Judgment R.P.SINHA, J. 1. Both these applications under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution were heard together as they arise out of two cases which were made analogous in the courts below and were disposed of by common orders. Since a common question of law is involved in both the applications, this judgment will govern both the cases. 2. In both the writ applications the petitioners and the respondents are the same and the annexures also are identical. The petitioners have prayed for quashing the orders Annexures-3, 4, 6, 7 and 8. The case of the petitioners has been that they and respondents Nos. 1 to 5 are closely related and co-sharers and are holding land adjoining the lands transferred by respondents Nos. 1 to 5 in favour of respondents Nos. 6 to 8 and so they are entitled to claim the right of pre-emption under S. 16 (3) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). They, accordingly, filed an application under S. 16 (3) of the Act in the Court of the Sub-divisional Officer, Siwan, who is appointed as the Collector under the Act claiming the right of pre-emption in respect of the lands sold by respondents Nos. 1 to 5 in favour of respondents Nos. 6 to 8 by three separate sale deeds. The application also accompanied a treasury challan showing deposit of the entire consideration money under the three sale deeds plus 10 per cent of the total amount as required under the Act. That petition was registered as L. C. Case No. 36 of 1968-69. Respondents Nos. 6 to 8, namely, the three vendees, who had purchased the lands from respondents Nos. That petition was registered as L. C. Case No. 36 of 1968-69. Respondents Nos. 6 to 8, namely, the three vendees, who had purchased the lands from respondents Nos. 1 to 5 contested the claim of the petitioners on amongst others two main grounds, namely, (i) misjoinder of parties and (ii) deposit of the consideration money along with 10 per cent of the total consideration amount under the three sale deeds under one challan as, according to them, since they had purchased the lands under three separate sale deeds having different amount of consideration under each in respect of separate plots of land, the petitioners should have filed three separate applications claiming pre-emption in respect of the lands conveyed and the consideration money under each of the sale deeds with 10 per cent more should have been deposited under three separate challans and not under one challan as has been done by the petitioners. The petitioners had tried to justify the filing of only one application claiming the right of pre-emption in respect of the lands conveyed under the three sale deeds in favour of the aforesaid respondents on the basis that the respondents who had purchased lands under the three sale deeds were own brothers and were members of a joint Hindu family and that they had purchased the lands under three sale deeds to avoid income-tax and the operation of the Act. 3. These petitioners had already filed a similar case which was numbered as L. C. Case No. 32 of 1967-68 which was also pending before the same court between the same parties and on similar facts and circumstances and 90 that case was made analogous to L. C. Case No 36 of 1968-69 and were disposed of, as already stated earlier, by common orders which have been sought to be quashed. 4. It appears that the petitioners had filed affidavits in support of their assertion that respondents Nos. 6 to 8, namely, the purchasers of the lands in question under the three sale deeds were members of a joint Hindu family having joint house, baithaka and lands. The affidavit of petitioner No. 1 Saryug Mishra is Annexure-1 and that of Shri Chandeshwar Rai Annexure-2 to the writ applications. 5. 6 to 8, namely, the purchasers of the lands in question under the three sale deeds were members of a joint Hindu family having joint house, baithaka and lands. The affidavit of petitioner No. 1 Saryug Mishra is Annexure-1 and that of Shri Chandeshwar Rai Annexure-2 to the writ applications. 5. The contention on behalf of the petitioners, in short, was that there was no illegality in making the deposit of the total amount of the consideration money of the three sale deeds by one challan and making one common application under Sec.16 (3) of the Act claiming the right of pre-emption in respect of all the lands covered under the three sale deeds executed in the name of three different persons, namely, respondents Nos. 6, 7 and 8 as those sale deeds were obtained for the benefit of the joint family. The contesting respondents (respondents Nos. 6 to 8) on the other hand had asserted before the learned Sub-divisional Officer that they are separate and are having business separately since long. In support of the assertion documents, it seems, were filed to show that they had purchased lands in the past also separately and they were carrying on their own separate business. 6. The learned Subdivisional Officer, by his order dated 11th July, 1969 which is Annexure-3 to the writ applications, held that the contesting respondents were separate even though there might not have been division of the property by metes and bounds. Consequently, he came to the conclusion that there was misjoinder of parties in the sense that one application by the petitioners in respect of the three sale deeds executed in favour of three different persons, namely, the contesting respondents, was bad. He also held that the deposit by one challan was bad because the deposit was made not in favour of the Collector and that the entire consideration money under the three sale deeds had been jumbled up together and deposited under one challan. For these two reasons the claim of the petitioners for pre-emption was dismissed and the petitioners were allowed to withdraw the deposit made by them. 7. As against the order passed by the Sub-divisional Officer, the petitioners preferred an appeal before the learned Additional Collector, Chapra. He also, in complete agreement with the impugned order of the learned Subdivisional Officer, dismissed the appeal (vide Annexure-4). 7. As against the order passed by the Sub-divisional Officer, the petitioners preferred an appeal before the learned Additional Collector, Chapra. He also, in complete agreement with the impugned order of the learned Subdivisional Officer, dismissed the appeal (vide Annexure-4). The petitioners, thereafter, filed an application in revision before the Commissioner, Tirhut Division, Muzaffarpur against the order of the learned Additional Collector. The learned Commissioner, however, referred the matter to the Collector of Saran by his order dated 21st January, 1971 (vide Annexure-5). The learned Collector, Saran by his order dated 27th December, 1971 (Annexure-6) rejected the revision petition. As against that order of the learned Collector, the petitioners again preferred an application in revision before the Commissioner who by his order dated 1st September, 1972 (Annexure-7) held that the Collector or the Commissioner had no revisional jurisdiction and hence the revision was dismissed summarily. Thereafter the petitioners preferred art application in revision before the Member, Board of Revenue and the Additional Member, Board of Revenue, by his order dated 21st November, 1974 (Annexure-8) held that although the defect in writing out the challan was not fatal but in view of the fact that there were three sale deeds in favour of three vendees who though may be brothers and belong to the joint family, yet, when three separate sale deeds were executed in their favour, one application for pre-emption to cover the three transactions was clearly irregular and untenable. Hence, on this ground also, he upheld the order of the Subdivisional Officer and the order passed on appeal by the learned Additional Collector and rejected the revision application of the petitioners. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioners has very vehemently argued that the contesting respondents were not only own brothers but were members of a joint Hindu family and that the three transactions embodied in the three sale deeds were for the benefit of the joint family and, therefore, one application by the petitioners for pre-emption in respect of the entire lands conveyed under the three sale deeds and the consolidated amount of the consideration money under those sale deeds were quite good and valid and that the order of the Subdivisional Officer and the orders of the appellate authority and the revisional authority that one application was not maintainable, being irregular, should be quashed. It has also been urged on behalf of the petitioners that petitioner No. 1 had sworn an affidavit in the Court of the learned Sub-divisional Officer asserting the fact that the contesting respondents were members of a joint Hindu family having a joint place of residence and having common joint family business and the assertion made in the affidavit of petitioner No. 1 was further affairmed by a lawyer, who has been styled by him as an advocate commissioner, 9. Learned counsel for the contesting respondents, in reply, has submitted that no reliance should be placed upon the affidavit sworn by petitioner No. 1 and the so-called advocate commissioner, because according to him and as stated in the counter affidavit filed in this Court, the respondents have been challenging the assertions made in the affidavits of the petitioners and have proved their assertions to be false to the satisfaction of the courts below by producing documents showing that the contesting respondents were separate in mess and business for the last several years. Regarding the advocate commissioner it has been asserted in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents that no advocate commissioner was appointed by the Court and if there was any, he was a self-appointed commissioner who did not give any notice to the respondents and that the report and affidavit were filed by the petitioners before the learned Subdivisional Officer at the time of final hearing. Since, however, the learned Subdivisional Officer, after hearing the parties, was not inclined to accept the affidavits in face of the documents filed by the respondents, no counter affidavit was thought necessary to be filed by the respondents in the court below. 10. One of the contesting respondents, namely, respondent No. 8 has filed an identical counter affidavit in both the writ applications and in para. 5 it has been affirmed that respondents Nos. 6 to 8 are brothers but the allegation that they are joint has been denied and it has been emphatically asserted that all the three brothers have been and are separate in mess and business since long before the sale deeds in question and they have taken the sale deeds separately in their names out of their separate funds. It has been further stated in para. 6 that respondents Nos. It has been further stated in para. 6 that respondents Nos. 6 to 8 do not constitute a joint family since long before they had taken the sale deeds in question; that no advocate commissioner was appointed by the court and if there be any, he was a self-appointed commissioner who did not give any notice to the parties nor he visited the lands of the respondents. Again in para. 7 it has been stated that the three sale deeds were not made for the benefit of any joint family constituted by respondents Nos. 6 to 8 and that the three sale deeds are not one transaction. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that one application under S. 16 (3) of the Act by the petitioners was good enough for claiming a right of pre-emption in respect of all the lands under the three sale deeds as, according to him, the respondents were own brothers and were members of a joint Hindu family and the three transactions were for the benefit of the joint family and not for the benefit of the individual vendees. Learned counsel contended that the transactions under the three sale deeds should be treated as one transaction and one application and a consolidated deposit of the consideration money were quite in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The fact that the respondents were joint and they had obtained the sale deeds in their names as members of a joint Hindu family, for the family benefit, had been denied from the very beginning and in support of this denial the respondents had filed documents before the learned Sub-divisional Officer who, being satisfied, came to the conclusion that the respondents were separate although there may not have been division of their property by metes and bounds and held that one application was bad. The claim of preemption was consequently disallowed by the learned Subdivisional Officer. The appellate authority has affirmed the order of the learned Subdivisional Officer and so has the Additional Member, Board of Revenue, done. The learned Member, Board of Revenue, relied upon a Bench decision of this Court in Ram Prasad Singh V/s. State of Bihar, ( AIR 1974 Pat 25 ) in support of his impugned order (Annexure-8). Learned counsel for the petitioners has also placed reliance on the same decision in support of his contention. The learned Member, Board of Revenue, relied upon a Bench decision of this Court in Ram Prasad Singh V/s. State of Bihar, ( AIR 1974 Pat 25 ) in support of his impugned order (Annexure-8). Learned counsel for the petitioners has also placed reliance on the same decision in support of his contention. In that case two sale deeds were executed on the same day by respondent No. 6 In favour of respondent No. 5 of that case. The pre-emptors had filed one application under S. 16 (3) of the Act on the ground of being adjoining raiyats of all the three plots of land transferred under the two sale deeds. It was held in that case that since two sale deeds had been executed on the same day by one person in favour of another and the pre-emptors claimed to be adjoining raiyats of all the plots transferred, they could file one application. But in that very decision this point had been elaborated in some detail and the relevant portion is as follows:- "If two sale deeds are executed by the same person in favour of different persons, then the pre-emptor may not, rather should not be permitted to file one application against the different sets of purchasers. There, on general principles, one purchaser should not be made a party in the case of the other purchaser and it should be insisted that two applications should be filed. It may well also be that if sale deeds are executed on different dates by same vendor in favour of the same vendee, then also filing of different applications may toe advisable or necessary." There cannot be any doubt that in the instant case, there were three independent sale deeds in favour of three different persons although by the same set of vendors. The vendees have claimed to acquire the lands under separate sale deeds, for their own benefit and not for the benefit of the joint family; that fact of twins members of a joint Hindu family having been vehemently denied by them. It may toe observed, by the way, that even a member of a joint family can acquire property for his own benefit. In Art. 222 at page 247 of Mullas Principles of Hindu Law, (13th Edn.) it is stated as follows :- "A Hindu, even if he be joint, may possess separate property. It may toe observed, by the way, that even a member of a joint family can acquire property for his own benefit. In Art. 222 at page 247 of Mullas Principles of Hindu Law, (13th Edn.) it is stated as follows :- "A Hindu, even if he be joint, may possess separate property. Such property belongs exclusively to him. No other member of the coparcenary, not even his male issue, acquires any interest in it by birth. He may sell it, or he may make a gift of it or bequeath it by will, to any person he likes. It is not liable to partition, and, on his death intestate, it passes by succession to his heirs, and not by survivorship to the surviving coparceners". In these writ applications the petitioners have not been able to conclusively prove by reference to the three sale deeds in question that the acquisition was made by the respondents for the benefit of the joint family. So, the contention of learned Counsel for the respondents that the sale deeds should be accepted at their face value and it must be held that the acquisitions were made, by the respondents in their individual capacity for their own benefits appears to be plausible. 12 Having examined the question involved in these applications I am of the opinion that the impugned order of the learned Subdivisional Officer and those of the appellate and revisional authorities, holding that there should have been three independent applications and not one as has been done in respect of the three separate sale deeds executed in favour of the contesting respondents by their vendors, have been rightly made and the applications of the petitioners claiming pre-emption have been rightly dismissed, 13. In the result, both the writ applications fail and they are, accordingly, dismissed. In the circumstances, however there will be no order as to costs. S.SARWAR ALI, J. 14 I agree.