JUDGMENT 1. - On 2.4.73 the petitioner applied under rule 8 of the Rajasthan (Minor Mineral Concession) Rules, 1959 hereinafter to be called "the Rules", for grant of a licence in a village Tamkoli, Tehsil Karauli in block No. 4 for mining of sand stone and Khanda. This application of the petitioner was granted under rule 11 of the Rules by the order of the Mining Engineer dated 30.1.74 (Ex.1). The amount of the lease money was Rs. 143/2/- and the lease period was for a period of five years. The petitioner alleges that in pursuance of the grant of the lease be deposited various amounts like Rs. 3578/- as deed rent and Rs. 3600/- as security. The deposit of this amount is not disputed by the respondents though it is stated that the petitioner deposited this amount at his own sweet will. It is however admitted that some dispute arose regarding the area that was leased to the petitioner and some other party and the petitioner was asked by the respondents to await till the decision of this dispute. In the meanwhile the respondent department also received further offer for this piece of mining lease ranging from Rs.20,000/- to Rs. 27,000/-. The former was given by one Prabhudayal. The petitioner's case further is that he received certain letters dated 23.3.74 asking him to see the Mining Engineer on 30.3.74 but received by him on 7.4.74. Similar is said to be the incongruity in the further letter written by the Mining Engineer. A letter of 1st July, 1974 required the petitioner to appear before him on 6.7.74 when the letter was received on 12.7.74. This part of course is denied in the reply where it is maintained that the petitioner did receive the letters but did not choose to another for the reasons best known to him. The further stand taken by their respondents is that on receipt of the offer of Rs.20,000/- by Mr. Jagannath, the Director of Mines addressed a letter to the petitioner on 19.9.74 asking him whether he was prepared to accept the lease on this amount as an annual dead rent but that the petitioner refused to accept the same and the letter came back unserved. Jagannath, the Director of Mines addressed a letter to the petitioner on 19.9.74 asking him whether he was prepared to accept the lease on this amount as an annual dead rent but that the petitioner refused to accept the same and the letter came back unserved. It is also stated that in the meanwhile the Director of Mines also decided that the area should be auctioned and a notification to this effect was published in the Rajasthan Rajpatra of 5th September, 1974. This area was later on auctioned in open auction on 7.10.74 and fresh bid of Rs.50,100/-. The petitioner had earlier to that written to the respondents on 5.10.74 pointing out that the auction should not take place as according to him he had already been sanctioned this lease. As however the auction proceeded as scheduled the petitioner came to this court challenging the action of the respondent in refusing to execute the lease deed in his favour and also the auction held instead. 2. From the pleadings of the parties it is clear that there is a serious controversy on the point as to where the fault lies. The petitioner maintains that after the lease had been sanctioned in his favour he had continuously asked the respondents give possession of the land to him and to execute the lease deed but that the respondents wrongly and illegally refused to do so. The case of the respondents however is that the petitioner was asked a number of times to appear before the Mining Engineer but that he consistently refused to do so. It is further stated by the respondents that in spite of the conduct of the petitioner the Director of Mines showed consideration to the petitioner by offering to sanction the said area at an annual dead rent of Rs. 20,000/- in favour of the petitioner (the amount for which one Prabhu Dayal had given the offer) but the grievance of the respondents is that this letter was even refused to be accepted by the petitioner. However, all, this is denied by the petitioner obviously it is not possible for this Court in these proceedings to give a finding on these disputed questions of fact and it is also unnecessary for me to decide all these disputed facts. 3. However, all, this is denied by the petitioner obviously it is not possible for this Court in these proceedings to give a finding on these disputed questions of fact and it is also unnecessary for me to decide all these disputed facts. 3. The real strong point urged by the counsel for the petitioner is that once the lease had been granted in favour of the petitioner under rule 11 there was no jurisdiction in the respondents to proceed to auction subsequently when the lease in favour of the petitioner had not been revoked. Rule 8 of the Rules provide for an application for a mining lease and rule 11 says that a mining lease may be granted for such area as the Government may deem fit. Rule 18 talks of the execution of the lease. Rule 43 provides for an appeal by any person aggrieved against refusal of grant of a mining lease. The grievance of the petitioner that there could be no auction when the grant of the petitioner was subsisting is sought to be countered by the respondents in their reply. It is however significant that it is admitted by the respondents that there has been no revocation of the sanction of the petitioner. On the other hand the categorical stand is that the revocation of the sanction could not be done because the petitioner came to this Court and in the reply permission is sought to revoke the sanction in favour of the petitioner. It is also stated that action for the revocation of the sanction in favour of the petitioner was being taken by the State Government and that before sanction is issued in favour of respondent 4 the sanction in favour of the petitioner will be definitely revoked. From the3 pleading by the respondents it is apparent that the weakness of the action of respondent in seeking to auction the lease without first revoking the petitioner's grant in accepted though the jurisdiction is given that I would have been so done had the petitioner not come to this court. Now it is only in accordance with the rules and basic principles of natural justice that if revocation has to take place the same must be only after giving an opportunity to the petitioner concerned. Mr. Now it is only in accordance with the rules and basic principles of natural justice that if revocation has to take place the same must be only after giving an opportunity to the petitioner concerned. Mr. Calla had at one time sought to urge that as no lease deed has been executed within rule 18 the petitioner has no right and no locus standi to urge and therefore the question of revocation was immaterial. I am afraid I cannot subscribe to that contention because rule 43 contemplates even an appeal against an order refusing the grant. Surely when a person who has been refused a grant in the first instance by the Assistant Mining Engineer is considered by the rules as a person aggrieved and has a locus standi to file an appeal, how can it be urged that a person who has been granted a lease under rule 11 is not a person aggrieved when any revocation is sought to be done by the State Government. Mr. Calla had also sought to rely on rule 18 which provides that where a lease has been granted under rule 11 the formal lease shall be executed within one month and if no such formal lease is executed within the aforesaid period the order granting lease shall be deemed to have been revoked. Now this contention has been made by Mr. Calla for the first time in the arguments and is completely contrary to the pleadings by the respondents where the positive stand taken is that steps are being taken to revoke the sanction and that it will definitely be done. It obviously signifies that action for revocation will be in future. Thus no reliance has been placed in the pleadings on the deeming provision of rule 18 so far as revocation is concerned. The proviso to rule 18 itself provides that if the State Government is satisfied that the applicant for lease is not responsible for the delay in execution of the lease the same can be executed within a reasonable time after the expiry of the period of one month. The proviso to rule 18 itself provides that if the State Government is satisfied that the applicant for lease is not responsible for the delay in execution of the lease the same can be executed within a reasonable time after the expiry of the period of one month. I mention this proviso because it is the petitioner's case that lease was not executed because the respondents were not in a position to clearly demarcate and give possession of the area and that though he was also following up with demands to execute the lease deed but that the Government was neglecting to do so. Of course the respondents do not accept this plea of the petitioner and maintain that the petitioner was at fault and did not pursue the matter properly or diligently. As I said before this is not a matter which calls for decision in these proceedings but I refer to it for pointing out that the stand of the respondents is not that the sanction for the lease granted had automatically been revoked under rule 18. I therefore cannot at this stage accept the bald plea made by the Deputy Government Advocate that the revocation should deemed to have taken place by virtue of rule 18. 4. The counsel for the petitioner had also urged that I should quash the auction which had been held subsequently because the same had taken place while the revocation of the sanction had not yet taken place. I do not feel inclined to do so in view of the course that I am taking. As I said before that the grant of a lease had given certain rights to the petitioner and as the respondents have stated that they have yet to take steps to revoke it, the matter is still as large where it will be open to the petitioner, in view of the fact that proceedings will now take place after giving an opportunity of hearing to him to urge that he was not at fault in not having the deed executed in time or that even subsequently the action of the respondents in holding an auction was not justified because the petitioner was all the time willing to carry out the terms on which lease had been sanctioned in his favour. It will thereafter then be for the authorities concerned to decide whether the plea is sustainable or not and then to take a decision regarding proceedings with respect to the auction or otherwise. 5. This petition therefore has to be allowed only to this extent that a mandamus will got the respondents to give an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner before any order of revocation is passed. The further action about this lease & auction will necessarily depend on the decision which the authorities concerned will give after hearing the petitioner. The parties through their counsel are directed to appear before the Director Mines and Geology, Udaipur on 29.7.76. If the Director is competent to deal with the matter of revocation he may deal with it himself or refer the parties to the authority which is competent to deal with such matters. I find that this mine has remained un-worked for couple of years and it will be proper if the whole matter is decided and finalised by the authorities in as quick a period as possible. Respondent 4 is not represented Mr. Calla the Deputy Government Advocate is directed to inform the respondent 4 to appear before the Director on the same date. There will be no order as to costs. *******