VENKATASWAMI, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal under S. 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act (hereinafter referred 10 as the Act) is by the husband (petitioner) and directed against an order dismissing the petition preferred under S. 9 of that Act, made by the Civil judge in MC. No. 3 of 1973. ( 2 ) THE material allegations in the pleadings, briefly, are as follows: The petitioner's case is that he and the respondent were married in the year 1068 and lived together till June, 1971 and be got a male child. Thereafter, the respondent-wife went to her parents' house in June, 1971 and never returned to her husband's house despite 'several attempts' by him to secure her return. On all these occasions the husband was turned out by the wife and her parents, and inspite of a legal notice got issued on 25-3-1972, the matters did not improve. Hence, the petition for restitution of conjugal rights. The petition has been resisted principally on the ground that the wife, during her stay with her husband, was 'severely illtreated' and even thereafter the husband had written letters to her threatening to do away with her and to commit suicide himself, with the result an apprehension was created in her mind that it would be harmful and injurious to her health and safety if she were to return to the marital home. ( 3 ) THE learned Civil Judge after an examination of the evidence adduced at trial, came to the conclusion that the wife had indeed been subjected to 'mental cruelty' during and after her stay with the husband. He, therefore, dismissed the petition. Hence, the appeal. ( 4 ) BEFORE proceeding to examine the evidence and the contentions urged bearing thereon, it is necessary briefly to refer to the law bearing on the case. ( 5 ) THE Act in question has been somewhat extensively amended by the marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, (Act No. 68 of 1976 ). He, therefore, dismissed the petition. Hence, the appeal. ( 4 ) BEFORE proceeding to examine the evidence and the contentions urged bearing thereon, it is necessary briefly to refer to the law bearing on the case. ( 5 ) THE Act in question has been somewhat extensively amended by the marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, (Act No. 68 of 1976 ). One of the sections so amended is S. 9, which after such amendment reads :"when either the husband or the wife has, without reasonable excuse, withdrawn from the society of the other, the aggrieved party may apply, by petition to the district court, for restitution of conjugal rights and the court, on being satisfied of the truth of the statements made in such petition and that there is no legal ground why the application should not be granted, may decree restitution of conjugal rights accordingly. Explanation-Where a question arises whether has been reasonable excuse for withdrawal from the society, the burden of proving reasonable excuse shall be on the person who has withdrawn from the society". ( 6 ) FURTHER by the provisions of S. 39 of the aforementioned amending act, it has been directed that all petitions and proceedings pending in any court on the day the said Act came into force, shall be dealt with and decided in accordance with the law as amended. The said section reads :"39. Special provision as to pending cases- (1) All petitions and proceedings in causes and matters matrimonial which are pending in any court at the commencement of the Marriage Laws (Amendment) act, 1976, shall be dealt with and decided by such court : (1) if it is a petition or proceeding under the Hindu Marriage Act, then so far as may be, as if it had been originally instituted therem under the Hindu Marriage Act, as amended by this Act; (ii) if it is a petition or proceeding under the Special Marriage Act, then so far as may be, as if it had been originally instituted therein under the Special Marriage Act, as amended by this Act. (2) In every petition or proceeding to which sub-sec. (1) applies, the court in which the petition or proceeding is pending shall give an opportunity to the parties to amend the pleadings, in so far as such amendment is necessary to give effect to the provisions of sub-sec. (2) In every petition or proceeding to which sub-sec. (1) applies, the court in which the petition or proceeding is pending shall give an opportunity to the parties to amend the pleadings, in so far as such amendment is necessary to give effect to the provisions of sub-sec. (1), within such time as it may allow in this behalf and any such amendment may include an amendment for conversion of a petition or proceeding for judicial separation into a petition or proceeding, as the case may be, for divorce". ( 7 ) IT is relevant to note that sub-sec. (1) of S. 9 as it stood before its amendment as aforesaid has remained unaltered except for the addition of an explanatory clause. It seems to us that the explanation has merely provided for a, rule of evidence by laying the burden of proof in regard to a question whether there has been a reasonable excuse for the withdrawal from the society of the petitioning spouse, on the party pleading such excuse. It is, therefore, reasonable to conclude that the said Explanation has not in any manner altered the scope and ambit of sub-sec. (1) of S. 9 of the Act before its amendment by the aforementioned Act. Nor for that matter the deletion of sub-sec (2) from the original S. 9 would make any difference as to the scope and ambit of S. 9 (1) of that Act. Sub-sec. (1) of S. 9, as it stood before its amendment, had come in for interpretation in at least two decisions of this Court. They are : Baldevdas v. Savitri 1962 Myslj 784. ; and Gangamma v. Hanumanthappa (1965) 1 Myslj 683. For the purpose of the present appeal, it is sufficient to reproduce the enunciation in regard to it in Baldevadas's case (1), which reads : "it is seen that while gub-sec. (2) relates to what should not be pleaded in answer to petition for restitution of conjugal rights, it is clear from sub-sec. (1) that before making a decree for restitution of conjugal rights, the Court should be satisfied; (1) that it was without reasonable excuse that the spouse had withdrawn from the society of the other, (2) that the statements made in the petition are true and (3) that there is no legal ground why the application should not be granted. (1) that before making a decree for restitution of conjugal rights, the Court should be satisfied; (1) that it was without reasonable excuse that the spouse had withdrawn from the society of the other, (2) that the statements made in the petition are true and (3) that there is no legal ground why the application should not be granted. Therefore, it follows that on the Court not being satisfied in respect of any of these three matters, the Court may refuse to grant a decree for restitution of conjugal rights, irrespective of what might have been pleaded by the other spouse in answer to the petition for restitution of conjugal rights. If it is not established that the withdrawal by the objecting spouse from the society of the petitioning spouse was without reasonable excuse, the Court will be justified in refusing to grant a decree for restitution of conjugal rights. ( 8 ) IN other words, even though the decree of cruelty may not have been established by the objecting spouse, yet, if the conduct of the petitioning spouse was such as to constitute reasonable excuse for the withdrawal by the objecting spouse, a decree for restitution may be refused. " again, as to the meaning to be attributed 1o the expression "reasonable excuse" occurring therein it has been enounced thus :"but, as to whether there has been reasonable excuse or not, in any particular case must necessarily depend upon the facts and circumstances of that case. There seems to be no justification for understanding this expression as having some technical meaning. In our opinion, these words should be understood in their ordinary sense. It would be sufficient, if the Court is satisfied that there was reasonable cause for the objecting spouse to withdraw from the society of the petitioning spouse. " ( 9 ) KEEPING these principles in view, we shall now proceed to examine the evidence in the case. The plea of the husband, as specifically set out in the petition, in regard to the attempts made by him to fetch the wife is:"thereon the petitioner made several attempts to bring his wife back to his place but the petitioner was turned out by the respondent and her parents". ( 10 ) THE only witness examined in support of such a plea is himself. ( 10 ) THE only witness examined in support of such a plea is himself. All that has been averred by him in this behalf is that he had approached her personally and requested her to come back. This has been denied on behalf of the wife. We find it difficult to accept this version of the husband, especially when it is seen that in none of the letters written by him, namely, Exts. D1, Ex. D2, and Ex. D4 to D6, has this fact been referred to. It seems to us that even assuming that he had in fact made such a request personally, it can hardly be said to be sufficient for the purpose of satisfying the requirements of S. 9 of the Act and to conclude that the wife had without reasonable excuse withdrawn from the society of the husband. It is evident from the age of the parties as shown in the cause title to the petition that they were both comparatively young at the relevant time and the wife was hardly 18 years of age. It is further to be seen that the wife had recently given birth to her first child. In this state of things and having regard to the fact that they both came from Hindu families having elders, it is ordinarily expected of such elders to take the initiative in regard to such a matter. We are not, therefore, inclined to believe the version of the husband in regard to this aspect of his case, far less conclude that the wife had without reasonable excuse withdrawn from the society of her husband Once this conclusion is reached, it follows that the husband must be held to have failed to establish his case for a decree for restitution of conjugal rights in the light of the principle enunciated in Baladevdas's Case (1), reproduced earlier. The petition, therefore, must fail on this ground alone. ( 11 ) ALL the same, we do not think it out of place to examine the evidence bearing on the question whether the wife had reasonable excuse to withdraw from the society of her husband. The oral evidence, consisting of that of the parties only, in our view, is vague and bereft of details and not much reliance can be placed on it one way or the other. The oral evidence, consisting of that of the parties only, in our view, is vague and bereft of details and not much reliance can be placed on it one way or the other. However, the documentary evidence produced in the shape of some letters written by the husband to the wife soon after the latter's return to her parents' house, affords an indication as to the state of mind of the parties, specially as to the possible reaction on the part of the wife in the face of the contents thereof. These letters are Ex. D1 to D6, all of them having been written by the husband to the wife with the exception of Ex. D3, which has been addressed to the father of the wife soon after marriage in the year 1968. These letters are inordinately lengthy and are unnecessary to be adverted to in any detail. But the learned counsel for the parties have taken us through the relevant portions thereof and we propose to confine our discussion to them. These letters being in Kannada, we have endeavoured to translate the portions referred into English and set out their sense as best as possible in the course of the ensuing discussion. ( 12 ) FIRST of these letters, Ex. D3, is dated 2nd August 1968 and is addressed to the father-in-law of the husband. It is to be noted that the parties were married in June 1968 and had continued to live together long thereafter, till june 1971. Hence this letter is not of any materiality to the issue before us. The only inference that flows from its contents is that the husband was not happy with the marriage and that he had not freely consented to it. ( 13 ) THE first of the letters to his wife, Exd. 1, is dated 17. 8. 1971, that is, written within a space of only two months of her return to her parents. It has a caption 'prateekara' (retaliation ). In this letter he has charged his wife as being mostly responsible for the differences between them. He has further thought fit to convey his final decision as regards his intention to seek a divorce. While stating his reasons for this decision, he has charged his wife as being hot-headed and as having made herself impossible to live with. In this letter he has charged his wife as being mostly responsible for the differences between them. He has further thought fit to convey his final decision as regards his intention to seek a divorce. While stating his reasons for this decision, he has charged his wife as being hot-headed and as having made herself impossible to live with. He has in more than one place in that letter reiterated his decision to seek a divoice. He has also assailed her character and stated that as the reason for his decision not to see her face again. He has demanded for the return of his son soon after his attaining the age of 6 months. He has also expressed his determination to see that "his son should have acquaintance with only one of his patents. He has further stated that he had decided to pay her maintenance and to marry again a, girl known to him and who had already agreed to marry him and bestow every love and affection on him. After having said all this, he has ended the letter with a somewhat equivocal statement expressing a fond hope that the past should be forgotten and a new life for both of them begun. It seems to us that this letter cannot be dismissed lightly by any self-respecting wife, especially when she was hardly 18 years of age and her sensibilities had not yet been blunted by any real experience of the knocks of married life. On a reading of this letter as a whole, we are clearly of the view that the husband must be credited with the intention to cause pain to his wife and it cannot at all be said to be the result of a momentary aberration as contended on his behalf. It is reasonable to think that the wife must have undergone considerable pain and mental suffering as a result of this letter. This circumstance, without more, in our view, is sufficient to hold that the wife had reasonable excuse to withdraw from the society of her husband, and also affords a sufficient basis for holding that the burden placed on her by virtue of the explanation appended to S. 9 of the Act had been amply discharged. The next letter is dated 12. 11. 1971. It has been written within 5 months of the return of the wife to her parent's house. The next letter is dated 12. 11. 1971. It has been written within 5 months of the return of the wife to her parent's house. The only material circumstance disclosed therein is that he has indirectly charged his wife with having committed some unspecified misdemeanours and offered to condone them if she wished to live with him as a loving wife. The next two letters Exs. D4 and D6 are dated 8. 12. 1971 and 24. 1. 1972 respectively. There is nothing much in these letters which deserves notice except that they indicate an attempt on the part of the husband to mollify the hurt feelings of his wife to some extent by appearing to relent from his earlier attitude towards her and expressing remorse for all that had happened till then. If the matters had rested at that, it would perhaps have been possible to look at the contents of Ex. D1 in the light not too unfavourable to the husband. ( 14 ) BUT the husband wrote one more letter, Exd2, dated 15,2. 1972, soon after his previous letter Ex. D6. In this letter the husband has charged his wife once again as being 'dharma bahira', that is one without morals or scruples, and threatened her with divine displeasure. He has also averred therein that he had taken to drinking and smoking. Indeed, he has gone to the length of threatening to ruin her life before himself committing suicide. Some reliance was sought to be placed on his behalf on the concluding part of the letter relating to his hope to live with her amicably, in support of an argument that it would be reasonable to attribute the whole thing to an emotional outburst resulting from his long separation from his wife at an early stage of married life. It may be that this letter when considered in isolation may lend itself to such an inference. But as have observed earlier, the letter Ex. D1, dated 17. 8. 1971, written as it has been within two months of their separation, could not be said to have been the result of a mere emotional outburst. The damage having been done thereby it was upon the husband and other elders of his family to have made suitable amends thereafter to avoid the contingency of the marriage going entirely on the rocks. The damage having been done thereby it was upon the husband and other elders of his family to have made suitable amends thereafter to avoid the contingency of the marriage going entirely on the rocks. Nothing much seems to have been done in this regard. For all these reasons, we are not persuaded to interfere with the decree in appeal. ( 15 ) IN view of the foregoing, the appeal is dismissed, but without costs. --- *** --- .