JUDGMENT G. Viswanatha Iyer, J. 1. This is an appeal by the plaintiffs against the decree disallowing their prayer to set aside the sale deed in respect of, and for recovery of possession of, the plaint schedule property. The plaint property consists of buildings and the land on which these buildings stand are scheduled to the plaint only as constituting a support to them. According to the plaintiffs, these buildings were purchased in 1124 under Ext. P-1 for Rs. 3,750 in the name of their father, Mohammedkutty on their behalf since they were minors then. Out of this Rs. 3,750 a sum of Rs. 1,200 was stated as paid in cash. Rs. 500 was recited as paid earlier as advance. Rs. 1,500 was reserved with the vendee Mohammedkutty for payment later within one year together with interest at 6 per cent per annum. Another sum of Rs. 550 was also reserved to be paid to the 1st defendant only after the 1st defendant discharged a prior charged debt in favour of the Industrial Bank under a kuri transaction. The further case of the plaintiffs is that the cash consideration was advanced by their grandfather Beerankutty only and not by their father Mohammedkutty. A few months afterwards plaintiffs father purchased the land in which the buildings stood under Ext. D-2 sale deed for Rs. 4,355. Even for that document the entire consideration had not been paid. Rs. 1,500 had been reserved with the vendee for future payment. Then as guardian of the plaintiffs, their father executed a usufructuary mortgage under Ext. D-1 dated 3rd March 1951 for the land and the building to discharge the amount reserved under Ext. P-1 sale deed. Possession of the property had also been given to the mortgagee and the property was taken back on lease by the father. Again after one year Mohammedkutty, in his individual capacity and as the guardian of the minors, sold the land and the buildings to the 1st defendant under Ext. P-2 sale deed dated 5th January 1952. The sale deed is for Rs. 8,500. It is made up of a number of recitals. A sum of Rs. 2,050 was reserved with the 1st defendant for payment to the plaintiffs on their attaining majority. The other recitals consist of amounts received from or otherwise adjusted with the vendee. P-2 sale deed dated 5th January 1952. The sale deed is for Rs. 8,500. It is made up of a number of recitals. A sum of Rs. 2,050 was reserved with the 1st defendant for payment to the plaintiffs on their attaining majority. The other recitals consist of amounts received from or otherwise adjusted with the vendee. Plaintiffs on their attaining majority filed the suit to set aside this sale deed in so far as it related to the transfer of their rights under Ext. P-1 sale deed. They impeached the sale deed on the ground that their father was not competent to execute the sale deed, that the sale deed is not supported by consideration and necessity binding on the minors. Defendants 1 and 2 opposed this claim. They defended the sale deed as valid, supported by consideration and necessity binding on the minors. They also expressed their willingness to pay the amount reserved in the sale deed to the plaintiffs as per the terms of Ext. P-2. The lower court after trial found that the plaintiffs father was competent to execute the sale deed, that the sale deed is beneficial to the plaintiffs and that therefore the same is not liable to be set aside, but granted a decree to the plaintiffs to recover the amount of Rs. 2,050 and interest reserved in the sale deed from the 1st defendant and charged on the plaint schedule property. The plaintiffs are not satisfied with this decree and they have come up in appeal. 2. So, the point for consideration is whether the sale deed, Ext. P-2, is valid and binding on the plaintiffs. For this it is necessary to refer to the documents relating to the acquisition of the property by the plaintiffs father and also to the extent of the right which the plaintiffs obtained under the sale deed, Ext. P-1 dated 10th Meenam 1124. The 1st defendant was the owner of the buildings scheduled to the plaint. He had encumbered this property as a security for payment of the future subscriptions in a chit conducted by the Industrial Bank Ltd. A sum of Rs. 550 remained to be paid towards the future subscriptions. While so, by Ext. P-1 sale deed the property was transferred to the plaintiffs represented by their father Mohammedkutty for Rs. 3,750. He had encumbered this property as a security for payment of the future subscriptions in a chit conducted by the Industrial Bank Ltd. A sum of Rs. 550 remained to be paid towards the future subscriptions. While so, by Ext. P-1 sale deed the property was transferred to the plaintiffs represented by their father Mohammedkutty for Rs. 3,750. This amount was made up of four recitals, namely, a sum of Rs. 550 referred to above reserved with the vendee for the discharge of the kuri debt, Rs. 500 received on an earlier occasion is acknowledged a sum of Rs. 1,500 is reserved with the vendee to be paid to the vendor after the expiry of one year with interest at 6 per cent and a sum of Rs. 1,200 received as ready cash on the date of the transaction. Thus, a sum of Rs. 2,050 remained to be paid to discharge the debt mentioned in the sale deed. The father of the plaintiffs subsequently purchased the land on which the building stood by a sale deed dated 30th December 1949. That sale deed was for a sum of Rs. 4,355. This was also made up of five recitals. Four of them are adjustments of the amounts paid previously and on the date of the sale deed. A balance sum of Rs. 1,451-10-8 was reserved with the vendee for payment to one of the executants on his attaining majority. Thus the plaintiffs father became the owner of the land and the plaintiffs and their minor sister since deceased became the owners of the buildings standing thereon. Both the buildings and the land remained separately charged for the discharge of the balance of consideration reserved in Exts. P1 and D2. While so, plaintiffs father executed a usufructuary mortgage and borrowed Rs. 1,750 for the discharge of the amounts reserved in Ext. P-1 sale deed as the vendor under Ext. P-1 pressed for the payment of the amount reserved in it and the plaintiffs father had no means of meeting the demand otherwise. On that date the amount reserved with the vendee had swelled up to Rs. 2,337 by way of principal and interest. Plaintiffs father paid Rs. 837 reserving still a balance of Rs. 1,500 and took Ext. D-4 from the 1st defendant. On that date the amount reserved with the vendee had swelled up to Rs. 2,337 by way of principal and interest. Plaintiffs father paid Rs. 837 reserving still a balance of Rs. 1,500 and took Ext. D-4 from the 1st defendant. It is in evidence that under this mortgage the property was put in possession of the mortgagee Moidu and taken back on lease. The financial position of the plaintiff father did not improve very much. The balance amount of Rs. 1,500 reserved under Ext. P-1 and the amount reserved under Ext. D-2 could not be paid and interest was accruing due on them. So, the plaintiffs father executed Ext. P-2 sale deed and transferred his rights as well as the rights of his children to the 1st defendant on 5th January 1952 for Rs. 8,500. The recital in the sale deed is that the three amounts charged on the property, namely, balance amount of Rs. 1,541-4-0 due under Ext. P-1, Sum of Rs. 1,524-11-3 due under Ext. D-2 and the mortgage amount of Rs. 1,874-5-0 due under Ext. D-1 have not been cleared and that the creditors are pressing for payment and there is no means to clear these debts except by the sale of the land and the buildings. A sum of Rs. 2,050 was reserved with the vendee for payment to the minors on their attaining majority with interest at 6 per cent from the date of the sale deed. A sum of Rs. 600 is acknowledged as received by way of advance at the time of the agreement for sale. Another sum of Rs. 200 received previously is also acknowledged and the balance sum of Rs. 710-3-1 is stated to have been received on the date of the sale deed. The first three recitals are not challenged by the plaintiffs as wanting in consideration. As a matter of fact, these amounts are the debts incurred or agreed to be paid at the time of acquiring the title to the buildings and the land. The last three recitals are proved in the case by the evidence tendered on behalf of the defendants. It is admitted that the amount reserved for payment to the minors has not been paid. The last three recitals are proved in the case by the evidence tendered on behalf of the defendants. It is admitted that the amount reserved for payment to the minors has not been paid. In these circumstances the question for consideration is whether the sale deed can be said to be binding on the minors in so far as it purports to convey their right over the buildings situated in the land. The lower court was of the view that in the facts and circumstances of the case the sale deed is binding on the minors. How far this is correct is the question that we have to consider in this appeal. 3. It has to be remembered that the plaintiffs have no title to the land on which the building is situate. Though the maxim quicouid inaedificatur solo solo cedit namely that whatever is attached to the earth will be part of the land and belong to the owner of the land is the law in other jurisdictions, that does not apply to India. It is doubtful whether the person who has got title to the buildings can insist that person having title to the land has no right to ask him to remove the structure. If such a demand is made by the person having title to the land, the person having title to the building should either receive the value of the buildings or remove the buildings and give vacant possession to the land owner. The extent of the right of a person who has put up a building on another man land was considered by this Court in Chellappan Nadar v. Krishnan Nair, 1963 K. L.T. 750. At page 754, paragraph 7, it was observed thus:” "The owner of the land is not the owner of the building, but neither is the builder unless, as I have said, the word building is used to cover only the materials of the building. The only right which the builder has is that, in the event of his being evicted, he should be allowed to take away the materials or be paid compensation."� In this view the minor right over the building is largely precarious. The owner of the land can require them to vacate. They will have to be satisfied with the compensation for the value of the building or they should remove the materials. The owner of the land can require them to vacate. They will have to be satisfied with the compensation for the value of the building or they should remove the materials. Their right is therefore not permanent or secured. Moreover, debt to the extent of Rs. 1,524 and odd is a debt due to the vendor of the buildings under Ext. P-1. The amount due under the mortgage and lease back comes to Rs. 1,874 and odd. These amounts have to be discharged by the plaintiffs if they want the building to be secured to them. Thus they had only an onerous title to the buildings. Any delay in the payment of these amounts will only increase their liability. The interest on the principal sum due under the above transactions was increasing. The minors had no other source of income. The father was only a labourer. It cannot be said that in these circumstances the arrangement entered into by their father to cash their interest in the building and reserve it for payment to the minors on their attaining majority was worn. It is a very prudent transaction which, in the circumstances of this case, is only beneficial to the minors. 4. In this connection the learned counsel for the appellant referred to some of the authorities relating to the right of a legal guardian to transfer immovable properties belonging to the minors. We shall briefly refer to them. He referred to para 362 of Mulla Mahomedan Law and contended that the powers of a legal guardian to sell immovable property are very much restricted to a case where he can obtain double its value or where the minor has no other property and the sale is necessary for his maintenance or where there are debts of the deceased and no other means of paying them or where there are legacies to be paid and no other means of paying them and where the expenses exceed the income of the property. It has to be said that these grounds are not exhaustive of the grounds which would justify the sale of immovable property by a legal guardian. If the sale is for the minor benefit it will be a case where the sale will be binding on the minor. It has to be said that these grounds are not exhaustive of the grounds which would justify the sale of immovable property by a legal guardian. If the sale is for the minor benefit it will be a case where the sale will be binding on the minor. In the leading case Imambandi and others v. Mutsaddi and others, 45 Indian Appeals 73 some examples of alienations by the legal and de facto guardians were considered. In considering the correctness of the decision in Ayderman Kutti v. Syed Ali, I.L.R. Madras 514 Their Lordships observed thus: ” "The second proposition, speaking with respect, appears to Their Lordships to lose sight of the fact that the acts of de jure guardians also are subject to the conditions of necessity for or benefit to the infant."� Again, in Kali Dutt Jha and others v. Sheik Abdool Ali and another, 16 Indian Appeals 96 Their Lordships upheld the sale effected by a legal guardian on the ground that the transaction was one for the minor benefit. On account of the changing social conditions the security and permanency attached to the ownership of immovable property previously have undergone a change and a strict adherence to the only type of benefits mentioned earlier will be inappropriate. All the instances pointed by Mulla in para 362 referred to above are cases of benefit to the minors. We need not dialate on this matter any further in this case. As stated earlier, the plaintiffs had title only to the building. The land belonged to another. There were debts incurred in the acquisition of title to the building. There was no means of discharging it and there was a risk of the minors losing their right over it. In such a situation the father who is the legal guardian and who is not shown to have acted otherwise than in the best interests of the minors was competent to conserve and convert into money the value of minor interest in the building. It is a prudent transaction which is to their benefit. 5. It was contended that these debts are charged on the property and there was no imminent danger of the property being proceeded against by creditors for the realisation of the amounts due to them. If the matter is delayed, as stated earlier, interest on the amounts due will go on increasing. 5. It was contended that these debts are charged on the property and there was no imminent danger of the property being proceeded against by creditors for the realisation of the amounts due to them. If the matter is delayed, as stated earlier, interest on the amounts due will go on increasing. It is not very necessary to enable the legal guardian to sell the property that a coercive sale is imminent. If he waits to that stage it is not likely that a fair price will be received. Therefore, the action of the father in disposing of the rights of the minors over the building is binding on them. 6. In view of this conclusion the decree passed by the lower court allowing the alternate prayer made in the plaint, namely, a decree for recovery of the amount reserved with the vendee with interest from that date is justifiable. The rights of the minors have been amply safeguarded in the decree passed by the lower court. We see no reason to interfere with that. 7. In the result, we confirm the judgment and decree of the lower court and dismiss the appeal. But, in the circumstances we make no order as to costs.