A. N. SURTI, J. ( 1 ) THE petitioner-tenant was aggrieved by the impugned decree of eviction passed by the learned 3rd Extra Assistant Judge Baroda in Civil Appeal No. 317 of 1972 and which had arisen out of the judgment and decree passed by the learned Joint Civil Judge (J. D. ). Baroda in Regular Civil Suit No. 293 1969. ( 2 ) A few relevant facts giving rise to the present revision application may be stated in brief. The opponent-landlord filed Regular Civil Suit No. 293 of 1959 in the Court of the Joint Civil Judge. J. D. . Baroda for getting an eviction decree essentially on two grounds viz (1) for arrears of rent for a period of more than six months and (2) for bonafide personal requirement. It may be mentioned at this stage that it was the case of the plaintiff that the defendant is a tenant of the shop on the ground floor of the premises in question and its monthly rent was fixed at Rs. 10/ - in the year 1951 It is also the case of the plaintiff that two residential rooms on the upper floor were also let out to the defendant and its monthly rent was fixed at Rs. 15. 00 per month in the year 1958. ( 3 ) THE plaintiff terminated the tenancy in respect of both the afore- said premises by a notice dated 25-11-1968 Ex. 31. By the said notice to quit the plaintiff called upon the defendant-tenant to pay to him the arrears of rent plus the education cess. ( 4 ) THE suit was resisted by the defendant-tenant on several grounds. It may be mentioned at this stage that one of the grounds was that the notice to quit Ex. 31 was not in accordance with law. Both the courts passed an eviction decree under sec. 12 (3) (a) of the Rent Act against the defendant-tenant. ( 5 ) IT is under these circumstances that the defendant-tenant was aggrieved by the impugned judgment and decree passed by both the courts below and has filed this revision application in this Court. ( 6 ) AT the time of hearing of this revision application Mr. 12 (3) (a) of the Rent Act against the defendant-tenant. ( 5 ) IT is under these circumstances that the defendant-tenant was aggrieved by the impugned judgment and decree passed by both the courts below and has filed this revision application in this Court. ( 6 ) AT the time of hearing of this revision application Mr. Majmudar the learned advocate appearing for the defendant-tenant submitted that in the instant case no decree can be passed as the landlord claimed not only the arrears of rent but also the education cess. In order to justify the submissions Mr. Majmudar placed reliance on the reported decision of this Court in Civil Revision Application No. 1344 of 1968 decided on 17th October 1976 (Coram: J. B. Mehta and M. C. Trivedi JJ. (DAYALAL GANGARAM V. BHIMANI BHUPATRAI XVII GLR 349 ). In this view of the matter Mr. Majmudar is right that no decree of eviction can be passed against the tenant under sec. 12 (3) (a) of the Act. ( 7 ) THE next point urged by Mr. Majmudar was that in the instant case the notice to quit Ex. 31 is bad in law. He stated that in the instant case firstly in the year 1958 the upper portion of the building in question was let out to the petitioner tenant and that the shop portion of the building situated on the ground floor was let out to the defendant on a monthly rent of Rs 10/-in the year 1961. He stated that in view of these premises two different and distinct tenancies were created by the opponent- landlord in favour of the petitioner. He stated that bearing these facts in mind when one turns to notice to quit Ex 31 the notice does not comply with the requirements of law. Mr. Majmudar emphasised the fact that in the instant case no distinct and separate particulars have been set out by the opponent-landlord in respect of each of the two different tenancies. He stated that one composite notice setting out different and distinct particulars in regard to the arrears of rent in respect of both the tenancies are not mentioned in the notice to quit-Ex. 31. He also stated that sec. 12 (2) of the Rent Act read with sec. He stated that one composite notice setting out different and distinct particulars in regard to the arrears of rent in respect of both the tenancies are not mentioned in the notice to quit-Ex. 31. He also stated that sec. 12 (2) of the Rent Act read with sec. 106 of the Tr- ansfer of Property Act does not permit the landlord to give also composite notice to tenancies the two different and distinct tenancies in respect of two different premises when setting out the relevant and the material two different premises when setting out the relevant and the material particulars in regard to the no of the standard rent or permitted increases due and payable by the tenant to the landlord. Mr. Majmudar emphasised the fact that in the instant case it is the statutory obligation on the landlord to mention different and distinct particulars in respect of two different tenancies created by the same landlord in favour of the same tenant and if he has not complied with the same the notice to quit is bad in law. ( 8 ) SEC. 12 (2) of the Rent Act provides as follows: 12 No suit for recovery of possession shall be instituted by a landlord against a tenant on the ground of non-payment of the standard rent or permitted increases due until the expiration of one month next after notice in writing of the demand of the standard rent or permitted increases has been served upon the tenant in the manner provided in sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 ( 9 ) SEC. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 provides as follows:- 106 In the absence of a contract or local law or usage to the contrary a lease of immovable property for agricultural or manufacturing purposes shall be deemed to be a lease from year to year terminable on the part of either lessor lessee by six months notice expiring with the end of a year of the tenancy; and a lease of immovable property for any other purpose shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month terminable on the part of either lessor or lessee by fifteen days notice expiring with the end of a month of the tenancy. EVERY notice under this section must be in writing signed by or on behalf of the person giving it and either be sent by post to the party who is intended to be bound by it or be tendered or delivered personally to such party or to one of his family or servants at his residence or (if such tender or delivery is not practicable) affixed to a conspicuous part of the property. The relevant discussion of the lower appellate Court in para 13 of the impugned judgment is in the following words:it is an admitted fact that the defendant was put in possession of the first floor and the second floor of the suit premises in A. D. 1958 with a monthly rent of Rs. 15/. At that time there was a shop of washerman on the ground floor of the said building. The tenant of that building vacated his portion and the present defendant was put in possession of the ground floor in A. D. 1961 with a monthly rent of Rs. 10. 00. This shows that two portions were rented to the defendant on the different dates. It may be noted that there is no evidence to show that there was one tenancy for both the premises. The plaintiff has not produced any rent note to show that the defendant had executed a writing at the time when the suit shop was rented to him. To show that one tenancy was created for both the premises we are left with the circumstances of the case. ( 10 ) THE lower appellate Court in para 14 has also observed as follows:- Looking to the facts and the conduct of the parties it is clear that they treated both the tenancies to be separate one. Batuklal who is examined in this case has stated that he is maintaining the account books and making the entries of the rent in the same but has not produced any account book to show that the particular amount was credited towards the business premises or the suit premises. From the aforesaid discussion and the finding of the lower appellate Court Mr. From the aforesaid discussion and the finding of the lower appellate Court Mr. Majmudar submitted that in the instant case the lower appellate Court did come to a conclusion that there were two separate tenancies created in favour of the petitioner-tenant in two separate and distinct premises and the rent in respect of the shop as well as the residential premises was different. In the circumstances Mr. Majmudar stated that the notice to quit Ex. 31 is bad in law and that on that account the entire suit which has been filed by the appellant-landlord should be dismissed. ( 11 ) MR. Mehta the learned advocate resisted with vehemence the second contention raised by Mr. Majmudar. Mr. Mehta drew any attention to Ex. 31 notice Ex. 32 reply given by the defendant-tenant and Ex. 35 a letter addressed by the tenant to the landlord. In substance Mr. Mehtas submission was that this Court should take into consideration the conduct of the parties in arriving at the conclusion as to whether the landlord complied with the statutory obligation or not. Mr. Mehta submitted that on reading Exs. 31 32 and 35 it is clear that the opponent treated both the tenancies as one tenancy and hence the notice to quit Ex. 31 is valid in law. ( 12 ) IN this behalf Mr. Mehta also invited my attention to the reported decision of this court in GULABCHAND V. KURJI 3 G. L R. 113 and rent out before me the following portion from the head note: a notice to quit though it may not be strictly accurate or consistent in the statements embodied in it may still be good and defective in law the test of sufficiency would be satisfied if the notice to quit conveys to the tenant that his tenancy would be terminated at a certain and definite time expiring with the month of the tenancy and the court must construe the notice to quit not with a view to finding faults in it which would render it defective but must construe it ut res magis valeat quam pereat. ( 13 ) WITH respect it is not possible for me to agree with the submissions made by Mr. Mehta. ( 13 ) WITH respect it is not possible for me to agree with the submissions made by Mr. Mehta. In the instant case the lower appellate Court having appreciated the evidence on the record of the case did come to a concl- usion that there is no evidence to show that there was one tenancy for both the premises. He also observed in para 14 of the impugned judgment that the parties did treat both the tenancies to be separate ones. In this view of the matter and on a plain reading of sec. 12 (2) of the Rent Act and sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act I am convinced that it is the duty of the landlord to terminate both the tenancies by giving different and distinct particulars in regard to each tenancy though it may be open to give only one notice. From this view point I did peruse Ex. 31 and I did not find any such particulars in respect of each tenancy in the said notice to quit. In this view of the matter Mr. Majmudar is right in bringing to my notice that in the instant case the notice to quit is bad in law. ( 14 ) AS a result of the aforesaid discussion the revision application succeeds. The suit filed by the opponent-landlord fails and must be dis- missed. Accordingly the rule is made absolute hut having regard to the contentions raised by the parties there will be no order as to costs. Application allowed. .