JUDGMENT G.C. Mathur, J. - This is an appeal against the judgment of a learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellants and refusing to quash the order of the State Government passed under Section 3 of the U. P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act 1947, granting permission to the landlords respondents nos. 1 to 5. 2. The disputed premises consists of four floors. On the ground floor there is commercial accommodation like godowns, etc. The first floor was occupied by the U. P. Cooperative Federation and the second and third floors are occupied by the appellants. Respondents nos. 1 to 5, who had purchased the entire building, were residing in house no. 47/96 Hatia Bazzar, Kanpur, as ten- ants. They filed one composite application under section 3 for the grant of per- mission to evict the tenants on all the four floors of this building. The ground on which they sought permission was that there were 40 members in their family, some of whom lived in the village and that they all desired to live in the city. The accommodation in the rented house in the city was (So small to accommodate all of them. The application was opposed by the tenants of all the four floors. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer found that the landlord needed additional accommodation but held that since the additional accommodation needed was residential only the landlords could not be granted permission in respect of the ground floor which was commercial accommodation. He further held that the requirement for additional accommodation of the landlords could be fully satisfied by the accommodation on the 1st floor occupied by the U.P. Cooperative Federation. He accordingly granted permission to the landlords against the U. P. Cooperative Federation and refused permission against the appellants and against the tenants of the ground floor. Against the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer two revisions were filed, one by the landlords against the appellants and the other by the U.P. Co-operative Federation against the landlords. The Commissioner agreed with the view taken by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer that the need of the landlords for additional accommodation could b sufficiently met by the accommodation in possession of the U.P. Co- operative Federation. He accordingly dismissed both the revisions. The Commissioner agreed with the view taken by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer that the need of the landlords for additional accommodation could b sufficiently met by the accommodation in possession of the U.P. Co- operative Federation. He accordingly dismissed both the revisions. Against the order of the Commissioner two representations were made to the State Government under section 7-F of the Act. One revision was filed by the landlords against the appellants and the other by the U. P. Cooperative Federation. The State Government dismissed the representation filed by the U. P. Cooperative Federation but allowed the revision of the landlords and granted them permission against the appellants also. Against the orders of the State Government the appellants tiled a writ petition in this Court which has been dismissed by the learned Single Judge. 3. Shri K. M. Dayal, learned counsel for the appellants contended that the order of the State Government was vitiated on account of its failure to record a categorical finding that the need of the landlords was greater than that of the tenants. He has relied upon two decisions of two Division Benches of this Court. The first decision was given in Amir Rai Sood v. Capt. Ashok kumar No. Char and others', S.A. 273 of 1974 decided on November 25, 1974, and the second in Gerald Valentine Massey v. Egbert Clarence Deniel, S.A. 212 of 1975 decided on March 9, 1976. In both these cases it was laid down that there is a rule of law that the District Magistrate and the revising authority must record a finding that the need of the landlord is greater than that of the tenant on a comparison of their needs before permission can be granted. There is no doubt that no such finding has been recorded in the present case. In our opinion the view taken by these two Division Benches runs counter to the view of the Supreme Court in Capital Multipurpose Cooperative Societies v. Stale of M.P., AIR 1967 Supreme Court 1815. The Supreme Court has observed that in case of quasi judicial order if the statute does not require the according of a particular finding the courts cannot insist upon the recording of such a finding provided the order shows an application of the mind to the relevant facts. The Supreme Court has observed that in case of quasi judicial order if the statute does not require the according of a particular finding the courts cannot insist upon the recording of such a finding provided the order shows an application of the mind to the relevant facts. We do not consider it necessary to refer this case for consideration to a larger Bench as, in our opinion, it can be decided on another ground. 4. From the recital of the facts above it is clear that the main controversy between the landlord respondents and the appellant-tenants before the State Government was whether the landlord's need for the appellants' accommodation was genuine and pressing or not. It is to be kept in mind that both the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and the Commissioner had held that the need of the landlords was genuine only qua one accommodation, i. e. the accommodation on the first floor occupied. by the U. P. Cooperative Federation. Both these authorities have held that the landlords' need for the accommodation in the occupation of the appellants was not genuine. The State Government was, therefore, required to apply its mind to this aspect of the case and to consider whether the landlords' need for the appellants' accommodation was genuine or not. It is only if it found that the need of the landlords for the appellants' accommodation was genuine that the question of considering the need of, the tenant and of comparing the needs of the two could arise. The order of the State Government has been read out to us several times. Having given out careful consideration to it we are of opinion that the State Government has not applied its mind to the question whether the landlords' for the appellants accommodation was genuine or not. After setting out the facts of the case in detail the State Government straight off weighed the needs of the landlords and the tenants and observed that the need of the tenants must be sacrificed for the need of the landlords. After setting out the facts of the case in detail the State Government straight off weighed the needs of the landlords and the tenants and observed that the need of the tenants must be sacrificed for the need of the landlords. Shri S. N. Kacker, learned counsel for the landlord respondents, contended that it was not necessary for the State Government to record a categorical finding whether the need of the landlord for the accommodation in the occupation of the appellants was or as not, genuine as the order shows that the State Government was alive to the question arising before it. We are unable to agree with this contention. When the State Government was reversing the finding of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and of the Commissioner regarding the need of the landlord for the appellants' accommodation it was required to give reasons for doing so. No such reasons have been given by the State Government. In fact there is no consideration of this question at all in the order of the State Government. The State Government has not at all applied its mind to this aspect of the case. That being so the order of the State Government cannot be sustained. 5. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The judgment of the learned Single Judge is set aside. The writ petition is allowed and the order of, the State Government dated July 11, 1972 granting permission to the landlords under Section 3 against the appellants is quashed. The State Government will reconsider the representation made by the landlords against the tenants and decide it afresh in the light of observations made above. The parties will bear their own costs of this appeal is well as of the writ petition.