MODI, J.—This is a tenants second appeal against the judgment and decree passed by the Additional District Judge, Sirohi, dated December 20, 1972, upholding the decree passed by Munsiff, Sirohi, dated December 23, 1971. 2. The suit, out of which this appeal arises, was brought by the respondent-landlord against the appellant-tenant, on October 13, 1969, for the recovery of arrears of rent and ejectment from the suit premises. The grounds on which the eviction was sought were three-fold. Firstly, that the defendant had committed default in payment of rent for six months; secondly, that the landlord required the suit premises reasonably and bonafide for his personal use; and thirdly, that the tenant had sub let a part of the demised premises without the permission of the landlord. The defendant resisted the suit. The trial court decreed the suit for eviction solely on the ground that the tenant had sub-let a part of the premises to one Moolchand without the permission of the landlord. This finding was upheld by the lower appellate court. The tenant defendant has now preferred this second appeal. 3. Admittedly, on October 13, 1969, when the present suit for eviction was presented, the sub-tenant was not in occupation of the suit premises or any part thereof, By the time, that suit was filed, the sub tenant had vacated the premises. He was also not occupying the suit premises when the notice dated September 19, 1969, terminating the tenancy was sent. But, he was admittedly there occupying the part of the suit premises as sub-tenant when earlier notice dated October 23, 1967 was sent calling upon the appellant to vacate the premises. The above facts are no longer in dispute. 4. Section 13(1) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950, provides.— 13. Eviction of tenant.—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract, no Court shall pass any decree, or make any order, in favour of a landlord, whether in execution of decree or otherwise, evicting the tenant so long as he is ready and willing to pay rent therefor to the full extent allowable by this Act, unless it is is satisfied.........." The Sub-section then sets out several ground of ejectment: Clause (e), which is relevant for our purposes, runs under, — "(e). that the tenant has assigned, sub-let or otherwise parted with the possession of, the whole or any part of the premises without permission of the landlord; or." The relevant words on which emphasis is laid on behalf of the defendant appellant are has sublet." It is argued that the use of the present perfect tense in this sub clause (e) contemplates a completed event connected in some way with the present time. In other words, it is argued that the words "has sub-let" suggest that the sub letting, which was made in the past has continued upto the present time i.e. up to the date of the suit. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, since sub letting in the present case did not admittedly continue up to the date of the suit, the tenant cannot be deprived of the protection under section 13(1) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950, and he cannot be evicted from the suit premises on the ground of his having sub-let the part of the suit premises without the permission of the landlord. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on the decision in Gappulal vs. Thakurji Shriji Dwarkadheeshji and another (1) and Lekh Ram vs. Firm Chander Bhan Rajinder Parkash (2). On the basis of these authorities, it is strenuously argued that the words "has sublet" in clause (e) of section 13(1) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950, meant that subletting in order to attract clause (e) of sub-section (1) of section 13 must subsist at the date of the suit. 5. The Supreme Court considered Gappulals case (1) in its subsequent decision in Gajanan Dattatreya vs. Sherbanu Hosang Patel (3). On detailed consideration of decision in Gappuulals case (1), their Lordships of the Supreme Court in unequivocal words observed that in Gappulals case (1), "the court did not consider the question as to whether sub-letting to be within the mischief of the relevant statute was to subsist at the date of the suit." Their Lordships further added that in Gappulals case, what was decided was that "sec. 13(1) (e) of the Rajasthan Act would include any sub-letting which made in the past would continue at the point of the time when the Act came into force." Relevant discussion of Gappulals case(1) runs as under,— "The appellant relied on a decision of this Court in Gappulal vs. Thakurji Shriji Dwarka-dheeshi in support of the proposition that the words has sub-let mean that the subletting is to subsist at the date of the suit. This Court in Gappulals case considered sec 13(1)(e) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1930. Sec. 13(1)(e) of the Rajasthan Act provides that no decree evicting the tenant shall be passed unless the Court is satisfied (e) that the tenant has assigned, sublet or otherwise parted with the possession of the whole or part of the premises, without the permission of the landlord. The High Court in Gappulals case, held that two shops were sublet after October 15, 1947 when the Jaipur Rent Control Order, 1947 came into force. Subletting was a ground for ejectment under paragraph 8(1)(b)(ii) of the Jaipur Rent Control Order, 1947. The High Court held that the tenants liability for eviction on this ground continued after the promulgation of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. This Court said that the High Court was in error that there was one integrated tenancy for six shops The fact found were that four shops were let out in 1944 and two shops were let out after 1945. This Court found that the High Court was in error in holding that two shops were sublet after 15th October, 1947. This Court held that the plaintiffs in Gappu Lals case did not establish that the subletting was after 15 October, 1947 and on the date of the subletting in 1944, no Rent Control Legislation was in force. It is in that context that it is said that the words has sublet contemplate a completed event connected in some way with the present time. This Court said that the words has sublet take within their sweep any subletting which was made in the past and has continued upto the present time. What is meant by these observations is that the vice of subletting which fell within the mischief of the Act continues to be a mischief within the Act. This Court said that the words has sublet take within their sweep any subletting which was made in the past and has continued upto the present time. What is meant by these observations is that the vice of subletting which fell within the mischief of the Act continues to be a mischief within the Act. In Gappu Lals case there was no subletting in 1947 to violate the 1947 Jaipur Rent Control Order and therefore, there could not be any subletting which could continue up to the 19 0 Rajasthan Act On the date of the subletting in 1944, this Court found in Gappulals case that there was no Rent Control Legislation in force. This Court did not consider the question as to whether subletting to be within the mischief of the relevant statute was to subsist at the date of the suit. This Court held that sec. 13(1)(e) of the Rajasthan Act would include any subletting which though made in the past would continue at the point of the time when the Act came into force." 6. Their Lordships in Gajanans case (3) were dealing with a case under sec. 13(1)(e) of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, which ran as under,— "l3(1)(e). That the tenant has, since the coming into operation of this Act, unlawfully sub-let or after the date of commencement of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control (Amendment) Act, 1973, unlawfully given on lease, the whole or part of the premises or assigned or transferred in any other manner his interest therein." On the basis of the Gappulals case (1) it was argued before the Supreme Court in Gajanans case(3) that the expression "the tenant has sublet" in section 13(1)(e) of the above mentioned Act, meant that the subletting must continue at the date of the suit for passing the decree. In Gajanans case (3), the facts were like this. The landlord gave notice to quit on April 1, 196", and sub-tenant vacated the premises on April 14, 1967. When the suit was filed, the sub-tenant was not in occupation of the suit premises. In Gajanans case (3), the facts were like this. The landlord gave notice to quit on April 1, 196", and sub-tenant vacated the premises on April 14, 1967. When the suit was filed, the sub-tenant was not in occupation of the suit premises. Dealing with the argument that the expression "the tenant has sublet" means that the sublet must continue on the date of the suit, their Lordships observed— "The provisions of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 indi-cate that a tenant is disentitled to any protection under the Act if he is within the mischief of the provisions of S. 13(1)(e) namely, that he has sublet The language is that if the tenant has oublet. The protection ceases To accede to the contention of the appellant would mean that a tenant would not be within the mischief of unlawful subletting if after the landlord gives a notice terminating the tenancy on the ground of unlawful subletting the sub-tenant vacates. The landlord will not be able to get any relief against the tenant inspite of unlawful subletting In that way the tenant can fail the attempt of landlord to obtain possession of the premises on the ground of subletting every time by getting the sub-tenant to vacate the premises The tenants liability to eviction arises once the fact of unlawful subletting is proved. At the date of the notice, if it is proved that there was unlawful sub-letting, the tenant is liable to be evicted." (Italic is mine). 7. The language of clause(e) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 13 of the Rajasthan premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950 quoted above, leaves no doubt in my mind, that on proof of the fact that the tenant has assigned or sublet or otherwise parted with the possession of whole or a part of the premises in question without the permission of the landlord, the landlord is entitled to a decree for eviction against the tenant unless, of course, it could be shown that the landlord had waived his right to such eviction. The question, therefore, whether the sub tenancy subsisted on the date of the suit, is of no relevance in such a case. The question, therefore, whether the sub tenancy subsisted on the date of the suit, is of no relevance in such a case. The provisions of the Rajasthan Act of 1950 do not provide expressly or impliedly that protection under Section 13(1)(e) shall be available only if subtenancy subsisted at the date of the suit. Apart from the Supreme Courts decision in Gajanans case (3) which supports my view, I am also supported by an unreported Single Bench decision of this Court delivered by Honble Mr. Justice P.N. Singhal, as he then was, in S.B. Civil Regular Second Appeal No. 76 of 1964 (Alakh Narain vs. Hari Shanker) decided on September 13, 1964. 8. Learned counsel for the appellant next drew my attention to the following sentence appearing in the decision of Gajanans case (3),— "At the date of the notice, if it is proved that there was unlawful subletting, the tenant is liable to be evicted." On the basis of the above sentence, the learned counsel for the appellant attempted to persuade me to hold that the expression "the tenant has sublet" means that the subletting must continue at the date of the notice at least. I find no substance in the above contention. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Gajanans case (3) have clearly, in unequivocal terms, laid down that "the tenants liability to eviction arises once the fact of unlawful subletting is proved." Their Lordship in the subsequent sentence referred to the date of notice because in that particular case, the sub tenant had vacated the premises after the notice was sent to him. To my mind, in Gajanans case (3), the Supreme Court did not consider the question as to whether subletting to be within the mischief of relevant statute, was to subsist at the date of the notice. On the contrary, the Supreme Court, in clear terms, laid down that on the language of the statute, it is clear that if the tenant had sublet, the protection under section 13 ceases. 9. The facts of the present case clearly reveal that the first notice was sent to the tenant on October 23, 1967 calling upon him to vacate the premises and admittedly on that date, the sub tenant was in unlawful occupation of a part of the premises in dispute. 9. The facts of the present case clearly reveal that the first notice was sent to the tenant on October 23, 1967 calling upon him to vacate the premises and admittedly on that date, the sub tenant was in unlawful occupation of a part of the premises in dispute. It is true that the sub-tenant vacated the premises when the second notice dated September 19, 1969 was sent by the landlord, but that is of no consequence. The tenant neither pleaded nor proved that during the interval, the landlord had waived his right to sue for eviction on the ground of unlawful sub-letting. 10. The learned counsel for the appellant referred to me the case of Lekh Ram vs. Firm Chander Bhan Rajinder Parkash (2). This is a decision by the learned Single Judge of the Punjab High Court. The wordings of sec. 13(2)(ii)(a) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, which came for consideration in that case, were to the effect that if it could be shown that "the tenant has after the commencement of this Act, without the written consent of the landlord......sublet the entire building...... or any portion thereof", the landlord would be entitled to evict the tenant by a petition before the Rent Controller. The Rent Controller and the Appellate Authority in that case came to the conclusion that although it was not made explicit in the relevant provisions of the law., it was nevertheless implied that subletting, which has to form the ground for ejectment, must be one which subsisted at the time of the filing of the petition This view also found favour with the learned Single fudge. With great respect, the view taken by the learned Single Judge in Lekh Rams case (2) cannot be regarded as sound, firstly, because there is nothing in the clause to justify such a conclusion, and secondly, such an interpretation would be wholly unworkable in the sense that the tenant may so adjust the matters with the subtenant that the sub lease may not subsist on the date of the petition. To my mind, it could not be the intention of the Legislature to recognise such a device and more so when there is nothing in the wordings of the relevant section to give such a meaning. To my mind, it could not be the intention of the Legislature to recognise such a device and more so when there is nothing in the wordings of the relevant section to give such a meaning. That apart, the views taken in Lekh Rams case(2) is contrary to the view taken by the Supreme Court in Gujanans case(3) Lekh Rams case(2), in these circumstances, cannot be of any assistance to the appellant. 10. The learned counsel for the appellant has also placed reliance on a recent decision of the Delhi High Court in Muni Lal vs. Dulara (4). The question in that case was that if before the date of service of notice, determining the tenancy of the tenant, the subtenant vacates the premises, will the court, even then, pass an order of eviction against the tenant ? In that case, the learned Single Judge was interpreting clause (b) of the proviso to sec. 14(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, which runs as under : "(b) That the tenant has, on or after 9th day of of June, 1972, sublet, assigned or otherwise parted with possession of the whole or any part of the premises without obtaining consent in writing the landlord." In that case, it was argued on behalf of the tenant that since he had removed the sub-tenant before the notice to quit was issued, he was not liable to be evicted. The learned Single Judge placing reliance on the passage appearing in Gajanans case (3), which has been quoted above in extenso, observed : "The relevant date, it would therefore, appear, that day, there was unlawful subletting, the ten-is the date of the notice, if it is proved that on ant is liable to be evicted." With great respect to the learned Judge, I do not think that in Gajanans case(3), their Lordships at all considered the question that the sub-tenancy must subsist on the date of the notice if the tenant has to be evicted on the ground of unlawful sub letting. 11. I may again mention here that the act of sub-letting, in the present case, was a voluntary act of the defendant, as, admittedly, the subletting was not with the permission of the landlord. In such a case, once liability for eviction has arisen under sec. 11. I may again mention here that the act of sub-letting, in the present case, was a voluntary act of the defendant, as, admittedly, the subletting was not with the permission of the landlord. In such a case, once liability for eviction has arisen under sec. 13 on account of the tenant having sublet the premises unlawfully without the permission of the landlord, then the right to sue for eviction accrues to the landlord and that right could be taken away only by an express provision of the statute or by necessary intendment. There is nothing in the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, as to what would happen if the tenant had once subject the suit premises and then removed the sub-tenant before the issue of notice to quit or before filing the suit. Simply because the tenant dislodged the sub tenant from the suit premises before the issue of notice or before filing of the suit, he cannot divest the landlord of his right to seek eviction, which had accrued to him. 12. For the reasons stated above, I find no substance in the above appeal. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. Having regard to the circumstances of the case, I leave the parties to bear their own costs in this court. 13. The learned counsel for the appellant prays for grant of leave to appeal to a Division Bench. I find no merit in the prayer and as such it is refused.