JUDGEMENT 1. This Criminal Revision Application is directed against the order of the Additional Sessions Judge, Panaji, dated 24-1-1976 dismissing the appeal of the applicant and confirming the order of conviction imposed upon him by the J.M.F.C., Panaji. 2. The case of the prosecution is that one Chandrakant Raikar, P.W.1 at whose instance this case was instituted by the Police was the owner in possession of a Raleigh Cycle (M.O.1); sometime between 1-12-1973 and 15-12-1973, Raikar parked the cycle near the Cine Nacional and went to see the film. When he returned to fetch his cycle after the picture was over he found that the cycle was missing. He did not lodge any complaint to the Police at the time the cycle was missing as, according to him, he was searching for the cycle. Sometime in the month of January the accused was arrested by the police in connection with some thefts of cycles. Raikar went to the Police Station to see whether his cycle was among the stolen cycles, but the Police did not show him the cycle. The complainant lodged his complaint on 27-1-1974. 3. The case of the accused is that Raikar had sold his cycle to him. On his behalf it is argued before me by Shri Vaze that the evidence on record was assessed in the light of a wrong notion of law. Shri Vaze states that both the Courts below held the view that the burden fell on the accused to prove conclusively that the cycle was purchased by him. His argument is that the accused is entitled to rebut the presumption arising against him under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, namely, that he had stolen the cycle, by offering an explanation which lis reasonable and probable. It is urged before me by Shri Vaze, learned advocate for the accused, that the evidence on record, if examined in the light of the correct position of law, is not sufficient to sustain a conviction, as there could be no other view in the face of that evidence, but that the explanation given by the accused is reasonable and probable. 4. The Supreme Court has examined the scope and ambit of a presumption arising under Section 114 of the Evidence Act in Dhanvantrai v. State of Maharashtra. AIR 1964 SC 575 = (1964 (1) Cri LJ 437). 4. The Supreme Court has examined the scope and ambit of a presumption arising under Section 114 of the Evidence Act in Dhanvantrai v. State of Maharashtra. AIR 1964 SC 575 = (1964 (1) Cri LJ 437). Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have distinguished between a presumption under that section and a legal presumption under Section 4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. In V.D. Jhingan v. State of Uttar Pradesh. AIR 1966 SC 1762 = (1966 Cri LJ 1357), the Supreme Court adverted to the dictum of Viscount Shankey in Woolmington v. Director of Public Prosecutions, 1935 AC 462, that no matter what the charge or where the trial, the principle that the prosecution must prove the guilt of the person is part of the common law of England and no attempt to whittle it down can be entertained. The same position prevails in the criminal law of India. That does not mean that if the statute places the burden of proof on an accused person, he is not required to establish his plea, but when a presumption arises under S.114 and even when a presumption arises under Section 4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, or under the Gold Control Order, the degree and character of proof which the accused is expected to furnish in support of his plea, cannot be equated with the degree and character of proof expected from the prosecution which is required to prove its case beyond the shadow of doubt. 5. I agree with the arguments of the learned advocate for the accused. The two courts below held a wrong view of law and assessed the evidence under a misconception of law. I am entitled to have the benefit of their views in the light of the correct legal position. I shall therefore remand this case to the trial Court. I order accordingly. The trial Court need not record any further evidence. It may discuss the evidence already recorded and give a finding in the light of the law laid down by the Supreme Court. Revision allowed.