JUDGMENT H.N. Agarwal, Member. - This is a second appeal against the judgment and decree dated August 9, 1968 passed by Sri Saiyid Husain, Addl. Commissioner, Jhansi division in appeal no. 117 of 66-67 dismissing the appeal with costs against the decree dated March 10, 1967 passed by the Addl. S.C.O. Garotha, distt. Jhansi in suit no. 1/1965-66 u/s 176 of Z.A. and L.R. Act. 2. I have heard th eld. counsels for the parties and have gone through the record. 3. Pooran Singh, Ram Das and Smt. Lakhan, plaintiff-respondents had filed a suit regarding the division of holding claiming that they alongwith Babu and Sunder defendant-appellants were co-tenant of the land in suit having ?rd share. The trial court passed a preliminary decreed holding the plaintiff's share to be one-half. Thereafter on March 10, 1967 the trial court passed the order regarding preparation of the final decree. Babu and Sunder went up in appeal against the final decree. This appeal was dismissed by the Addl. Commissioner on August 9, 1968. They have now come up in second appeal before this court. 4. The main grounds taken in this appeal are that the judgments of the courts below are illegal as they were bound by the pleadings of the parties, that the alleged agreement relied upon by the courts below was inadmissible in evidence for want of registration, that the courts below and no jurisdiction to vary the preliminary decree which had become final between the parties and that one of the plots in suit plot i.e. no. 439 had already been sold on December 30, 1963 to one Smt. Sunder Dullaiya and both the parties have been equally benefited by the sale consideration and thus it was not the subject matter of the present suit which was instituted on October 27, 1965 long after the aforesaid sale. The appellant's prayer is that the trial court be directed to frame that final decree in accordance with the preliminary decree. It is of course a settled principle of law that the trial court as well as the appellant court are bound by the pleading of the parties. The Id. counsel for the appellant has referred to Venketa Reddy v. Pethi Reddy A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 992 in which a Full Bench of the Supreme court has observed as follows. It is of course a settled principle of law that the trial court as well as the appellant court are bound by the pleading of the parties. The Id. counsel for the appellant has referred to Venketa Reddy v. Pethi Reddy A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 992 in which a Full Bench of the Supreme court has observed as follows. "A preliminary decree passed, whether it is in a mortgage suit or a partition suit, is not a tentative decree but must, in so far as matters dealt with the by it are concerned, be regarded as conclusive. No doubt, in suits which contemplate the making of two decrees a preliminary decree and a final decree the decree which would by executable would be the final decree. But the finality of a decree or a decision does not necessarily depend upon its being executable. The legislature in its wisdom has thought that suits of certain types should be decided in stages and though the suit in such cases can be regarded as fully and completely decided only after a final decree the earlier stage also has finality attached to it. It would be relevant to refer to S. 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides that where a party aggrieved by a preliminary decree does not appeal from it, he is precluded from disputing its correctness in any appel which may be preferred form the final decree. This provision thus clearly indicates that as to the matter covered by it, a preliminary decree is regarded as embodying the final decision of the court passing that decree." 5. It would appear from the registered sale deed dated December 30, 1963 which is on record that the contesting parties had sold their Bhumidari plot no. 439 to one Smt. Sunder Dullaiya widow of Sheodin. Thus by virtue of this sale both the contesting parties had lost any claim for the plot and this plot was not even included in the plaint. It is settled principle of law that it is not open to trial court or appellate court to go beyond the pleadings of the parties and to set out anew case for them. Thus according to the principle it was not possible either for the trial court or for the lower appellate court to pass a decree allotting any share in this plot to the present contesting parties. Thus according to the principle it was not possible either for the trial court or for the lower appellate court to pass a decree allotting any share in this plot to the present contesting parties. It is however, seen that the trial court by its order dated November 15, 1966 varied the preliminary decree prepared on June, 20, 1966 and gave half share in plot no. 439 of the parties. The trial court has no jurisdiction to vary the terms of the preliminary decree in view of the Supreme Court judgment referred to above. Thus this order of the trail court dated November 15, 1966 and the final decree passed by the trial court on March 10, 1967 on the basis of this order are patently bad in law. 6. The trial court has referred to ,"an honest agreement between the parties to the effect that the plot no. 439 was really in possession of both the contesting parties even after sale." The so-called honest agreement' is really the height of dishonesty. It had not been registered though the law requires registration of any deed regarding property exceeding rs. 100/- in value. Since the area of plot no. 439 is 3-60 acres it is undisputed that its value exceeds Rs. 100/- in value. Thus the fact that this agreement has not been registered means that there has been an attempt to defraud government of requisite stamp duty on the registration this deed. The verdict of the trial court that this was an honest agreement which cannot be ignored is quite perverse in law and the Id. Addl. Commissioner has failed to correct this material legal error of the trial court. 7. The result is that I allow the appeal set aside the order of the Addl. commissioner dated August 9, 1968 and of the Addl. S.D.O. dated March 10, 1976 and direct that the trail court shall proceed to frame the final decree in accordance with the preliminary decree dated June 20, 1966.