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1976 DIGILAW 18 (BOM)

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF GREATER BOMBAY v. P. GANAPATHY

1976-01-22

B.LENTIN, S.M.HAJARNAVIS

body1976
JUDGMENT LENTIN J.-By this Special Civil Application, the Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay seeks to set aside the order dated 25th November 1970 passed by the 2nd respondent who is the Presiding Officer, 1st Labour Court, Bombay. 2. The undisputed facts which have led to the matter before us are that at all material times, the 1st respondent was employed by the petitioner-Corporation as a Bus-Shunter in its Bombay Electric Supply and Transport Undertaking (referred to hereafter as "the B. E. S. T."). On 19th April 1967, the 1st respondent left his residence at Kurla at about 6.30 a.m. and boarded a B.E. S. T. bus in order to proceed to Sion from where be had to take another B. E. S. T. bus in order to report for duty at Dadar. Between Kurla and Sion, the driver of the B. E. S. T. bus in which the 1st respondent was travelling, applied the emergency brake, which caused a jerk As a result, the, 1st respondent sustained an injury to his back and was in plaster from 23rd April 1967 till 10th July 1967. He received a sum of Rs.316, being the payment to which he was entitled under section 4 (1) (d) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. He, thereafter made a demand to the B. E. S. T. Undertaking of the petitioner Corporation for a further sum or Rs. 435.28, being the difference in his full wages and the amount received by him under section 4 (1) (d). This demand was made by the 1st respondent under an Agreement dated 21st May 1965 between the B. E. S. T. undertaking of the petitioner-Corporation and the Union of its employees. As this demand of Rs. 435.28 was repulsed, the 1st respondent made his claim before the Labour Court, which, by its judgment and order dated 25th November 1970, upheld the same, and ordered the payment thereof to the 1st respondent. Hence the present special Civil Application. 3. The only point that arises before us for determination pertains to the construction of the words "arising but of out of employment " in clause 2 of the Agreement dated 21st May 1965. That clause reads as under:- "It is agreed that employees injured in accidents arising out of employment shall be paid full wages during the period of incapacity except in cases….. That clause reads as under:- "It is agreed that employees injured in accidents arising out of employment shall be paid full wages during the period of incapacity except in cases….. " It is not in dispute that we are not concerned with the exception provided in this clause. 4. Mr. Singhvi, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner Corporation; contended that the words "arising out Of employment"; must not be given the same connotation or meaning as the words, "in the course of employment" and that the legal fiction of notional extension of time and place attributed to the words, "in the Course of employment", would have no application to the words in the Agreement, viz. "arising out of employment". Mr. Singhvi urged that the meaning of the words "arising out of", is more restrictive than the words "in the course of". Thus, according to Mr. Singhvi the accident not having arisen out of the 1st respondent's employment, or in the course of his duties as a Bus-shunter he was not entitled to the additional amount of Rs. 435.28, and hence the 2nd respondent was in error in awarding the same. 5. We are in agreement with these contentions of Mr. Singhvi. Random House Dictionary defines "arise" as- "to come into being, originate, appear, spring up". "Course" is defined as- "the continuous passage or progress through time or a succession of stages." Thus, the continuous passage or progress through time or a succession of stages as envisaged by the definition of "course", is conspicuous by its absence in the definition of "arise". These two phraseologies, viz. "arising out of" and "in the course of", are distinct, separate and independent of each other, wit bout the ode having any nexus or connection with the other. The one cannot be read or confused with, or substituted for, the other. The words in the Agreement, "arising out of employment", are necessarily less wide than the words", "in the course of employment" the words "arising out of employment", unlike the words "in the course of employment", must necessarily mean that the incident must be the direct result of, and must be immediately connected with, the employment and the performance or the duty of the worker concerned. Mr. Mr. Singhvi is correct that the legal fiction of notional extension of time and place given to the words, "in the course of employment", cannot he given to the words "arising out of employment" Hence it cannot be said that the accident bad any nexus with the 1st respondent's employment, which would entitle, him to the additional amount claimed by him. 6. As an aid to the construction placed by us on the words "arising out of employment", we may say that in section 3 or the Workmen's Compensation Act which provides for the employer’s liability for compensation for personal injury caused to a workman by accident, both the phraseologies, viz. "arising out of and in the course of his employment” are used. The Legislature in its wisdom would not have done so had the meaning of both these phraseologies been the same. It is presumed, that the Legislature does not use words which are superfluous and the very fact that both these phraseologies have been used in that section, would be an unmistakable indication that the same meaning cannot be attributed to them. We make it clear that we are not construing this section of the Workmen's Compensation Act but have only alluded to it as an aid in arriving at the construction placed by us on the words, "arising out of employment", in the Agreement before us. 7. However, Mr. Naik, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the 1st respondent, invited us to come to a contrary finding on the ground that, according to Mr. Naik, when the Agreement dated 21st May 1965 was arrived at, the intention of the parties was that the worker should receive a larger amount than what he would have been entitled to under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Mr. Nalk invited our attention to Service Regulation No. 27/14 which was as under ;- "Accident Leave. Whole staff; In cases in which any one of the Undertaking's staff is absent from duty as a result of an accident incurred in the direct performance of his duties in the Undertaking's service, Heads of Branches are authorised to sanction at their discretion full (or less) pay for a period not exceeding 3 months…..” Mr. Whole staff; In cases in which any one of the Undertaking's staff is absent from duty as a result of an accident incurred in the direct performance of his duties in the Undertaking's service, Heads of Branches are authorised to sanction at their discretion full (or less) pay for a period not exceeding 3 months…..” Mr. Naik emphasized that the word "direct" in this Service Regulation had been given a go-by in clause 2 of the agreement where that word does not find a place, because it was intended under clause 2 of the agreement, the injured worker would be entitled to full wages even if the injury did not arise directly in the performance of his duties. 8. We are not much impressed by this contention of Mr. Naik. The words "arising out of employment", in clause 2 of the agreement must be given their natural meaning. If the intention had been as suggested by Mr. Naik, there was nothing to prevent the parties from using the words "in the course of employment", instead of the restrictive words "arising out of employment", in clause 2 of that Agreement. This was the only contention urged by Mr. Naik, which must fail. 9. In the result, the judgment and order of the learned Presiding Officer is set aside and this Special Civil Application is allowed. Rule absolute. Mr. Singhvi fairly does not press for costs. There will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.