JUDGMENT-There is not much dispute about the facts in this case. The petitioner was the holder of 55 acres 24 gunthas of land on 26-9 1970. Her husband was alive at that time, but it seems to be a common ground that she was the holder of these lands in her own right. Out of 55 acres 24 gunthas, 4 acres 39 gunthas are Pot-kharab. On 10-11-1971 she sold 25 acres 10 gunthas covered by the two survey numbers, namely, Nos. 3/6 and 4. All these lands are situated at village Khopda, Taluq Morshi, District Amravati. Her husband died on 10-1-1975. Under the will of her husband dated 15-2-1972 she received 35 acres 4 gunthas. Thus, on the commencement date of the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling on Holdings) Act, 1961, as amended by Act No. 21 of 1975 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), the petitioner held in all 65 acres 18 gunthas, after excluding the land sold by her on 10-11-1971 and adding the lands which she got from her husband under the will. It is not disputed that 8 acres 22 gunthas out of this 65 acres 18 gunthas are Pot-kharab. Therefore, on the commencement date, namely, 2-10-1975, she was the holder of only 57 acres 36 gunthas. 2. Notwithstanding these indisputable facts, the Surplus Land Determination Tribunal, Morshi, held her to be the holder to the extent of 77 acres 15 gunthas and surplus holder to the extent of 23 acres 15 gunthas by its order dated 12-3-1976 by ignoring the sales dated 10-11-1971. On appeal, the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal dismissed it and confirmed the said order by its order dated 7-5-1976. The validity of these orders is challenged in this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. 3. Mr. Marpakwar, the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner, contends that the Courts below were in error in presuming that the sale of the two lands measuring 25 acres 10 gunthas on 10-11-1971 by the petitioner was hit by section 10 of the Act as amended. According to Mr. Marpakwar, the ceiling area admittedly is 54 acres. After exclusion of the Pot-kharab area of 4 acres 39 gunthas the petitioner held only 50 acres 25 gunthas on 26-9-1970. According to Mr. Marpakwar, the ceiling area admittedly is 54 acres. After exclusion of the Pot-kharab area of 4 acres 39 gunthas the petitioner held only 50 acres 25 gunthas on 26-9-1970. Her sale in all of 25 acres 10 gunthas on 10-11-1971, by no stretch of imagination, could be said to be within the mischief of section 10 of the Act as amended. There appears to be considerable substance in this contention of the learned Advocate. All that section 10 (1) of the Act as amended contemplates is that transfers made by "any person" or "a member of a family unit" after the 26th day of September 1970 and before the commencement date, namely, 2-10-1975 in anticipation of or in order to avoid or defeat the object of the Amending Act, 1972, should be so ignored as to take the same into consideration in calculating the ceiling area of the "person" or the "family unit", as the case may be. The section then also raises a statutory fiction of such transfers being deemed (unless the contrary is proved) to have been made in anticipation of· or in order to avoid or defeat the object of the Amending Act, 1972. Any reference to other parts of the section for the purposes of the determination of the point under consideration is not necessary. The question that really falls for consideration is: Can any such presumption of transfer being in anticipation of or in order to avoid or defeat the object of the Amending Act, 1972, ever be raised where on the date of the transfer the transferor holds lands upto less than the ceiling area? My learned Brother Sawant J. had occasion to consider this very question in Abdul Bhai v. State1. The learned Judge answered the question in the negative. Mr. R. R. Deshpande, the learned Assistant Government Pleader, could not dispute the proposition of law laid down in this judgment. It is thus clear that ordinarily the two sales of lands dated 10-11-1971 could not be deemed to have been made in anticipation of or in order to avoid or defeat the object of the Amending Act, 1972, and the petitioner could not have been called upon to prove to the contrary as she was holding lands less than the ceiling area, namely, 54 acres, on the date of the sale, namely, 10-11-1971. 4. Mr. 4. Mr. Deshpande, however, contends that the ratio of the above judgment of Sawant J. can have no application to the facts obtaining in the present case. According to Mr. Deshpande, the husband of the petitioner, was also the holder of 35 acres 4 gunthas on the date of sale, bequeathed by him later under the will dated 15-2-1972 in favour of his wife. Section 10 applies not only to transfers by persons but also to transfers by members of a family unit. On the date of the sale, namely, 10-11-1971, the husband and wife being alive, both together must be deemed to have held the lands as members of the family unit. The lands of both having admittedly exceeded the ceiling area, the case clearly attracted the deeming provision of section 10 of the Act, and till the contrary was proved, the sales dated 10-11-1971 must be deemed to have been made in anticipation of or in order to avoid or defeat the object of the Amending Act, 1972. 5. The contention raised by Mr. Deshpande is no doubt attractive. The question that, however, arises for consideration is whether the expression "family unit" referred to in section 10 is referable to the family unit which existed on or after 2-10-1975 i.e. the commencement date as defined under the Act No. 21 of 1975, or to such group of persons like the petitioner and her deceased husband that existed prior to that date and answered the descript ion of the words "family unit" as introduced in the Act by the Act No. 21 of 1975 but ceased to be such family unit even before 2-10- I 975 because of the husband's death. In my opinion, the expression "family unit" in section 10 of the Act can only have reference to such family units as were in existence on 2-10-1975, and not to those which ceased to exist but could also have been in existence prior to the introduction of such conception in the enactment itself and its enforcement. It is section 3 of the Act (as amended) which prevents a person or a family unit from holding land in excess of the ceiling area. The prohibition becomes operative from the commencement date of the Act, namely, 2-10-1975. This prohibition has no application to the holding of the land in excess of the ceiling area as defined under the unamended enactment. The prohibition becomes operative from the commencement date of the Act, namely, 2-10-1975. This prohibition has no application to the holding of the land in excess of the ceiling area as defined under the unamended enactment. In fact, the unamended enactment did not contain any conception of family unit as such, nor it was pregnant with such drastic implications under the Act No. 21 of 1975. [ The proviso to section 4 of the Act No. 21 of 1975, the Bill No. LVI of 1972 for which was initiated in the Assembly on 7-8-1972 and reserved for assent of the President till 6-8-1975 contemplated exclusion of such lands from the holding of the family unit, as were acquired by the members thereof in their own rights as specified therein before 26-9- 1970. It is only when the proviso was deleted by section 3 of the Maharashtra Act No. 47 of 1975 on 20-9-1975, that such lands also became liable to be included in the holding of family unit.} The seller, like the petitioner could not have imagined on the date of the sale of he or she being ever required to rebut any such fiction or presumption as a member of any such family unit. Such legal conception, with its retrospective implications, was not in existence and could not have been even foreseen till the amendment of the Act by Act No. 47 of 1975 on 20-9-1975. It is obvious that when section 10 seeks to invalidate transfers by a person or a member of a family unit even to a limited extent, it only refers to a member of the family unit which is prohibited from holding land in excess of the ceiling area under section 3 of the Act, and many person or a member of a family unit" can only have reference in the context, to holders as such persons or family units who are in existence on the commencement date, namely, 2-10-1975. 6. Mr. Deshpande, however, contends that section 10 of the Act is retrospective and the conception of family unit must also be deemed to have been deliberately made effective retrospectively. Now, on the face of it, section 10 is retrospective to a certain extent. Section 10 in its present form has been introduced in the Act by the Amending Act No. 21 of 1975, which was enforced from 19-9-1975. Now, on the face of it, section 10 is retrospective to a certain extent. Section 10 in its present form has been introduced in the Act by the Amending Act No. 21 of 1975, which was enforced from 19-9-1975. It does seek to affect the sales adversely that were effected between 26-9-1970 and 2-10-1975 i.e. long before the amended enactment saw the light of the day. That by itself, however, is not enough to warrant the conclusion that the Legislature intended to give retrospective effect to the conception of "family unit" in an unqualified manner. At least, I have not been able to trace any basis or foundation for such assumption in the language of the section. As indicated earlier, even a sale by a member of a family unit between 26-9-1970 and 2-10-1975 is intended to be brought within the mischief of the section. But this is done only with the limited object of finding out the holdings of the family units if found to be the holder of the land on 2-12-1975. In other words, the sale of only such person will be hit by this section retrospectively who either is a holder of the land as such person, or who happens to be a member of a family unit which is assumed to be the surplus holder of the land on the commencement date. In cases where, as here, the holder cannot be said to be the family unit on the commencement date, the fiction of any of its members having effected the transfer with the object of avoiding or defeating the object of the Amending Act, 1972, cannot arise, much less the question of calculating the holdings of all the members of the family unit together on the date of any such sale, there being no inquiry into the holding of any family unit. The conception is not made so retrospective as to permit raising the contemplated fiction or presumption against the sale of any person as member of the family unit, which does not happen to be the holder because of not being in existence on 2-10-1975. 7. It is true that on the commencement date, namely, 2-10-1975, the petitioner was a holder of the land in excess of the ceiling area. 7. It is true that on the commencement date, namely, 2-10-1975, the petitioner was a holder of the land in excess of the ceiling area. By this time her husband was dead, and under the will dated 15-2-1972 she also became the holder of 35 acres 4 gunthas more with effect from 10-1-1975 when her husband died. I am, however, unable to trace how this circumstance can have any relevance to attract the provisions of section 10 of the Act. What attracts section 10 is the holding of excess land actually or notionally on the commencement date either by the person or the family unit, which can be said to have been in existence on the commencement date. I do not thus think that section 10 has any application to the facts of this case. The Surplus Lands Determination Tribunal and the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal were obviously in error in going into the question whether 25 acres 10 gunthas were transferred by her on 10-11-1971 with a view to avoid or defeat the object of the Amending Act, 1972. Admittedly, the petitioner was the holder only of 50 acres 25 gunthas on the date of sale. The findings of the Courts below are liable to be set aside. The petitioner, however, shall have to be held to be the holder of 57 acres 37 gunthas. This holding is admittedly in excess of 54 acres which is the ceiling area under the Act as amended by Act No. 21 of 1975. The petitioner is, therefore, liable to be the surplus landholder to the extent of 3 acres 36 gunthas only. The rule is liable to be made absolute to this extent. The rule is thus made absolute. The petitioner will get her costs from the respondents. Rule absolute.