JUDGMENT : S.H. SHETH, J. 1. The plaintiff filed the present suit against the defendants for recovering possession of the suit premises which consist of a shop. He alleges three grounds : (1) defendant No. 1 has unlawfully sub-let the suit premises to defendants nos. 2, 3 and 4 ; (2) defendant No. 1 has constructed a partition wall which is a permanent structure within the meaning of section 13(l)(b) and (3) he has committed acts injurious to the suit premises. 2. The defendants denied sub-letting and commission of acts injurious to the suit property. They admitted that they have constructed it partition wall. 3. The learned Trial Judge found that defendant No. 1 has not sublet the suit premises to defendants Nos. 2, 3 and 4, that defendant No. 1 has constructed a partition wall by which he has divided the suit shop into two parts and that he had dug fire-pits and removed the existing partition wall and that both of them are such alterations as would not be removable without causing serious damage to the suit premises. In that view of the matter the learned Trial Judge passed against the defendants a decree for possession. 4. Defendants Nos. 1 and 4 appealed against that decree to the District Court. The learned District Judge confirmed the finding recorded by the learned Trial Judge and dismissed the appeal. It appears that a contention was raised before hint that the suit was not maintainable because the statutory notice was served upon defendant No. 1 not by the plaintiff landlord but by one Tahilram. For the reasons stated by him in his judgment the learned Appellate Judge negatived that contention and held that the suit was maintainable. 5. It is that appellate decree which is challenged by defendants Nos. 1 and 4 in this Civil Revision Application. 6. The first contention which Miss Shah has raised before me is that since the statutory notice was served upon defendant No. 1 not by the plaintiff landlord but by one Tahilram, the suit was not maintainable. She has also contended that it was Tahilram and not the plaintiff landlord who filed the suit. On that account, according to her, the suit was not maintainable. 7. She has relied upon the decision of this Court in Nanalal Girdharlal and another v. Gulamnabi Jamalbhai Motorwala and others, 13 Guj. L.R. 880. She has also contended that it was Tahilram and not the plaintiff landlord who filed the suit. On that account, according to her, the suit was not maintainable. 7. She has relied upon the decision of this Court in Nanalal Girdharlal and another v. Gulamnabi Jamalbhai Motorwala and others, 13 Guj. L.R. 880. It was a case in which one of the co-owners had served the statutory notice upon the tenant. I he principle which has been laid down by this Court in that decision is that where two or more co-owners have granted a periodic tenancy, it can be determined only by a notice to quit given by all co-owners. This would be so irrespective whether the co-owners are joint tenants or tenants-in-common and whether the periodic nature of the tenancy is agreed upon between the parties or, in the absence of a contract to the contrary, is implied by section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. This Court has further observed in that decision that it is not necessary that the statutory notice should be signed by all the co-owners. It is sufficient if it is given by someone acting as agent on behalf of the co-owners. The agent may be one of the co-owners himself or he may be a third person such as, for example, a solicitor or an advocate. Such an agency may be express or implied So long as the agency is established, notice to quit given by the agent would be a valid notice determining the tenancy. In any case, the authority of the agent, express or implied, must exist at the date when the notice to quit is given and subsequent ratification of the notice to quit by the co-owners would not be sufficient to determine the interest of the tenant. This decision clearly lays down that the statutory notice can be served by the landlord's agent upon the tenant. A person who acts as an agent on behalf of the landlord may have an express authority or an implied authority. 8. In the instant case, the question which has arisen is whether Tahilram D. Ramchandani was the agent of Trikamdas Dariyanomal, the landlord. There are two reasons on account of which the contention raised by Miss Shah cannot be upheld. Clause 8 of the rent-note, Ex. 8. In the instant case, the question which has arisen is whether Tahilram D. Ramchandani was the agent of Trikamdas Dariyanomal, the landlord. There are two reasons on account of which the contention raised by Miss Shah cannot be upheld. Clause 8 of the rent-note, Ex. 53 provides as follows- That the tenant shall treat the agent Shri Tahilram D.R. or any other agent appointed by the landlord as landlord for observance of the above terms and conditions." Therefore, so far as the enforcement of the terms and conditions of the tenancy were concerned, Tahilram was the agent of the plaintiff-landlord and defendant No. 1 accepted that position. Clause 8 does not expressly specify that Tahilramh would have the authority to terminate the tenancy of defendant No. 1 and to file a suit. However, the acceptance of the fact by defendant No. 1 that Tahilram was the agent of the plaintiff-landlord clearly implies that Tahilram had the authority not only to enforce the terms and conditions of the tenancy but also to terminate the tenancy of defendant No. 1 and file a suit against him. This rent-note has been signed by Tahilram on behalf of the landlord Trikamdas Dariyanomal. It has also been signed by defendant No. 1. The second reason on account of which the contention raised by Miss Shah cannot be upheld is that the rent-note was not executed directly between the landlord Trikamdas Darivanomal and defendant No. 1 but it was executed between defendant No. 1 on one hand and Tahilram Dwarkadas Ramchandani on the other hand to whom reference has been made in the rent-note as the authorised agent of Trikamdas Dariyanomal, the landlord These two facts which emerge out of the rent-note, Ex. 53, clearly establish that Tahilram Dwarkadas Ramchandani had the necessary authority to deal with the suit property to enforce the terms conditions of the tenancy against defendant No. 1 to determine the tenancy of defendant No.1 and to file a suit for possession against him. The learned Appellate Judge has adopted a very strange reasoning with which I am not able to agree. He has recorded the conclusion that the rent-note, Ex. 53, created tenancy in favour of defendant No. 1 for an indefinite period of time and that, therefore, it was compulsorily registrable. According to him, since It was not registered it would not be admissible in evidence. He has recorded the conclusion that the rent-note, Ex. 53, created tenancy in favour of defendant No. 1 for an indefinite period of time and that, therefore, it was compulsorily registrable. According to him, since It was not registered it would not be admissible in evidence. However, he has admitted it in evidence on the footing that it can be regarded as one creating tenancy for less than a year. These two findings recorded by the learned Appellate Judge are absolutely erroneous and cannot be upheld. A close perusal of the rent-note, Ex. 53, clearly shows that it has created in favour of defendant No. 1 only a monthly tenancy and nothing more. To say that the rent-note which creates a monthly tenancy is a rent-note for an indefinite period of time because the period of time for which the tenancy has been created is not specified is to take an erroneous view. On the basis of such an erroneous view a rent-note otherwise validly executed cannot be held to be inadmissible for want of registration nor can an inference be drawn therefrom that it is for a period less than a year. It was necessary for the learned Appellate Judge to have a close look at the rent-note, Ex. 53, and to find out whether it was for a specific period or for an indefinite period of time or whether it created a monthly tenancy. 9. For the reasons which I have stated in this judgment I am of the opinion that the rent-note, Ex. 53, was not compulsorily registrable. It was, therefore, admissible in evidence. The term of that rent-note to which I have referred above clearly shows that Tahilram had the necessary authority which defendant No. 1 accepted, interalia, to serve upon defendant No. 1 the statutory notice and to institute a suit against him. The first contention raised by Miss Shah, therefor?, fails and is rejected. 10. The second contention which she has raised takes me to the merits of the case. She has assailed the finding recorded by the Courts below that the defendants are liable to be evicted from the suit premises on account of the fact that they have constructed a partition wall by which they have divided the suit shop into two parts. The second contention which she has raised takes me to the merits of the case. She has assailed the finding recorded by the Courts below that the defendants are liable to be evicted from the suit premises on account of the fact that they have constructed a partition wall by which they have divided the suit shop into two parts. It appears to me that the Courts below have overlooked the explanation to clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 13 which in terms states that the construction of a partition wall shall not be deemed to be a permanent structure within the meaning of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 13 if it can be removed without serious damage to the premises. 11. In Civil Revision Application No. 480 of 1972 decided by me on 8th/9th August 1974 1 have construed the Explanation to clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 13 and held that the expression "as can be removed without serious damage to the premises" governs not only the expression "such other alterations" but also the expression "partition wall, door or lattice work or the filling of kitchen-stand." There is no finding in this case to show that the partition wall which defendant No. 1 has constructed cannot be removed without serious damage to the suit premises. The Courts below have recorded the finding that defendant No. 1 has dug fire pits for preparing sweetmeats and has removed a partition wall. If a partition wall the removal of which does not cause any serious damage to the suit premises can be constructed without losing the protection of the Bombay Rent Act, a partition wall which is existing can also be removed if that act does not cause any serious damage to the property. The removal of an existing partition wall will, in my opinion, be covered by the expression "such other alterations." I have expressed this view in Civil Revision Application No. 626 of 1971 decided by me on 22nd July 1974. In that case the question with which I dealt related to the closing of an existing window and opening of a new one. 12. The next finding which the Courts below have recorded is that defendant No. 1 has dug fire-pits and lights fire there in order to prepare sweetmeats. Defendant No. 1 is a sweetmeat vendor. In that case the question with which I dealt related to the closing of an existing window and opening of a new one. 12. The next finding which the Courts below have recorded is that defendant No. 1 has dug fire-pits and lights fire there in order to prepare sweetmeats. Defendant No. 1 is a sweetmeat vendor. In the opinion of the Courts below the fire which would be lighted in the fire-pits for the aforesaid purposes would produce temperature which would affect the life of the wall of the suit shop. According to them, therefore, by digging the fire-pits defendant No. 1 has constructed a permanent structure which would not he removable without causing serious damage to the suit premises. It is difficult to say that digging a fire-pit and lighting tire therein can be objected to. If such acts on the part of the tenant can he objected to, even the normal and ordinary activity of lighting fire in the kitchen and cooking food by a tenant can also be objected to. Therefore, merely because a fire-pit has been dug and fire is lighted therein, defendant No. 1 cannot be evicted from the suit premises. In order to bring home to a tenant this ground for evicting him from the suit premises, it is necessary to establish by cogent evidence (if necessary by expert evidence) what is the degree of temperature which such a fire produces and what is the extent of serious damage which it causes to the walls. If there was evidence to show that the fire which defendant No. I has been lighting produces a very high degree of temperature and affects very adversely the walls and causes them serious damage, then the plaintiffs, case in that behalf would have merited serious consideration. Charcol fire lighted for the purpose of cooking food in a kitchen and fire-wood fire lighted for preparing sweetmeats for commercial purpose belong to the same kind. There is only a difference of degree between them. In absence, therefore, of any cogent evidence to show the degree of temperature and the extent of serious damage which it produces to the walls, I am unable to uphold the finding recorded by the Courts below that defendant No. 1 is liable to be evicted from the suit premises on that ground. In absence, therefore, of any cogent evidence to show the degree of temperature and the extent of serious damage which it produces to the walls, I am unable to uphold the finding recorded by the Courts below that defendant No. 1 is liable to be evicted from the suit premises on that ground. If the Courts below had taken into account the language of section 13(1) (b) of the Bombay Rent Act and the Explanation to it, I am quite sure they would not have come to the conclusion to which they have come. 13. Mr. Motwani has however invited my attention to the rent-note, Ex. 53, which inter alia provides as follows :- "That the tenant agrees that no addition and/or alteration be carried out in the said shop without prior permission from the landlord. The tenant agrees that he will not make fire pit in the premises and also agrees that corridor in front of shop will be kept free from any nature of encroachment by the tenant." The argument which Mr. Motwani has advanced is that irrespective of what section 13 (1) (b) read in the light of the Explanation to it provides, it is open to the plaintiff to evict defendant No. 1 from the suit premises for breach of the aforesaid term of tenancy. It cannot be gainsaid that a tenant can be evicted for breach of a term of tenancy unless that term is in conflict with the provisions of the Bombay Rent Act. Where there is such a conflict, a term of tenancy cannot be given effect to. In such a case the express provision of the Bombay Rent Act must override it. Miss Shah has argued that this term runs contrary to the provisions of section 13 (1) (b) and that, therefore, it cannot be enforced against defendant No. 1. In order to examine the argument which Miss Shah has raised it is necessary to have a second look at section 13 (1) (b). The scheme of sub-section (1) of section 13 is to provide for circumstances under which a landlord can recover possession of the premises let out by him to his tenant. If a landlord is not able to satisfy, so far as section 13 is concerned, the requirements of any one or more clauses of that sub-section, he cannot recover possession of the premises let out to his tenant. If a landlord is not able to satisfy, so far as section 13 is concerned, the requirements of any one or more clauses of that sub-section, he cannot recover possession of the premises let out to his tenant. Clause (b) of sub-section (1) read with the Explanation to it makes it clear that though a landlord is entitled to recover possession of his premises from his tenant if his tenant has, without his consent given in writing, erected on the premises any permanent structure. He cannot do so if such a permanent structure which his tenant has constructed is a partition wall, door, latice work or the filling of kitchen-stand or if such a permanent work amounts to an alteration made by him in the premises as can be removed without serious damage to the premises. Therefore, so far as the construction of a permanent structure by a tenant in the premises let out to him is concerned, the Bombay Rent Act provides that he shall not be evicted if such a permanent structure answers the description thereof given in the Explanation to clause (b) of sub-section 1 of section 13. On the other hand, the rent-note, Ex. 53 provides that, if defendant No. 1 makes any addition or alteration without obtaining prior permission of the plaintiff or digs a fire-pit, then he shall be liable to he evicted from the suit premises. It is clear, therefore, that, where as the rent-note, Ex. 53 casts upon him the liability of being evicted from the suit premises on the aforesaid ground, clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 13 read with the Explanation exempts him from such a liability or exonerates him from being liable to be evicted from the suit premises. In my opinion, the aforesaid term of tenancy covers the same field which the Explanation to clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 13 covers. The question, therefore, is that, even though under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 13 read with the Explanation, defendant No. 1 is exonerated from the liability of being evicted from the-suit premises on the aforesaid ground, can I evict him from the suit premises under the rent-note by enforcing the aforesaid term of the contract ? The question, therefore, is that, even though under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 13 read with the Explanation, defendant No. 1 is exonerated from the liability of being evicted from the-suit premises on the aforesaid ground, can I evict him from the suit premises under the rent-note by enforcing the aforesaid term of the contract ? Sub-section (1) of section 13 opens with the expression "Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act." But the non-obstante clause with which sub section (1) opens does not state that it shall apply "notwithstanding anything contained in any contract between the parties." Though it does not expressly override a contractual obligation which defendant No. 1 has undertaken under the rent note, Ex. 53, to give effect to that contractual obligation is, in my opinion, to defeat the provisions of the Explanation to clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 13. The Bombay Rent Act has been enacted for the purpose of protecting the tenants against evicted except in accordance with the provisions thereof. To hold that, though under clause (b) of sub section (1) of section 13 defendant No. 1 is not liable to be evicted and the plaintiff is not entitled to obtain possession of the suit premises from him, defendant No. 1 has incurred that liability and the plaintiff has acquired that right under the aforesaid term of tenancy is to defeat the provisions of the Explanation to Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 13. In my opinion, therefore, the aforesaid contractual term cannot be given effect to. The Courts below were, therefore, in error in passing against the defendants the decree for possession. The defendants, in my opinion, were not liable to be evicted from the suit premises. In the result, I allow the Civil Revision Application, set aside the decree for possession passed by the Courts below and dismiss the plaintiff's suit. Rule is made absolute with no order as to costs in the circumstances of the case. Revision allowed.