JUDGMENT 1. - The petitioner challenges the order by which he has been removed as a Sarpanch and also the order of respondent No. 3 by which a meeting was called of the Panchayat Samiti, Baap in which respondent No. 4 was elected as temporary Pradhan of the Panchayat Samiti. 2. The petitioner was elected as a Sarpanch of the Panchayat Samiti Kanasar in 1965. By virtue of section 8(1)(i) of the Rajasthan Panchayat Samitis and Zila Parishads Acts, 1959 thereinafter, called "the 1959 Act", the Sarpanch is an ex officio member of the Panchayat Samiti. The petitioner was subsequently elected as a Up Pradhan of the Panchayat Samiti. 3. It appears complaints were made against the petitioner that he had misused his position as a Sarpanch and had against utilised the grant made by the State Government to the Panchayat and had thus misconducted himself. The Deputy District Development Officer, Jodhpur asked the Panchayat Assistant to enquire and report under section 17 (4) of the Rajasthan Panchayat Act, 1953 (hereinafter called as "the 1953 Act"). After holding a preliminary enquiry and finding charges prima facie proved a notice was issued to the petitioner. Subsequently the State Government passed an order under section 17 (4) of the Act dated 29.7.75 removing the petitioner from the Sarpanchship. By the same order it was also directed that steps should be taken to recover from the petitioner the amount which he had mis-utilised on which the charges had been proved. Thereafter the impugned notice dated 6.8.75 was issued by respondent No. 3 in which it was stated that the petitioner had ceased to be a Sarpanch under section 17 (4) of the 1953 Act and consequently had ceased to be a Up Pradhan and therefore a meeting of the Panchayat Samiti was being called on 12.8.75 to elect a new Pradhan in place of the petitioner. This led the petitioner to file the present writ petition challenging both his removal as a Sarpanch and also the action of respondent No. 3 in holding a meeting for election of Pradhan and the consequent election of respondent 4 as Up Pradhan. 4. The first grievance of the counsel for the petitioner Mr. This led the petitioner to file the present writ petition challenging both his removal as a Sarpanch and also the action of respondent No. 3 in holding a meeting for election of Pradhan and the consequent election of respondent 4 as Up Pradhan. 4. The first grievance of the counsel for the petitioner Mr. Parekh is that the finding of the Government is vitiated because of the non compliance with the fundamental principles of natural justice in as much as no opportunity was given to the petitioner and also further that no enquiry report on the basis of which the ultimate decision to remove the petitioner was taken by the State Government was made available to him. This plea, has been contested by the respondents in their reply in which it has been specifically stated that on receipt of the complaint against the petitioner the Panchayat Assistant was asked to enquire and report under section 17 (4) of the 1953 Act. After Mr. Mohan Singh, the Panchayat Assistant made an enquiry in presence of the petitioner a report was submitted to the Collector and there upon a notice for explanation was issued to the petitioner. Thereafter the Collector held a preliminary enquiry and the petitioner was served the allegations. The reply of the petitioner having been found unsatisfactory State Government appointed Sub Divisional Officer, Phalodi as Enquiry Officer under Rules. The petitioner and his witnesses appeared before the Inquiry Officer on 25.3.71 and 17.6.71. I find that the notices were issued to the petitioner asking him to participate in the proceedings. Not only that, the proceedings before the Inquiry Officer clearly show that the witnesses were examination in the presence of the petitioner and that the petitioner fully participated in the enquiry. Mr. Parekh however joins issue and maintains that it may be that the petitioner had joined the proceedings before the Inquiry Officer but nevertheless the order of the State Government is vitiated because no report of the Inquiry Officer was sent to the3 petitioner with the result that he could not give his explanation properly. This plea is contested in the reploy affidavit filed by respondents Nos. This plea is contested in the reploy affidavit filed by respondents Nos. 1 to 3 in which it is stated that the State Government on receipt of the enquiry report from the Sub Divisional Officer, Phalodi served a notice on the petitioner along with a copy of the charge sheet and enquiry report of the Sub Divisional Officer, Phalodi for reply and personal hearing. Ex. R/18 and Ex. R/19 said to be the notice and the3 acknowledgement said to have been refused by the petitioner have been attached. A reference to Ex. R/18 clearly shows that it is a show cause notice sent under section 17 (4) of the 1953 Act to the petitioner in which it is mentioned that the charges against the petitioner have been proved. It also says that a charge sheet was being enclosed and also further intimating to him that whatever papers or documents or record he wants to produce in his defence may be done by him. However, this letter was said to have been refused by the petitioner as per registered acknowledgement due (Ex. R/19). Mr. Parekh sought to make much of the fact that in Para 11 (a) of the reply the respondents have mentioned the date for a personal hearing as being 9.1.75. Mr. Calla Deputy Government Advocate has however made it clear that the 1975 has wrongly been mentioned for 1973; that appears to be so because in the letter Ex. R/18 dated 29.11.72 the date of hearing mentioned in the body of letter is 9.1.73. That apart, the decision of the removing the petitioner was not taken by that date and the matter seems to have been adjourned. The petitioner himself has admitted that he was asked to appear before the Minister of Community Development and Panchayat on 15.7.75 by notice attached as Ex. 'D'. In this notice also the the petitioner has been asked to produce any recorded or any other documents in his defence which he likes. The petitioner also admits in the writ petition that similar notices have been previously received by him from the State Government to that same effect. 'D'. In this notice also the the petitioner has been asked to produce any recorded or any other documents in his defence which he likes. The petitioner also admits in the writ petition that similar notices have been previously received by him from the State Government to that same effect. It is relevant to note that the petitioner has not either stated in the petitioner or filed any letter by which he might have asked from the respondents that a copy of the report of the Inquiry Officer be supplied to him and that the same was refused to him. The argument of Mr. Parekh that the non supply of the enquiry report vitiates the order of the State Government cannot be accepted as it is based on mistaken assumption that the enquiry report was not supplied to the petitioner. On the other hand the respondents have taken the categorical stand that the report of the Inquiry Officer was sent to the petitioner and also further it is clear that at no stage was ever a complaint or a demand made by the petitioner to the State Government for supply of the enquiry report. I could have understood the grievance if the petitioner had asked for the report of the Inquiry Officer and the same had been denied. But the petitioner having never asked for the same, it must be taken that he at no time felt prejudiced in his defence and it is now therefore futile for Mr. Parekh to raise this ground for invalidating the State Government's order. 5. Mr. Parekh had also sought to attack to that part of the order of the State Government which had directed that recovery be made from the petitioner of that amount of loss which had been caused by his misconduct by urging that there was no power in the State Government to resort to the coercive process of recovery as arrears of land revenue of the loss alleged to have been occasioned by the action of the petitioner and referred me to Ganesha Ram v. Collector, Jalore AIR 1968 Rajasthan 72 . it is no doubt true that decision lays down that it is not open to invoke the provisions of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Code against the Sarpanch for recovery of the alleged loss as arrears of land revenue. Mr. it is no doubt true that decision lays down that it is not open to invoke the provisions of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Code against the Sarpanch for recovery of the alleged loss as arrears of land revenue. Mr. Parekh has also referred me to section 80 of the 1953 Act which according to him suggests that only a suit can be instituted against the Sarpanch for any loss or waste as consequence of his neglect or misconduct. I am afraid the argument of Mr. Parekh is a product of fear if not misconceived because I do not find any order by which the proceedings against the petitioner have been started to recover the amount as arrears of land revenue. Mr. Parkesh however, stated that the request has been made to the Collector to recover the amount and says that the only method of recovery which he will apply will be that of recovery of arrears of land revenue. I am afraid it is not possible to anticipate what steps the Collector would take or recover the amount from the petitioner and whether that mode would or would not be legal. The argument of Mr. Parekh is too much in the real of speculation and cannot be countenanced. However, it would always be open to the petitioner to challenge the action of the Collector whenever it is taken, if he feels that it is not legal, in the manner permitted under law, but I cannot persuade myself at this stage to quash such a direction because I do not find that there is any order directing the recovery of an amount as arrears of land revenue and therefore there is nothing that I could quash in this regard. This plea therefore fails. 6. Mr. Parekh has also made a half hearted attempt to canvass before me regarding the findings of the Inquiry Officer so as to urge that the findings were not such as to call for action against the petitioner. I am afraid this agreement seeks to convert the scope of this Court in writ petition as an appellate court. Which is not permissible. The action of removal is within the domain of State Government under section 17(4) o the Act and unless the action suffers from lack of jurisdiction or is patently unsustainable it cannot be interfered with. I am afraid this agreement seeks to convert the scope of this Court in writ petition as an appellate court. Which is not permissible. The action of removal is within the domain of State Government under section 17(4) o the Act and unless the action suffers from lack of jurisdiction or is patently unsustainable it cannot be interfered with. As it is from the report of the Inquiry Officer it is clear that the petitioner has been found guilty of charges 1 to 3 which included the charge of doing favour to his own relations by giving them contract of the Panchayat, and which also shows misuse of about Rs. 6000/-. Whether on these all gations the State Government should have taken an action for removing the petitioner are matters exclusively within its jurisdiction and I cannot find any such patent error in its order as to call for interference. It must therefore be held that the order of the State Government removing the petitioner from the Sarpanchship is not assailable. 7. The next line of argument of Mr. Parekh is that even if it be assumed that the petitioner had been rightly removed as a Sarpanch he does automatically cease to be a up Pradhan. Now section 15 (1) (k) of 1959 Act provides that a person shall be disqualified to become a member of the Panchayat Samiti if he is disqualified for election as a Sarpanch under sub section (4B) of section 17 of the 1953 Act. A person removed under section 17 (4) (b) of the 1953 Act, incurs the disqualification under section 17 (4) (b) of the 1953 Act. Section 16 of 1959 Act states that a member of the Panchayat Samiti shall not be eligible to continue to be a such member if he become subject to any of the disqualification specified in section 15. Prima facie therefore the petitioner who had been proceeded against under section 17(4) of the 1953 Act would be disqualified to stand as Sarpanch under section 17(4B) of the 1953 Act and would not be eligible to continue as a member under section 16 of the 1959 Act. Mr. Prima facie therefore the petitioner who had been proceeded against under section 17(4) of the 1953 Act would be disqualified to stand as Sarpanch under section 17(4B) of the 1953 Act and would not be eligible to continue as a member under section 16 of the 1959 Act. Mr. Parekh however refers me to section 16(2) of the 1959 Act and urges that unless there is a declaration made by the State Government after hearing a person that he has become ineligible to continue to be a member that person has a right to continue to hold his office. I do not find it necessary to decide whether in a case like the3 present one when the State Government itself has passed an order of removal under section 17 (4) of the 1953 Act, then until a further declaration under section 16(2) of the 1959 Act is made the3 petitioner will continue to remain a member of the Panchayat Samiti. Prima facie it seems to me to be a little anomalous that where the State Government itself has passed an order removing the petitioner as a Sarpaqnch it should further have still to pass a declaration after giving an opportunity (which really means duplicating the very process it had gone into before) declaring that the petitioner had become ineligible to be a member of the Panchayat Samiti before it can be held that the petitioner had become ineligible to continue as a member. But that apart, I find that section 14(2) (a) of the 1959 Act provides that a member specified in clause (i) of sub section (1) of section 8 shall hold office so long as he continues to be a member of the Panchayat Samiti. Admittedly the petitioner is one of those is a ex officio member of the Panchayat Samiti by virtue of clause (i) of sub section (1) of section 8 of the 1953 Act. By this provision therefore the petitioner who was a member of the Samiti because of his being a Sarpanch had a right to continue as a member only so long as he continued to be a Sarpanch. By this provision therefore the petitioner who was a member of the Samiti because of his being a Sarpanch had a right to continue as a member only so long as he continued to be a Sarpanch. When therefore the order of 29th July, 1975 was passed by the State Government removing the petitioner as a Sarpanch, the term of the petitioner ended and he could not continue to be a member of the Panchayat Samiti thereafter and automatically ceased to be a member immediately. It was not therefore necessary for the State Government to resort to the provisions of section 16(2) of the 1959 Act and therefore the fact that no declaration may have been given by the State Government can have not significance and cannot prevent the petitioner from ceasing to be a member of the Panchayat Samimit. The removal of the petitioner as a Sarpanch automatically meant the end of the term and the ceasing of the petitioner as a member of the Panchayat Samiti by virtue of section 14 (2) (a) of the 1959 Act. Mr. Parekh stressed that section 14 (2) of 1959 Act states with "save as otherwise provided in the Act" and contends, that this brings in section 16(2). I cannot agree. The only signification of these words is that the term of a member will come to an end not only in the eventualities contemplated by section 14(2) of the 1959 Act, but also in the eventualities contemplated by other provisions of the Act. These words do not attract section 16(2) in a case like the present which is specifically covered by the provisions of section 14 (2) (a) of the 1959 Act. 8. There is another reason why I am disinclined in this case to exercise the discretionary jurisdiction of this Court. The reason is that Mr. Parekh has himself admitted that the petitioner has moved the court under section 17 of the 1959 Act. Now under the said provision the judge after making an enquiry has to determine whether a member has become disqualified or not. The present plea that Mr. Parekh is raising namely that the petitioner has not ceased to be a member of Panchayat Samiti is now before the court under section 17 of the 1959 Act. Now under the said provision the judge after making an enquiry has to determine whether a member has become disqualified or not. The present plea that Mr. Parekh is raising namely that the petitioner has not ceased to be a member of Panchayat Samiti is now before the court under section 17 of the 1959 Act. Evidently therefore it will not be proper for this Court to give any finding on the said point when the petitioner himself has chosen the alternative remedy of moving the court under section 17 of the 1959 Act. 9. The result is that the writ petition fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. *******