Judgment LALIT MOHAN SHARMA, J. 1. The petitioner, by the present application under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India has challenged the order passed by the Board of Revenue (respondent No. 4) contained in Annexure-9 to the writ application. 2. Plots Nos. 4343 and 4344 of village Kailakh in Madhubani district belong to the petitioner and plots Nos. 4345 and 3604 to the respondent No. 5. There has been a demarcating ridge between the two blocks of land. A dispute was raised by respondent No. 5 and a proceeding u/s. 144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was drawn up but was later dropped. Another Criminal Proceeding started by respondent No. 5 also failed. He thereafter filed an application under the provisions of the Bengal Survey Act before the Demarcation Deputy Collector, respondent No. 2. The petitioner objected but an order was passed against the petitioner on the 13th of January, 1969. The petitioner filed fresh objections and wanted respondent No. 2 to review his previous order. This prayer was rejected by an order as contained in Annexure-4 to the writ application. A direction to respondent No. 5 was given to deposit the cost of demarcation. The petitioner thereafter made a prayer for appointment of an advocate-commissioner to inspect the field and submit a report. The prayer was allowed and the advocate-commissioner, appointed in the case submitted a report which is Annexure-5 to the writ application. After considering the matter afresh the Court reiterated the earlier order by Annexure-6 and redirected respondent No. 5 to deposit the cost. The petitioner thereafter appealed before the Collector which was dismissed by an order contained in Annexure-7. The petitioner, then, filed a revision application before the Commissioner which was allowed and the application of respondent No. 5 before the Demarcation Deputy Collector was dismissed. Respondent No. 5 then moved the Board of Revenue by an application which was allowed by the Additional Member, Board of Revenue by an order as contained in Annexure-9. The petitioner has challenged this order in the present case. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the provisions of Part V of the Bengal Survey Act dealing with the boundary disputes refer to a stage when such dispute arises in course of a survey under the Act. The petitioner has challenged this order in the present case. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the provisions of Part V of the Bengal Survey Act dealing with the boundary disputes refer to a stage when such dispute arises in course of a survey under the Act. As no survey proceeding was going on, the authority concerned had no jurisdiction to entertain the application of respondent No. 5 and to pass the impugned orders. Reliance was placed on the language of Sec. 40 which reads as follows : "40. Procedure in case of disputes as to boundary- If it shall come to the notice of the Collector, in the course of a survey under this Act, that a dispute exists as to any boundary which should be surveyed, the Collector, after holding such inquiry as he may deem necessary, may determine such boundary as hereinafter provided." It has been urged that the other sections of Part V provide the procedure in regard to a proceeding under Sec. 40. The learned counsel laid emphasis on the words "in course of survey under this Act" mentioned in the section quoted above. Admittedly no survey proceeding under the Act was pending when the application by respondent No. 5 was filed before respondent No. 2. The argument, on behalf of the petitioner, accordingly, is that in that situation respondent No. 2 had no jurisdiction to allow the prayer of respondent No. 5. 4. Mr. Rambalak Mahato, appearing for the respondents Nos. 1 to 4 contended that the application by respondent No. 5 had been filed under the provisions of Sec. 45 of the Act and the said section is wider in range and application than a proceeding under Sec. 40 of the Act. 5. Sec. 45 of the Act does not appear to deal with the procedure of a proceeding under Sec. 40. It provides for a separate proceeding independently of Sec. 40. 5. Sec. 45 of the Act does not appear to deal with the procedure of a proceeding under Sec. 40. It provides for a separate proceeding independently of Sec. 40. The language of Sec. 45 which is quoted below:- "If it shall come to the notice of the Collector at any time, or in any manner, that a doubt or dispute exists in respect of any boundary- (a) which has at any time been determined by a competent Court; or (b) which has been laid down and shown in a map, in the course of a previous revenue survey or settlement, or other proceeding of revenue officer for any special purpose, and against which no objection has been preferred to any authority competent to decide upon such objection or (c) which has been laid down by survey under this Act- the Collector may, if he thinks it desirable for any reason that the boundary so determined or laid down shall be relaid proceed to relay the boundary in the manner prescribed in Sec.144 of this Act. and for the purpose of so relaying the boundary he may make any inquiries and surveys which may be necessary, and such inquiries and surveys shall be deemed to be proceedings under Sec. 6, and the Collector shall exercise in respect thereof all powers which he may exercise in respect of inquiries and surveys under that section." clearly indicates that the section covers a clearly wider field than that mentioned in Sec. 40. Not only the words "in course of a survey under this Act" mentioned in Sec. 40 have been omitted in Sec. 45, it has also been said that the Collector may take steps or act "at any time". The "manner" in which a doubt or dispute existing in respect of any boundary may come to the notice of the Collector is also unlimited. The grounds on which the Collector has to act and the discretion given to him in this regard are quite extensive. On a comparison of the language of Sections 40 and 45 it will be clear that there are two kinds of proceedings contemplated, namely (i) a proceeding as mentioned in Sec. 40 of the Act and (ii) another in Sec. 45. Sections 41 to 44 are connected with Sec. 40 and refer to the proceeding of the first kind. On a comparison of the language of Sections 40 and 45 it will be clear that there are two kinds of proceedings contemplated, namely (i) a proceeding as mentioned in Sec. 40 of the Act and (ii) another in Sec. 45. Sections 41 to 44 are connected with Sec. 40 and refer to the proceeding of the first kind. So far as Sec. 45 is concerned it deals with the second category and cannot be subjected to the limitations applicable to the first category. The language of Sec. 45 is in the widest terms and there does not appear to be any reason to cut down and limit its application to disputes arising "in course of a survey under the Act". I therefore reject the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner. 6 The learned counsel also contended that the pleader-commissioners report, in substance is in favour of the petitioner and the proceeding should have been dropped by respondent No. 2 after its receipt. I am afraid, this argument, based upon a supposed strength of the petitioners case on merits cannot be entertained in a writ application. It has been pointed out by the demarcation Deputy Collector and the Additional Member of the Board of Revenue that there is no dispute between the parties in regard to the title of the two blocks of land. The petitioner does not claim any portion of the plots No. 4345 and 3604. The only dispute which has arisen between the parties is in regard to the ridge between their lands. The authorities have considered it fit to have the boundary relaid in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 45 of the Act and there is no reason for the High Court to reconsider this aspect. The learned counsel further said that the order as mentioned in Annexure-9 is bad as the foundation of the order is the fact that the petitioner had moved respondent No. 2 for appointment of a pleader-commissioner. I do not agree with this interpretation of the order of the Board of Revenue. The aforementioned fact has been mentioned in the order as one of the factors. The other relevant circumstances discussed in the order clearly show that on merits the petitioner has no claim. This point also must therefore fail. 7. In the result, the writ application is dismissed with costs, hearing fee Rs. The aforementioned fact has been mentioned in the order as one of the factors. The other relevant circumstances discussed in the order clearly show that on merits the petitioner has no claim. This point also must therefore fail. 7. In the result, the writ application is dismissed with costs, hearing fee Rs. 50.00 payable to respondent No. 1 the State of Bihar. GOVIND MOHAN MISRA, J. 8 I agree.