JUDGMENT - G.N. VAIDYA, J.:---The above Special Civil Application under Article 227 of the Constitution is directed against the judgment and order passed by the Appellate Bench of the Court of Small Causes at Bombay, upon a revision application filed by two of the tenants of a building known as "Jamal Mansion" situated on Sleater Road, Bombay, against an order passed on their application under section 24 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947, on September 30. 1974 by a Judge of the Small Causes Court directing the landlord, respondent in the tenants application, to restore the lift service to the tenants as it existed prior to December, 1966, i.e. both ways for going up as well as coming down and further directing that if the landlord Yakub Haji Musa Patrawala fails to restore the lift service within fifteen days he shall be liable to pay a daily fine of Rs. 25/-. It is undisputed that on October 1, 1974, the said Patrawala sold the building to the petitioner in the above Special Civil Application, Bhimsi H.Nisar, Nisar made an application before the Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court on March 3, 1976 for permission of the Appellate Bench for cross-examining three witnesses, viz. Dr. Raichand K. Nisar, Shri Ramanlal Gordhanadas Sheth and Shri Gulam Husein J. Taki who were not cross examined by the original landlord in the trial Court as his predecessor Shri Patrawala and his Advocate had not remained present for cross-examination of these witnesses. It must be noticed that the petitioner was made a party to the revision application at the instance of the tenants. The original landlord Shri Patrawala remained absent in the revision application. It is in these circumstances that the petitioner made the above application for opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses on the ground that the original landlord Shri Patrawala had lost interest in the property. In the petition, filed in this Court, in para 5 it is stated that when the notice of the proceedings in revision was served on the petitioner, he objected to the said course being adopted by the tenants and contended that in the absence of any application for joining him as a party, he should not have been straightway served with the notice of the revision application. He also objected on the ground that under section 29 of the Rent Act the powers of the revisional Bench were very limited and that the Appellate Bench should give him an opportunity and for that purpose remand the case to the trial Court. All these objections were overruled and the request for permission was also rejected. The Appellate Bench by its aforesaid order dated March 10, 1976, modified the order passed by the trial Court and directed both the original landlord and the petitioner to restore the lift service to the tenants as it existed prior to December 1966 i.e. from 8 a.m. to 1.p.m. and 4 p.m. to 10 p.m. both for going up as well as for coming down; and further directed restoration of the lift service not only to the tenants, but also to their family members, guests and relations during the said timings, for going up as well as coming down. The Appellate Bench lastly directed that the order was to take effect after 10 days from the date of the order, confirming the rest of the order passed by the trial Court. Feeling aggrieved by the said decision of the Appellate Bench, the petitioner filed the above Special Civil Application under Article 227 of the Constitution. The interim stay ordered by this Court was vacated and when a fresh application for stay was made, this Special Civil Application was ordered to be fixed for hearing. Mr. Morje, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, urged that the Appellate Bench had no jurisdiction to pass directions against both the old landlord and the new landlord when the old landlord had ceased to be a landlord and there was no order passed by the trial Court against the new landlord-petitioner. He also submitted that in any event it was the duty of the Appellate Bench to remand the matter for giving an opportunity to the petitioner as requested by him for cross-examining the witnesses whom the old landlord and his Advocate had failed to cross-examine as they had lost interest in the property and were negotiating to sell the property to the petitioner and actually sold it a day after the matter was decided by the trial Court. The proceedings under section 24(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947, are by way of an inquiry. The proceedings under section 24(3) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947, are by way of an inquiry. It is a summary remedy provided to the tenants against the landlord committing breach of section 24(1) which lays down that no landlord either himself or through any person acting or purporting to act on his behalf shall without just or sufficient cause cut off or withhold any essential supply or service enjoyed by the tenant in respect of the premises let to him. The order directing the landlord to restore such supply or service after an inquiry under sub-section (3) of section 24 is a personal order directed against the landlord as can be seen from the sub-section which reads as under : "24(3) If the Court on inquiry finds that the tenant has been in enjoyment of the essential supply or service and that it was cut off or withheld by the landlord, without just or sufficient cause, the Court shall make an order directing the landlord to restore such supply or service before a date to be specified in the order. Any landlord who fails to restore the supply or service before the date so specified shall for each day during which the default continues thereafter be liable (upon a further direction by the Court to that effect) to fine which may extend to one hundred rupees. " A concurrent remedy is also provided under sub-section (4) to the tenant who can complain to a Magistrate and get the landlord convicted under the sub-section. Section 47 makes the offence under sub-section (4) of section 24 cognizable. Explanation II to section 24 reads as follows : "Explanation II.---For the purpose of this section, withholding any essential supply or service shall include acts or omissions attributable to the landlord on account of which the essential supply or service is cut off by the local authority or any other competent authority." Section 29 of the Rent Act lays down that an appeal shall lie against an order made by the Court to Small Causes, to a Bench of two judges of that Court. In the present case the proceedings were instituted on an application made by the tenant. But it is clear from the scheme of section 24 that what the Court has to do is to hold an inquiry. In the present case the proceedings were instituted on an application made by the tenant. But it is clear from the scheme of section 24 that what the Court has to do is to hold an inquiry. In other words, the proceedings are by way of inquiry to be held by the Judge of the Small Causes Court so far as Greater Bombay is concerned. The inquiry must end in an order which is revisable. Under the proviso to section 29 Part (IV) it is laid down that no appeal shall lie from an order made upon an application by a tenant for a direction to restore any essential supply or service in respect of the premises let to him. Section 31 of the Bombay Rent Act lays down that the courts specified in sections 28 and 29 shall follow the prescribed procedure in trying and hearing suits, proceedings, applications and appeals in executing orders made by them. It is not disputed before me that the Small Causes Court at Bombay, can, in the course of hearing an ordinary appeal, implead a necessary party to that appeal. In the present case the revision is merely a continuation of an inquiry under section 24(3); and, therefore, absence of an application made by the tenants does not vitiate the notice of the proceedings given to the petitioner and the petitioner cannot therefore, contend that the Appellate Bench had no jurisdiction to implead him as a party to the revision application filed by the tenant. It is not disputed before me that in a revision application under section 29(3) the Appellate Bench could, in exercise of its powers, implead a necessary party in the proceedings. The Petitioner was a necessary party because he had become the landlord of the premises in dispute on October 1, 1974, as already stated above. It cannot, therefore, be said that the revisional Bench had no jurisdiction to serve the notice of the proceedings on the Petitioner. However, the second contention of Mr. Morje is well-founded. The order to be passed under section 24 is a personal order against the landlord whose acts or omissions have resulted in withholding of the essential supply to the tenants. The word landlord must have the same meaning which is attributed to it under section 5(3) of the Bombay Rent Act. The petitioner became the landlord on October 1, 1974. The order to be passed under section 24 is a personal order against the landlord whose acts or omissions have resulted in withholding of the essential supply to the tenants. The word landlord must have the same meaning which is attributed to it under section 5(3) of the Bombay Rent Act. The petitioner became the landlord on October 1, 1974. The order which was passed against the former landlord is not binding on him under any provisions of the Bombay Rent Act. Mr. Dalvi, the learned Counsel appearing for the tenants, submitted that the said order would be binding on the new landlord under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code. But that rule cannot have any application to an enquiry to be held under section 24(3), particularly when it cannot be said that the application was instituted in the name of a wrong person or that it was doubtful whether it had been instituted in the name of the right person as stated in Order 1 Rule 10(1). Order 1 Rule 10(2) empowers the Court at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order the name of any party improperly joined to be struck off and the name of any person who ought to have been joined to be made a party. It may be that this power empowered the revisional Court to implead the petitioner in the revisional proceedings but that does not mean that the original order passed by the trial Court is binding on the landlord without the new landlord getting any opportunity to show cause against any such order being passed. There is nothing in Order 1 Rule 10 which lays down that an order passed against the previous landlord under section 24 would be binding on the new landlord who purchased the property a day after the order was passed against the old landlord. Mr. Dalvi then relied on Order XXII Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code which lays down : "10(1) In other cases of assignment, creation or devolution of any interest during the pendency of a suit, the suit may, by leave of the Court, be continued by or against the person to or upon whom such interest has come or devolved. Dalvi then relied on Order XXII Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code which lays down : "10(1) In other cases of assignment, creation or devolution of any interest during the pendency of a suit, the suit may, by leave of the Court, be continued by or against the person to or upon whom such interest has come or devolved. (2) The attachment of a decree pending an appeal therefrom shall be deemed to be an interest entitling the person who procured such attachment to the benefit of sub-rule (1)." Mr. Dalvi contended that because the petitioner purchased the property a day after the order was passed by the trial Court, the order could be considered as binding under this rule or under a general principle that whoever purchases the property purchases it subject to all the obligations in connection with the property. He could not point out any provision of law under which an obligation like the obligation under section 24 would be binding on the new landlord when the new landlord had no opportunity to show cause against an order being passed under section 24. As stated above, the directions for restoration of essential services are to be made only after a proper inquiry. It can never be said that a proper inquiry is made against the new landlord merely because an inquiry was held against the old landlord. Natural justice and fairplay require that the new landlord must be heard before any directions are given to him to restore the services and he is made liable to pay a daily fine of Rs. 25/- as ordered by the trial Court in this case. There is nothing before me to show that the new landlord, the petitioner, was aware of the proceedings pending between the tenants and the old landlord. The Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court had assumed that merely because the tenants were in possession of the building, therefore, the petitioner ought to have known about the proceedings in the Small Causes Court. It is difficult to understand this reasoning, because unless there is some evidence to show that some tenants had brought it to the notice of the new landlord or the new landlord had somehow known about the proceedings no such inference can be drawn from the mere fact that there are tenants in the premises. It is difficult to understand this reasoning, because unless there is some evidence to show that some tenants had brought it to the notice of the new landlord or the new landlord had somehow known about the proceedings no such inference can be drawn from the mere fact that there are tenants in the premises. Even assuming that the new landlord was aware of these proceedings, for which there is no evidence on the record, or ought to have made himself aware of these proceedings, it is not possible to hold that the directions given to the old landlord can bind the new landlord in the absence of any general principle of law or provision in Section 24 or somewhere else to impose a liability with regard to the carrying out of the directions under section 24 as to show that the new landlord would be liable under these directions. It must be noted that section 24 creates not merely a civil liability to restore the services, but also a penal liability of being fined for not restoring the services and a further penal liability to be convicted by a criminal Court. The section must, therefore, be strictly construed. It is true that the word landlord is defined in the section so as to include a successor in title of the original landlord. But to hold that the successor in title would be liable for any directions given under section 24 would result in absurd results. For instance, if the landlord dies leaving behind him all minor children, every one of these children would be liable to restore those services if the interpretation made by the Appellate Bench is correct. I do not think that such an absurd result was intended by the legislature. The liability to be imposed on the landlord under section 24 is a personal liability. It is open to new landlord to take that liability and to carry it out; but if he has any grievance, he can make an application to the Court to hold a fresh inquiry under section 24(3). Sub-section 3 does not even say that the tenant should make an application and thereafter the Court should hold an inquiry. In any event, there is nothing in that section to transmit the liability incurred by a previous landlord to a new landlord. Sub-section 3 does not even say that the tenant should make an application and thereafter the Court should hold an inquiry. In any event, there is nothing in that section to transmit the liability incurred by a previous landlord to a new landlord. There is also nothing in the section which continue the liability of the old landlord even after he sells his property. It may be that for the breach committed by him while he was a landlord, he may be prosecuted or he may be liable for the fine which is already imposed in the event of default, upto the time that he continued to be a landlord; but I do not think that the old landlord would continue to be liable after he ceases to be the landlord, to restore the essential services to the tenants. All these aspects have been completely ignored by the Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court when modifying the order passed by the trial Court on the revision application made by the tenants. It was the duty of the Appellate Bench in the facts and circumstances of the case to grant the request of the petitioner and give him an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses who are examined at the trial Court. The petitioner has filed an additional affidavit, after one of the tenants has filed his affidavit in reply to the petition, which discloses several disputed facts between the tenants and the new landlord. Before giving directions to the new landlord, the Appellate Bench ought to have given him an opportunity to say what he wanted to say or to lead such evidence as he wanted to lead with regard to the directions proposed to be given to him under section 24. The order passed by the appellate Bench against the petitioner is, therefore, liable to be set aside. So far as the original landlord is concerned, he appears to have completely lost interest in the litigation. He did not challenge the order passed by the trial Court; though he was served with the notice of the revisional proceedings, he did not care to appear before the Appellate Bench, he was served even with the notice of the above special civil application, but he has not cared to appear in this Court. He did not challenge the order passed by the trial Court; though he was served with the notice of the revisional proceedings, he did not care to appear before the Appellate Bench, he was served even with the notice of the above special civil application, but he has not cared to appear in this Court. In so far as the order is against the original landlord, therefore, it is unnecessary to say anything against the order passed against him. I leave them as they are subject to what I have stated above; but so far as the petitioner is concerned, the order passed by the trial Court not bind him, as the directions to be given under section 24(3) are directions to be given to the actual landlord personally. If the landlord is a corporate body or a society or a trust the Court will have to give directions to some living human persons who will fall within the definition of the word landlord contained in the Bombay Rent Act. We are not concerned with such a situation in the instant case. It is open to the Small Causes Court to hold a proper inquiry under section 24(3) and then proceed to give such directions to the new landlord as it may consider proper and legal in the light of the observations made hereinabove, after giving an opportunity to file the statements, if any, or to examine witnesses, if any, in addition to giving an opportunity to the petitioner to cross-examine the witnesses already examined after recalling them. A fair opportunity should be given to all the parties before the orders are passed under section 24(3). In the result, Special Civil Application No. 2309 of 1976 is allowed. The judgment and order passed by the Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court are set aside and quashed so far as the petitioner is concerned, and R.A.N. Application No. 630/RES of 1972 is restored to the file of the Court of Small Causes at Bombay for holding a proper inquiry as directed above and then give directions to the petitioner in accordance with law and in the light of the observation made hereinabove. Rule made absolute Costs in the original proceedings. Rule made absolute Costs in the original proceedings. The proceedings shall be heard and disposed of as early as possible not later than a month after the receipt of the writ of this Court, and before the end of December 1976. -----