M. P. THAKKAR, J. ( 1 ) ARE the services of a teacher liable to be terminated at the pleasure of the institution which has employed him or whether such a teacher is entitled to any protection under sec. 36 of the Gujarat Secondary Education Act of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) is the central issue raised in this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India (it has been styled to be a petition under Articles 226 and 227 but inasmuch as it is directed against an order of a Tribunal it in fact falls within the four corners of Article 227 only) by a teacher whose services have been terminated otherwise than by way of a penal action for misconduct. ( 2 ) THE petitioner was engaged as a permanent teacher in 1970 by respondent No. 1 Society which is running a High School at Gandhinagar known as St. Xaviers High School. The respondent institution had served a notice Annexure A dated February 28 1975 calling upon the petitioner to show cause why his services should not be terminated The notice in question was in the following terms :i am to inform you that the Managing Committee of The Ahmedabad Jesuit Schools Society proposes to terminate your services by one months notice with effect from 31st March 1975 You are hereby informed that if you have to say anything against the proposed action you may send your explanation and/or representation within fifteen days of the receipt of this notice. Otherwise the managing Committee will presume that you have nothing to say against the proposed action. You are further informed that the Managing Committee after considering your representations any and after hearing you if you so desire will take a suitable decision. The Managing Committee has also decided to pay six months compensation if it decides to terminate your services. The petitioner by his reply Annexure B dated March 14 1975 called the attention of the respondent institution to the fact that the proposed action was in clear violation of sec. 36 (1) (a) of the Act. The Managing Committee has also decided to pay six months compensation if it decides to terminate your services. The petitioner by his reply Annexure B dated March 14 1975 called the attention of the respondent institution to the fact that the proposed action was in clear violation of sec. 36 (1) (a) of the Act. He further informed the respondent that he was not in a position to show cause as to why his services should not be terminated inasmuch as in the show cause notice itself no ground for the proposed action was disclosed In the wake of this correspondence the respondent institution terminated the services of the petitioner by order at Annexure C dated March 24 1975 with effect from March 31 1975 on payment of six months salary as compensation. He was inter alia informed that the Managing Comatose had considered his reply to the show cause notice but had formed the Opinion that the petitioner had failed to show any cause for desisting from the proposed action. The petitioner moved the Tribunal constituted under the Act by way of an application which was registered as Application No. 82/75 by the Gujarat Secondary Education Tribunal Ahmedabad. The Tribunal was moved under secs. 38 and 39 of the Act. The Tribunal after taking into account the affidavits filed by the parties dismissed the application by the impugned order at Annexure F dated August 8 1975 on taking the view that inasmuch as the termination was effected alter serving a show cause notice there was sufficient compliance with the statutory provision embodied in sec. 36 (1) (a) of the Act. The Tribunal negatived the contention that the petitioner had not been afforded reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the proposed action inasmuch as the respondent institution had not assigned any reasons for terminating the services of the petitioner and that in the absence of such reasons the petitioner was not in a position to effectively show cause against the proposed action. The petitioner has thereupon invoked the jurisdiction of this Court by way of the present petition. ( 3 ) SEC. 36 (1) which has given rise to serious controversy in the present matter requires to bequoted in order to appreciate the nature and content of the controversy. The petitioner has thereupon invoked the jurisdiction of this Court by way of the present petition. ( 3 ) SEC. 36 (1) which has given rise to serious controversy in the present matter requires to bequoted in order to appreciate the nature and content of the controversy. It reads as under :36 (1) No person who is appointed as a head master a teacher or a member of non-teaching staff of a registered private secondary school shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank nor shall his service be otherwise terminated by the manager until (a) he has been given by the manager a reasonable of showing cause against the action proposed to be taken in regard to him and (b) the action proposed to be taken in regard to him has been approved in writing by an officer authorised in this behalf by the Board:provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to any person who is appointed for a temporary period only. Now in the present case the following facts are not in dispute : (1) The respondent institution had served on the petitioner a notice calling upon him to show cause why his services should not be terminated on payment of compensation but the respondent institution had not assigned any reasons for the proposed action of termination of the petitioners services. (2) No enquiry was held by the respondent institution and the services of the petitioner have been terminated on the premise that the respondent has a contractual right to terminate the services at its pleasure on payment of compensation. (3) The respondent institution is a minority institution and therefore clause (b) of sec. 36 (1) does not apply to such an institution and the approval in writing by an officer authorised by the Board is not necessary before taking action under sec. 36. ( 4 ) THE respondents did not assume the posture that sec 36 (1) was not applicable to a termination simpliciter before the Tribunal It has however been contended on behalf of the respondents that sec. 36 (1) can be invoked only by a teacher whose services have been terminated by way of a penal action and that it cannot be invoked by a teacher whose services have been terminated in exercise of a contractual right. On a plain reading of sub- sec. (1) of sec. 36 (1) can be invoked only by a teacher whose services have been terminated by way of a penal action and that it cannot be invoked by a teacher whose services have been terminated in exercise of a contractual right. On a plain reading of sub- sec. (1) of sec. 36 it is clear that the provision is applicable not only in regard to penal action resulting in dismissal or removal or reduction in rank but also to an action which results in termination of services of a teacher otherwise than by way of a disciplinary action. It is not possible to accede to the argument that the expression nor shall his service be otherwise terminated must mean terminated by way of a penal action. A termination by way of a penal action is already covered by the expression dismissal or removal. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the expression nor shall his service be otherwise terminated must be construed ejusdem generis and must take colour from the preceding expressions which are referable to penal action viz. dismissal or removal or reduction in rank. If it is so construed the expression would be emptied of all its meaning and content and would be rendered otiose for dismissal or removal would cover any action of penal nature and in that event it would be altogether unnecessary for the Legislature to extend protection in respect of termination otherwise than by way of dismissal or removal. Learned counsel argued that the expression otherwise terminated would refer to termination simpliciter which is effected on account of some misconduct by way of a penal measure. Now the expression termination simpliciter carries the concept of termination otherwise than for misconduct and otherwise than by way of a disciplinary action. It would be impossible to construe the expression otherwise terminated as being referable only to a termination by way of a disciplinary measure by way of a penal action. If plain and natural meaning is given to the aforesaid expression it is not possible to construe it in the manner suggested by the learned counsel for the respondents. Counsel then argued that the expression otherwise terminated should be applied to cases where the termination on the face of it was a termination simpliciter in form but in reality and substance was a termination by way of a penal measure. Counsel then argued that the expression otherwise terminated should be applied to cases where the termination on the face of it was a termination simpliciter in form but in reality and substance was a termination by way of a penal measure. The expression dismissal or removal would cover a situation like the one placed in focus by counsel. If it is dismissal or removal by way of a penal measure in reality but it is given an appearance of termination simpliciter it is nonetheless dismissal and would be covered by the expression dismissal or removal from service. It is therefore not possible to uphold the submission urged on behalf of the respondents that the expression otherwise terminated would mean termination of service by way of a penal action and not termination simpliciter. ( 5 ) IT was then argued that the concept of affording reasonable opportunity for showing cause against a termination simpliciter was not known to Industrial Law and therefore the Legislature could not have intended to make a provision in this behalf in relation to the employment of teachers. There is however no warrant to attribute to the Legislature an intention to maintain status quo in regard to such matters in all fields when the provision itself is plain enough and it in terms provides for protection to teachers in the sense that it obliges the management to afford a reasonable opportunity to the teacher concerned to show cause against the proposed action of termination of his services by way of termination simpliciter. It is not possible to read down the provision by attributing to the Legislature an intention not to introduce such a concept in relation to teachers. Teachers are entrusted with extremely delicate and vital functions by the society. They are the architects engaged in building a new generation. There is nothing shocking or surprising in the Legislature wanting to extend protection to the teachers so that they are not at the mercy of the management in regard to the matter of their employment. Unless protection is extended to them and some amount of reasonable security exists the teachers would not be in a position to offer the best in them. With the changing times the Legislature was presumably aware of the necessity to extend protection to the teachers vis a vis the management. Unless protection is extended to them and some amount of reasonable security exists the teachers would not be in a position to offer the best in them. With the changing times the Legislature was presumably aware of the necessity to extend protection to the teachers vis a vis the management. There is therefore nothing surprising in restrictions being imposed on the management in the matter of terminating the services of the teachers. And the concept of job protection (it needs to be realized) is a concept which has received recognition at international level in respect of all employees. It appears to have been realised that workers who constitute the real wealth of a Nation cannot be permitted to be treated as inanimate objects which can be discarded or thrown away if they cease to cater to the pleasure of the Master at his whim and caprice. It must have been realised that terminating the service of an employee has an effect similar to an earthquake in his world. Not only he but his parents wife and children are maimed by the decision. An employer cannot be invested with arbitrary power to destroy the entire world of the worker at his whim and pleasure (or displeasure) A worker is not an instrument evolved to enable the Master to mint his profits Nor is a worker his slave. The society permits the employer to function on condition that he conducts his affairs in a civilized manner in keeping with the trends of the awakened and the enlightened world where a worker is respected and valued for without his labour the society cannot exist much less proper. A reference to this subject for instance is made in Part IV of Chapter 5 of the treatise on Labour Law by J. B. Cronin and R. P. Grime (page 123 and onwards ). A recommendation made by the International Labour Organisation (I. L. O.) which is referred to as Recommendation No. 119 concerning termination of employment at the initiative of the employer 1963 deserves to be quoted :1 Effect may be given to this Recommendation through national laws or regulations collective agreement works rules arbitration awards or court decisions or in such other manner consistent with national practice as may be appropriate under national conditions. 2 (1) Termination of employment should not take place unless there is a valid reason for such termination connected with the capacity or conduct of the worker or based on the operational requirements of the undertaking establishment or service (2) The definition or interpretation of such valid reason should be left to the methods of implementation set out in Paragraph 1. 3 The following inter alia should not constitute valid reasons for termination of employment: (a) union membership or participation in union activities outside working hours or with the consent of the employer within working hours; (b) seeking office as or acting or having acted in the capacity of a workers representative; (c) the filing in 800d faith of a complaint or the participation in a proceeding against an employer involving violation of laws or regulations; or (d) race colour sex marital status religion political opinion national extraction or social origin xx xx xx xx xx xx xx while the Legislature may not have been able to implement these recommendations in other spheres if the Legislature considered it desirable to implement the said recommendations and considered the time to be. ripe in matters relating to the service conditions of teachers there is nothing surprising in the Legislature making a provision in this behalf by way of sec. 36 (1 ). Be that as it may in the face of the clear language of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 36 it is futile to contend that the provision is not applicable to cases of termination simpliciter. In fact the respondents themselves accepted the position that sub-sec. (1) of sec. 36 was applicable and did serve the petitioner with a notice to show cause why his services should not be terminated. It is therefore not possible to accede to the argument that sec. 36 (1) does not apply to the case of a teacher whose services have been terminated otherwise than by way of a penal action ( 6 ) THE next question is whether it is sufficient for the management to call upon the petitioner to show cause why his services should not be terminated without assigning any reasons for taking the decision to terminate the services. Clause (a) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. Clause (a) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 36 in terms provides that the teacher concerned is entitled to a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the proposed action before the action can be taken by the management. Can it be said that a teacher has been afforded reasonable opportunity when he is not apprised of the reasons which influenced the management in taking a decision to terminate his services ? Surely the management was not terminating his services for arbitrary or capricious grounds. It had some reason for doing so. Unless that reason was made manifest how was the teacher to show cause against the proposed action based on the said undisclosed reason ? The opportunity to show cause is no opportunity unless the teacher can effectively show cause. If the reason which operates on the mind of the management is locked in the secret recesses of its mind and if the teacher is asked to show cause as to why his services should not be terminated for the said reason what cause can the teacher show ? Not knowing the reasons he cannot disabuse the mind of the management and cannot make the management alter its decision to terminate the services. Only when the reason which operates on the mind of the management is communicated to the teacher can the teacher satisfy the management in exercise of the right conferred by sec. 36 (1) (a) that the reason is no real reason that there is some misconception or the reason itself is non existent or an illusory one. The purpose of affording an opportunity is only one viz. to create a situation where the management can see the point of view of the teacher and to try to alter its decision from the prospective of the reasons which weigh with the management. Surely it is not an empty formality for the sake of idle compliance with the mere letter of law emptied of all content and meaning. It must be a real opportunity. May be the management may alter its decision. May be it may not. But the teacher must be afforded an opportunity to place before the management material and arguments in order to show that the decision is not a correct or just decision. We must assume that the management is action in good faith honestly and in a bona fide manner for rational reasons. May be it may not. But the teacher must be afforded an opportunity to place before the management material and arguments in order to show that the decision is not a correct or just decision. We must assume that the management is action in good faith honestly and in a bona fide manner for rational reasons. We cannot assume that the management is acting in an arbitrary and capricious fashion in order to visit the teacher with its likes and dislikes or in order to be vindictive. The whole purpose of obliging the management to afford a reasonable opportunity is that the reasons operating on the mind of the management are exposed to the view of the authorities and the teacher has an opportunity to show whether or not the reasons are germane and genuine or irrelevant and illusory. Be it realised that sec. 36 (1) applies to all institutions and clause (b) of sec. 36 (1) provides that the management cannot take the proposed action unless it is approved in writing by an officer authorised in this behalf by the Board. Unless the reasons are revealed to the teacher and to the authorised officer how can the officer concerned obtain the assistance from the teacher in order to understand the other point of view and how can the officer concerned take a rational decision to accord or to with hold approval. In the present case no doubt the question of approval will not arise having regard to the fact that the respondent institution is a minority institution. But then sec. 36 has to be interpreted in the context of the circumstance that it applies to all institutions and except in regard to some institutions which belong to minority community even in regard to termination of service by way of termination simpliciter within the meaning of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 36 the action has to be approved by an officer authorised by the Board as enjoined by clause (b) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 36. Sec. 36 (1) cannot be construed in one fashion for the minority institutions and another fashion for the management in respect of the institutions other than minority institutions as sec. 36 (1) (a) is applicable to all institutions. It is therefore not nece- ssary to demonstrate any further that on a true interpretation of clause (a) of sec. 36. Sec. 36 (1) cannot be construed in one fashion for the minority institutions and another fashion for the management in respect of the institutions other than minority institutions as sec. 36 (1) (a) is applicable to all institutions. It is therefore not nece- ssary to demonstrate any further that on a true interpretation of clause (a) of sec. 36 (1) it is incumbent on the management to disclose to the teacher concerned the reasons operating on its mind and the factors influencing the management in taking a decision to terminate his services in order to satisfy the requirement of affording reasonable opportunity imposed on it by clause (a) of sec. 36 (1 ). The Tribunal was therefore in error in taking the view that so long as a notice was served it was sufficient compliance within the meaning of sec. 36 (1) (a) regardless of the admitted position that the notice did not contain any reasons against which cause could be shown. ( 7 ) IT was then argued by the learned counsel for the respondents that the petitioner had accepted the compensation offered to him along with the notice and therefore the petitioner was estopped from challenging the action taken by the management by way of termination simpliciterthe petitioner has placed on record a copy of a letter addressed by him to the President of the respondent Society on September 15 1975 at Annexure H. In paragraphs 7 and 8 of the said letter it has in terms been stated that the cheque was being cashed under protest and without prejudice and subject to his legal rights with an assurance that the amount would be returned. It is no doubt true that the respondent replied to the aforesaid letter by a communication dated September 20 1975 at Annexure I in the last paragraph whereof it has been stated as under :. . . . . It is for you to accept or reject it. The same was rent to you for payment. Therefore your request for our permission to cash the cheque is misconceived. If you accept the same the question of returning the same does not arise. It will be deemed to be treated as acceptance of compensation and of the legality of the order made by the Management and declared valid by the Tribunal. The petitioner replied as under by Annexure J :. . . . If you accept the same the question of returning the same does not arise. It will be deemed to be treated as acceptance of compensation and of the legality of the order made by the Management and declared valid by the Tribunal. The petitioner replied as under by Annexure J :. . . . . I thank you for sending the D. C. which however I am accepting without any prejudice to my claim that the termination of my service is illegal and void. Similarly about the compensation amount I had to encash the cheque after informing you since the date of the validity of the cheque was expiring. I beg to reiterate my contention that the termination order passed against me was illegal and void. I had mentioned to you that I was ready and willing to return the cheque. In the circumstances I have received the amount under protest and subject to my contentions against the termination order. If and when I succeed in the petition you will be entitled to the credit of the said amount. It will be seen that the petitioner had encashed the cheque because the last date for encashing the cheque was expiring and he had in tenants made it clear that he was accepting it without prejudice to his contention that the termination was illegal and void and on a clear understanding that the amount would be returned when the application made to the Education Tribunal was decided in his favour. It is therefore not possible to uphold the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that the petitioner is estopped from challenging the legality and validity of the impugned order of termination. ( 8 ) LEARNED counsel for the respondents thereupon urged that an application under sec. 38 was competent only so long as a teacher was in the employment and the relationship of master and servant was in subsistence. Sec. 38 in so far as material may be quoted in order to understand this argument:-38 (1) Where there is any dispute or difference between the manager of a registered private secondary school and any person in service of such school as head-master a teacher or a member of non teaching staff which is connected with the conditions of service of such person the manager or as the case may be the person may. make an application to the Tribunal for the decision of the dispute this provision had come up for construction before this High Court in Special Civil Application No. 539/75 with Special Civil Application N. 664/76 decided by a Division Bench of this High Court consisting of J. B. Mehta Ag. C. J and P. D. Desai J. on 2/5/6th July 1976. (Satsangi Shishuvihar Kelvani Trust v. P. N. Patel XVIII G. L. R. 615 ). This very argument has in terms been negatived by the Division Bench for the very good reason that a Tribunal has been specially constituted under the Act to decide disputes of this nature and all that has to be established is that a relationship of master and servant was in subsistence at the point of time when the dispute itself which is connected with the conditions of service of such a teacher came into existence. Counsel argued that the decision rendered by the Division Bench required to be reconsidered and that a reference should be made to a Full Bench. Since the Constitution of the Tribunal in 1973 the Tribunal has been exercising jurisdiction in such matters without let and hindrance and as the point is covered by a decision of a Division Bench I do not see any good reason to make a reference to a larger bench particularly as it appears to me that the very Constitution of the Tribunal would be rendered purposeless if such a view were to be taken. I am therefore unable to accept the contention urged by counsel in this behalf. ( 9 ) LASTLY it was argued that in any view of the matter the petitioner was not entitled to any relief inasmuch as the Tribunal constituted under the Act had no jurisdiction to direct reinstatement of a teacher under sub-sec. (9) of sec. 39 in a case of a termination simpliciter. It is no doubt true that under sub-sec. (9) of sec. 39 reinstatement can be ordered only when the Tribunal holds that an order of dismissal removal or re- duction in rank is wrongful or unlawful. No reference is made to termination simpliciter in sub-sec. (9) of sec. 39. But then relief can be granted under sub-sec. (4) of sec. 39 for the Legislature has empowered the Tribunal to entertain and decide disputes of the nature referred to in sub-sec. (1) sec. 38. No reference is made to termination simpliciter in sub-sec. (9) of sec. 39. But then relief can be granted under sub-sec. (4) of sec. 39 for the Legislature has empowered the Tribunal to entertain and decide disputes of the nature referred to in sub-sec. (1) sec. 38. The present dispute would fall under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 38 as it has been held by the Division Bench in the aforesaid matters and therefore the Tribunal can deal with and decide any application made by a teacher challenging the legality and validity of an order passed by a management in contravention of sec. 36 (1) (a) of the Act. The impugned order is in violation of sec. 36 (1) (a) and is void on the ground that it has been passed without compliance with the mandatory requirement enjoined by sec. 36 (1) (a) Since the impugned order is in violation of the mandatory requirement of a statutory provision it is ab initio null and void and non-existent in the eye of law. The Tribunal therefore did have the jurisdiction to hold that the order of termination was passed without complying with the mandatory provision of sec. 36 (1) (a) and that inas much as the condition precedent to exercise of the power had not been complied with the order was non-existent in the eye of law. This decision could have been rendered by the Tribunal and the fact that no order for reinstatement in terms could have been passed under sec. 39 (9) cannot impair the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to decide the question under sub-sec. (4) of sec. 39. There is therefore no substance in this contention either. ( 10 ) IN the result the petition succeeds. The impugned order passed by the Tribunal Annexure F to the extent that the application made by the petitioner is dismissed must be quashed and set aside. The impugned order of termination Annexure C must be held to be illegal and void and non-existent in the eye of law. ( 11 ) THE petition is allowed. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent. Having regard to the circumstances of the case there will be no order regarding costs. .