. Manoanjan AIR. 1955 Cal. 192 the same High Court had occasion to consider the effect of non-inclusion of any particular property in the schedule annexed to the application for permission to sue as a pauper. 1955 Cal. 192 the same High Court had occasion to consider the effect of non-inclusion of any particular property in the schedule annexed to the application for permission to sue as a pauper. Das Gupta J. (as he then was) speaking for the Bench which decided the case observed as follows at page 193: "In our opinion the non-inclusion of any particular property in the schedule annexed to an application for permission to sue as a pauper would not entitle a Court to reject an application under R.5 of 0.33, Civil P.C. What is laid down in sub-rule (a) of R.5 is that where an application is 'not framed and presented in the manner prescribed by R.2' the Court shall reject the said application. An application can be said to have been framed and presented in the manner prescribed by R.2 if in fact it contains in regard to plaints, a schedule of the movable and/or immovable property alleged by the applicant as belonging to him with the estimated value thereof and is signed and verified in the manner prescribed for the signing and verification of plaints. What sub-rule (a) of R.5 insists upon is that the frame of the application must be in accordance with R.2. It does not say that all the particulars given in the application must be correct. That question as to whether or not the particulars of the properties which are set out in the schedule to the petition are correct has to be investigated at a subsequent stage, and if on such investigation the court comes to the conclusion that some properties were omitted from the schedule annexed to the petition, then the court should proceed to determine the value of these properties and taking the said value into consideration determine whether or not the applicant is a pauper. If the court finds on ascertaining the value of the said property and the other properties which are set out in the schedule that the applicant is not a pauper, then the court should dismiss the application on that ground, i.e., he is not a pauper." A similar view was taken in Madan Mohanlal v. Fhalman Singh, AIR. 1954 Cal. 89. 1954 Cal. 89. I respectfully agree with the view expressed by the Calcutta High Court in these cases and hold that the non-inclusion of the movables which were in the house where the petitioner was residing would not amount to a violation of R.2 and 3 of Order XXXIII CPC. 4. It is, no doubt, a settled principle that an application for permission to sue should be filed with utmost good faith and if any asset belonging to the applicant is shown to have been intentionally and deliberately omitted to be included in the schedule annexed to the application that is a factor which the court will take into account in exercising its discretion to allow or not to allow the permission asked for to sue as a pauper. The lower court has relied on the decisions reported in Kuppusmami v. Varadappa AIR 1943 Madras II and Durga Prasad v. Srinivas AIR. 1930 Patna 368 and also Mt Chamela Kaur v. Purushotam Das AIR. 1932 Patna 308 to come to the conclusion that the application to sue as a pauper should be rejected if it was revealed in the course of the hearing of the application that the applicant has not stated with utmost good faith the whole of his assets in the schedule to the application. Possibly the lower court overlooked the fact that the later rulings of the above High Courts had occasion to consider the scope of the above decisions and to explain these decisions I will refer to the later decision where the above cases had come up for consideration. 5. The decisions in Kuppuswami v. Varadappa A I R.1943 Madras 11 was considered in Ramakrishna Chetti v. Govindammal (1954) 1 MLJ 26. In the latter case Justice Venkatarama Ayyar pointed out that the rule laid down in the earlier case must be limited to a case where a suppression is deliberate and not bona fide. This was followed by Rajamannar, C. J. in Murugan v. Sivaraman (1955) 2 MLJ. 638. After referring to the decision of Chandrasekhara Ayyar, J. in AIR. 1943 Mad. 11 and also the decision of Venkatarama Ayyar, J. the learned judge stated the test to find out whether an omission to include an asset in the schedule was deliberate and mala fide. 638. After referring to the decision of Chandrasekhara Ayyar, J. in AIR. 1943 Mad. 11 and also the decision of Venkatarama Ayyar, J. the learned judge stated the test to find out whether an omission to include an asset in the schedule was deliberate and mala fide. His observation at the page 639 reads thus: "In my opinion, to find out whether an omission was deliberate and mala fide one test is to ascertain whether the intention was to conceal the omitted item, because if that were included, the Court would find that the petitioner had means to pay the court fee. To give a concrete illustration, if the court fee payable is, say, Rs. 1,000 and the petitioner seeking leave to file the suit in forma pauper is has omitted to disclose some movable property worth Rs 50 or Rs. 100 it cannot be said that the omission was deliberate and mala fide for the obvious reason that even if he had mentioned it, he could still have easily maintained that he was not in a position to pay the court fee of Rs. 1,000 and, therefore, he was entitled to sue as a pauper." With respect, I agree with this dictum. It lays down a workable test to find out whether the omission is deliberate and mala fide. Similarly, the decision of the Patna High Court reported in Durga Prasad v. Srinivasa AIR. 1930 Patna 368 was explained in Mt. Chamela Kaur v. Purushotam Das AIR. 1932 Patna 308 at page 309 thus: "The learned Subordinate Judge has wholly misapprehended the observations of this Court referred to by me. It was never the intention of this court to lay it down that if one or two wooden almirah worth a few rupees be left out such an omission will have the effect of rejecting the application without determination on merits. It must be found that there was a mala fide omission from the schedule of properties which would materially affect the question of pauperism. As I understand it the object of prescribing that the pauper should set out a list of his properties is to help the Government in ascertaining whether the applicant is in a position to pay the court fee payable on the plaint. As I understand it the object of prescribing that the pauper should set out a list of his properties is to help the Government in ascertaining whether the applicant is in a position to pay the court fee payable on the plaint. It cannot be said that the omission of a few articles worth a few rupees which could in no way affect the decision of the court on the question of pauperism has the effect of throwing out the application on the ground that it does not contain a list of all the properties held by the petitioner. I am of opinion that there is nothing to show that the omission in the present case of the two trunks or the chaukis and the almirah was an act of bad faith on the part of the petitioner. It is rather difficult to say how the petitioner would have been benefited by a deliberate omission of these articles:" Again in Pokkan Gorain v. Bengali Gorain AIR. 1941 Patna 621 Rowland, J. explained the dictum laid down in AIR. 1930 Patna 368 thus: "I am referred to the decision in II PLT 567 (Durga Prasad v. Srinivas Surckha) where a Division Bench of this court refused an application for leave to appeal in forma pauperis on the ground that the applicant had not set forth his assets with the utmost good faith: It was said in such a case that it was open to the court to reject the application ab initio without ordering inquiry into the fact of pauperism and this court did reject the application; but it was not laid down that an applicant must necessarily be deemed to be acting in bad faith because there is an omission to specify in the application some particular item of assets " A similar view was taken by Vithayathil, J. in Chinnaswamy v. Anthonyswamy AIR. 1953 T C. 614. His Lordship observed that the mere non-inclusion of some of the assets in the schedule which are of trifling value cannot be characterised as deliberate and malafide and an application should not be dismissed on that ground. 6. In the light of the principles laid down in these decisions I hold that a mere non-inclusion of some assets which, if included, would not have established that the applicant is not a pauper should not entail a rejection of the application. 6. In the light of the principles laid down in these decisions I hold that a mere non-inclusion of some assets which, if included, would not have established that the applicant is not a pauper should not entail a rejection of the application. If any such item is subsequently disclosed in the course of the proceedings its value should also be taken into account and a finding recorded whether the applicant is a pauper or not under R.5 (b) only. 7. The counsel for the respondents referred me to the decision in Ramnnikalal v. Mathurlal AIR. 1965 Guj. 214, Rajkumar Bhagwatsaran v. F. P. F. Rajan (1971) 1 MLJ. 510 and Maluram v. Arjun Singh AIR. 1972 Raj. 314 and contended that if the applicant for permission to sue as a pauperis not frank and true in the matter of pointing out his assets his petition to sue as forma pauperis should be dismissed. Such a conclusion is not warranted by the language of Order XXXIII R.5 (a) That rule only provides to reject an application for permission to sue as a pauper where it is not framed and presented in the manner prescribed in R.2 and 3 or where the applicant is not a pauper. As stated earlier, if the application has been framed and presented the non-inclusion of some of the items will not affect the framing and presenting the application as required by law. The question whether an applicant is a pauper or not is a matter for enquiry and the decision on evidence. In evaluating the evidence not only the assets mentioned in the schedule but also the value of these disclosed during the course of the enquiry should also be taken into account in arriving at the decision whether the applicant is a pauper or not. The omission to include ipso facto does not entail the dismissal of the application. 8. Further what has come out during the course of the cross-examination of the petitioner is only that there are some movables in the house where he resides and that the value of the movables comes to Rs. 500. He is staying with his wife, grown-up daughter and her husband. 8. Further what has come out during the course of the cross-examination of the petitioner is only that there are some movables in the house where he resides and that the value of the movables comes to Rs. 500. He is staying with his wife, grown-up daughter and her husband. He did not say that these movables belonged to him There is no proof that these movables belonged to him excepting possibly a presumption that everything in the house belonging to him is owned by him. From this it does not follow that there was a case of suppression, and even if it is so assumed, it does not follow that it was deliberate and mala fide. 9. Again the lower court has not found that the petitioner is not a pauper. The lower court directed the petitioner to pay court fee only because the petitioner did not disclose the movables in the house where he resides in the schedule annexed to the application. I have tried to show that that is not a ground in this case to call upon the petitioner to pay the court fee. Since he is not shown to be a pauper he should be allowed to sue informa pauperis, and I order accordingly. 10. In the result, this revision petition is allowed. The order of the lower court is set aside and the application to sue informa pauperis filed by the petitioner in the lower court is allowed. In the nature of this case the parties shall bear their costs. Allowed.