( 1 ) THIS is a revision under S. 50 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 and is directed against the decision of the District Judge, South Kanara, confirming in appeal the decision of the Munsiff, Karkala and thereby allowing the petition of the landlord-respondent for eviction of the tenant who is the present petitioner. HRC No. 24 of 1973 was institituted by the landlord for eviction of the present petitioner on the ground that the tenant had without the landlord's consent in writing, erected on the premises a permanent structure, that the premises were required by the landlord for his reasonable and bona fide occupation and that the tenant after coming into operation of the Act acquired vacant possession of another suitable building, culminating in the pleas classified under proviso (c), (h) and (p) of S. 21 (1) of the Act. It was stated that the disputed premises consisted of two rooms one over the other while there was a jagali in front of the room on the ground floor. This jagali was in fact an open space meant for shop purposes and was enclosed by the tenant by a wooden structure of which the walls were filled up by wooden planks and the structure was fixed with the rafters of the roof. Besides it was stated 8 new rafters were placed in 1973 and the former roofing which was of tin sheets was replaced. According to the landlord, all these acts amounted to erection on the premises of a permanent structure and thereby gave a plea for eviction of the tenant. It was also contended in the petition that the landlord required the shop premises for his fourth son for whom he intended to open a book shop in these premises. That was a reasonable and bona fide need of the landlord and as such the tenant was to be evicted. The third plea, of course, related to the occupation by the tenant of the another suitable building which was vacated near about two years before the institution of the petition. All these pleas were denied on behalf of the tenant. It was stated that the aforementioned construction over the jagali was not a permanant structure. The third plea, of course, related to the occupation by the tenant of the another suitable building which was vacated near about two years before the institution of the petition. All these pleas were denied on behalf of the tenant. It was stated that the aforementioned construction over the jagali was not a permanant structure. It was further contended that the shop premises were neither reasonably or bona fide required by the landlord for his son nor could it be stated that comparative hardship was in favour of the landlord and not in favour of the tenant and as such according to the tenant the shop premises could not be got vacated on that ground. The tenant further denied with reference to the plea under Cl. (p) that he ever got vacant possession of any of the shop premises, so that he could start his business in those premises. In fact the tenant runs a stamp vendors shop in the disputed premises from the year 1948. It was also revealed from evidence that the Sub-Registrar's office is situate opposite to the disputed premises and the stamp vending business done by the tenant has reference to the documents which are to be written and registered in the office of the Registrar. ( 2 ) THE learned trial Munsiff allowed the petition and held that a part of the construction was a permanent structure. According to him the enclosure made over the jagali was not a permanent structure, but replacement of Zinc Sheets over the rafters was a permanent structure within the meaning of Clause (c) and as such the tenant was liable to b evicted on that ground. The learned Munsiff further held that the shop premises were reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for the business of his son. He also decided in favour of the landlord with reference to the plea contained in Clause (p), holding that some building was vacated and the tenant could very well make use of that building for the shifting of his business. The tenant came in appeal before the learned District Judge and there too he failed. Tha learned District Judge went a little further on the point of permanent structure and held that the entire construction fell in that definition and the plea under Cl (c) applied and the tenant was liable to be evicted. The tenant came in appeal before the learned District Judge and there too he failed. Tha learned District Judge went a little further on the point of permanent structure and held that the entire construction fell in that definition and the plea under Cl (c) applied and the tenant was liable to be evicted. As regards the plea relating to reasonable and bona fide requirement of the landlord he agreed with the learned Muasiff. However, in respect of the plea pertaining to clause (p) he considered that some other shop premises said to be in'possession of one Shamaraya Achari fell vacant two years ago and the tenant could very well shift his business in that shop. Accordingly he dismissed the appeal and maintained the order of eviction of the tenant. The present revision petition is filed by the tenant being dissatisfied with the two decisions of the courts below. ( 3 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant contended in the foremost that the disputed construction that has been made over the Jagali, as well as the replacement of tin sheets by zinc sheets could not be classified as permanent structure within the meaning of Cl (c) of the proviso to S. 21 (1 ). It is no doubt correct that the Act itself does not provide for any definition of "permanent structure" although the expression was the subject matter of several decisions in this Court. It has been held that for a permanent structure the raw material used while making that structure will not ba a factor for consideration. The material used may be soft or hard or may result in a construction which would last temporarily or permanently, but that alone will not be a factor to decide if the structure is permanent so as to afford a plea for eviction of the tenant. As held by me in padmanabha Shettigara v. Srinivasa Acharya, (1976) 2 Karlj. 237 . the said expression necessarily refers to some material alteration made in the building. There has to be an addition or subtraction in the building leading to alteration in the character of enjoyment. Only such a construction in a case may be held to be a permanent structure so as to afford the ground for eviction of the tenant. 237 . the said expression necessarily refers to some material alteration made in the building. There has to be an addition or subtraction in the building leading to alteration in the character of enjoyment. Only such a construction in a case may be held to be a permanent structure so as to afford the ground for eviction of the tenant. It is then to ascertain in the instant case as to what type of construction has been made and as to whether there is any material alteration in the use and enjoyment of the building. Could the construction be considered to have led to any material addition or substraction in the building? As regards the enclosure of the jagali the learned Munsiff thought it not to be a permanent structure. Rather, it was considered by him that the replacement of tin sheets by zinc sheets would be a permanent structure. To that extent the finding of the learned Munsiff appears to be prima facie incorrect. Probably that finding was given because according to the landlord the Jagali was enclosed in 1973 and as in point of time it was a recent construction, it was held by the learned Munsiff not to be a permanent structure. As the evidence indicates the Jagali was enclosed, according to the tenant, in the yefer 1960 and according to the landlord, in the year 1973. However, both the parties have at one stage stated that the Zinc sheets were put in 1978. According to the tenant the tin sheets were there in 1960. The enclosure made over the jagali and the replacement of tin sheets did not alter in any manner the mode of enjoyment of the jagali. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that like the case Padmanabha shettigara. supra (1) the present dispute also relates to the very same area and in order to give protection from rain and sun-shine a temporary enclosure has been put over the jagali. The replacement of tin sheets by zinc sheets can never be considered to be an alteration in the construction. In fact the tin sheets were replaced almost every year and that has been conceded to by the parties in their evidence. Therefore the finding of the learned District Judge that the construction was a permanent one does not appear to be correct. In fact the tin sheets were replaced almost every year and that has been conceded to by the parties in their evidence. Therefore the finding of the learned District Judge that the construction was a permanent one does not appear to be correct. At any rate the learned Munsiff was right in holding that a part of the construction was not a permanent one. Therefore the plea unnder Cl (c) failed and the tenant could not be evicted on that ground. ( 4 ) THE other contention of the landlord pertained to his reasonable and bonafide requirement of the premises. In that connection the learned counsel pointed out and the tenant very much stated in his deposition that he runs a stamp vendor and stationary shop and that the Sub-Registrar's office is situate opposite to the shop premises. In case he is evicted from the disputed shop premises his business is likely to be adversely affected. That circumstance which is proved by the statement of the tenant was not taken care of by the two courts below. There is not even a suggestion in the statesment of the landlord that the tenant is not likely to suffer any loss in the business although it was stated that the tenant owns several other buildings, meaning thereby that he could shift his business to any such other building. The fact of the matter remains that the shifting of the business from the disputed premises will affect the business chances of the tenant. To that extent the evidence has remained unrebutted. As pointed out by their lordships of the Supreme Court in Central Tobacco Co. , v. Chandra Prakash, AIR 1969 SC 88. on the point of relative hardship to the landlord and the tenant both sides must adduce all relevant evidence, before the Court can determine, that question, the landlord must show that other reasonable accommodation was not available to him and the tenant must also adduce evidence to that effect and it is only by sifting that evidence that the court must come to the conclusion on consideration of all the circumstances of the case as to whether greater hardship would be caused by passing the decree than by refusing to pass it. Considering that decision, in the present case it is to be seen whether greater hardship would be caused to the tenant in case he is asked to vacate the premises. For this I have already pointed out the statement of the tenant namely, that he is a stamp vendor and also runs a stationery shop and in view of the shop being opposite to the Sub-Registrar's office, he is likely to suffer the loss of business in case he is asked to vacate the shop and open his business elsewhere. That apart, two other circumstances were pointed out by the learned Counsel, namely, that the landlord got possession over a house for the residence of his son and the tenant occupying that house was evicted on that ground. Subsequently that son never occupied that house as he was residing somewhere else. The argument was that the landlord pointed out a bona fide need namely, residence of the first son, in respect of another building, but subsequently that need was not found bona fide, in as much, as that his son never occupied that building. On that basis the learned Counsel argued that the present need of the fourth son of the same landlord could not be considered bona fide and that could even be a pretext to get the shop premises vacated. The other circumstance pointed out by the learned Counsel pertained to another vacancy which occurred some time in July 1974 of a building belonging to this landlord and as such the said building could aa well be utilised by his fourth son for opening a shop. For this contention, a miscellaneous application was given by the learned Counsel that the said fact regarding vacation of the building be considered by the Court, being a subsequent event which requires consideration by the Court in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Soonda Ram v. Rameswarlal, AIR 1975 SC 479 , as against that, the argument of the learned Counsel for the respondent was, that the event could not be a subsequent one because although the petition was filed on 20-10-1973 and the vacancy occurred in July 1974 yet the petition itself was decided in October, 1974. Both the parties led eviidence in Sepr, 1974 and the tenant should be presumed to have known about that vacancy which took place in July 1974. Both the parties led eviidence in Sepr, 1974 and the tenant should be presumed to have known about that vacancy which took place in July 1974. For this the answer on behalf of the petitioner is that he was not aware of that vacancy which was of course within the personal knowledge of the landlord and that was the reason why he could not, bring that evidence to his aid while he gave the statement in Sepr, 1974. In my opinion the entire controversy rests in this, as to whether the additional evidence could be brought on record and in that connection the learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out the aforesaid decision in Soonda Ram's case (3), but as contended by the respondent the additional evidence in the present proceedings should not be permitted as it would lead to the filling up of the lacuna in the case as set up by the other party. Be it as it may, even if the additional evidence is ignored, in my opinion, the other two circumstances as pointed out by the tenant and especially the circumstance pertaining to greater hardship for which definite evidence was given by the tenant in his statement and which remained uncontroverted on the side of the landlord, may be considered sufficient to decide the issue. It seems to have been considered by the Courts below that by the mere fact that a reasonable and bona fide need of the landlord existed, the burden of proof lay upon the tenant to prove greater hardship in case he is asked to vacate the premises. This proposition referable to burden of proof has been set at rest by the Supreme Court in P. B. Desai v. C. M. Patel, AIR 1974 SC 1059 , in fact both the parties are required to adduce evidence and after sifting of that evidence alone that the Court can arrive at the conclusion as to comparative hardship with reference to S. 21 (4) which is by no means a mandatory provision, before a tenant can be asked to vacate. As I have stated before, the question regarding comparative hardship in the instant case is decided in favour of the tenant. As I have stated before, the question regarding comparative hardship in the instant case is decided in favour of the tenant. This is immaterial, as it applies both in the case of the landlord and the tenant, that they own several buildings because the landlord can as well ask one of his tenants to vacate in his favour. ( 5 ) THE learned Counsel for the respondent pointed out that some time in 1973 the tenant himself got possession of a certain shop premises on the ground of its demolition. The learned Counsel further pointed out that some 4 or 5 years ago the wife of the tenant also acquired a vacant site for the construction of a mill. I do not think these circumstances will tilt the balance in favour of the landlord. If the shop premises are demolished and not reconstructed, it cannot be stated that any premises were available for the tenant for "doing his own business. Similarly the acquisition of a vacant site by the wife of the tenant will not be a factor to consider that he could very well construct his shop over that site for his own business. ( 6 ) AS regards the last plea relating to Cl (p) the learned Counsel pointed out that the tenant in his statement very much admitted that one shamaraya Achari was leased out "orally" two years back a certain shop premises. There is no such statement as to whether Shamaraya Achsri was not in physical possession of that shop even before two years. A bald statement of like nature cannot lead to so many presumptions namely that the shop premises were physically occupied by the tenant and he chose to let them out to Shamaraya Achari. Before the learned Counsel could found his case on such plea, sufficient details were required to be given as cl (p) of the proviso to S. 21 (1) clearly points out that the tenant must acquire prior vacant possession of a suitable building. As such not only vacant possession by the tenant is required to be proved but the suitability of the building is also to be pleaded and established before the plea can be sustained. In my opinion the statement pointed out by the learned counsel did not go to substantiate a plea under that clause. As such not only vacant possession by the tenant is required to be proved but the suitability of the building is also to be pleaded and established before the plea can be sustained. In my opinion the statement pointed out by the learned counsel did not go to substantiate a plea under that clause. In fact the learned Munsiff did not consider that the leasing out of any shop premises to Shamaraya Achari sustained the plea under Cl (p ). He referred to some other building "which was perhaps vacated at some point of time, the learned Dist Judge has no doubt indirectly referred to the building leased out to Shamarava Achari. But he too has not given any detail, so that the plea could at all be founded with reference to Cl (p ). I will thus consider that no plea was made out under that clause and the tenant could not be evicted on that ground. ( 7 ) THE result of my finding therefore is just the contrary to the decisions arrived at in the two Courts below. The revision is allowed and the petition of the landlord for eviction shall stand dismissed. Parties are however left to bear their own costs. ( 8 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner points out that certain amounts of rent has been deposited by the tenant to the credit of the landlord in the High Court. The landlord, may approach the High Court to withdraw that amount. --- *** --- .