Judgment 1. This appeal by the State of Bihar, which was defendant first party in the trial Court, is directed against the judgment and decree of the lower appellate Court, affirming those of the trial Court. 2. In order to appreciate the point involved in this appeal, it will be necessary to state some material facts. Rajendra Prasad Baid (respondent No. 1) had instituted a title suit for a declaration that the lands described in Schedule A of the plaint were rent free, were not liable to assessment of any rent and were not kabil lagan and that the order passed by the Block Development Officer, Khizarsarai, on the 10th of January, 1966 fixing rent in respect of those lands was illegal, void, ultra vires and without jurisdiction. 3. The suit was contested by the State of Bihar only. The parties adduced evidence and also filed documentary evidence in support of their respective claims, as according to the State of Bihar, its officer had right to fix fair and equitable rent as the lands in dispute were not rent free lands. On behalf of the plaintiff the survey Khatian (Ext. 6) as well as the three grants made in favour of his ancestor Pandit Horil Baid by three different persons were filed to show that the lands which were given to the ancestor of the plaintiff under those documents were rent free. Those documents were exhibited as Exts. 10, 10 (a) and 10 (b). Ext. 10 is dated the 4th Bhado, 1274 Fasli, corresponding to 1867, Ext. 10 (a) is dated the 13th Baisakh 1261 Fasli, corresponding to 1854 and Ext. 10 (b) is dated the 19th Asarh, 1301 Fasli, corresponding to 1894. 4. The trial Court, on a consideration of the evidence on the record, came to the conclusion that the suit lands were rent free and the defendant No. 1 or its officers were not entitled to assess or fix rent of the lands in suit in view of the nature of the grants under Exts. 10 to 10 (b), on the basis of which the survey khatian entries were made. The suit was, accordingly, decreed. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial Court, the State of Bihar preferred an appeal. 10 to 10 (b), on the basis of which the survey khatian entries were made. The suit was, accordingly, decreed. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the trial Court, the State of Bihar preferred an appeal. Affirming the finding of the trial Court the lower appellate Court held that "the plaintiff being just a raiyat, his interest did not vest in the State and no rent can be fixed for his lands under Sec. 6 of the Land Reforms Act". It will be useful to refer to a portion of paragraph 8 of the judgment of the lower appellate Court which reads thus: "I have not found any provision in the B. T. Act which gave a right to the landlord to fix rent for rent-free lands. I gave sufficient time to the learned Government Pleader to show me any provision which could enable the B. D. O. to fix rent for rent-free Brahmotar land, but he could not show any. According to the provisions of the B. T. Act, rent can be fixed only for Kabil Lagan lands and not for rent-free lands: " The appeal was, accordingly, dismissed by the lower appellate Court. 5 Mr. Kbaleel Ahmad, Government Pleader No. III, has assailed the judgment and decree of the Courts below and contended that they have erred in holding that the lands were rent-free. He referred to Ext. 10 series which simply mention that the lands were given to the ancestor of the plaintiff as Bishnuprit. In the survey Khatian (Ext. 6), against the lands in dispute is simply mentioned "Brahmottar" in the remarks column. He has submitted that the lands which were given to the ancestor of the plaintiff were only for the sake of cultivation and, therefore, it must be presumed that they were Kabil Lagan lands. He also urged that the onus was on the plaintiff to establish that the lands in suit were rent free. He has submitted that the lands which were given to the ancestor of the plaintiff were only for the sake of cultivation and, therefore, it must be presumed that they were Kabil Lagan lands. He also urged that the onus was on the plaintiff to establish that the lands in suit were rent free. In order to find support to his contention, he has drawn my attention to the definition of word "tenant" in Sec.3 (3) of the Bihar Tenancy Act, 1885 , which is as follows: " Tenant means a person who holds land under another person, and is, or but for a special contract would be liable to pay rent for that land to that person." Learned counsel submitted that according to the above definition of the word "tenant", it is clear that a tenant has to pay rent to the landlord unless the tenant produces a special contract to show that he was not liable to pay rent. The plaintiff, according to him, being a tenant, the onus was upon him to show that by a special contract he was exempted from paying rent. He also referred to Sec.24 of the Bihar Tenancy Act which provides as follows: "An occupancy raiyat shall pay rent for his holding at fair and equitable rates." Lastly, learned counsel has drawn my attention to the provision contained under Sec.158 (1) (d) of the Act which provides for determination of incidents of tenancy. Sec.158 (1) (d) read thus: "The Collector or any revenue officer specially empowered by the State Government in this behalf may, on application of either the landlord or the tenant of the land, determine in the prescribed manner all or any of the following matters, namely:- xxxxxxxx (d) the rent payable for the land and other incidents of the tenancy: xxxxxx " On the basis of the aforesaid provisions, learned counsel for the State submitted that in the instant case, the Block Development Officer was justified in getting the rent fixed for the disputed lands. 6. In my opinion, the submission the learned Counsel for the State is not acceptable. In order to show that the lands in suit were rent free, the plaintiff produced Exts. 10 series to show special contract. No doubt, those documents do not show in clear words that the lands given under those grants were rent-free. 6. In my opinion, the submission the learned Counsel for the State is not acceptable. In order to show that the lands in suit were rent free, the plaintiff produced Exts. 10 series to show special contract. No doubt, those documents do not show in clear words that the lands given under those grants were rent-free. They simply say that the lands were given for "Bishunu-prit". Exts 10 series, however, do not say that the lands granted to the ancestor of the plaintiff were Kabil Lagan. As mentioned earlier, in the survey Khatian (Ext.6) in the remarks column against those lands is mentioned "Brahmottar". In this connection reference may also be made to Guide And Glossary to the Survey and Settlement Operations under the Bihar Tenancy Act, 1938 Edition, edited by the Board of Revenue, Bihar. At pages 22 and 23 of the Book, for the vernacular word "Birt", the English translation is "Rent-free grant in consideration of religious services, past, present or future, generally defined by the addition of Brahmotar, etc." In the remarks column, it is mentioned that "such grants are almost invariably heritable and transferable even to persons who cannot be, expected to keep up the particular observances for which they were originally made. The expression "Birt Brahmotar" has been defined as "Rent-free grant to Brahmin." The expression "Birt Bishunprit" has been translated as "Rent free grant for worship of God Bishun." Therefore, by reference to the expression "Birt Brahmotar" or "Birt Bishunprit", it has to be presumed that the lands given to the plaintiffs ancestor were rent-free. If the donors intended that the lands given by the grants would also carry rent, they could have very well said so in Exts. 10 series. But as; mentioned earlier, they do not contain the words "Kabil Lagan". In that view of the matter, I am unable to interpret those words contained in Exts. 10 series as implying the words "Kabil Lagan." 7. The provisions contained and under Sec.158 (1) (d) of the Bihar Tenancy Act would apply only when the lands were held to be Kabil Lagan. But since in tire instant case I am unable to hold that the lands granted under Exts. 10 series were Kabil Lagan, the provisions contained under Sec.158 (1) (d) of the Act are not attracted. The provisions contained and under Sec.158 (1) (d) of the Bihar Tenancy Act would apply only when the lands were held to be Kabil Lagan. But since in tire instant case I am unable to hold that the lands granted under Exts. 10 series were Kabil Lagan, the provisions contained under Sec.158 (1) (d) of the Act are not attracted. In this connection reference may also be made to the case of Kiran Chandra Roy V/s. Srinath Chakravarti (AIR 1927 Cal 210 which corresponds to 31 Cal WN 135), on which reliance was placed on behalf of the appellant. Learned counsel drew my attention to a portion of the judgment at page 212 of the report wherein it was observed that strong reliance was placed by the learned Vakil for the appellant on the presumption as to the correctness of the entry in the record of rights in favour of the plaintiffs. Their Lordships observed that there could not be any doubt that the entry must be presumed to be correct unless the contrary was proved but when the matter was investigated by the Civil Court and the parties adduced their evidence on the point in controversy, the entry lost its weight when the evidence disclosed no foundation for it. In my opinion the above observations do not lend any support to the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant in the present case, rather the other observations of their Lordships support the case of the plaintiff respondent. In this connection it will be necessary to reproduce the finding of the trial Court in this regard which reads thus: "Therefore, from the aforesaid three documents, Ext. 10 series, read with the khatian entries, Ext. 6, I am satisfied to conclude that the said lands were rent free and also that those lands were never tenure grants, rather for agricultural purposes purely." It is, therefore, evident that in the present case, the trial Court has drawn inference from the entries in the Khatian (Ext. 6). 8 In Anup Mahto V/s. Mita Dusadh, (AIR 1934 PC 5), it was observed that inferences drawn from statements in the Khatian are inferences of fact with which a High Court could not interfere in second appeal. 6). 8 In Anup Mahto V/s. Mita Dusadh, (AIR 1934 PC 5), it was observed that inferences drawn from statements in the Khatian are inferences of fact with which a High Court could not interfere in second appeal. In that view of the matter also, I do not find any ground to interfere with the inference drawn by the trial Court by reference to the entries in the Khatian (Ext. 6). It may be noticed that in AIR 1927 Cal 210 (supra), on which reliance was placed on behalf of the appellant, the appellants in that case brought a suit under Sec.158 of the Bengal Tenancy Act for the assessment of fair and equitable rent for certain lands appertaining to their Zemindari., Touzi No. 5557 of the Faridpur Collectorate in the possession of the defendants of that case and also for arrears of rent for the years 1326 to 1329. In the course of a record-of-rights, the lands in suit were recovered as Brahmottar Prankrishna Bhattacharji liable to assessment with fair and equitable rent. The claim of the plaintiff in that case was based on the said entry in the record-of-rights. The defence of the defendants was that the lands in suit appertained to Brahmottar Prankrishna Bhattacharji, that those lands were enjoyed as such by the grantee and his successors from before the permanent settlement and that in execution of a decree, dated 1879, against a successor of the original grantee, the lands in suit were sold as rent-free brahmottar in 1882 and were purchased by defendants Nos. 6, 7, 8 and 9. The defendants alleged that the purchasers were all along in possession of the lands as rent-free brahmottar without any payment of rent to the plaintiffs. Their Lordships on the facts and circumstances of that case observed as follows at page 212: "In the present case the learned Subordinate judge has found possession for 62 years under a claim of a rent-free grant by the original grantee and his successors and then, after the property was sold by the purchasers, defendants. During this long period of time the Zamindar did not receive any rent for these lands. During this long period of time the Zamindar did not receive any rent for these lands. I am, therefore, of opinion that the learned Subordinate judge was right in holding that from the circumstances of the present case the presumption of a lost grant arose." In that case, it may be seen, in the record-of-rights it was mentioned that the lands were liable to assessment with fair and equitable rent. Even then their Lordships held that rent could not have been charged. In the present case, there is no such entry in Ext. 6. Therefore, in my view, the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is not tenable. Simply because in Ext. 10 series it was mentioned that the grantee will cultivate the lands and appropriate its produce, it cannot be interpreted that the grantee intended that those lands were Kabil Lagan, i. e. liable to assessment with fair and equitable rent. It is well known that if lands are given as Birt Bishunprit for worship of God Vishnu, it is expected that the grantor would not give barren lands. Similarly in Birt Brahmottar, one does not expect that the grantor would pass on his waste or barren lands to Brahmins. The "Birt" is religious oriented. On religious grounds such grants were made, so that the lands transferred to the grantees yielded benefit to the grantees. In that view of the matter, in my view, there is no merit in the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant. 9 In the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs, and the judgment and decree of the Courts below are affirmed.