JUDGMENT B.R. Vohra, M. - This is a second appeal against the order of the Commissioner, Agra Division in proceedings under Section 137-A of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. 2. Lenard counsel for the appellant has filed an application today challenging the very jurisdiction of this court to proceed with the hearing of this second appeal. He has challenged the jurisdiction of this court on the following grounds- (1) that Shri N.B. Lal, Member, Board of Revenue, who is incharge of Bareilly and Lucknow Divisions till recently stopped hearing of cases at Allahabad from the beginning of December 1975 and even though he is reported to have since taken over charge as Special Secretary, Department of Health, at Lucknow, there has been no fresh distribution of business and territorial division of jurisdiction as provided under Section 7 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act. The Board is thus not properly constituted and no Member sitting individually or as Member of a Bench can legally deal with any case pending before the Board. Moreover, Sri N.B. Lal could not possibly be permitted to discharge judicial functions as a Member, Board of Revenue, when he is engaged in Executive duties as Special Secretary, Health Department. (2) that the order od distribution of business and territorial division of jurisdiction by the Chairman, Board of Revenue, dated July 16, 1973, and the more recent order date November 25, 1975 are no orders in the eyes of law for there is no such authority as Chairman, Board of Revenue, mentioned either in the U.P. Land Revenue Act or Revenue Court Manual. The order purporting to have been passed by the Chairman is thus abinitio void and any court functioning in pursuance of that order is acting without jurisdiction. 3. Learned D.G.C. (R), who has taken notice of this application on behalf of the State, contends that neither of these two assertions is correct. In so far as the first point is concerned, he urged that it is immaterial for the purposes of jurisdiction of this court whether Sri N.B. Lal could continue to hold simultaneously the charge of the post of Member, Board of Revenue as also of the post of any vacant charge fresh distribution of business or territorial division of jurisdiction has been done or not. If the argument put forward by the learned counsel for the appellant were to be accepted, then the working of the Board of Revenue would come to a stand still every time a Member is transferred or goes on leave for it takes some time to redistribute business and make territorial division of jurisdiction. The court in any case has a definite territorial jurisdiction allotted to it by the Full Board and the nature of cases it can deal with is specified. The instant case falls within this territorial jurisdiction and the class of the case is also within its competence to deal with. The question of lack of jurisdiction of this curt, just because the work until recently handed by Sri N.B. Lal, Member, has not been redistributed does not arise. 4. With regard to the second point, learned D.G.C. (R) urged that there is no doubt no authority by the designation of Chairman, Board of Revenue, mentioned in the U.P. land Revenue Act or Revenue Court Manual. He urged, however, that the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant does not have any bearing on the jurisdiction on this court for the jurisdiction of this court was last determined not by the Chairman but by the Full Board at its meeting held in Lucknow on October 15, 1975 under Section 7 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act. This is clear from a reading of the latest order on the subject dated November 25, 1975 of which a copy has now been placed on this file. 5. I am inclined to agree with the D.G.C. (R) on both the points. This court is not the forum for agitating validity of Sri N.B. Lal holding concurrently charged as Member, Board of Revenue, at Allahabad, as also of the post of Special Secretary in the Department of Heath, Lucknow. And so long as decision taken by the Board at its meeting held in Lucknow on October 15, 1975 with regard to jurisdiction of this court is not altered, it makes no difference whether or not there is any territorial redistribution of the charge held as Member Board of Revenue by Sri N.B. Lal. 6. And so long as decision taken by the Board at its meeting held in Lucknow on October 15, 1975 with regard to jurisdiction of this court is not altered, it makes no difference whether or not there is any territorial redistribution of the charge held as Member Board of Revenue by Sri N.B. Lal. 6. The point that there is no such authority was Chairman Board of Revenue, mentioned either in the U.P. Land Revenue Act or Revenue Court Manual and, therefore, any order passed by such an authority, invoking powers under this Act and the Manual, is void, requires looking into. D.G.C. (R) should bring this point to the notice of the Government and of Chairman, Board of Revenue. But as rightly pointed out by the learned D.G.C. (R) this controversy has no effect in so far as jurisdiction of this court is concerned for territorial as also subject-wise jurisdiction of this court was determined by the Board at its meeting at Lucknow on October 15, 1975 and not by Chairman. 7. In view of the foregoing, the preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the appellant is dismissed. 8. His preliminary objection being dismissed, the learned counsel for the appellant then moved an application for adjournment of the case for a month for he want ed to file a writ petition before the Hon'ble High Court against this order. Learned counsel for the respondent opposed this request for adjournment on the ground that this is just a dilatory tactics designed to further delay the disposal of this appeal which was filed almost 10 years back in 1966-67. D.G.C. (R) argued that no adjourned need be allowed for even if the learned counsel wants to challenge this court's decision on jurisdiction, he could always do so when the appeal is finally decided. 9. I agree with the learned D.G.C. (R) on this point also. The request of the learned counsel for the appellant for adjournment of the case is, therefore, rejected. 10. Having disposed of these preliminary objections the parties were allowed to argue the appeal on merits. But before I consider these arguments let me narrate briefly the facts of the case. 11. The request of the learned counsel for the appellant for adjournment of the case is, therefore, rejected. 10. Having disposed of these preliminary objections the parties were allowed to argue the appeal on merits. But before I consider these arguments let me narrate briefly the facts of the case. 11. On September 23, 1965, Beni Prasad, appellant before this court, moved an application for cancellation of the Sanad issued in favour of respondent Basant Lal on the ground that he in fact was the owner of the land having purchased the same from Bharat Stores Ltd. and that Basant Lal in collusion with the lekhpal had got his name entered in the village papers and obtained Bhumidhari Sanad by concealment of material facts and that he was never in possession. Basant Lal resisted the proceedings on the ground that he was in possession for the last 15, years , that he had acquired Sirdari rights, that the disputed land had been demarcated as agricultural area and had been recorded as Sirdari in revenue papers. The trial court ordered for the cancellation of the Sanad. On appeal, the learned Commissioner reversed the finding of the trial court, allowed the appeal and rejected the application for cancellation moved under Section 137-A of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act, Beni Prasad has now come up in Second Appeal before the Board. 12. It is argued on behalf of the appellant that the learned Commissioner having accepted the position that a Sanad had been issued and that plots in dispute were excluded from Z.A. Area, he had no option but to agree with the trial court and order cancellation of the Sanad issued. It is also argued that although the point has not been taken in the memo of appeal, the lower appellate court had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal and allowed the same. It was further urged that as the present respondent is not in possession, even if he holds a title as a Sirdar, he could not be granted Bhumidhari Sanad. In fact, the learned counsel pointed out, the lower appellate court did not even deal with this finding of the trial court while upsetting its finding. It was further urged that as the present respondent is not in possession, even if he holds a title as a Sirdar, he could not be granted Bhumidhari Sanad. In fact, the learned counsel pointed out, the lower appellate court did not even deal with this finding of the trial court while upsetting its finding. It was further argued that on the land in dispute buildings have already come up and as such the land is not longer land as defined in Section 2(1) of the Act, and, therefore, no Sanad could have been granted. It is finally argued that since these two plots came to be owned by the Housing Society as far back as 1949, no Bhumidhari Sanad could have been issued in respect of these two plots subsequent to that date. 13. Learned counsel for the respondent challenges all these contentions. He submitted that U.P. Urban Area Z.A. and L.R. Act was enforced in the area on July 1, 1961 (1969 Fasli). In the Khatauni of 1372-74 Fasli the respondent is entered as Sirdar with effect from 1369 Fasli, that is, from the time the Act was enforced in this Area. This application for grant of Bhumidhari Sanad was moved on July, 1965 and the Sanad was granted the same day. At the time this Sanad was granted the respondent was entered in the Khatauni as Sirdar of the land in dispute and, therefore, they had every right under law to obtain Bhumidhari rights. It was only on January 20, 1966, six months after the issue of the Bhumidhari Sanad, that Demarcation Officer would appear to have passed on order to the effect that, amongst other plots, Nos. 614 and 620 (which are the two plots in dispute), are excluded from Z.A. Area. A mention to this effect was made in form 3 and 4 prepared under the U.P. Urban Area Z.A. and L.R. Act in respect of the village where land in dispute is situate. All these things are admitted to the other side as mentioned in para 8 of the leaned Additional Commissioner's order and this being so, appeal has no legs to stand. All these things are admitted to the other side as mentioned in para 8 of the leaned Additional Commissioner's order and this being so, appeal has no legs to stand. With regard to jurisdiction of the lower appellate court the learned counsel argued that it was the appellant who had moved an application for cancellation of Sanad before the trial court which court had cancelled the Sanad treating it to be an application under Section 137-A. An appeal is provided against a decision on an application under Section 137-A to the Commissioner and the learned Commissioner, therefore, had full jurisdiction to deal with the same. With regard to the argument about the respondent not being in possession, learned counsel argues that possession is not at all necessary for a Sirdar to be granted Bhumidhari rights. All that is required is that he should have clear title as Sirdar and he deposits the necessary amount with the Government Treasury, both of which conditions are satisfied in the instant case. In any case, the learned counsel urged there is no finding by the trial court that the appellant was not in possession of the land, so this discussion is all academic. With regard to the point that on the land in dispute constructions have come up and it, therefore, is no longer 'land' as defined in the Act, there is no conclusive evidence to this effect. But even if buildings have since been constructed, it does not help the appellant for at the crucial time when the Sanad was granted the land was recorded as agricultural and the respondent was recorded as Sirdar thereof. With regard to the land being owned by the Housing Society, the learned counsel urges that there is no evidence to connect the plots in dispute e.g. plot Nos. 614 and 620 with the land purchased by the appellant which carry the number 27 and 28. Registered sale deed filed by the appellant does not indicate the revenue plot Nos. nor does the area of plots 614/14 and 620/14 (i.e., roughly 4990 square yards) correspond to the areas of Society's plots 27 and 28 which is 1242 square yards (614-628). 14. By way of reply, the learned counsel for the appellant says that unless respondent proves to the hit that he was entitled to the grant of Bhumidhari Sanad, the Sanad should not have been granted. 14. By way of reply, the learned counsel for the appellant says that unless respondent proves to the hit that he was entitled to the grant of Bhumidhari Sanad, the Sanad should not have been granted. He further argued that in view of the Demarcation Officer's order dated January 20, 1966 declaring the plots in dispute amongst other plots as excluded from Z.A. Area there was no question of making an application for grant of Bhumidhari Sanad. If, there was any order against the respondent it was for him to first get it set aside. 15. I have considered the arguments and perused the record. 16. The point raised by the learned counsel for the appellant have no force. The crucial consideration involved in the instant case is with regard to the status of the land on the date application for grant of Sanad was made by the respondent and the date on which Sanad was ordered to be issued both of which happened to be the same in this case that is, July 27, 1965. From the extract of Khatauni 1372-1374F. which is on record, it is clear that the respondent was shown therein as Sirdar from the year 1369F. i.e. from they the year when Zamindari was abolished in this area. the order of Demarcation Officer as noted in the forms 3 and 4 prepared under U.P. Urban Areas Z.A. and L.R. Act which excluded amongst others the two plots from the purview of Z.A. & L.R. Act is dated January 20, 1966 on which date respondent had already acquired Bhumidhari rights in this land. By the order of the Demarcation Officer these rights already acquired could not be terminated. (Learned counsel or the appellant had on November 13, 1975 sought an adjournment of the case in order that he may produce notification to support his assertion that the land in dispute was non-agricultural land on the date Sanad was granted this time was allowed, but the learned counsel has not been able to produce any such notification). 17. With regard to other points raised by the learned counsel for the appellant these have been successfully answered by the learned counsel for the respondent with whose arguments I entirely agree. 17. With regard to other points raised by the learned counsel for the appellant these have been successfully answered by the learned counsel for the respondent with whose arguments I entirely agree. The jurisdiction of the lower appellate court was not challenged when the matter was argued before him, nor has any such plea been taken in the grounds of appeal before the Commissioner. Commissioner had full jurisdiction to hear an appeal in the instant case for an appeal is clearly provided to the Commissioner is Schedule II appended to the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act against orders passed on an application for cancellation of certificate under Section 137-A of the Act. 18. With regard to the point about possession, there is no law that requires that a Sirdar must be in possession before he may apply for grant of Bhumidhari Sanad or the same may be granted to him. 19. With regard to the nature of land, even if it were to be admitted that some building have been constructed on the land in dispute there is nothing on record to suggest that such buildings existed on the date Bhumidhari Sanad was granted to the respondent. Most importantly, it has not been established by any evidence that the plots which the appellant had bought from the Housing Society are the plots on which the respondent is recorded as Bhumidhar. There is no mention of the revenue plot Nos. in the sale deed nor does the area of the plots that defendant-appellant brought from the Housing Society correspond even approximately to the area of the two plots in dispute. The leanrd Commissioner has in his impugned order clearly dealt with the circumstances in which a Bhumidhari Sanad could be cancelled and come to the conclusion that non of those conditions are fulled in the instant case. I agree entirely with his finding. None of arguments passed before this court have,as I have already shown, any force. 20. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.