STATE OF KARNATAKA v. R. P. VASUDEVA — 1976 DIGILAW 163 (KAR)

( 1 ) SHRI R. N. Vasudeva (Petr. in WP. 922 of 1975), hereinafter referred to as the 'petitioner' was in the IAS Cadre of Karnataka State. He and his family, after partition of the country came to India from Sargoda Dist, which now forms part of Pakistan. The family, which consisted of himself and his brothers, held some garden land in Sargoda Dist. In lieu thereof, they received compensation quite some time back. When he was on deputation with the Central Govt, about 3 acres of land in village Chhatarpur (Delhi) stood in the name of his wife from the year 1965 onwards. The said land was got cultivated by the petitioner through hired labour under his own supervision. Expecting his transfer back to the Karnataka State after the expiry of his deputation with the Central Govt in the year 1967, and with the intention of starting an agricultural farm in Karnataka State, the petitioner got purchased through his attorney, certain land by two sale deeds dt. 15-6-1967 and 16-11-1967. He was actually transferred to karnataka State in September, 1967 and took his assignment as Divisional commissoner of Bangalore Division, Bangalore. ( 2 ) AFTER securing the land in the manner aforesaid in Karnataka state, he took steps to start agricultural operations therein and ag a preliminary step got boring done through the Dept of Geology and Mining at his own cost. He got about 200 coconut and 150 guava and sapota planted and he also raised Ragi crop therein. Finding water supply from the bore inadequate for the cultivation, and irrigation through hired laboui costly, the petitioner gave up the idea of pursuing cultivation and sought the said land to be converted into one for non-agricultural use. His application to that effect was allowed by the Deputy Commr under S. 95 of the karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as the 'revenue act' ). The petitioner in the meantime rose to the position of the Chier secretary of the State of Karnataka, but in May, 1971 he stood again transferred to the Central Govt on deputation, where from he eventually retired. ( 3 ) ON 17th December 1971, the Asst Commr of Bangalore Sub-Divn, bangalore, issued notice (Ext. The petitioner in the meantime rose to the position of the Chier secretary of the State of Karnataka, but in May, 1971 he stood again transferred to the Central Govt on deputation, where from he eventually retired. ( 3 ) ON 17th December 1971, the Asst Commr of Bangalore Sub-Divn, bangalore, issued notice (Ext. A) u/s. 83 of the Karnataka Land Reforms act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the 'act'), calling upon him to assciate with an enquiry to be made under that section and to help him to find out whether the purchases in question effected through sale deeds dt. 15-6-1967 and 16-11-19767 had been effected in contravention of the provisions of the 'act', in particular of S. 80 of the 'act'. In obedience to the said notice, he filed his objections (Ext. B) and also made a sworn statement before him (Ext. C) wherein he reiterated the contents of his objection- statement. Therein apart from mentioning the facts, which had been already recapitulated earlier in this judgment, the petitioner took the stand that he was an agriculturist and therefore, did not contravene the provisions of S. 80 of the 'act'; that the land having already been converted for non-agricultural use, lost its character of agricultural land and therefore, the Assistant commissioner had no jurisdiction to go into the matter; that since, in any case, the land had been purchased for raising an agricultural farm by the personal cultivation and that in fact, he had taken up cultivation in right earnest, the conditions prescribed in the provisio to S. 80 of the Act, for according permission to purchase, stood amply fulfilled. ( 4 ) THE Assistant Commissioner by his order (Ext. D) dated 12-4-1973 declared the aforesaid sale transactions as null and void holding that the petitioner was not an agriculturist in that, the land that he got cultivated under his supervision was in the ownership of his wife, as she held the same in her own right and not as a benamidar of the petitioner, as had been asserted by him in the objection-statements as also in his testimony. ( 5 ) THE petitioner went up in appeal to the Karnataka Revenue Appellate tribunal, (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal ). ( 5 ) THE petitioner went up in appeal to the Karnataka Revenue Appellate tribunal, (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal ). Before it, apart from reiterating his contentions raised before the Assistant Commissioner, he additionally urged that the letter of the Central Government, which had led the Assistant Commissioner to hold that the land in Chhattarpur village in Delhi was held by petitioner's wife in her own right and not as benamidar of the petitioner, was never shown or put to him and therefore, he did not have the opportunity to explain the contents of the said letter. 5 (a ). Since admittedly the said letter had been relied upon by the assistant Commissioner without even putting it to the petitioner, this contention of the petitioner prevailed with the Tribunal, which by its order dated 20th July, 1974 (Ext. F) without going into the merits of the case remained the case back to the Assistant Commissioner for re-determination. 5 (b ). The State of Karnataka aggrieved by this order of the Tribunal has challenged it in this Court on the writ side through WP. No. 55 of 1975. The petitioner too following on its heels has challenged in his WP. No. 922 of 1975, the order of the Tribunal, as also that of the Assistant Commissioner dated 12-4-1973 (Ext. D) and the notice issued by the Assistant Commissioner after the case had been remanded to him by the Tribunal. No. 55 of 1975. The petitioner too following on its heels has challenged in his WP. No. 922 of 1975, the order of the Tribunal, as also that of the Assistant Commissioner dated 12-4-1973 (Ext. D) and the notice issued by the Assistant Commissioner after the case had been remanded to him by the Tribunal. ( 6 ) THE order of the Tribunal has been assailed by the petitioner on the ground that it failed to give its own findings on merits, while that of the asst Commissioner is challenged inter alia, on the ground that the provisions of S. 83 of the Act whereunder he issued the notice, suffer from vice of excessive delegation of the Legislative power, in that no period of limitation was mentioned within which the Assistant Commissioner could seek to declare a sale transaction as null and void; that the Assistant Commissioner was estopped from enquiring into the matter as the Deputy Commissioner by his order dated 19th April, 1969, had permitted the petitioner to get the land converted for the use of non-agricultural purposes, which fact was within the knowledge of the Assistant Commissioner; that the penalty provisions incorporated in S. 83 by the Amendment Act of 1and74 were ultra vires the provisions of the Constitution, as it provided for acquisition of land without payment of compensation; that the order of the Assistant Commissioner suffers from an error of law apparent on the face of the record in that the petitioner was held by him to be non-agriculturist merely from the fact that the land, which he had got cultivated through hired labour and under his own supervision did not belong to him, although according to the relevant provisions of the Act he could not be held to be an agriculturist. ( 7 ) THE two writ petitions besides being between the same parties, are also intimately connected with each other and therefore, we think it appropriate and advisable to dispose them of by a common order. ( 8 ) DEALING with the writ petition of the State first, it may be observed, the only question that falls for determination therein is, as to whether the tribunal was competent to entertain the appeal of the petitioner. Mr. ( 8 ) DEALING with the writ petition of the State first, it may be observed, the only question that falls for determination therein is, as to whether the tribunal was competent to entertain the appeal of the petitioner. Mr. M. P. Chandrakantharaj Urs, learned Counsel for the State, canvassing ths point that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal of the petitioner, made reference to the fact that the Assistant Commissioner while dealirg with the matter falling under S. 83 of the Act, acted as 'the prescribed authority' and not as the Assistant Commissioner and since in the Act no provision is made for an appeal from the orders passed by the 'prescribed authority', sub-sec. (2) of S. 118 of the Act, as it then stood at the relevant time, providing for an appeal inter alia, from the orders passed by the assistant Commissioner, could not be availed of by the petitioner. ( 9 ) AT this stage, reference to Ss. 82 and 83 of the Act as it then stood prior to Amendment Act I 1974 is necessary. They read : "82. Reporting of illegal transactions : Every village officer and every officer of the Revenue, Registration and Land Records Departments shall report to the Tribunal or other prescribed authority as the case may be, every transaction in respect of any land in contravention of any of the provisions of this Act, which comes to the notice of such officer. 83. Inquiry regarding illegal transactions ; The prescribed authority shall, after a summary inquiry, determine whether the transaction reported to it under S. 82 or coming to its notice in any other manner is in contravention of the provisions of this Act,. and make a declaration accordingly. Any transaction so declared to be in contravention of any of the provisions of this Act shall be null and void". A perusal of the provisions of S. 82 of the Act aforesaid would show that various functionaries mentioned therein were required to report, inter alia, to the prescribed authority any violation of the provisions of the Act. Any transaction so declared to be in contravention of any of the provisions of this Act shall be null and void". A perusal of the provisions of S. 82 of the Act aforesaid would show that various functionaries mentioned therein were required to report, inter alia, to the prescribed authority any violation of the provisions of the Act. The provisions of S. 83 of the Act aforesaid reveal that the prescribed authority would, after a summary enquiry, determine as to whether any contravention had been made, and if it came by a transaction gone through in contravention of any provision of the Act, declare the same as null and void. ( 10 ) ADMITTEDLY the 'prescribed authority' was not identified in the Act. It had to be done by the rule making body. Rule 39 of the Karnataka Land reforms Rules, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as the 'rules') identify the 'prescribed authority' referred to in S. 82 of the Act, to be the Assistant commissioner of the Revenue Sub-Division, in which the land in question happened to be located. It wa. s apparently the 'prescribed authority' refer- red to in 9. 82 of the Act that was intended to act under S. 83 and thus the assistant Commissioner came to be specified as the 'prescribed authority' by the rule making authority to act under S. 83 of the Act aforesaid. ( 11 ) THE provisions of sub-sec (2) of S. 118 of the Act as it then stood, provide for appeals from the various orders passed under the Act. Its relevant portion reads : "118 (2 ). From every order passed by the Deputy Commissioner or the Assistant Commissioner, an appeal shall lie to the Mysore Revenue appellate Tribunal and the order of the Revenue Appellate tribunal on such appeal shall be final". A perusal of sub-sec (2) of S. 118 of the Act would show that it provides for an appeal from the order of the Deputy Commissioner or Assistant commissioner and not from that of any 'prescribed authority' under the Act. The question that arises for consideration is as to whether, by providing for an appeal from the order of the Assistant Commissioner, the Legislature, in the aforesaid provision, intended to provide for an appeal from the orders' of the Assistant Commissioner, while acting as a 'prescribed authority'. The question that arises for consideration is as to whether, by providing for an appeal from the order of the Assistant Commissioner, the Legislature, in the aforesaid provision, intended to provide for an appeal from the orders' of the Assistant Commissioner, while acting as a 'prescribed authority'. ( 12 ) A plain reading of the aforesaid provision leaves no manner of doubt that it does not do so. Such an intention cannot be implied also, for at the time when the Legislature specified the 'prescribed authority' to deal with the matter under S. 83 of the Act, the Legislature could rot be sure as to whether the Assistant Commissioner would be the 'prescribed authority'. The rule making body could even have named some one as the 'prescribed authority', who did not find a mention in ihe provision? of sub-sec (2) ol s. 118 of the Act. Hence, we are clearly of the view that the Tribunal could not act as an appellate authority and entertain an appeal from the order ol the 'prescribed authority' under S. 83 of the Act. ( 13 ) WE are, however, not oblivious of the fact that even the trivial orders passed by the Assistant Commissioner are appealable but not an order entailing such serious consequences r. r, the nullifying of the transaction and the forfeiture of the land, 1h nbject-mat'er or the transaction, to the State, without compensation. But that was for the Legislature to see. So far as the Courts are concerned, the illogicality pointed out above cannot provide a sufficient justification to hold that the Legislature while providing for an appeal from the orders of the Assistant Commissioner, also provided for an appeal from such orders of the Assistant Commissioner as passed while acting as the 'prescribed authority' for, that would be quite contrary to the intention of the Legislature, as already observed. ( 14 ) IN view of the above, the writ petition filed by the State against the order of the Tribunal has to be allowed and therefore, the impugned order is hereby quashed. ( 15 ) NOW coming to the contentions of the petitioner raised in WP. 922 of 1975, it may be observed that the crux of the matter lies in the fact as to whether the petitioner, at the relevant time, was an agriculturist as envisaged by the relevant provisions of the Act. ( 15 ) NOW coming to the contentions of the petitioner raised in WP. 922 of 1975, it may be observed that the crux of the matter lies in the fact as to whether the petitioner, at the relevant time, was an agriculturist as envisaged by the relevant provisions of the Act. ( 16 ) HOWEVER, before proceeding toi consider the relevant provisions on the point, it is necessary to notice the facts upon which the said provisions are to operate. ( 17 ) THE allegations in the petition, which have not been controverted by the respondents, are the mere reiteration of the assertions made before the Asst Commr by the petitioner in his objection-statements and his sworn testimony except in regard to the fact as to whether the land which stood in the name of petitioner's wife in Chhattarpur village (Delhi) belonged to her in her own right or she was merely his benamidar. In the writ petition, the petitioner has not asserted that she held the land as his benamidar, and in the counter filed to the petition of the State, he positively states that the land in question belonged to his wife. So whatever may have been the stand of the petitioner before the Asst Commr, the factual position in regard to the factum of ownership of Chhattarpur village (Delhi) land that emerges in this Court is that the said land was held and owned by the petitioner's wife in her own right and therefore, the Asst Commr was right in proceeding on the premises that the land in Chhattapur villalage (Delhi) was owned by the petitioner's wife in her own right and not as benamidar of the petitioner. It is on these premises that one has to determine as to whether the conclusion drawn by the Asst Commr that the petitioner was not an agriculturist is justified in law or not. ( 18 ) CLAUSE (3) of sub-sec (A) of S. 2 of the Act, as it stood at the relevant time, defines 'agriculturist' as 'a person who cultivates land personally'. Immediately a question crops up as to what do we mean by the term 'cultivates land personally'. ( 18 ) CLAUSE (3) of sub-sec (A) of S. 2 of the Act, as it stood at the relevant time, defines 'agriculturist' as 'a person who cultivates land personally'. Immediately a question crops up as to what do we mean by the term 'cultivates land personally'. The Legislature answers this query in cl (11) of the aforesaid section, which reads : (11) 'to cultivat personally' means to cultivate land on one's own account- , (i) by one's own labour, or (ii) by the labour of any member of one's family, or (iii) by hired labour or by servants on wages payable in cash or kind, but not in crops share, under the personal supervision of oneself or by member of one's family; explanation I.-Any of the persons mentioned in proviso (b) to sub-sec (1) of S. 5 shall be deemed to cultivate the land personally if such land is cultivated by servants or by hired labour. Explanation II-In the case of joint family, the land shall be deemed to be cultivated personally, if it is cultivated by any member of such family. Explanation III-In the case of a company, association or other body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, or a religious, charitable or other institutions capable of holding property, the land shall be deemed to be cultivated personally, if such land is cultivated by hired labour or by servants under the personal supervision of an employee or agent of such company, association, body or institution;' a perusal of the aforesaid clause would show that it makes a reference to one's family and so the fact as to what the Legislature understood by the word 'family' also became relevant and the definition thereof was attempted by Legislature in Cl (12) of the aforesaid section, which is in the following terms :" (12) 'family' in relation to a person means such person, and it married, the wife or husband, as the case may be, and the dependent children and grand-children of such person:"perusal of the definition of 'agriculturist' in Cl (3) of sub-sec (A) of s. 2 and the definition of the expression 'to cultivate personally' in Cl (11) of sub-sec (A) of S. 2, would show that the land referred to therein has not, been envisaged to be necessarily in the ownership of the person who 'personally cultivates it. ' ( 19 ) THE facts that are admitted on all hands are that the petitioner got cultivated the land belonging to his wife through hired labour under his own supervision at the relevant time, when he effected purchase of the land in Karnataka State. The question that arises for consideration is whether that amounted to 'cultivate land on his own account'. If the answer to this query is in the affirmative, then there can be no doubt that he has to be treated as an agriculturist as defined by Cl (3) of sub-sec (A) or section 2 of the Act. ( 20 ) IT has been contended by Mr. Urs on behalf of respondent-Statt that the petitioner in getting his wife's land cultivated through hirea labour under his own supervision, got that land cultivated on account of his wife, as the land belonged to his wife. ( 21 ) THE question is can the expression 'on one's own account' be interpreted to mean 'exclusively on account of the owner', if the land 01 an owner member of the family is got cultivated through hired labour, under the personal supervision, by another family member ('family' as defined in Cl (12) of the aforesaid section ). ( 22 ) IT would be seen that the expression used in Cl (11) of sub-sec (A) of S. 2 is to cultivate land on one's own account' and not 'to cultivate land solely or exclusively on one's own account'. The expression 'on one's own account' has not been defined by the Legislature in the Act or in the other statutes referred to in S. 2 (B ). It is also clear that the expression 'on one's own account' is not a term of art. Therefore, it has to be presumed that the Legislature while using the above expression had in mind its dictionary meaning. ( 23 ) IN Concise Oxford Dictionary, the expression 'on one's own account' is described to mean 'at one's own purpose or risk'. In Webster's third New International Dictionary Vol. 1, the expression 'on one's own account' is described to mean (1) for one's own interest or on one's own behalf (I am doing it on my own account not for any one else) (2) on one's own risk (3) on one's own intelligence or strength: on his own motivation'. In Webster's third New International Dictionary Vol. 1, the expression 'on one's own account' is described to mean (1) for one's own interest or on one's own behalf (I am doing it on my own account not for any one else) (2) on one's own risk (3) on one's own intelligence or strength: on his own motivation'. ( 24 ) THUS, it would be seen that one of the dictionary meaning as given to the expression 'or. one's own account' is for one's own interest or one's own behalf. The question, therefore, would arise whether the petitioner had in the cultivation of the land owned by his wife, a familymember as defined by Cl (12) of the aforesaid section, that degree of interest, as to term 'cultivation' of his wife's land through hired labour under his personal supervision 'on his own account' as well. ( 25 ) BY virtue of relationship of the family members inter se more particularly of a husband and wife inter se and of a dependent son to his father, and the consequent interest in the land and its product of each such member of the family, it cannot be said that in the cultivation of the land of the owner member in the manner envisaged in Cl (11) (iii), such super- vising member -would have no interest. ( 26 ) THEREORE, in the. given case, where one member of the family gets cultivated the land of the owner member of his family through hired labour under his own supervision, the said cultivation by such supervising member would squarely fall within the definition of 'personal cultivation' as defined in Cl (11) of the aforesaid section. ( 27 ) MR. URS, learned Counsel for the respondents at this stage has urged that such a construction on Cl (11) is not warranted by the Explanations added to the said clause. He further contended that the aforesaid construction on cl (11) would defeat the object of the provisions of S. 80 of the Act, which is inter alia intended to see that the agricultural land does not pass out from the hands of the agriculturists into those of non-agriculturists, who instead of putting the land for agricultural use, might use for speculative purposes and get it converted for non-agricultural use which besides resulting in the reduction of agricultural area would create other social problems. We do not think, the learned Counsel is right in his submissions. ( 28 ) AS for the construction sought to be put on Cl (11) of the said section, not being warranted by Explanations added to Cl (11) is concerned, it may be observed that the said Explanations had been added to mitigate the hardship which would have otherwise resulted to certain persons if the explanations in question had not been added. ( 29 ) FOR instance, Explanation I was added to protect the interests of persons referred to in proviso (b) to subsec (1) of S. 5 of the Act, as it stood at the relevant time. The persons mentioned therein, are a minor, a widow, an unmarried woman, a person incapable of cultivating land by reason of any physical or mental disability, or a soldier in service in the Armed forces of the Union or a seaman. ( 30 ) THE Legislature may have regarded that persons in a given case, by virtue of circumstances peculiar to them may not be able to cultivate the land held by :them in the three modes indicated in Cl (11) i. e. , by one's own labour, or by the labour of any member of one's family, (if in a given case none of them had any family member) or through hired labour or by servants under personal supervision or under the supervision of a family member. Then perforce they would have to carry on cultivation by hired labour under the supervision by an employee. If Explanation I had not been added, to Cl (11), cultivation of their land in such a manner would not have been considered as their 'personal cultivation' which fact would have caused great injustice to such persons who deserved to be protected. For instance, if such persons had resumed land under S. 14 of the Act, and if the explanations had not been added, cultivation of such land carried on through hired labour and under the supervision of an employee or an agent, then such resumed land could not have been retained by them and would have been forfeited to the Government. For instance, if such persons had resumed land under S. 14 of the Act, and if the explanations had not been added, cultivation of such land carried on through hired labour and under the supervision of an employee or an agent, then such resumed land could not have been retained by them and would have been forfeited to the Government. ( 31 ) EXPLANATION II was added to take care of a case of the joint family, where a member of such joint family may not necessarily be member of the family as defined in Cl (12) of the aforesaid section and if the joint family land had been cultivated by one of the family members and if that family member did not answer to the description of the family member as defined in Cl (12) and if Cl (11) would have stood without Explanation II, the cultivation by such a family member would not have been considered as 'personal cultivation' by other family members of the joint family. Since the Legislature intended that even in such a case, the other members of the joint family should be treated as to have cultivated the land 'personally' the explanation II was added to Cl (11 ). ( 32 ) EXPLANATION III was added as the Legislature intended that the individual member of a Company, association or other body of individuals, etc. , should be treated to have 'personally cultivated' the land held by such a body even if the cultivation had been done in neither of the three modes mentioned in Cl (11) for, in the nature of things, in the case of a company, association etc. , the three modes indicated could not have been complied with. For instance, a company or association being a juristic person, could not cultivate by its own labour, nor could it cultivate by a member of family (Company would not have a family) and members of the family of its individual members would not constitute family as defined in Cl (12) in regard to other members of such association. For that very reason, supervision of cultivation through hired labour by any member of the family of individual member of such a company could not have satisfied the requirement of Clause (11) (iii) of the Act. For that very reason, supervision of cultivation through hired labour by any member of the family of individual member of such a company could not have satisfied the requirement of Clause (11) (iii) of the Act. ( 33 ) HENCE in all these three cases i. e. cultivation of the land, held by persons covered by Explanation I or by a joint family covered by Explanation II or by a Company, association etc. , covered by Explanation III, through hired labour under the supervision of an employee would be considered on account of such persons although if these Explanations had not been added to Cl (11), such would not have been the case. ( 34 ) THIS, however, would not prove the converse, that is, if a member of the family as defined by Cl (12) gets cultivated the land belonging to his family member through hired labour under his supervision, such cultivation of the land would not be treated as cultivation by such supervising member 'on his own account'. ( 35 ) AS to the second contention advanced on behalf of the State, we do not quite see as to how the construction sought to be put on Cl (11) would defeat the object of the provisions of S. 80 of the Act. 35 (a ). With a view to highlight our misgiving in this regard, let us take two hypothetical cases in one the land is owned by the wife as in the present case, she takes no interest whatever in the land and her husband takes upon himself to have the land cultivated through hired labour under his personal cultivation. If in this given case, the wife had effected the present purchases in question, the underlining policy of 9. 80 of the Act would have been advanced. The only qualification she had was that she owned the land, although she had no interest in cultivation of that land whatsoever, nor knew anything about the cultivation of the land as such. But if the husband, who had husbanded the land, got it cultivated under his personal supervision through hired labour, were to purchase the land, as he has done, that would have defeated the object of the provisions of S. 80 of the Act. But if the husband, who had husbanded the land, got it cultivated under his personal supervision through hired labour, were to purchase the land, as he has done, that would have defeated the object of the provisions of S. 80 of the Act. ( 36 ) IN the other, take the case where the land is owned by a father who is totally negligent about the land, neglects cultivation thereof and the cultivation is taken up by the dependent son, who gets it cultivated through hired labour under his own supervision. We are again unable to understand as to how if the father had purchased the land that would have advanced the cause of provisipns of S. 80 of the Act but if the son were to purchase, that would have defeated its object. ( 37 ) IN any case, the embargo against the purchase of agricultural land by non-agriculturists is not absolute for, if the non-agriculturist intends bona fide to take to agriculture, he could be so permitted by the Asst. Commr. In the present case, it has not been contested that the petitioner after purchasing the land had in right earnest tried to cultivate the land. He had bored a well and planted guava, sapota and coconut trees and raised ragi crop and therefore, it cannot be said that the land purchased by him was intended for speculative purposes or for the purpose of turning agricultural land for non-agricultural use. ( 38 ) FOR the reasons stated, we hold that the petitioner, when he effected purchase of the land in Karnnataka State through sale deeds in question was an agriculturist and the Asst Commr, when he held that the petitioner was not an agriculturist and declared the transactions as null and void, committed an error of law apparent on the face of the record in that he failed to take into account the fact that for a person to qualify to be an 'agriculturist', it is not necessary that he should have got cultivated his own land. ( 39 ) IN view of our finding that the petitioner, at the relevant time, was an 'agriculturist' it is unnecessary to go into other grounds on which challenge to the legality of the order of the Asst Commr has been based. ( 39 ) IN view of our finding that the petitioner, at the relevant time, was an 'agriculturist' it is unnecessary to go into other grounds on which challenge to the legality of the order of the Asst Commr has been based. ( 40 ) IN the result, the writ petition filed by the petitioner is allowed and the order of the Asst Commr is quashed. The parties are left to bear their own costs in both the writ petitions. --- *** --- .