URMILA KOTHABI v. TOWN MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, KALGHATGI
1976-09-21
GOVINDA BHAT, VENKATACHALAIAH
body1976
DigiLaw.ai
VENKATACHALIAH, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal arises out of and is directed against the order dt. 3-3-1976 of Srinivasa lyengar, J, dismissing the appellant's petition, seeking for the issue of a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the Town Municipal council of Kalghatgi in Dist of Dharwar, to forbear from levying a' supervision-fee' with respect to the appellant's trucks passing through the State high-ways within the territorial limits of the said Municipal Council. ( 2 ) THE relevant and undisputed facts are that appellant, as subcontractor of M/s West End Minerals and Exports P. Ltd. , which latter is stated to be the transport-contractor of Mysore-Minerals Ltd, is engaged in the transport from-Railyard at Hubli to the harbours at Karwar and Balakheri of iron-ore of the said Mysore Minerals Ltd, brought from mine-heads- in hospet taluk to Hubli by Railway wagons. It is not disputed that appellant's trucks carrying the said irom-ore pass through: the municipal areas of Kalghatgi Town, which lies en-route, do not unload their cargo at any intermediate point between Hubli Railyard and the destination i. e. , karwar or Belekeri harbours. ( 3 ) UNDER certain resolutions passed by the Municipal Council and approved by the State Govt. , the former is stated to be competent to levy, inter alia, a fee under S. 124 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) read with Rule 26 of the Karnataka municipalities Taxation Rules, 1965, at one rupee per lorry for the issue of a transport-permit. Accordingly, a fee at the said rate is sought to be levied on the trucks of the appellant for each of their trips along the highway within the municipal limits of Kalghatgi. The said S. 124 of the Act reads :"124. Nonliability for octroi and refund of octroi on goods in transit.- (1) Any article or animal brought into the municipal limits for the purpose of immediate exportation may at the option of the importer not be subjected to levy of octroi if such article or animal be conveyed direct from the place of import to the place of export by such routes, within such time, and under such supervision as the municipal council may by resolution determine. For purposes of this sub-section the municipal council shall on payment of the prescribed fees issue promptly the necessary transport permits.
For purposes of this sub-section the municipal council shall on payment of the prescribed fees issue promptly the necessary transport permits. (2) When any article in respect of which octroi has been paid is exported from the municipal limits, in the same condition in which it was brought into or received from beyond the municipal limits, the amount of octroi paid shall, subject to such rules as may be prescribed, be refunded. "rule 26 of the Karnataka Municipalities Taxation Rules, 1965, quantifies the levy. The relevant portion of the said Rule 26 reads :"26. In case the person bringing the goods wishes to transport the goods at once beyond the limits of the municipality he shall do so only after obtaining a transport permit in Form IV, on payment of a fee of rupees two for each lorry and rupee one in other cases in the case of a city municipal, council and rupee one for each lorry and fifty paise in other cases in the case of a town municipal council. "it is on the authority of S. 124 read with the said Rule 26 that the levy is sought to be justified. The vires of the said statutory provisions are not challenged in these proceedings and therefore the present enquiry is within a narrow pale as to whether, on the construction of the said S. 124 of the Act, it could be said that iron-ore transported from Hubli to Karwar or to Belekeri as the case may be-are articles ' brought into municipal limits for the purpose of immediate exportation' within the meaning of and so as to attract the levy under the said S. 124 of the Act. It is not disputed that to attract the said levy the articles should have been "brought into the municipal limits for the purpose of immediate exportation". ( 4 ) IT was contended before the learned single Judge that the iron-ore was merely in transit through the State highways passing through the municipal area and that the provisions cf S. 124 of the Act are not attracted to such a case.
( 4 ) IT was contended before the learned single Judge that the iron-ore was merely in transit through the State highways passing through the municipal area and that the provisions cf S. 124 of the Act are not attracted to such a case. The learned single Judge, however, sustained the levy on the view that the expressions 'importer' 'place of import' and 'place of export' in the said S. 124 of the Act are comprehensive enough to describe an activity even if it be "only confined to transit of the goods across the municipal limits" and that the "provision in regard to the transport-permit, and fee therefor is made only with a view to subserve the main purpose, namely, the levy of octroi on goods brought into the municipal limits for consumption or use therein and not subject persons who do not bring "such goods for use therein to that levy". The correctness of this view if challenged in appeal. ( 5 ) ANALOGOUS provisions in para-8 of Bye-laws 45 under the City of bangalore Municipal Corporation Act, 1949, came to be considered in the ease of Inter-State Transport (P) Ltd v. Corpn of the City of Bangalore, (1972) 1 Myslj. 47 . and a Bench of this Court observed :"it is common knowledge that goods vehicles that paes through the City start from distant places like Bombay and travel to Madras and other cities in the South. In the course of transportation, such vehicles have to pass the limits of several Municipalities and Panchayats. If Municipalities and Panchayats which under the Constitution are not empowered to levy octroi on goods that merely pass through thair limits are permitted to levy and collect fee for what is styled as 'export pass' on the basis of number of consignments carried in a vehicle, the burden on trade and commerce will be unbearable and would constitute a serious impediment to the freedom of trade and commerce guaranteed under the Constitution. It is further doubtful whether para 8 of Bye-law 45 is intended to cover cases of goods vehicles that merely pass through the City limits. There is no case of importation and re-export in such cases. However, we do not express' a final opinion on this question since the petitioners have no objection to pay fee for an export pass in respect of each vehicle.
There is no case of importation and re-export in such cases. However, we do not express' a final opinion on this question since the petitioners have no objection to pay fee for an export pass in respect of each vehicle. " ( 6 ) THE limitation set by the commerce-clause of the Constitution on the State power of taxation and the manner in which the taxing powers of the State are to be harmonised with the limitations implicit in the commerce-clause on the exertion of that power have posed problems of great niceties and diversity. However, the present question before us does not trench upon any such aspect of constitutional limits on legislative power; but relates only to a proper construction of S. 124 of the Act, its constitutional validity not having been challenged. It appears to us that even on this limited question, appellant should succeed for the reasons which we shall state presently. ( 7 ) IN the case of Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Co of India ltd v. Commercial Tax Officer, AIR. 1961 SC. 315, the amplitude of the expression 'export' came up for consideration before the Supreme Court though, however, in a different context. The following observations of the Supreme Court are instructive :"the word 'export' may conceivably be used in more senses than one. In one sense, 'export' may mean sending or taking out of the country, but in another sense, it. may mean sending goods from one country to another. Often, the latter involves a commercial transaction but not necessarily. The country to which the goods are thus sent is said to import them, and the words 'export' and 'import' in this sense are complementary. "the expressions 'import' and 'export' contemplated in S. 124 of the Act are not defined terms and are not used in any other than the ordinary sense. ( 8 ) IN Central India Spinning and Weaving and Mfg Co Ltd v. Municipal committee, AIR. 1958 SC.
"the expressions 'import' and 'export' contemplated in S. 124 of the Act are not defined terms and are not used in any other than the ordinary sense. ( 8 ) IN Central India Spinning and Weaving and Mfg Co Ltd v. Municipal committee, AIR. 1958 SC. 341, the Supreme Court while, considering the provisions in S. 66 (1) (a) of the CP and Berar Municipalities Act (2 of 1922), which authorised the imposition of ' a terminal tax on goods or animals imported into or exported from the limits of the municipality' had occasion to explain the amplitude of the expressions 'imported into' and 'exported from' in their derivative meaning as distinct from the shades of meaning these expressions have acquired in the commercial sense. It is no doubt true that in the said case the contention of the appellants therein that the words 'imported into' and 'exported from' did not merely mean to 'bring into' or to 'carry out of or away from' but also have reference to and imply the termination or the commencement of the journey of the goods sought to be taxed, was examined in the context of the adjective 'terminal' occurring in the provision. However, the following observation of the Supreme court at para 22 of its judgment which are of broader significance are worth recalling :"22. By giving to the words 'imported into or exported from' their derivative meaning without any reference to the ordinary connotation of these words as used in the commercial sense, the decided cases in India have ascribed too general a meaning to these words which it appears from the setting, context and history of the clause was not intended. The effect of the construction of 'import' or 'export' in the manner insisted upon by the respondent would make rail-borne goods passing through a railway station within the limits of a municipality liable to the imposition of the tax on their arrival at the Rly stn or departure therefrom or both which would not only lead to inconvenience but confusion, and would also result in inordinate delays and unbearable burdon on trade both inter State and intra State. It is hardly likely that that was the intention of the legislature. Such an interpretation would lead to absurdity which has, according to the rules of interpretation, to be avoided.
It is hardly likely that that was the intention of the legislature. Such an interpretation would lead to absurdity which has, according to the rules of interpretation, to be avoided. " ( 9 ) IN the prescnt case, to attract the provisions of S. 124 of the Act, the goods must be "brought into the municipal limits for the purpose of immediate exportation". The ideas 'bringing in' and 'export' are complementary to each other, and the essential element implicit in these two processes is that an element of pause and repose is attached to the first process before the second process of export commences. The expression 'brought into' and 'immediate exportation' thus understood do not, in our opinion, take in or envisage a continuous process of transit of goods by vehicles which merely use the State high-ways across the municipal areas. Upon a proper construction of S. 124 of the Act, such a process of continuous transit cannot be held to imply or involve the process of 'bringing into' and 'immediate exportation' from the municipal limits of the goods in question. For instance, a vessel, say, with a cargo destined for New Zealand may call in at number of ports on the voyage and may continue her voyage without it being said that the goods it carries are 'imported goods' and were brought into each of the ports for the immediate purpose of exportation therefrom. ( 10 ) WE are unable to bring ourselves to agree with the view taken by the learned single Judge. The trucks of appellant which merely pass through the State high-ways within the municipality limits cannot be said to have 'brought into' for the 'immediate purpose of exportation' from the municipal limits the cargo they carry. The impugned levy on such trucks is not one that can be said to be authorised by S 124 of the Act.
The trucks of appellant which merely pass through the State high-ways within the municipality limits cannot be said to have 'brought into' for the 'immediate purpose of exportation' from the municipal limits the cargo they carry. The impugned levy on such trucks is not one that can be said to be authorised by S 124 of the Act. ( 11 ) ACCORDINGLY, this appeal is allowed and in reversal of the order of the learned single Judge, we issue a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondent to forbear from levying or collecting the impugned 'supervision-fee, purported under S. 124 of the Act read with Rule 26 of the Karnataka Municipalities Taxation Rules, 1965 or appellant's trucks carrying iron-ore from Hubli Railyard to the harbours at Karwar or Belekeri, as the case may be, via State high-ways in the area of the Town municipal Council of Kalghatgi. ( 12 ) THE appellant will be entitled to its costs both before the learned single Judge and in this appeal Advocate's fee is fixed at Rs. 250/- for both Courts. --- *** --- .