JUDGMENT Shivdayal, C.J.- l. This is a reference under section 256 (1) of the Income Tax Act. The following questions have been referred to us by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Nagpur, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur :- "(1) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the delay of 12 months and 14 days in presenting the application for registration for the assessment year 1963 64 was properly condoned ? (2) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was justified in upholding the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner granting registration to the firm?" 2. The matter relates to the assessment year 1963-64, the accounting year being from Diwali 1961 to Diwali 1962 (November 9, 1961 to October 28, 1962). The assessee-firm. M/s Khemraj Laxmichand, Raipur, was allowed registration in the past, including the assessment year 1962-63, that is, from Diwali 1960 to Diwali 1961. 3. The application for registration for the assessment year 1963-64 was due to be filed before the end of the accounting year, i.e., on October 28, 1962. However, the application was actually filed on November 11, 1963. There was a delay of 12 months and 14 days in filing the application for registration. When the firm was called upon to explain the cause of the delay, the explanation given was that the partnership deed was signed by all the partners on March 22, 1962, which was along with other necessary papers handed over to their counsel Shri R.S. Agrawal, for being filed in the Income Tax Office, but due to lapse of memory, Shri Agrawal forgot to file tile necessary papers before the Income Tax Officer. This explanation was filed by Nemichand, a partner. It was supported by an affidavit of Shri R S. Agrawal himself, who very much regretted the lapse on his part and pleaded for condonation of delay. After recording evidence on the point, the Income Tax Officer refused registration. On appeal, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner observed that the assessee was a firm of standing and repute and had been granted registration in every year and it had complied with the requirements of the department on due dates in every year. After recording evidence on the point, the Income Tax Officer refused registration. On appeal, the Appellate Assistant Commissioner observed that the assessee was a firm of standing and repute and had been granted registration in every year and it had complied with the requirements of the department on due dates in every year. Having regard to the past record of the assessee, the statement of Nemichand and the affidavit of Shri R. S. Agrawal the appellate authority held that this was a fit case for condonation of delay. Accordingly it set aside the order of the Income Tax Officer and directed him to register the firm. 4. The Revenue took the matter in further appeal before the Tribunal. It was argued that it was not certain when the application for registration was really handed over to Shri R. S. Agrawal. Moreover, Shri R. S. Agrawal being an agent of the firm, the firm must suffer the consequences for default of its agent. 5. In Commissioner of Income Tax v. Sivakashi Match Exporting Co., (1964) 53 ITR 204 the Supreme Court held that the jurisdiction of the Income Tax Officer is confined to ascertaining these facts :- (1) Whether the application for registration was in conformity with the rules made under the Act: (2) Whether the firm shown in the document presented for registration was a bogus one or had no legal existence; and (3) Whether the discretion conferred on him under section 26-A of the Income Tax Act, 1922 was a judicial one and he could not refuse to register the firm on mere speculation but had to base his conclusions on relevant evidence, 6. The circumstance acted on by the Tribunal may be summed up as follows:- (1) It was not the Revenue's case that the firm was bogus or had no legal existence. (2) The assessee firm was a firm of repute. (3) The firm was granted registration year after year, (4) On November 9, 1961, two new partners joined the firm in addition to the six existing partners, who constituted the firm earlier. A stamp paper of Rs. 27/- was purchased by the firm on March 22, 1962, on which date the partnership deed was executed giving retrospective effect from Diwali 1961. (5) The application was filed on November 11, 1963, Forms XI, XI-A and XII. A stamp paper of Rs. 27/- was purchased by the firm on March 22, 1962, on which date the partnership deed was executed giving retrospective effect from Diwali 1961. (5) The application was filed on November 11, 1963, Forms XI, XI-A and XII. (6) Shri R.S. Agrawal had been looking after the income-tax work of the assessee-firm and another firm (M/s Khemraj Nemichand) for over 20 years. (7) Shri R.S. Agrawal had not committed any such default in the past. (8) The partners of the firm were under the bona fide belief that the requirements of obtaining registration would be complied with by Shri R. S. Agrawal within the statutory time limit. (9) The application for registration was signed at least on August 25, 1963. (10) There was no evidence that Shri R. S. Agrawal was an employee of the firm. (11) In these circumstances, it would not be proper to penalise the firm for the default of Shri R. S. Agrawal. (12) Reliance was placed on Pandu v. Hira, AIR 1936 Nag 85 where it was laid down that if a party does all that he is required to do under the law to retain a pleader and he is betrayed by the pleader, it is manifestly unjust to visit the party with penalty. 7. The Tribunal accordingly dismissed the appeal. 8. At the instance of the Commissioner of Income Tax this reference was made. 9. In Mata Din v. A. Narayanan, AIR 1970 SC 1953 Hidayatullah, C.J., speaking for the Court, said :- "The law is settled that mistakes or counsel may in certain circumstances be taken into account in condoning delay although there is no general proposition that mistake of counsel by itself is always a sufficient ground. It is always a question whether the mistake was bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose such as laches on the part of the litigant or an attempt to save limitation in an under- hand way." So also in Punjabi University v. A.S. Ganesh, AIR 1972 SC 1973 their Lordships held that bona fide mistakes have got to be taken note of by the Courts ii1 considering whether the delay in filing an appeal should be condoned or not. It was observed :- "It has been repeatedly held by Courts that a mistake by a lawyer is good ground for condoning the delay in firing the appeal." 10. Thus, it is essentially a question of fact whether the mistake of the counsel was bona fide. That is the crux of the matter. Since, in the present case, the Tribunal, on the facts and the circumstances enumerated above, came to the conclusion that the lapse on the part of the counsel was bona fide, the Tribunal was right in condoning the delay. 11. Accordingly, we answer both the questions referred to us in the affirmative. Parties shall bear their own costs.