N. C. MUKHERJI, J. ( 1 ) THIS is an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and is directed against Order No. 12 dated 13th July 1974 passed by Shri B. B. Dutta, Munsif, 1st Court, Basirhat, in Misc. Case No. 31 of 1974 arising out of a proceeding in Case No. 133 of 1966 under S. 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act. ( 2 ) THE facts of the case may brief be stated as follows: - in this case the impugned transfer was made by a Kobala dated 19th of August, 1964. On 29th November 1966 the petitioners filed an application under S. 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 claiming pre-emption on the ground that they were co-sharers in the tenancy of the properties and that no notice of the transfer was served upon them. The opposite party No. 2 contested the application. It was her contention that she did not actually sell the property but she had taken a loan from the opposite party No. 1 and executed the sale deed with an agreement for re-conveyance as a security for the loan. On 17th August 1966 the property had been re-conveyed to her. The application was allowed by the learned Sub-Divisional Land Reforms Officer on 2nd February 1968. The petitioners in execution of the said order obtained possession of the properties. The opposite party filed an appeal being L. R. Appeal No. 3 of 1968. The learned Munsif allowed the said appeal and set aside the order of the learned Sub-Divisional Land Reforms Officer and sent the case back on remand for fresh trial. The petitioners being aggrieved by the order of remand passed by the learned Munsif moved this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. During the pendency of the Rule there was the decision of the Full Bench case reported in AIR 1972 Calcutta 502 (Madan Mohan Ghosh and others v. Sishu Bala Atta and others ). The learned Judge directed the trial authority to consider the effect of the Full Bench decision in the facts of the present case. With regard to the amendment of the application it was kept open for the petitioners to raise any question before the lower tribunal. The learned Judge directed the trial authority to consider the effect of the Full Bench decision in the facts of the present case. With regard to the amendment of the application it was kept open for the petitioners to raise any question before the lower tribunal. After the disposal of the Rule on 24th of June 1974 an application for amendment of the application for pre-emption for adding a ground that the petitioner is a contiguous owner. The opposite party filed objection and after hearing both the parties the learned court dismissed the application. Being aggrieved, the present application has been filed by the petitioners in this Court. ( 3 ) MR. Saktinath Mukherjee, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners contends that the learned court below was wrong to hold that the amendment if allowed would change the nature of the case. The original application was one seeking for pre-emption; the amendment if allowed would not change the character and nature of the application. The application would remain one for pre-emption. In this connection it is contended that at the time when the original application was filed it was not necessary for the petitioners to take any other ground besides the ground that the petitioner is a co-sharer. Now, in view of the decision reported in AIR 1972 Calcutta 502 the raiyats of the holding cannot be regarded as co-shares after vesting. In such circumstances it has become necessary for the petitioner to amend the application claiming pre-emption on the ground that the petitioner is a contiguous owner. ( 4 ) MR. Mukherjee first relies on a decision reported in AIR 1964 Jammu and Kashmir 82 (Mst Gulab Bibi and another v. Smt. Shakuntala Devi and others ). In this case the plaintiff filed a suit for possession of the suit property on the ground that he has a right of pre-emption based on contiguity. During the pendency of the suit, the law of pre-emption based on contiguity was held void by Supreme Court and the High Court. Immediately he filed an application for amending the plaint so as to pre-empt the property on the basis of a right of easement. During the pendency of the suit, the law of pre-emption based on contiguity was held void by Supreme Court and the High Court. Immediately he filed an application for amending the plaint so as to pre-empt the property on the basis of a right of easement. It was held that Order 6 Rule 17 did not in any way fetter the discretion of the Court in granting the amendment provided the amendment did not work serious injustice to the other party or change the nature of the suit. It was held that the amendment sought in the case did not alter the nature of the suit because even after such amendment, the suit would still be a suit for pre-emption. With regard to the question of limitation it was held though the plea taken in the application for amendment was barred by limitation on the date when the application was made it was not barred at the time when the original application was made. In such circumstances it was held that the amendment seeking an additional plea of easement could be granted by the Court, even if that plea was barred by limitation at the time when the application was made. But in the present case the period of limitation for filing an application for pre-emption on the ground that the petitioner is a contiguous owner is 4 months from the date of transfer. This has been held in a recent Bench decision reported in 1975 (1) C. L. J. 494 (Sm. Ashalata Bairagya and Anr. v. Gopal Chandra Chakraborty and Ors ). It has been held ?section 8 itself clearly specifies that the commencement of the period of limitation for making an application by an adjoining owner would be the date of transfer and the other termini of the said period would be the date of expiry of 4 months from the date of such transfer. ? as has already been stated in the present case the transfer was made on 19. 8. 64 and the application was filed on 29. 11. 66. It is true that if the application for amendment be allowed it will relate back to the date of the original application but even then the application would be barred by limitation. ( 5 ) MR. 8. 64 and the application was filed on 29. 11. 66. It is true that if the application for amendment be allowed it will relate back to the date of the original application but even then the application would be barred by limitation. ( 5 ) MR. Mukherjee next refers to a decision reported in AIR 1950 Hyderabad 43 (K. Laxman Rao v. Bhavani Singh and another ). In this case a suit was filed for pre-emption on the basis of Muhammadan Law and it was admitted that the plaintiff was the pattadar of the suit house, amendment of the plaint by adding a prayer for relief under the Shikmidari Rules under the Land Revenue Act can be allowed as it would neither change the character of the suit nor alter the cause of action. The facts of this case are completely different from the facts of the present case and as such the principle laid down in this case has no application. ( 6 ) MR. Mukherjee next relies on an unreported decision in Civil Revision No. 238 of 1974 (Palan Mondal v. Durgapada Mondal ). The facts of this case are similar to the facts of the present case. In this case also the original application was for pre-emption on the ground that the petitioner was a co-sharer. Subsequently, the petitioner wanted to amend the application by adding a prayer that he was a contiguous owner. Sharma. J, allowed the application holding that the proposed amendment would not change the nature of the application. On going through the judgment it is, however, seen that no question of limitation was involved in the said case. ( 7 ) MR. Sudhis Das Gupta, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the opposite party, submits that the proposed amendment would completely change the character of the application. It is submitted that the original application was made on 29th November 1966 and the application for amendment was made after about 10 years on 24th June 1974. If really the petitioner was a contiguous owner there was no difficulty in adding that ground in his original application. Mr. Das Gupta supports the order passed by the learned court below on two grounds. If really the petitioner was a contiguous owner there was no difficulty in adding that ground in his original application. Mr. Das Gupta supports the order passed by the learned court below on two grounds. Firstly, that the proposed amendment would change the nature of the application and secondly, even if the proposed amendment be allowed it would be barred by limitation on the date when the original application was made. ( 8 ) MR. Das Gupta to support his contention first refers to a decision reported in AIR 1947 Allahabad 59 (L. Baij Nath v. Mt. Ram Pyari ). It was a suit for pre-emption and the plaintiff alleged that he was a co-sharer in which the property was situated and that the defendant vendee was a stranger. The defendant alleged that he too was a co-sharer and that plaintiff was not entitled to get preference over him. After issues were framed and before the date for final hearing, the plaintiff applied for amendment of his plaint claiming relief on the ground that he was a near relation of the vendor within the meaning of S. 12 Agra Pre-emption Act and that this ground had not been mentioned in the plaint through forgetfulness. It was held that the amendment, if allowed, would change the nature of the case, for the suit would then have been based on a totally new ground. Further, it was very likely that the allegation as to relationship was not true and that if the amendment had been allowed it would have enabled the plaintiff to adduce false evidence. ? ( 9 ) MR. Das Gupta next refers to a decision reported in 78 Calwn 572 (Arun Kumar Chatterjee v. Karuna Rakshit ). In this case a suit was instituted for eviction of the tenant under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act only on the ground of default. An application for amendment of the plaint was made praying for ejectment on the ground of sub-letting, nuisance and damage. The application was not allowed on the ground that all these grounds were very much known to the plaintiff and the said application was made only at a time when the plaintiff realized that his suit for ejectment on the ground of default was bound to fail. ( 10 ) MR. The application was not allowed on the ground that all these grounds were very much known to the plaintiff and the said application was made only at a time when the plaintiff realized that his suit for ejectment on the ground of default was bound to fail. ( 10 ) MR. Das Gupta next refers to a decision reported in AIR 1950 Madras 32 (Bhagavatula Gopalkrishnamurthi and ors. v. Dhulipalla Sreedhara Rao and antoher ). In this case it has been held ?if by reason of the subsequent events certain rights accrue to the plaintiff the plaintiff would be entitled to claim reliefs under those rights by amendment. But where certain facts are alleged which facts were available to the plaintiff and which the plaintiff has not chosen to mention in the original plaint it would not be open to Court to permit such an amendment as it would permit a new case to be made on facts which were available but were not pleaded. ? ( 11 ) MR. Das Gupta also relies on an unreported decision in Civil Rule No. 3365 of 1974. In this case Anil K. Sen. J. in similar circumstances disallowed an application for amendment of the original application for pre-emption. ( 12 ) CONSIDERING the facts and circumstances of the case and also considering the principles of law enunciated in the decisions referred to above I am of the opinion that the learned court below was right in rejecting the application. In the circumstances the present application is dismissed and the Rule is discharged. There will be no order for costs. Rule discharged.