JUDGMENT S. K. Jha, J. This application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India has been made by two petitioners• the first being the managing committee of Town Middle School, Hajipur, represented through one Shri Sheo Kumar Prasad claiming to be the Secretary of the managing committee, the second Shri Kameshwar Prasad who is the Headmaster of the aforesaid school. The prayer made in the application is for issuance of an appropriate writ quashing annexures 1 and 2 to the petition. It is pertinent to note here that, when the application was originally filed, a document purporting to be not exactly annexure 1 was filed due to some inadvertence. Soon after it was detected, an application under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure was filed asserting that the true copy of annexure 1 was not as was originally annexed to the petition but as one which was annexed to the application under section 151 and, therefore, a prayer was made in that application to treat the real annexure 1 as the one annexed to the petition under section 151 C. P. C. That prayer was allowed. The net result, therefore, is that the impugned annexure 1 is an order dated 9.10.1975 passed by the District Education Officer, Muzaffarpur, Vaishali and Sitamarhi, respondent 2, where by in purported exercise of his power under Article 206 of the Bihar Education Code (hereinafter to be referred to as the Code) the petitioner managing committee was dissolved and an ad hoc committee consisting of three members was formed, namely, the Sub-divisional Officer, Hajipur, Vaishali, respondent 3, as the President, the Chairman of the Hajipur Municipality, respondent 4, as its Secretary and the Deputy Inspector of Schools, Hajipur, respondent 5, as a Member. The impugned annexure 2 is a letter from the Chairman, Hajipur, Municipality, respondent 4, acting as the Secretary of' the ad hoc committee aforesaid, addressed to the Headmaster of the school in question directing him to reinstate respondents 6 to 10, who were formerly the teachers of the School but whose services had been terminated by a resolution of the managing committee, petitioner. 2. 2. From the labyrinth of affidavits, counter affidavits and supplementary affidavits the facts that emerge in his case are very short which I shall hereinafter state and the point of law is very simple and that is : whether the managing committee of a proprietary or municipal-aided middle school can be dissolved or its functioning interfered with by the District Education Officer. When this case was placed before a learned single Judge of this court B.D. Singh J. finding, as we were informed at the Bar, an apparent conflict between two single Judge decisions of this court, namely, Jamalpure V. The District Education Officer. Monghyr ( AIR 1973 Pat 260 ) and Kameshwar Prasad V. The State of Bihar. ( 1975 BBCJ 236 ) he directed that this case be placed before a Division Bench; and hence this case before us. 3. Before entering into any discussion on the question of law mooted before us, it is advisable to set out the salient facts of the case. According to the petitioners, the school in question is a proprietary school whereas, according to the respondents, it is a municipal aided school. According to the petitioner's case again, while Shri Sheo Kumar Prasad is the Secretary of the managing committee petitioner I, according to the respondents, he was merely a Member before it was dissolved and not its Secretary. I have made a special reference to this fact at this stage since it will have some bearing on a preliminary objection raised by the respondents at the bearing of this case with regard to the maintainability of this application at the instance of Shri Sheo Kumar Prasad claiming to be the Secretary of the managing committee of the schoo1. These controversial facts I shall deal with at an appropriate place. But, to continue with the narration of facts, petitioner 2, who was admittedly acting as a permanent Headmaster of the school, On attaining the age of 62 years in the year 1974, applied for extension of the period of his service and the managing committee of the school, taking into consideration his physical and mental fitness, unanimously resolved to grant extension till the completion of 65 years of age. Yet the Deputy Director of Education (Basic and Primary), Bihar, passed an order for retiring petitioner 2 on the ground that be bad attained the age of compulsory superannuation, i.e. 62 years and the managing committee had no jurisdiction to grant him any extension under the statutory rules. Both the petitioners 1 and 2 challenged the aforesaid order by filing two writ applications in this court which were registered as C.W.J.C. Nos. 330 and 427 of 1974. These applications having been admitted were ultimately allowed by judgment and order dated the 20th of September, 1974 passed by H. L. Agrawal, J. This is the judgment which bas been reported in 1975 B.B.C.J. 236 reference to which has been made earlier. After the passing of the aforesaid order by this court petitioner 2 continued to discharge the functions of the Headmaster of the school. The local Education authorities, however, did not sanction the bills submitted by petitioner 2 in spite of this courts order and treated respondent 9 Shri Ramprit Mahto as the acting Headmaster of the school. This resulted in petitioner 2 filing an application for issuance of a rule of contempt against the Sub-divisional Education Officer, the Deputy Director of Education (Basic and Primary), Bihar, and respondent 9. A rule for contempt was issued by this court and the case registered as Miscellaneous Judicial Case no. 50 of /975. Ultimately the case was disposed of on the 3rd of April 1975 wherein the contemners tendered an unqualified apology and gave a clear understanding in this court that petitioner 2 was the Headmaster of the school. Motives of malafide have been alleged in the petition• on account of the aforesaid facts against some of the respondents. But for the purpose of disposal of this application, it is needless to go into the question of motive. Suffice it to say that the managing committee of the school was dissolved and an ad hoc committer was formed under annexure 1. As the petitioner's case is, before passing the order as incorporated in annexure 1, respondent 2 did not ask petitioner I to show cause against any charge or allegation on account of which it was Sought to be dissolved. As the petitioner's case is, before passing the order as incorporated in annexure 1, respondent 2 did not ask petitioner I to show cause against any charge or allegation on account of which it was Sought to be dissolved. By annexure 2, thereafter, as already stated earlier, five of the teachers of the school, namely, respondents 6 to 10, whose services had been earlier terminated by the managing committee, were directed to be reinstated. On these facts, the question that arises for determination is as to whether the District Education Officer, respondent 2, had any legal auth0rity or jurisdiction to dissolve the managing committee of the school and, if none, then, consequentially, the ad hoc committee formed had no jurisdiction to issue the direction as contained in annexure 2. 4. The facts as generally stated above may not be controversial. The only fact worth mentioning, which has been controverted, is that Shri Sheo Kumar Prasad was not the Secretary of the managing committee and that, therefore, the petitioners had no locus standi to file this writ application: this application was, therefore, not maintainable. All other facts which have been stated in the counter affidavits filed on behalf of the contesting respondents merely amount to submissions regarding the legality of the orders passed under the two impugned annexures. 5. This then leads us to the first question which was raised by way of preliminary objection on beha1f of the respondents with regard to the locus standi of the petitioners to move this application. This in its turn entails reference to certain materials on record. In paragraph 3 of the petition it has been asserted that petitioner I runs and manages the affairs of the school with Shri Shea Kumar Prasad as its Secretary. In paragraph 5 of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondents 2,3 and 5 it has been stated that the managing committee was constituted with one Shri Satyadeo Narain Singh as its Secretary and Shri Sheo Kumar Prasad was merely one of its Members. The petitioners filed an affidavit in reply to the supplementary counter-affidavit duly sworn by Shri Sheo Kumar Prasad on the 26th of February, 1976 asserting in paragraph 1 thereof that he was the Secretary of the managing committee of the school. The petitioners filed an affidavit in reply to the supplementary counter-affidavit duly sworn by Shri Sheo Kumar Prasad on the 26th of February, 1976 asserting in paragraph 1 thereof that he was the Secretary of the managing committee of the school. In paragraph 3 of the same rejoinder it has been asserted that in C.W.J.C. 427/74 referred to earlier Shri Sheo Kumar Prasad had represented the managing committee as its Secretary and respondents 2,3,4,5 and 9 who were parties to that application had never questioned his authority and that this court had allowed the writ application filed by Sri Sheo Kumar Prasad in his capacity as Secretary of the managing committee. It has further been asserted in paragraph 3 of the reply that respondents 9 and 10 themselves had always recognised the managing committee of the school with Shri Sheo Kumar Prasad aforesaid as its Secretary and they have submitted petitions to Shri Sheo Kumar Prasad even as late as on the 26th of July, 1975. True copies of their petitions with endorsement of Shri Sheo Kumar Prasad as Secretary of the school have been marked annexures 3 and 3/1 to the reply to the supplementary counter-affidavit. In this state of affairs I have no hesitation in holding that the denial in the counter-affidavit with regard to the status of Shri Sheo Kumar Prasad bas been made merely for the sake of denial. If in the earlier writ application he was accepted as representing the managing committee as its Secretary and if respondents 9 and 10 as per annexures 3 and 3/1 referred to earlier to have addressed letters to him in his capacity of Secretary of the managing committee, even if the principle of estoppel be not applied, on facts I have no hesitation in holding that Shri Sheo Kumar Prasad is the Secretary of the managing committee of the school duly authorised to action its behalf. The preliminary objection of the respondents, therefore, must fail and I overrule the contention that the application at the instance of the present petitioners is not maintainable, 6. As hinted at earlier, one of the facts on which the parties were at loggerheads is as to whether the school in question is a municipal-aided school or not. On one hand the petitioners case is that it is a proprietary school. As hinted at earlier, one of the facts on which the parties were at loggerheads is as to whether the school in question is a municipal-aided school or not. On one hand the petitioners case is that it is a proprietary school. On the other the respondent's case is that it is a municipal-aided school. The petitioners allege that no direct aid is being given to the school or the managing committee from the municipal funds but they accept that from out of the municipal funds some payment is made to the teachers of the school through the Headmaster. Proceeding upon the assumption, therefore, that such a case is true, it is difficult for me to appreciate the stand of the petitioners that the school is not necessarily a municipal-aided school. I may make it perfectly clear that I am not expressing my considered view on this matter since the fate of this case will not turn upon this factor. All the same, the term 'aid' has not been def1ned anywhere. Therefore, we have to fall back upon the dictionary meaning of the term 'aid'. The chamber's Twentieth Century Dictionary says that 'aid' means and includes help, assistance or that which helps. Accepting, therefore, the uncontroverted position that a portion of teachers' salary of the school in question was paid from out of municipal funds through the Headmaster, petitioner 2, and not to the school direct• that means to its managing committee, it may still be covered by the term 'aid', for the sums disbursed to the teachers through the Headmaster certainly do a lot towards helping the institution. In this connection, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that in the earlier case reported in 1975 B.B.C.J. 236 it has already been decided that the school is a proprietary school and not a municipal-aided school. This submission is misconceived. Towards the end of paragraph 7 of the judgment in the case of Kameshwar Prasad H.L. Agrawal J. has stated thus: "I have said enough to show that there was no material on the record to establish that any aid was given to this school out of the District Education Fund which has been constituted under section 56 A of the Act. The petitioners on the contrary have claimed that school is a proprietary school. The petitioners on the contrary have claimed that school is a proprietary school. This fact is however controverted by the respondent and it is not necessary for me to enter into this question for disposing of these cases. " Thus, the question as to whether the school was proprietary in nature or was municipal-aided is still res integra. Therefore, I proceed upon the assumption, although not expressing any conclusive opinion on the point, that the school may be said to be a municipal-aided school. Nonetheless, as 1 have already indicated earlier, in the view that I am going to take in this case the question is merely of academic importance. 7. Starting with the premise that the school in question is a municipal-aided one, the point which is vital for consideration is as to whether there is any statute or statutory rule authorising respondent 2 to dissolve the managing committee of even a municipal-aided school or Dot and whether he is authorised to constitute an ad hoc committee. It goes without saying that if there is no jurisdiction to dissolve the managing committee and to form an ad hoc one then any action of the ad hoc committee such as the one taken under the impugned annexure 2, will as a necessary corollary, have to be struck down. As already stated earlier respondent 2 in passing the order as incorporated in annexure ] has purported to Act, under Article 206 of the Code, which runs as follows: "For reasons specified in clause (e) of the aforesaid rule, the President, Board of Secondary Education in respect of secondary school and District Education Officer in respect of Elementary schools, instead of withdrawing or withholding recognition, may withdraw the approval of the constitution of the Managing Committee and make such arrangement for the management of the school as he considers suitable, pending proper reconstitution of the managing committee. For the purpose of this rule, Elementary schools will mean "Primary and Middle schools. Reference to clause (e) of Article 205 necessitates the question of that clause also. For the purpose of this rule, Elementary schools will mean "Primary and Middle schools. Reference to clause (e) of Article 205 necessitates the question of that clause also. Article 205 (e) reads as follows ;- "205 Recognition shall only be withdrawn for reasons to be recorded in writing on one of the following grounds :- X X X (e) that the managing committee of the school is not functioning in a way conducive to the smooth administration of the local affairs or proper maintenance of discipline among the teachers or pupils, is not carrying out the directions of the Board of Secondary Education or any competent authority or is not administering the finance of school properly." The insertion of these two Articles has been noted in the Code on the basis of the D.P.I's letter no. 3012 dated the 14th August, 1958. As has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of Sri Dwarka Naill, Tewari V. State of Biharl Education Code which inter alia provides for withdrawing or withholding of recognition in case the managing committee of a school does not carry out the directions of the Board of Secondary Education, has no greater sanction than an administrative order or rule, and is not based on any statutory authority or other authority which could give it the force of law. As already indicated earlier, Articles 205 and 206 of the Code derive their authority from the D.P.I's letter mentioned above. They can, therefore, have no statutory force unless it can be shown that they derive their authority from any statutory provision or are in exercise of any competent rule making power. Mr. Prabha Shanker Mishra, learned Counsel for the respondents, then invited our attention to the Bihar High Schools (Control and Regulation of Administration) Act, 1960 (Bihar Act, XIII of 1960) which, he submitted, was merely passed in order to get over the difficulty presented by the decision of the Supreme Court in Dwarka Nath Tiwary's case. Mr. Mishra placed reliance upon section 8 of that Act, which lays down the power to make rules. Mr. Mishra placed reliance upon section 8 of that Act, which lays down the power to make rules. Section 8 (1) of the 1960 Act, lays down that the State Government may, after previous publication and subject to the provisions of Articles 29, 30 and 337 of the Constitution of India, make rules not inconsistent with this Act, for currying out the purposes of the Act, (underlining is mine since it will have a bearing upon the question). On the strength of this statutory provision, it was submitted that Articles 205 and 206 as quoted will now be deemed to have been the rules framed under the rule making power of the State Government under the 1960 Act. This argument, in my view, is wholly fallacious. Act, XIII of 1960 was brought on the statute Book to control and regulate the administration of high schools other than schools owned by the State Government and matters connected therewith, as is clear from the Preamble to the Act. Section 2 (b) of this ad defines a 'high school' to deem "a recognised school imparting instruction in secondary or higher secondary education." This Act, has, therefore, nothing to do with the middle schools. The portion underlined in section 8 (1) of the Act, clearly empowers the state Government to make rules for carrying out the purposes of this Act, which means in the matter of high schools imparting instruction in secondary or higher secondary education, it does not empower the State Government to frame any rule with regard to middle schools. As a matter of fact, Article 6 of the Code itself mentions the different kinds of schools. It is worthwhile to quote a portion of Article 6 in this regard- 8. Schools are divided into two kinds :- (a) Schools of general instruction (b) Schools for special instruction Schools under (a) above are divided into following types :- (i) High Schools. (ii) Higher Secondary and Multipurpose Schools including Netarhat Residential Schools. X X X (v) Middle schools, including senior Basic school, Sanskrit Middle Schools, if any. (vi) Primary schools, including upper primary and lower primary schools, primary Urdu schools, primary sanskrit schools and Junior Basic schools." It will thus be seen that middle schools and primary schools do not come within the category of either high schools or higher secondary and multipurpose schools. (vi) Primary schools, including upper primary and lower primary schools, primary Urdu schools, primary sanskrit schools and Junior Basic schools." It will thus be seen that middle schools and primary schools do not come within the category of either high schools or higher secondary and multipurpose schools. The argument put forward, therefore, that Articles 205 and 206 of the Code should be treated to be in the exercise of the rules making power of the Government under Bihar Act, XIII of 1960 is wholly misconceived, in so far as it is made to relate to middle schools. 9. Mr. Prabha Shankar Mishra, when faced with this difficulty, submitted before us that the Source of authority of Article 206 of the Code itself, but it derived it~ authority from a letter dated 24.7.1958 from Shri N.D.J. Rao l.A.S., Additional Secretary-cum-Special Officer to Government, to the Director of Public instruction, Bihar, published in the Bihar Gazette Extraordinary dated March, 23, 1959, which reads as follows; "No. VII/R8-0I/57E/3802 Government of Bihar. Education Department. 'From Shri N.D.J. Rao, I.A.S. Additional Secretary-cum-Special Officer to Government. To The Director of Public Instruction, Bihar Patna, the 24th July, 1958. Subject ;-Revision of rule for the withdrawal or with-holding of recognition of schools. Sir, I am directed to refer to Government order no. 1230 -E, dated the 13th March, 1936 and subsequent notification no. 3167-E, dated the 1st May, 1950, and to say that the State Government have been pleased to amend the existing rules and lay down additional ones regarding withdrawal or withholding of recognition of schools as below ;- Rules 1. Withdrawal or withholding of recognition-Recognition shall only be withdrawn or withheld for reasons to be recorded in writing and on one of the following grounds;- (a) that the school does not follow the course of study prescribed or approved by the committee. (b) that it has committed a wilful breach of the transfer rules. (c) that it has not attained or does not attain a reasonable standard of efficiency, (d) that it does not maintain a satisfactory standard of discipline or employs any teacher who take a part in political agitation directed against the authority of Government or who endeavours to inculcate opinion tending to excit feelings of political disloalty or disaffection among the pupils, or to create hatred between the different classes of the residents of the Indian Union. (e) that the Managing committee of the school not functioning in a way conducive to the smooth administration of the school affairs Or proper maintenance of discipline among the teachers or pupils, is not carrying out the directions of the Board of Secondary Education or any competent authority or is not administering the finances of the school properly, and (f) that it appears to the authority empowered to grant recognition for any other reason to be injurious to the interest of Education. Note :- These rules apply to such Middle and Primary schools (including Primary Sanskrit schools and Primary Urdu schools) as are not under the control of District Boards and special schools such as Sanskrit toles and. Madarsas. If recognition is refused to a school under the control of a Municipality, a copy of the order should be sent to the Chairman d the Municipality. The recognition of schools, under the control of District Boards, is governed by the statutory rules framed for these bodies. I-B. Withdrawal of approval to the constitution of the Managing Committee.-For reasons specified in clause (e) of the aforesaid rule, the President, Board of Secondary Education in respect of secondary schools and District Education Officer in respect of Elementary schools instead of withdrawing or withholding recognition, may withdraw the approval to the constitution of the Managing Committee and make such arrangements for the management of the school, as he considers suitable pending proper reconstitution of the Managing committee. For the purpose of this rule, Elementary schools will mean, "Primary and Middle schools. " Your faithfully, sd. N .D. J. Rao, Additional Secretary-cum-Special Officer to Government." From the initial portion of the gazette aforesaid, it appears that a notification in the Education Department dated the 21st March, 1959. reads as follows :- "Notification. The 21st March, 1959. No. II/BI-01/59-E-1050- The following notifications, resolutions and orders, issued by the Government of Bihar, Education Department, and circulars and orders issued by the Director of Public Instruction, Bihar, are published for general information. By order of the Governor of Bihar. Sd. R.D. Pande. Deputy Secretary to Government." In the gazette itself, apart from notifications and resolutions of the Government, with which we are not concerned, is incorporated the letter dated the 24th July 1958 from the Additional Secretary-cum-Special Officer to the Government addressed to the Director of Public Instruction, which has been quoted earlier in extenso. Sd. R.D. Pande. Deputy Secretary to Government." In the gazette itself, apart from notifications and resolutions of the Government, with which we are not concerned, is incorporated the letter dated the 24th July 1958 from the Additional Secretary-cum-Special Officer to the Government addressed to the Director of Public Instruction, which has been quoted earlier in extenso. It is obvious that Articles 205 and 206 of the Code are the same as the so-called rules 1 and 1- B mentioned in the letter of the Additional Secretary-cum-Special Officer referred to above. This document, however, can not take the place of any rule framed under any statutory authority. As it is apparent, it is merely a letter from the Additional Secretary I to the Director of Public Instruction, which is the same thing as an inter-departmental Communication. This not being a notification nor any resolution of the Government but merely a piece of correspondence between the two departmenta1 heads cannot take the place of any statutory rule. Learned Counsel for the respondents laid great stress on the beginning portion of the letter in question in which it has been stated "to refer to Government order no. 1230-E, dated the 13th March, 1936 and subsequent notification no. 3167-E, dated the 1st May, 1950 and to say that the State Government have been pleased to amend the existing rules and lay down additional ones regarding withdrawal or withholding of recognition of schools" and it was submitted on the strength of such reference that it must be presumed that the State Government had duly framed these rules under some statutory authority. When called upon to place before us any statutory provisions, empowering the State Government to make such rules in respect of municipal-aided middle schools, learned counsel for the respondents ultimately had to fall back upon the provisions of section 341 of the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act, 1922. When called upon to place before us any statutory provisions, empowering the State Government to make such rules in respect of municipal-aided middle schools, learned counsel for the respondents ultimately had to fall back upon the provisions of section 341 of the Bihar and Orissa Municipal Act, 1922. This, therefore, necessitates a reference to the provisions of section 341 of the Municipal Act, which reads as follows :- "The State Government may make rules consistent with this Act-- (i) determining the classes of schools which may be maintained or aided by the Commissioners : (ii) regulating the construction and repair of buildings connected with such schools, including hostels : (iii) regulating the appointment and salaries of masters and assistant masters of such schools; and (iv) regulating the establishment of scholarships generally, or for the furtherance of technical or any other special form of education. " Special stress was laid on clause (iii) of section 341 which empowers the State Government to make rules regulating the appointment and salaries of masters and assistant masters of such schools. I fail to see how any such statutory provision can embrace within its sweep the matters regarding withholding of recognition or dissolution of managing committee of municipal-aided middle schools. Articles 205 and 206 of the Code can, by no stretch of imagination, be held to be rules framed in exercise of the rule making power of the State Government under section 341 (iii) of the Municipal Act. There is absolutely no nexus between regulating appointment and salaries of masters and dissolution of the managing committee on the grounds mentioned in Article 205 (a) of the Code. Apart from the fact that the letter from Shri Rao to the Director of Public Instruction, as published in the gazette, is not authenticated in the name of the Governor as enjoined by Article J 66 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, can not have the effect of any statutory rule framed by the State Government, there is no source for such authority in section 341 (iii) of the Municipal Act. 10. 10. It is one of the well settled cannons of construction of statutes and subordinate legislation that generally the initial difference between subordinate legislation and statute law lies in the fact that a subordinate law making body is bound by the terms of its delegated Or derived authority and that courts of law, as a general rule, will not give effect to the rules made unless satisfied that all the conditions precedent to the validity of the rules have been fulfilled. 1 he courts therefore, will require due proof that the rules have been made and promulgated in accordance with the statutory authority. Secondly, if the competent authority, as in this case the State Government, used the powers given under a statute for some purpose wholly unconnected with the provisions of the Act, they can not justify their action under the statutory power, as the answer would be t hat they were not acting under it. 11. As I have already stated above, the letter as printed in the gazette extraordinary has ipso facto no force of rule. Assuming, however that the State Government had purported to exercise its power under the rule making authority given to them under section 341, Articles 205 and 206 of the Code are not for any purpose connected with the provisions of section 341 (iii) of the Municipal Act, and hence on this ground also the impugned Articles can not have the force of any statutory rule. 12. No other point of law was pointed out before us in order to persuade me to hold that Articles 205 and 206 have the force of any rule in so far as the middle schools are concerned. r am, therefore, constrained to hold that there is no law or rule empowering the District Education Officer, respondent 2, to dissolve the managing committee of the school, petitioner 1, or to constitute any ad hoc committee. 13. Another point which was convassed at the Bar in this case was that in the absence of any notice or reasonable opportunity to show cause, the managing committee could not be dissolved by respondent 2 even if he had any such authority. This fact was asserted in the petition in paragraphs 9 and 10 thereof. In the counter-affidavit filed earlier on behalf of the respondents this fact was not denied. This fact was asserted in the petition in paragraphs 9 and 10 thereof. In the counter-affidavit filed earlier on behalf of the respondents this fact was not denied. But in a counter-at1idavit filed at a rather late stage the fact with regard to the absence of notice was denied. But it is not necessary to go into this controversial question in the view that I have already taken of Articles 205 and 206 of the Code. 14. The main points arising in the case have already been dealt with by me. There, yet, remains one small matter which needs to be gone into. As already observed at the outset, there is a decision of a learned single Judge reported in A.I.R. 1973 Patna 260 supra, in which B. D. Singh, J. has held that the District Education Officer was competent to pass an order withdrawing the approval of recognition of the managing committee of a middle school and constituting an ad hoc committee in place thereof. Considering the same piece of correspondence, as has been referred to by me, in the gazette extraordinary dated the 23rd March, 1959 the learned Judge has held that it had the force of a statutory rule in view of section 8 (2) of Bihar Act, XIII of 1960 with very great respect to the learned Judge and having given the matter my serious consideration, I think the judgment is not good law. In that case, the decision proceeds upon a fallacious reasoning by presupposing that the letter published in the gazette extraordinary should be deemed to be rules duly framed by virtue of section 8 (2) of the 1960 Act. As I have already stated earlier. 1960 Act, is concerned only with high schools or higher secondary schools and not with middle schools at all. In so far as this point is concerned. I am of the view and I say so with utmost respect that the view taken by the learned single judge in M.M. School's case is not correct. 15. No other point was pressed before us, in the result, therefore, I allow this application, quash the orders as incorporated in annexures 1 and 2 and direct that the management of the school in question by the managing committee be, in no way, interferred with except in accordance with law. In the circumstances however I shall make no order as to cost. In the circumstances however I shall make no order as to cost. 16. Incidentally I may mention that we were informed at the Bar that respondents 6 to 10 were being sought by the departmental authorities to be provided with teaching jobs in some other schools. If that be the position, this judgment should, in no way, be treated as any obstacle in the way of their absorption elsewhere. Application allowed.