JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS appeal under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been preferred by the appellant-plaintiff against the judgment and decree dated 18-2-1969 passed by the Additional District Judge, Ambikapur, in civil Appeal No. 61-A of 1967. ( 2. ) BRIEF facts leading to the present appeal are that the appellant plaintiff, s. C. Rai, was Circle Organiser, Tribal Welfare Department, and posted at kusami, district Sarguja, in the year 1957. He was transferred to Balrampur by an order dated 25-6-1957 against which he made a representation which was rejected on 18-7-1957. He was asked to hand over charge by an order dated 31-8 1957, but he did not do so. A departmental enquiry was then instituted against him on certain charges and he was suspended by an order dated 24-9-1957 (Ex. P-8) with immediate effect. This order of suspension was passed by the Collector, Surguja. It was during the pendency of the suspension, the appellant-plaintiff handed over charge of his office on 6-11-1957. Then, the earlier order of suspension was modified and was given retrospective effect from 17-8-1957 vide order dated 6-1-1958 (Ex. P-14 ). Ultimately, in the enquiry, respondent No. 2 (Director of Tribal Welfare, M. P.) held the charges to have been proved against the appellant-plaintiff and passed an order (Ex. P-22) dated 5-12-1959 imposing on him a punishment to the effect that the period of suspension already undergone by him be treated as punishment and it was. further ordered that he would only be entitled to suspension allowance for the entire period of his suspension which he has already drawn and not to full pay and allowances. In that order, another enquiry was ordered to be instituted against the appellant-plaintiff on different grounds. Thereafter, the appellant-plaintiff filed an appeal which was heard by the same officer, though in a different capacity, as Secretary to Government, Tribal Welfare Department, and the same was rejected vide order dated 29-8-1961 (Ex. D-20 ). Aggrieved by the aforesaid orders, the appellant-plaintiff filed the present suit after service of notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure for declaration that the order dated 5-12-1959 (Ex. P-22) passed by the respondent No. 2 (Director of Tribal welfare) and the other respondent No. 1 (State of M. P.) in appeal dated 29-8-1961 (Ex. D-20 ). Aggrieved by the aforesaid orders, the appellant-plaintiff filed the present suit after service of notice under section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure for declaration that the order dated 5-12-1959 (Ex. P-22) passed by the respondent No. 2 (Director of Tribal welfare) and the other respondent No. 1 (State of M. P.) in appeal dated 29-8-1961 (Ex. D-20) were void and inoperative and in consequence he claimed further relief of arrears of pay and allowances amounting to Rs. 2,034. 10 np. together with interest. ( 3. ) THE suit was contested by the respondent-defendants. ( 4. ) THE trial Court on the basis of the evidence on record held that the punishment awarded to the appellant-plaintiff could not be awarded under the provisions of the Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1955 and as such the order (Ex. P-22) dated 5-12-1959 was illegal and void to the extent it imposed the punishment. But so far as it related to the reinstatement of the appellant-plaintiff, the said order was held to be good. Further, it was held that the appellate order dated 29-8-1961 (Ex. P-20) was bad as the appeal was heard by the same person who passed the order of punishment. In the instant case, Shri T. N. Bahal first passed the order dated 5-12-1959 (Ex. P-22)in the capacity of Director, Tribal Welfare, and later he also heard the appeal against that order himself as Secretary to Government, Tribal Welfare Department. Accordingly, it decreed the claim of the appellant-plaintiff for arrears of salary for the period 17-8-1957 to 6-12-1959 as claimed in the plaint. In appeal, preferred by the respondent-defendants, the lower appellate Court partly allowed the same and held that out of the total claim for arrears of pay except for two months, i. e. , November and December, 1959, the rest of the claim was time barred under Article 102 of the Limitation Act, 1908. The finding of the Trial Court that the orders dated 5-12-1959 (Ex. P-22) and 29-8-1961 (Ex D-20) were void and inoperative was affirmed. Hence this second appeal by the appellant plaintiff. ( 5. ) HAVING heard learned counsel of the parties, I am of opinion that there is merit in this appeal and it must be allowed. ( 6. The finding of the Trial Court that the orders dated 5-12-1959 (Ex. P-22) and 29-8-1961 (Ex D-20) were void and inoperative was affirmed. Hence this second appeal by the appellant plaintiff. ( 5. ) HAVING heard learned counsel of the parties, I am of opinion that there is merit in this appeal and it must be allowed. ( 6. ) BEFORE I proceed to deal with the appeal on merits, I would like to dispose of a preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondent-defendants that the present appeal was filed beyond the period of limitation. According to him, this Court vide its order dated 21-7-1970 held the appeal as within time without giving an opportunity to the respondent-defendants of being heard. As regards the hearing the respondent defendants is concerned, the submission is correct as I find from the record that the order was passed for issue of notices to the respondent-defendants on an application of the appellant-plaintiff under section 5 of the Limitation Act. But notices were not issued inspite of payment of process-fee by the appellant-plaintiff as is borne out from the record. Any way, in my opinion, in the instant case the mistake does not in any manner affect the order passed by this Court on 21-7-1970 holding the appeal as within time. This Court had sent for a report of the copying application register for the relevant period of the lower appellate Court. The report of the District Judge shows that no notice, oral or written, was actually issued to Shri S. P. Sinha or his clerk or the appellant-plaintiff requiring him to pay further funds for preparation of the copies. This court relied on the official record and held the appeal as within time in the detailed order and further held that the application under section 5 of the limitation Act was unnecessary, learned counsel for the respondent-defendants appearing before me did not speak a word as to how he treated the appeal to be barred by time on the facts found vide order-sheet of this Court dated 21-7-1970. He did not make any challenge even to the report of the District judge. All that he contended was that he should have been heard. On these facts, I find it difficult to sustain the objection of the learned counsel for holding that the appeal is time barred. The objection is accordingly over-ruled. He did not make any challenge even to the report of the District judge. All that he contended was that he should have been heard. On these facts, I find it difficult to sustain the objection of the learned counsel for holding that the appeal is time barred. The objection is accordingly over-ruled. ( 7. ) I shall now proceed to deal with the merits of the appeal. At the outset I may also state here that learned counsel for the respondent-defendants very frankly accepted that the finding of both of the Courts below that the orders dated 5-12-1959 (Ex. P-22) and 29-8-1961 (Ex. D-20) were bad and inoperative for purposes of the present appeal. That being so, I shall consider the solitary point raised before me on behalf of the appellant-plaintiff whether he did have a cause of action for claiming his full pay and allowances for the period 17-8-1957 to 31-10-1959 in the present suit which he filed on 17-11-1962 and declined by the lower appellate Court. According to the learned counsel, the lower appellate Court was in error in holding that the claim for arrears of salary and allowances for that period was time barred under Article 102 of the limitation Act, 1908 and only the claim for the subsequent two months november and December was within time from the date of the filing of the present suit which that Court decreed. ( 8. ) IN the instant appeal, it was again not a matter of dispute that the appellant-plaintiff could be suspended during the pendency of the departmental enquiry. That being so, it is unthinkable that he could lay any claim for his salary and allowances for the period of his suspension. Under Fundamental rule 53, he could only claim subsistence allowance which he was granted and was continuing to get. A claim for full wages could be raised by the appellant-plaintiff only when the order of suspension stood revoked. Prior to that if he had made a claim for the salary and allowances for the period of suspension the suit would have been dismissed because wages had not become due and no cause for suit had accrued, as the order of suspension was not without authority and all that the appellant-plaintiff could claim was subsistence allowance. Prior to that if he had made a claim for the salary and allowances for the period of suspension the suit would have been dismissed because wages had not become due and no cause for suit had accrued, as the order of suspension was not without authority and all that the appellant-plaintiff could claim was subsistence allowance. If the case would have been that the order of suspension was without jurisdiction, that would have been a different matter and in that case the appellant-plaintiff could have been said to have claimed the salary even without awaiting for a final decision in the departmental enquiry. But that is not the case here. The legal position as regards the masters right to place his servants under suspension has been explained by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of V. P. Gidroniya v. State of M. P. and others, 1971 MPLJ 227. of which relevant paras 7 and 8 read as under: "the legal position as regards a masters right to place his servants under suspension is now well settled by the decisions of this Court. In The Management of Hotel Imperial, new Delhi and others v. Hotel Workers Union, AIR 1959 SC 1342 . the question whether a master could suspend his servant during the pendency of an enquiry came up for consideration by this court. Therein this Court observed that it was well settled that under the ordinary law of master and servant the power to suspend the servant without pay could not be implied as a term in an ordinary contract of service between the master and servant but must arise either from an express term in the contract itself or a statutory provision governing such contract. It was further observed therein that ordinarily the absence of such a power either in express terms in the contract or under the rules framed under some statute would mean that the master would have no power to suspend a workman and even if he does so in the sense that he forbids the employee to work he will have to pay the wages during the so-called period of suspension. Where, however, there is power to suspend either in the contract of employment or in the statute or the rules framed thereunder, the suspension has the effect of temporarily suspending the relationship of master and the servant with the consequence that the servant is not bound to render service and the master is not bound to pay. The same view was reiterated by this Court in T. Cajee v. U. Jormenik Siem and another, AIR 1961 SC 276 . The rule laid down in the above decisions was followed by this Court in if. P. Kapur v. Union of india, AIR 1964 SC 787 . The law on the subject was exhaustively reviewed in Bahantray Ratilal Patel v. Slate of Maharashtra, AIR 1968 SC 800 . . Therein the legal position was stated thus: The general principle is that an employer can suspend an employee of his pending an enquiry into his misconduct and the only question that can arise in such a suspension will relate to the payment of his wages during the period of such suspension. It is now well settled that power to suspend, in the sense of a right to forbid a employee to work, is not an implied term in an ordinary contract between master and servant, and that such a power can only be the creature either of a statute governing the contract, or of an express term in the contract itself. Ordinarily, therefore, the absence of such a power either as an express term in the contract or in the rules framed under some statute would mean that an employer would have no power to suspend an employee of his and even if he does so in the sense that he forbids the employee to work, he will have to pay the employees wages during the period of suspension. Where, however, there is power to suspend either in the contract of employment or in the statute or the rules framed thereunder, the order of suspension has the effect of temporarily suspending the relationship of master and servant with the consequence that the servant is not bound to render service and the master is not bound to pay. Where, however, there is power to suspend either in the contract of employment or in the statute or the rules framed thereunder, the order of suspension has the effect of temporarily suspending the relationship of master and servant with the consequence that the servant is not bound to render service and the master is not bound to pay. It is equally well settled that an order of interim suspension can be passed against the employee while an enquiry is pending into his conduct even though there is no such term in the contract of employment or in the rules, but in such a case the employee would be entitled to his remuneration for the period of suspension if there is no statute or rule under which, it could be withheld. The distinction between suspending the contract of a service of a servant and suspending him from performing the duties of his office on the basis that the contract is subsisting is important. The suspension in the latter case is always an implied term in every contract of service. When an employee is suspended in this sense, it means that the employer merely issues a direction to him that he should not do the service required of him during a particular period. In other words the employer is regarded as issuing an order to the employee which because the contract is subsisting, the employee must obey. " ( 9. ) AS regards the accrual of the cause of action, I am supported in my view point by a number of decisions of other High Courts. I was told at the bar that so far there is no direct authority on the point of our High Court. In Divisional Superintendent Northern Railway v. Mukund Lal, AIR 1957 Punj. 130 (F B ). it has been held: "this Court considered this matter in AIR 1954 Punj. 298. It was a case almost on all fours with the present one and the provisions of Rules 1711 and 2043 of the establishment Code were considered. The Division Bench gave its decision in clear and categorical terms where the employer has no power to suspend the employee he remains under an obligation to pay to such employee the full salary for the period for which he without actually dismissing him does not allow him to work professing to have suspended him for that period. The Division Bench gave its decision in clear and categorical terms where the employer has no power to suspend the employee he remains under an obligation to pay to such employee the full salary for the period for which he without actually dismissing him does not allow him to work professing to have suspended him for that period. Where, however, the employer in the exercise of a lawful power vested in him to suspend an employee does suspend him he cannot be said to be under any obligation to pay any salary to the employee for the period of suspension unless the terms of service themselves provide for payment of the whole or a part of such salary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . In the present case the railway administration had an indisputable power to suspend the petitioner and the said administration having duly suspended him in the exercise of that power the petitioner is not entitled to any salary for the period of suspension excepting the subsistence grant not exceeding 1 /4th of his salary provided for in the rules which he has already received. " In Sudhir Ranjan Haider v. State of West Bengal and another, AIR 1961 Cal. 626 (D B ). it has been held as under: "mr Bankim Chandra Banerjee, learned Advocate, for the State, however, contended that part of the plaintiffs claim for wages was baned by limitation under Article 102 of the Limitation Act. Article 102 provides for a three years period of limitation starting from the time when the wages accrued due. The plaintiff was suspended by an order, dated November 4, 1947, and the copy of the order was sent to him on the next following day. By the order of suspension he was only allowed to draw-one-fourth of his pay during the period of suspension. He was dismissed by an order, dated August 13, 1948, and the order was forwarded to him on August 20. 1948 There is nothing to show that the suspension was illegal Therefore, during the period of his suspension he could not sue for his wages. He was dismissed by an order, dated August 13, 1948, and the order was forwarded to him on August 20. 1948 There is nothing to show that the suspension was illegal Therefore, during the period of his suspension he could not sue for his wages. His dismissal was, however, wrongful and illegal and his cause of action for wrongful dismissal and wrongful with- holding of his pay and emoluments arose from that date. As such his suspended wages became due and payable again only after his wrongful dismissal. In the facts of the instant case the date of the wrongful dismissal (or the date of intimation of the order to the plaintiff) must be treated as the date when the wages accrued due. The present suit filed on June 2, 1951 was within the period of limitation prescribed under Article 102 of the Limitation Act. " In Union of India v. Gian Singh Kadian, AIR 1970 Del. 185 . this is what has been held : "article 102 of the said Limitation Act undoubtedly provides that a suit for wages has to be filed within three years of the time when they accrue due. The question, therefore, is whether the respondent did have a cause of action for claiming his full pay and allowances for the period 19-11-53 to 18-7-56 in the present suit which he filed on September 10, 1959. On 19-11-1953 the respondent was placed under suspension and the validity of the order of suspension is not challenged. That being so, the only wages to which the respondent would be entitled by reason of Fundamental Rule 53 would be the subsistence allowance granted to him and if he were to file a suit for his full salary and allowances tor any period between 19-11-1953 and 18-7-1956, the suit would have had to be dismissed on the ground that full wages had not accrued due and there was no cause of action for the suit. It was only on the date of the receipt of the notice of termination of services, that is, 26-1-1958 that the order of suspension stood revoked and it would be only on and after 26-1-1958 that the respondent could be entitled to claim full pay and allowances for the period of suspension. It was only on the date of the receipt of the notice of termination of services, that is, 26-1-1958 that the order of suspension stood revoked and it would be only on and after 26-1-1958 that the respondent could be entitled to claim full pay and allowances for the period of suspension. Full wages for the period of suspension would, therefore, accrue to him by reason of Fundamental Rule 53 only when the order of suspension is revoked or could be deemed to have been revoked. Prior to that the wages would n6t accrue and he would have no cause of action". In the aforesaid Delhi case, an earlier decision of the Punjab High Court in union of India v. Ram Nath Chitory, AIR 1966 Punj. 500. has been considered and explained. ( 10. ) IN view of the aforementioned decisions, I have no manner of doubt that the lower appellate Court was not correct in computing the period of limitation in the instant case. The finality to the departmental enquiry came by the appellate order passed by the Secretary to Government, Tribal Welfare department, dated 29-8-1961 (Ex. D-20); whereafter alone while challenging the departmental orders in the present suit, the appellant-plaintiff could claim salary and allowances for the period of suspension. There was no anterior stage available to the appellant-plaintiff for claiming such a relief. The present suit was filed on 17-11-1962, which is a date within the period of three years even to the earlier departmental order dated 5-12-1959 (Ex. P-22), much less to say the date of the appellate order. Therefore, I am of opinion that the claim of the appellant-plaintiff was well within time in accordance with the provisions of Article 102 of the Limitation Act, 1908. That being so, the first court was right is decreeing the claim of the appellant-plaintiff for his salary and allowances for the entire period of suspension from 17-8-1957 to 6-12-1959, while the lower appellate Court was in error in holding only a part of the claim within time. ( 11. That being so, the first court was right is decreeing the claim of the appellant-plaintiff for his salary and allowances for the entire period of suspension from 17-8-1957 to 6-12-1959, while the lower appellate Court was in error in holding only a part of the claim within time. ( 11. ) BEFORE parting with the case, I would like to make a mention of the two decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent-defendants in support of his submission that the part of the claim would be barred as held by the lower appellate Court, namely, Provincial Government, Central Provinces and Berar v. Shamshul Hussain Siraj Hussain, AIR 1949 Nag. 118. and Union of India v. Shri P. V. Jagannath Rao, 1968 M P L J 328,. Having read both the decisions, I am of opinion that they are not relevant to the facts and circumstances of the present case. So far as the first case if concerned, in that the party was suspended on 27-10 1937 and dismissed on 10-11-1937. A claim for salary was made from 8-10-1937 to 10-11-1943, i. e. , the date of the filing of the suit. In the suit the dismissal order was held as bad and inoperative. The institution of the suit in that case was after more than 6 years from the date of the dismissal order and in that view of the matter it was held relying on the earlier decision of the Federal court in Punjab Province v. Tara Chand, AIR 1947 F C 23. that the plaintiff could only claim salary for a period of three years and not more. As regards the second case, there the claimant was a Railway Guard whose services were terminated with effect from 18-7-1946. He filed a civil suit claiming only a declaration that the order of termination of his services was illegal, which was decreed and also ultimately affirmed by the High Court. The claimant was thereupon re-instated and he joined his post on 30-1-1959. Then, he filed a second suit on 1-3-1962 claiming recovery of arrears of his salary from 18-7-1946 to 29-1-1959 with interest. On those facts, a Division Bench of this Court held that the claim to salary for a period prior to three years of the institution of the suit was barred by limitation under Article 102 of the Limitation Act, 1908. On those facts, a Division Bench of this Court held that the claim to salary for a period prior to three years of the institution of the suit was barred by limitation under Article 102 of the Limitation Act, 1908. Since the whole claim related to a period prior to three years of the date of the suit, it was barred by time. ( 12. ) FOR the view that I have taken of the point raised in favour of the appellant-plaintiff, the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent-defendants in that regard has to be rejected. ( 13. ) FOR the reasons stated above, the appeal succeeds and is allowed with costs and in consequence the judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court are modified by further decreeing the claim of the appellant-plaintiff for his salary and allowance for the period 17-8-1957 to 31-10-1959. Thus, the claim for Rs. 2034. 10 np. as made by the appellant-plaintiff is decreed with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the suit. Counsels fee as per schedule or a certificate whichever is less. Appeal allowed.