B. M. KRISHNAMURTHY v. STATE OF KARNATAKA — 1976 DIGILAW 180 (KAR)

( 1 ) THE petitioners and the respondents are common in these writ- petitions. ( 2 ) IN WP. 2167 of 1976 the petitioners have sought for issue of a writ in the nature of prohibition to the 2nd respondent from proceeding with the case No. LRF 933-61/74, and to quash Ext. 'd'. ( 3 ) IN WP. 5844 of 1976 the petitioners have sought for issue of a writ sn the nature of certiorari quashing the order passed by the respondent 1 under the original of Ext. 'e'. ( 4 ) IN WP. 3288 of 1976 the petitioners have sought for issue of a writ in the nature of certiorari or any other suitable writ quashing the order passed by the 1st respondent therein under Ext. 'l' d. 20-2-1976 in case No. 61-933/74-75 registering the 3rd respondent therein as an occupant, of Sy Nos. 65, 19/2 and 94 of Vijanapura Village, Krishnarajapurarn hobli, Bangalore South Taluk. ( 5 ) BRIEF facts of the case are as follows: Petitioners father late B. M. Muniswamappa was the earstwhile Jodidar of Jodi Vijanapura Village in bangalore South Taluk. Sy Nos. 19/2 measuring 3 acres 2 guntas in extent, sy No. 65 measuring 5 acres 18 guntas in extent and Sy No. 94 measuring 3 acres 2 guntas in extent were in the personal cultivation of late B. M. Muniswamappa. On the vesting of the Jodi Village in the State of karnataka, late Shri B. M. Muniswamappa applied for registration of occupancy rights in these lands in 1956-57 before the Special Deputy Commr, bangalore. He claimed registry of the lands in his name under S. 9 of the mysore (Karnataka) (Personal and Miscellaneous) Inams Abolition Act, 1954 (to be hereinafter called tne 'inams Abolition Act' ). His claim was allowed on 19-4-1958 by the Special Deputy Commr under Ext. 'a' produced in WP. 3288 of 1976. These lands had never been leased out to anybody at any time by the Writ Petitions allowed and after his death they were under the personal cultivation of the petitioners. The 3rd respondent herein was at no time in possession of these lands either as a tenant or in any capacity whatsoever. He claimed occupancy rights in Sy No. 65 in Case No. 43 of 1956-57 before the Special Deputy Commr, Bangalore. It came to be rejected. Against the order rejecting his claim in Case no. The 3rd respondent herein was at no time in possession of these lands either as a tenant or in any capacity whatsoever. He claimed occupancy rights in Sy No. 65 in Case No. 43 of 1956-57 before the Special Deputy Commr, Bangalore. It came to be rejected. Against the order rejecting his claim in Case no. 43 of 1956-57 in respect of Sy No. 65, but not against the order passed in Case No. 1 of 1956-57 registering the three lands in favour of late Shri b. M. Muniswamappa, the 3rd respondent preferred an appeal to the then mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal, which remanded the matter to the special Deputy Commr. After the remand the 3rd respondent claimed other Sy Nos. viz 19/2 and 94. The Special Deputy Commr rejected the claim of the third respondent as not maintainable on the ground that he having not challenged the crder passed in Case No. 1/56-57, his application was liable to be rejected. The 3rd respondent preferred an appeal against the order of the learned Special Deputy Commr, before the then revenue Appellate Tribunal, which by its order dt. 21-2-1969 rejected the appeal. Against that order the 3rd respondent preferred a writ petition in WP. 1002 of 1970 in this Court, which was also dismissed. Thereafter the 3rd respondent instituted a suit in OS. 936 of 1974 in the Court of the addl Second Munsiff, against the petitioners and their brothers claiming that he was a tenant in respect of the lands in question and that he is in possession thereof and sought for a decree for permanent injunction. He also filed an application for grant of ad-interim order of injunction. It was refused. The suit is still pending. ( 6 ) THEREAFTER the 3rd respondent filed an application on 26-8-1974 before the Tribunal under S. 48a (1) for registration as an occupant under s. 45 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 (to be hereinafter called the 'act' ). In that application he claimed registration of occupancy in, respect of Sy No. 65 of Vijanapura Village and showed that he and the brothers of his family held Sy Nos. 1912 and 94 and another number in their names. In that application he claimed registration of occupancy in, respect of Sy No. 65 of Vijanapura Village and showed that he and the brothers of his family held Sy Nos. 1912 and 94 and another number in their names. The 3rd respondent further stated in that application thus :"registration of right of occupancy in my favour is pending before the Special Deputy Commr for Inams Abolition, Bangalore, as the same is remanded to that authority in Appeal Nos. 2675 and 1443 of 1967 by the revenue Appellate Tribunal, Bangalore. "further, he filed another application under the same provisions to the Land tribunal, on 26-12-1974 claiming registration of occupancy as tenant in respect of Sy Nos. 19/2, 65 and 94 of Vijanapura Village, but did not show any other land held in his name and in the name of his family members. The 2nd respondent, issued notices to the petitioners as per Ext. 'd' marked in wp. 2167 of 1976 as required under Sec. 48 (2) of the Act in Form No. 9, which contained that the lands in question have been vested in the State govt and the Tribunal had to decide the question whether the 3rd respondent was entitled to registration of occupancy as a tenant under S. 45 of the Act. The date of hearing was fixed on 6-2-1976. On 6-2-1976 the 1st petitioner, who was looking after the management of these lands on behalf of all his brothers was present when the case was called and denied the claim of the 3rd respondent. The 3rd respondent was questioned by the tribunal and be stated that the lands in question were owned by him. The 1st petitioner was asked to put a few questions to the 3rd respondent. Accordingly, the 1st petitioner put a few questions and wanted to confront him with previous proceedings. But the 1st petitioner was told that he could not cross-examine in detail with regard to the previous proceedings and could not exhibit the documents. His request was rejected orally by the Tribunal. Thereafter, the 1st petitioner was examined. He has stated that the 3rd respondent was never in occupation of the lands either as a tenant or in any other capacity and the lands belong to him and his brothers. His request was rejected orally by the Tribunal. Thereafter, the 1st petitioner was examined. He has stated that the 3rd respondent was never in occupation of the lands either as a tenant or in any other capacity and the lands belong to him and his brothers. When his request to produce documents was rejected by the Tribunal after coming out of the Tribunal, the 1st petitioner sent a representation of the facts of the case along with two documents by registered post to the Tahsildar, viz. , the Secretary the 2nd respondent in the proceeding on 6-2-1976. On 7-2-1976 he applied for the copies of the deposition recorded by the Tribunal- in that proceeding. His request was not granted and he brought this to the notice of the Deputy Commr. Thereafter on 9-2-1976 the 1st petitioner was arrested by the Ulsoor Gate Police on the complaint made by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Bangalore Sub-Division, who was also the Chairman of the respondent-Tribunal. On 6-3-1976 the petitioner filed WP. No. 2167 of 1976 before this Court seeking writ of prohibition against the respondent-tribunal from proceeding with the case in LRF. 933-16/74, to quash the notice issued under Ext'd' produced in that writ petition and obtained an order of stay on 10-3-1976. Again on 10-3-1976 the 1st petitioner received a notice from the 2nd respondent Tribunal calling upon him to appear before the 2nd respondent Tribunal on 11-3-1976 informing about the claim made by the 3rd respondent for registering his occupancy in respect of the lands in question. Further certain action was also taken by the police at the instance of the Chairman of the Tribunal not to enter upon the lands. He was also informed by the police that a final order had been passed by the respondent-tribunal registering the 3rd respondent as an occupant on 20-2-1976. Thereafter, the petitioner obtained a copy of that order at Ext. 'l' and filed a WP in WP. No. 3288 of 1976 seeking reliefs stated therein and obtained stay of further proceedings. ( 7 ) WP. NOS. 2167 and 3288 of 1976 were posted to 9-3-1976 and thereafter they were adjourned to 12-3-1976. In the meanwhile on 9-3-1976 the tribunal passed an order of injunction as per Ext. 'e' in LRF. No. 933/1974 (WP. No. 5844 of 1976) restraining the petitioner and the members of his family from entering upon the suit lands. NOS. 2167 and 3288 of 1976 were posted to 9-3-1976 and thereafter they were adjourned to 12-3-1976. In the meanwhile on 9-3-1976 the tribunal passed an order of injunction as per Ext. 'e' in LRF. No. 933/1974 (WP. No. 5844 of 1976) restraining the petitioner and the members of his family from entering upon the suit lands. By that time the petitioner had ploughed the lands by the use of a tractor after the rains set in and had sown 'ragi', 'avare' and 'jola' in all these lands. The order passed by the tribunal says that without any prejudice to the final orders by the High court, the Tribunal decided to issue injunction order against the petitioners and their family members. This order was passed in spite of the fact that the petitioners had obtained stay of further proceedings in LRF. No. 933/74- 75, on 9th July, 1976. Therefore, the petitioners filed WP. No. 5844 of 19'76 for the issue of a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the order at ext. 'e'. ( 8 ) IN all these three writ petitions, the parties are common and they raise common questions of fact and law and, therefore, they are heard together and the following common order is passed. ( 9 ) LET me take up for consideration WP. No. 5844 of 1976. As already stated, the impugned order in this writ petition is passed after the stay orders were issued by this Court in WP Nos. 2167 and 3288 of 1966. The impugned order at Ext. 'e' is passed by the Tribunal in flagrant violation and disobedience to the order of stay passed by this Court in those writ petitions. Further the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order after the final order in LRF. 61-933/74-75 was passed registering occupancy in the name of the 3rd respondent on 20-2-1976. It is brought to the notice of this Court by the petitioner's Advocate that the petitioners have institued a Contempt of Court proceedings in this Court for the disobedience of the respondent-Tribunal to the order of stay granted by this Court, I do not wish to go into the merits of the complaint in WP. No. 5844 of 1976. The learned Govt Advocate and Mr. G. B. Raikar, appearing for the 3rd respondent were unable to support the impugned order. Suffice it to say,. No. 5844 of 1976. The learned Govt Advocate and Mr. G. B. Raikar, appearing for the 3rd respondent were unable to support the impugned order. Suffice it to say,. that the order impugned in WP. No. 5844 of 1976 is null and void and it has been passed in flagrant violation and disobedience 'to the stay orders granted by this Court. With these observations WP. No. 5844 of 1976 is disposed of. ( 10 ) LET me now consider WP. No. 2167 of 1976 and 3288 of 1976, together. In WP. No. 2167 of 1976, as already, stated, the petitioner has sought for the issue of a writ of prohibition directing the respondent- tribunal from proceeding with the case No. LRF. 61-933 of 1974 and also he has sought for the issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the notice issued of the respondent-Tribunal under the original of Ext. 'd'. In WP. No. 3288 of 1976 the petitioner has sought for the issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the order passed by the 2nd respondent under Ext. 'l' dated 20-2-1976 registering the 3rd respondent as an occupant in respect of Sy. Nos. 65, 1912 and ,94 of Vijanapura village. ( 11 ) MR. H. R. Venkatararnanaiah, learned Advocate for the petitioners firstly, contended that the procedure followed by the Tribunal is not fair, open and impartial, besides the petitioner was subjected to threat, intimidation and humiliation by the Chairman of the Tribunal who made a complaint to the Station House Officer, Ulsoor Gate Police Station, Bangalore to register a case against the petitioner and to arrest him immediately. Secondly, he contended that the impugned order Ext. 'l' produced in WP. No. 3288 of 1976 dated 20-2-1976 lacks bona fides. He urged that the discrepancy in the dates regarding pronouncement of the order betrays bias and pre-judgment on the part of the Chairman, who has dated the impugned order and also wrote the order-sheet dated 11-3-1976. Thirdly, he contended that the Tribunal has recorded a finding that the 3rd respondent is entitled to be registered as an occupant on no evidence and misreading of the evidence. Thirdly, he contended that the Tribunal has recorded a finding that the 3rd respondent is entitled to be registered as an occupant on no evidence and misreading of the evidence. Fourthly, he contended that the Tribunal has ignored the decisions of the Special Deputy Commr for Inams Abolition in case No. 43156-57 and Case No. Ij56-57 in respect of all these three survey numbers which were ultimately upheld by the Karnataka Revenue Appellate Tribunal and the order of this court in WP. No. 1002 of 1970. Lastly, he contended that the 3rd respondent claimed the lands as belonging to his grandfather, which were given on a simple mortgage to the father of the petitioner and that he continued to be in possession of the same. He urged that the 3rd respondent suppressed the fact that there was finality of the proceedings before the Special Deputy Commr for Abolition of Inams, Bangalore, by stating in the application filed for registration of occupancy in respect of Sy. No. 65 of Vijanapura village by stating that the appeal in respect of granting occupancy rights has been pending before the Special deputy Commr for Abolition of Inams. Further, he urged that the 2nd respondent Tribunal did not get any clarification about the discrepancy in the separate applications filed by the 3rd respondent, in respect of these survey numbers. ( 12 ) MR. Govt Pleader, contended that there is no failure of natural justice in the case. He explained that, in view of the affidavit filed by the chairman, the discrepancy regarding the date of pronouncement of Ext. 'l' is a bona fide mistake and it has not in any way vitiated the order regarding the occupancy rights in the name of the 3rd respondent. ( 13 ) MR. G. B. Raikar, learned advocate for the 3rd respondent, contended that there is neither failure of natural justice nor there is any error of law apparent on the face of the record, and, therefore, he urged that, in view of the fact that the 3rd respondent has successfully established that he was tenant of the lands in question, the WP. No. 3288 of 1976 is liable to be dismissed. ( 14 ) TAKING the first contention of Mr. H. R. Venkataramaniah, it may be stated that the proceedings before the Tribunal do suffer from the infirmities pointed out by the learned Advocate for the petitioners. No. 3288 of 1976 is liable to be dismissed. ( 14 ) TAKING the first contention of Mr. H. R. Venkataramaniah, it may be stated that the proceedings before the Tribunal do suffer from the infirmities pointed out by the learned Advocate for the petitioners. The 1st petitioner appeared before the Tribunal on 6-2-1976. The statement of the 3rd respondent was recorded. The'petitioners' case is that they were denied right of cross-examination of the 3rd respondent and confronting him with the previous proceedings before the Special Deputy Commr for inams Abolition. He was told by the Chairman of the Tribunal ithat he could not cross-examine 3rd respondent in detail with regard to the previous proceedings and could not also exhibit the documents. The petitioner having no other alternative took precaution to send a written representation of the facts of the case along with two documents by registered post to the Secretary of the Tribunal on 6-2-1976. Thus, there was denial of cross-examination of the 3rd respondent and also denial of opportunity to produce relevant documents in support of petitioner's case. ( 15 ) ON 10-3-1976 the 1st petitioner received a fresh notice at Exhibit 'g' to appear before 'the Tribunal "on 11-3-1976 for a fresh enquiry with regard to the claim of the 3rd respondent for registering his occupancy in respect of the lands in question. He filed a writ petition in WP. 2176 of of 1976 which was admitted on 10-3-1976 and a stay of further proceedings was ordered by this Court. Thereafter, he learnt that the 3rd respondent lias trespassed into the lands in question. He approached the police of krishnarajapura for protection on 7-4-1976. On 9-4-1976 the Police of krishnarajapuram issued a notice at Ext. 'j' asking him to appear before the Station House Officer on 9-4-1976 at 10 a. m. and produce the documents. When he appeared before the Police, he was intimated by the police that final orders had been passed by the Tribunal registering the 3rd respondent as an occupant on 20-2-1976. 'j' asking him to appear before the Station House Officer on 9-4-1976 at 10 a. m. and produce the documents. When he appeared before the Police, he was intimated by the police that final orders had been passed by the Tribunal registering the 3rd respondent as an occupant on 20-2-1976. The petitioner was surprised to know that orders were passed on 20-2-1976 finally disposing of the matter in spite of the fact that he was served with a fresh notice to appear before the 2nd respondent Tribunal on 11-3-1976 for enquiry with regard to the claim of the 3rd respondent for registration of his occupancy as a tenant in resipect of these lands. Thereafter, he presented a copy application before the respondent-Tribunal for granting certified copies of the entire order-sheet, deposition of parties and the order, if any, passed by the 2nd respondent Tribunal. The copy of it is marked as Ext. 'a'. He also obtained the copy of the impugned order. But the note in the order sheet made on 7-2-1976 discloses that in spite of being informed in the court and service of notice the respondent was absent and the evidence of three witnesses was taken at the spot and the case was reserved for orders to 20-2-1976. But, what transpired on 6-2-76 is clear from Ext. 'p' found in the records produced by the Second Respondent Tribunal. It read? thus:"c. R. No. 156/75-76 Office of the Sub-Divl Magistrate, bangalore Sub-Division, Bangalore, dt. 6th February, 1976. To the Station House Officer, Ulsoor Gate Police Station, Bangalore. When the sitting of the Tribunal was held at 12 noon on 6th february 1976, one Sri B. M. Krishna Murthy, respondent in Case no. 61, 933/74-75 was present. In the course of the proceedings, Sri b. M. Krishnamurthy, began to behave unruly, calling Tribunal members by names, imputing motives. T as Chairman of the Tribunal asked him to maintain decorum in the Court, and not to obstruct the judicial proceedings of the Tribunal. He remained flouting the direction of the Chairman. Again at later stage, he tried to use insulting language to the members of the Tribunal and obstructed the proceedings of the tribunal and was gesticulating in a most threatening manner. After the case was over, he was found holding out threats to members. He remained flouting the direction of the Chairman. Again at later stage, he tried to use insulting language to the members of the Tribunal and obstructed the proceedings of the tribunal and was gesticulating in a most threatening manner. After the case was over, he was found holding out threats to members. The proceedings of the Tribunal are judicial under S. 124 of the karnataka Land Reforms Act, and he has committed offence under ss. 228 and 353 of the Indian Penal Code. Action may be taken as per law and to apprehend him immediately. Sdl- sub-Divl Magistrate, Bangalore, Sub-Divn, Bangalore. Received on 6-2-76 at 7-45 p. m. and registered the case in Cr. No. 70/76 u/s. 228, 353 IPC. Sd/- psteps. " ( 16 ) IN pursuance to this complaint made by the Sub-Divl Magistrate, the Ulsoor Gate Police sent up FIR to the Metropolitan Magistrate, 5th court, Bangalore, as per Ext. 'q' found in the Tribunal Records on 6-2-76 itself. The petitioner was arrested on 9-2-76 by the Ulsoor Gate Police and was released on bail. The circumstances remain uncontroverted by the respondents. The order-sheet does not bear testimony to the allegations about the unruly behaviour on the part of the 1st Petnr. Nor does the affidavit filed by the 3rd respondent who was present before the Tribunal on 6-2-1976 disclose any unruly behaviour on the part of the 1st petitioner before the Tribunal. Nothing prevented the Chairman, if what is stated in the affidavit is true to take action against the petitioner then and there in the proceedings of the Tribunal, according to law. It is stated by the petitioners' Counsel at the Bar that nothing further was heard about the complaint. It is therefore plain that the Chairman sent the above complaint and subjected the 1st petitioner to humiliation, threat and intimidation in exercise of her power as a Sub Divl Magistrate. This conduct on the part of the Chairman is deprecated. ( 17 ) THE case was posted for spot inspection and enquiry near the lands on the very nex. t day. It is noted in the order-sheet that on 7-2-1976 that the petitioner was absent and the Tribunal proceeded ex parte against him by examining the witnesses on behalf of the 3rd respondent and reserving the case for orders on 20-2-1976. t day. It is noted in the order-sheet that on 7-2-1976 that the petitioner was absent and the Tribunal proceeded ex parte against him by examining the witnesses on behalf of the 3rd respondent and reserving the case for orders on 20-2-1976. The haste and hurry with which the Chairman has gone through the proceedings reveals the bent of mind of the Chairman to harm the interest of the petitioner by denying him a fair opportunity. In such circumstances it wag quite natural for the petitioner-1. who apprehended trouble at the hands of the Chairman, did not appear before the Tribunal at the spot enquiry on 7-2-1976. But still the Chairman proceeded with the enquiry. In these circumstances the inference that the Chairman of the Tribunal had made up her mind somehow or the other to get the registration of occupancy made in the name of the 3rd respondent and deprive the petitioner of the lands in question is inescapable. Suffice it to say that either the Chairman was over zealous in implementing the provisions of the Land Reforms Act, or that she was motivated by extraneous considerations to follow this extraordinary procedure in the case. I am constrained to observe that implementation of a legislation like Land Reforms Act, would go into disrepute and alienate the faith of the people, if over zealous officers tried to implement the legislation in this manner. It would not serve the cause of the tenants either. ( 18 ) NOW adverting, to the discrepancy as such with regard to the date on which the impugned order Ext. 'l' was pronounced, it is necessary to refer to certain circumstances pointed out by the learned Advocate for the petitioners. It may be remembered that the case was posted in posthaste on the very next day after the hearing on 6-2-1976. The circumstances which prevented the petitioner to appear before the Tribunal on 11-3-1976 has already been adverted to. ( 19 ) MR. H. R. Venkataramaniah, learned Advocate for the petitioner argued that during the pendency of the proceedings in question before the 2nd respondent Tribunal, this Court held that notices served on parties in connection with registration of occupancv rights in favour of the tenants were invalid. His contention is that the Tribunal again served another notice at Ext. H. R. Venkataramaniah, learned Advocate for the petitioner argued that during the pendency of the proceedings in question before the 2nd respondent Tribunal, this Court held that notices served on parties in connection with registration of occupancv rights in favour of the tenants were invalid. His contention is that the Tribunal again served another notice at Ext. 'g' on 10-3-1976 on the petitioner to appear on 11-3- 1976 for a fresh enquiry to remedy the defect in the previous notice at ext. 'd'. He urged that since the petitioner was seeking legal remedies after 6th February, 1976 and before 11th March 1976, the 2nd respondent tribunal passed the impugned order to make it appear in the proceedings that the case had already been disposed of on 20-2-76. Therefore, he contended that the enquiry by the Tribunal was not fair, open and impartial. He further urged that the Tribunal had prejudged the issues involved in the case by preparing the order on 20-2-1976 itself and further steps taken by it were all to show that proceedings were conducted in a fair, open and impartial manner. ( 20 ) THE Chairman of the Tribunal has filed an affidavit explaining the circumstances in which the discrepancy has arisen. The Chairman in the affidavit has stated thus :"on 20-2-1976, there was a meeting of the Land Tribunal, on which date Sriyuths K. Prabhakar, R. Narayanaswamy Reddy and b. Basavalingappa were present. After discussing the matter with the other members of the Tribunal and on examination of the records, I wrote an order in my own handwriting, allowing the applications of Sri muniyellappa which was signed by the above members who were present. By sheer habit and inadvertence, I have also written 'pronounced in open Court' and dated it as 20-2-1976. As both the parties to the cases were not present on 20-2-1976 the Land Tribunal did not pronounce the orders as stated in the original order or the copies sup. plied thereof and directed issue of notices to the parties to be present on 11-3-1976 to pronounce the orders of the Tribunal, prepared on 20-2-1976. As both the parties to the cases were not present on 20-2-1976 the Land Tribunal did not pronounce the orders as stated in the original order or the copies sup. plied thereof and directed issue of notices to the parties to be present on 11-3-1976 to pronounce the orders of the Tribunal, prepared on 20-2-1976. I now find that the concerned case-worker attached to the office of the Tahsildar and Secretary, Land Tribunal, Bangalore South taluk, instead of intimating that the case is posted to 11-3-1976 for pronouncing the order of "the Land Tribunal", has sent a notice in form No. 9 as if the proceedings have to commence denovo specifying the date of hearing as 11-3-1976. On 11-3-1976. I and the other members of the Tribunal that were present in the Court Hall of the Asst Commissioner, rvronounced the orders that had been written by me in my own handwriting and signed by the other members of the Tribunal at 11 a. m. As already stated by me. the Tribunal did not pronounce its orders on 20-2-1976, but pronounced the same on 11-3-1976 at 11 a. m. at which time the Tribunal commenced its proceedings on that date, though a reading of the original order copy, notice dt. 6-3-1976 and copies of the order communicated by the Tahsildar give an impression to the contrary. I and the other members of the Land Tribunal realise that they were mistakes and should not have occurred and should also have been avoided. The allegations of the petitioners in their writ petitions to the contrary are not true. It is unfortunate that the above mistakes should have occurred in the proceedings of the Tribunal. But these mistakes were not deliberately committed by me and others with any ulterior motive or on any collateral considerations of helping anybody or harm any of the parties in the above case before the Land Tribunal. The mistakes committed by me and others were bona fide and were not actuated by any bias against any of the parties. I and other members of the Tribunal sincerely regret for the mistakes that have occurred in the proceedings. I assure this Hon'ble Court that T will never give room for such mistakes in the discharge of my official duties. "the averment in the affidavit is that the impugned order at Ext. I and other members of the Tribunal sincerely regret for the mistakes that have occurred in the proceedings. I assure this Hon'ble Court that T will never give room for such mistakes in the discharge of my official duties. "the averment in the affidavit is that the impugned order at Ext. 'l' which was prepared on 20-2-76 was not pronounced, as the parties were not present on 20-2-76. If as stated in the affidavit that the impugned order was prepared on 20-2-76 in consultation with the members of the Tribunal and was ready for pronouncement, the Chairman could have made a note to that effect in the order-sheet dt. 20-2-76. No such note is forthcoming in' the order-sheet. Even the order-sheet d. 11-3-1976 does not indicate that the Chairman had pronounced the order in the open Court at 11 a. m. which was prepared on 20-2-76. In the affidavit filed by the 3rd respondent in WP. 3288 of 1976 he has stated thus :"even the averments in para 3 are not correct. The petitioners were aware of the orders passed by the Tribunal, but still with mala fide intention 'suppressing the said fact that they have filed the earlier writ petition and at any rate by filing the present writ petition and bringing it to the notice of this Hon'ble Court to the effect that the tribunal has already passed the orders, the previous writ petition has become infructuous. " ( 21 ) IN para 3 of the petition, this is what the petitioner has stated:"the 1st petitioner gathered reliably that respondent-3 had trespassed on sy No. 65 and the other two lands. The 1st petitioner lodged a complaint to the Police Station at Krishnarajapuram on 7-4-76. On 9-4-76, the police of Krishnarajapuram Police Station issued a notice to the 1st petitioner, copy of which is produced herewith as ext. 'j', asking him to appear before the Station House Officer on 9-4-1976 at 10 a. m. and to produce all the documents. The 1st petitioner was also asked not to enter upon the lands in question till the disposal of his complaint petition. The 1st petitioner went to the Police station on 9-4-76 and wanted to seek some time to produce the documents since he did not have them immediately. The 1st petitioner was also asked not to enter upon the lands in question till the disposal of his complaint petition. The 1st petitioner went to the Police station on 9-4-76 and wanted to seek some time to produce the documents since he did not have them immediately. It was then intimated at the Police Station that the 3rd respondent had been stating them that a final order had been passed by the Tribunal registering him as an occupant, on 20-2-76 and that he had been asked to produce a certified copy thereof. The 1st petitioner who was surprised to learn about this fact told the police that on 10-3-76, he had received a notice issued by the 2nd respondent in which it was stated that the hearing of the case had been fixed on 11-3-76 and that therefore, there could not have been any order passed on 20-2-76 finally disposing of the matter and that he would also verify the matters by applying for certified copies of the entire order-sheet, depositions and the order, if any, passed. He came to Bangalore on 9-4-76 and presented a copy application to the 2nd respondent-tribunal seeking copies of the entire order-sheet, the depositions of parties and the order, if any, passed by the 2nd respondent tribunal. A copy of the application presented and acknowledged by the Secretary of the Tribunal is produced herewith as Ext-'k'. On the same day, the 1st petitioner was furnished with copies of the depositions of petitioner-1, respondent-3 as well as the order passed on 20-2-1976. The 1st petitioner was surprised to know that orders had been passed on 20-2-76 registering respondent-3 as a tenant in respect of the lands claimed by him. Certified copies of the. order passed by the 2nd respondent-Tribunal on 20-2-76, deposition of the 1st petitioner and deposition of the 3rd respondent are herewith produced and marked as Exts. 'l', 'm' and 'n' respectively. " ( 22 ) IT is in answer to this, the third respondent has stated in his written statement that the petitioner had suppressed the fact that the final order had been passed on 20-2-1976 and still filed the writ petition in this court. Thus from the averments in the petition and the affidavit of the 3rd respondent, it is clear that the 3rd respondent made the police to believe that final order had been passed on 20-2-1976. Thus from the averments in the petition and the affidavit of the 3rd respondent, it is clear that the 3rd respondent made the police to believe that final order had been passed on 20-2-1976. There is no explanation, how the 3rd respondent came to know about Ext. 'l' which was not pronounced on 20-2-1976. Thus the proceedings of the Tribunal have misled the 3rd respondent, the petitioner and the police to believe that final orders had been passed on 20-2-1976. The contention of the Govt Advocate that the discrepancy in noting the date is a bona fide mistake cannot be accepted. If such mistakes were to be committed by any officer in the judicial department consequences would be severe to such an officer. ( 23 ) IN this context, it may be remembered that the WP. No 2167 of 1976 which was filed on 6-3-1976 was admitted on 10-3-1976 and stay of further proceedings before the Tribunal had been stayed and it was served on the respondent-Tribunal on 11-3-1976. But the explanation of the learned govt Advocate is that the Stay Order had been served on the Tribunal (2nd respondent) on 11-3-1976 after the Tribunal had pronounced the impugned order at 11-00 a. m. Thus, there is room to think that the Tribunal in order to get the order of stay issued by this Court and to nullify the legal remedieg the petitioner was seeking in the High Court committed several grave irregularities in the conduct of the enquiry. ( 24 ) MR. H. R. Venkataramanaiah, learned Advocate for the petitioners, invited the attention of the Court to the samples of the kind of complaints made by people regarding Rent Tribunals in England by HWR wade in his Book on Administrative Law. At page 264, this is what the author has stated : as a sample of the kind of complaint made by people whose livelihood were greatly affected by tribunals' decisions may be cited the following comments on rent tribunals which were made to the Franks committee by the Justice for Landladies Association : (1) There is no appeal against the tribunal's decision. Tremendous power, which can ruin a person's life has been put into the hands of three men. Yet there is no higher court in which their decisions can be tested. (2) The three on the bench of the tribunal need have no proper legal qualifications. Tremendous power, which can ruin a person's life has been put into the hands of three men. Yet there is no higher court in which their decisions can be tested. (2) The three on the bench of the tribunal need have no proper legal qualifications. A Court of no appeal has been put into the hands of men who are generally neither qualified lawyers, magistrates or judges. (3) There is no evidence on oath, and therefore there can be no proper cross-examination as in a court of law. Statements are made on both sides, but the time-honoured method of getting to the truth cannot be used. (4) Procedure is as the tribunal shall determine. No rules have been laid down as to the procedure at a tribunal hearing. Witnesses may be heard or not heard at their pleasure. The comments quoted above are apt and true in some respects in the proceedings before the Land Tribunals. There is no appeal provided in the land Reforms Act, 1961, against the Tribunal's decision. Tremendous power which can ruin a, person's life has been put into the hands of the five persons, some of whom had no legal qualifications. There is no evidence on oath and there is no proper cross-examination as in a Court of Law. There is also no method to get at the truth. ( 25 ) FURTHER Mr. H. R. Venkataramanaiah, learned Advocate for the petitioners, invited the attention of the Court to certain comments made by the same author viz, HWD. Wade in his Book (1972 Edn) Legal Control of Govt Administrative Law in Britain and the United States. The learned author at page 162 has stated thus : chairmen and clerks. Undoubtedly the most important single factor in the effectiveness of any tribunal is the quality of the Chairman. It is obvious that Chairmen ought to have legal qualifications; tribunals have to administer law which is often complex, they may have qualified Advocates appearing before them, and they must know the elements of procedure. Nevertheless chairmen without lega] qualifications have served successfully on a number of tribunals, for example national insurance local tribunals. And in the case of supplementary benefit appeal tribunals, unqualified chairmen are the rule rather than the exception. This last instance is all the more striking, since from those tribunals there is no right of appeal of any kind. Nevertheless chairmen without lega] qualifications have served successfully on a number of tribunals, for example national insurance local tribunals. And in the case of supplementary benefit appeal tribunals, unqualified chairmen are the rule rather than the exception. This last instance is all the more striking, since from those tribunals there is no right of appeal of any kind. But dispensing relief to the poorest people in the community is in some ways well suited to an experienced lay chairman. Although the Franks Committee recommended that legal chairman should be Ihe rule except where others were particularly suitable, the Council on Tribunals has made little criticism of the qualifications of Chairman and members. Outside the field of supplementary benefit, however, the Committee's policy is in force and Chairmen without legal qualifications are now quite rare. Though the learned author with reference to functioning of Tribunals in britain and United Stu. es had stated so, it is relevant in the context of the land Tribunals functioning in Karnataka State, where tremendous power has been invested with a Tribunal which can ruin a person's life. Undoubtedly the most important single factor in the effectiveness of the Land Tribunal is the quality of the Chairman. The Chairman ought to have knowledge of elements of procedural and substantive law governing the rights of parties. On a careful perusal of ;the proceedings of the Tribunal in this case and also on the admissions made by the Chairman in the course of her affidavit, I am constrained to observe that the Chairman has not displayed the quality of the Chairman. Consequently. the effectiveness of the Tribunal is lacking in this enquiry. ( 26 ) TWO sound principles of natural justice are; that no person be a judge in his own cause; and that no man may be condemned unheard. In this case, the petitioner is condemned unheard. The Chairman scared the petitioner by denying him the opportunity of cross-examination of the 3rd respondent and following it up by threat and intimidation by a police complaint on the same day. Though the 1st respondent has stated in her affidavit that the mistake committed by her and others were bona fide and were not actuated by any bias against any of the parties, there is ample material on record to show that she was infected by personal bias and prejudgment. Thus the decision of the Tribunal is vitiated. Though the 1st respondent has stated in her affidavit that the mistake committed by her and others were bona fide and were not actuated by any bias against any of the parties, there is ample material on record to show that she was infected by personal bias and prejudgment. Thus the decision of the Tribunal is vitiated. ( 27 ) THE Clerk of the respondent-Tribunal has added to the lack of fairness in procedure by issuing a notice at Ext 'g' which gave the impression to the petitioner 'that the enquiry would be held denovo and thus misled him. No doubt he has said in his affidavit that, he sent the notice in form No. 9 as the usual notice forms were not immediately available to specify the date of hearing as 11-3-1976. It is difficult to accept his statement. It is an instance of a clerk dominating the Tribunal. ( 28 ) I do not for a moment suggest that the constitution of the Land' tribunal under the Land Reforms Act is bad. It is on the other hand a welcome feature to associate people's representatives in the adjudication of tenancy disputes. Some tribunals are doing speedy, useful and good work. But the emphasis is on the proper functioning of the Land Tribunals to render justice to the parties who appear before them, in conformity with the principles of natural justice. In the light of what has been discussed above, i. am constrained to observe that proceedings in this case were not fair, open and impartial. ( 29 ) ASSUMING that the impugned order at Ex. 'l' was passed on 11-3-1976, I will now proceed 'to consider whether on merits it can be sustained at all. Therefore, the questions for determination are : (1) Whether the impugned order is violative of the principles of natural justice; (2) Whether there are errors of law apparent On the face of the record; and (3) Whether it is based upon no evidence. 27. The learned Govt Advocate, relied upon the decision in Syed yakoob v. K. S. Radhakrishnan, AIR 1964 SC 477 . as to when a writ of certiorari can be issued and also as to the jurisdiction of this Court to issue a writ. 27. The learned Govt Advocate, relied upon the decision in Syed yakoob v. K. S. Radhakrishnan, AIR 1964 SC 477 . as to when a writ of certiorari can be issued and also as to the jurisdiction of this Court to issue a writ. Gajendragadkar, J (as he then was) at para 7 of the judgment observes thus:"the question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior Courts or Tribunate: these are cases where orders are passed by inferior Courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or as a result or failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of juridisiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adapted dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be re-opened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of feet recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned findings. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error or law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error or law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari vishnu Kamath v. Ahmed Ishaque (1955-1 SCR 1104: (S) AIR 1955 sc 233 ); Nagendra Nath v. Commr of Hills Divn ( 1958 SCR 1240 : air 1958 SC 398 ) and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh ( AIR 1960 sc 1168 ). "28. Mr. G. B. Raikar, learned Advocate for the 3rd respondent, relied upon the same and some decisions in support of 3rd respondent's" case. He argued that the 2nd respondent-Tribunal has properly appreciated and assessed the evidence and held that the 3rd respondent is a tenant of the lands and the said finding is a finding of fact and this Court under arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution cannot legitimately exercise its jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari. He pointed out that the Tribunal" relied upon the evidence given and the documents produced by the parties, besides looking into the index of lands and spot inspection and has reached the conclusion that the 3rd respondent was the tenant of the land and, therefore, he urged that WP. 3288 of 1976 is liable to be dismissed. 29. By an application dt. 26-8-1974 under 9. 48a (1) of the Act, the 3rd respondent claimed occupancy right in Sy No. 65 of vijanapura village and stated in that application that his brothers and his family members held Sy Nos. 19/2 and 94. 3288 of 1976 is liable to be dismissed. 29. By an application dt. 26-8-1974 under 9. 48a (1) of the Act, the 3rd respondent claimed occupancy right in Sy No. 65 of vijanapura village and stated in that application that his brothers and his family members held Sy Nos. 19/2 and 94. In view of pendency of proceedings before the Special Deputy (Jommr for Inams Abolition, Bangalore and as the same was remanded to that authority in appeal Nos. 2675 and 1443 of 1967 by the Revenue Appellate Tribunal, Bangalore, he filed another application on 26-12-74 claiming registration of occupancy as a tenant in respect of sy Nos. 19/2. 65 and 94 of Vijanapura village also. The Tribunal has failed to get any clarification from the 3rd respondent as to why in his application dt. 26-8-74 the 3rd respondent did not include Sy. Nos. 19/2 and 94 of vijanapura village even though he held them as a tenant. Further, the tribunal has failed to look into the reference given by the 3rd respondent in his first application at Ext. 'o' as to the capacity in which he held Sy nos. 19/2 and 94. As already pointed out the grievance of the 1st petitioner is that the respondent-Tribunal denied him 'the opportunity to cross-examine 3rd respondent on this question and also to produce records. Further, as stated above that the 1st petitioner as a measuse of precaution sent two documents with the statement of facts relating to this claim made by the 3rd respondent by registered post on 6-2-76. The Tribunal has totally ignored the documents sent by the 1st petitioner. There is no reference to them in the course of the impugned order. Thus, the Tribunal while deciding the question of tenancy has not acted legally and has erroneously refused to admit the admissible evidence in respect of the proceedings before the special Deputy Commr for Inams Abolition and the orders passed by the mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal, which culminated in the final order passed by this Court is WP. 1002/1970. Thus, there is violation of principles of natural justice. ( 30 ) NEXTLY, the statement given by the 3rd respondent before the tribunal reads thus :"i am cultivating this land from the days of my father. The land was mortgaged to the father of the respondent in 1930. 1002/1970. Thus, there is violation of principles of natural justice. ( 30 ) NEXTLY, the statement given by the 3rd respondent before the tribunal reads thus :"i am cultivating this land from the days of my father. The land was mortgaged to the father of the respondent in 1930. I continued to be in possession of the lands in question as a tenant by paying him gutta. Since it was a simple mortgage, I continued to cultivate as a tenant. I was paying Gutta to the father of the respondent and later to the respondent after his death since 'they were powerful persons they were not issuing receipt. This must be registered in my name. Cross-examination: I have applied for regrant of these numbers to Inam D. C. in case No. 43/50-51. It is my ancestral land as stated before, Inam D. C. in 1969. The case was in KRAT. The petition was dismissed on grounds of limitation. I did not put review application. On 19-2-70 I filed a writ petition in High Court which was dismissed on question of limitaltion. I filed a civil suit against you for injunction in Civil court. The suit is pending. " ( 31 ) THE petitioner's statement reads thus :"the applicant is not my tenant for Sy No. 1912, 65, 94. These lands Sy No. 65 is purchased in Court auction by my father in 1930. This is an Inam Abolition village in 1965 when the lands were vested with Govt. This land was in enjoyment and possession of my father. My father was registered as occupant for Sy No. 65 and Sy Nos. 94 and 19/2. There is no appeal in respect of Sy Nos. 65, 94 and 1912, case no. 1 of 1965 of Inam D. C. Cross-examination: I am cultivating year by year. My father died in 1965. I cultivate by tractor and I personally cultivate. I have not filed any declaration of holding. The Pahani is a fabricated document in the names of Thimmaiya and Muniyellappa. I have not gone in appeal against the pahani entries. You can see the pahani whether the pahani before or after the 1972-73. " ( 32 ) A reading of the statement made by the 3rd respondent makes it clear that the 3rd respondent transferred his interest in these lands in favour of the father of the petitioners on a simple mortgage. You can see the pahani whether the pahani before or after the 1972-73. " ( 32 ) A reading of the statement made by the 3rd respondent makes it clear that the 3rd respondent transferred his interest in these lands in favour of the father of the petitioners on a simple mortgage. ( 33 ) SIMPLE mortgage consists of a transfer, obligation to pay the debt and transfer a right to cause the property to be sold in the event of failure to pay the debt. In a simple mortgage the right of ownership is not transferred to the mortgagee and the possession is also not given. Thus the relationship of a debtor and a creditor subsisted between the 3rd respondent and the father of the petitioners and no relationship of a tenant and landlord can be spelled out. It is relevant to refer to Section 4 (c) of the Act. It says1 that a person lawfully cultivating any land belonging to any other person shall be deemed to be a tenant if such land is not cultivated personally by the owner and if such person is not a mortgagee in possession. It means that a mortgagee in possession is not a deemed tenant. When this is the position in law, it is difficult to comprehend how a owner who mortgaged his land to another person on a simple mortgage can become a deemed tenant of the land under the Act. Such a person would continue as a owner in possession and not as a tenant. But the Tribunal has wholly ignored the implications of the law of simple mortgage and the meaning of deemed tenant in S. 4 of the Act and also the inconsistent case made out by the 3rd respondent, while recording a finding that the 3rd respondent is a deemed tenant of the lands in question. This is a patent error of law on the face of the record which has vitiated the impugned order. ( 34 ) IN Ext. 'g' the application filed by the 3rd respondent in Form no. 7 for registration of occupancy right in Sy. No. 65 of vijanapura village, the 3rd respondent has stated the capacity in which he held Sy Nos 19/2 and 94. ( 34 ) IN Ext. 'g' the application filed by the 3rd respondent in Form no. 7 for registration of occupancy right in Sy. No. 65 of vijanapura village, the 3rd respondent has stated the capacity in which he held Sy Nos 19/2 and 94. His case is that registration of occupancy in his favour was pending in the Office of the Special Deputy Commr for Abolition Inams, bangalore as remanded to that authority in appeal Nos. 2765/1966 and 1443/67 of the Revenue Appellate Tribunal (KRAT ). But in the next application form filed by the 3rd respondent, he has claimed registration of occupancy rights in respect of all the three numbers viz, 19/2, 65 and 94 of Vijanapura village and he has not made any reference to the proceedings purported to be pending before the Special Deputy Commr, Bangalore. The respondent-Tribunal, has not got this discrepancy in these two applications clarified by the 3rd respondent. Be that as it may, let us consider whether the 3rd respondent in his first application has disclosed the true state-of-affairs with regard to the proceedings before the Inams abolition Act. The copy of the order Ext. 'a' passed by the Special Deputy commr in case No. 1 of 1956-57 discloses that the father of the petitioners was in possession and enjoyment of these lands and was registered as an occupant under 9. 9 of the Inams Abolition Act. It cannot be disputed that the 3rd respondent claimed occupancy rights in Sy No. 65 in case No. 43/56- 57 before the Special Deputy Commr, and it was rejected. He preferred an appeal before the then Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal which remanded the matter to the Special Deputy Commr. It is also not disputed that after the remand, the 3rd respondent claimed the other two Sy Nos viz, 19/2 and 94 of Vijanapura village. The Special Deputy Commr, rejected the claim of the 3rd respondent as not maintainable on the ground that he having not challenged the order passed in Case No. 1/56-67 his application was liable to be rejected. Thereafter the 3rd respondent preferred an appeal against the order of the Special Deputy Commr, before the Revenue Appellate Tribunal, which by its order dt. 21st February. 1969 rejected the appeal. Against that order the 3rd respondent filed a writ petition before this Court in WP. Thereafter the 3rd respondent preferred an appeal against the order of the Special Deputy Commr, before the Revenue Appellate Tribunal, which by its order dt. 21st February. 1969 rejected the appeal. Against that order the 3rd respondent filed a writ petition before this Court in WP. 1002/1970 challenging the order passed by the Revenue Appellate Tribunal in appeal No. 1443/67. This court dismissed the writ petition on the ground that the 3rd respondent had notice of the pronouncement of the impugned order passed on 28-3-67 in appeal No. 1958/67. When the matter stood at that at the time of filing the 1st application under S. 45 of the Act , on 26-8-74 the 3rd respondent represented before the 2nd respondent-Tribunal that these proceedings were still pending which is not true to facts. Thus the 3rd respondent had suppressed true state of affairs of the proceedings in respect of these lands, which the 2nd respondent Tribunal has overlooked. ( 35 ) IT is interesting to note in Ext. 'q' a statement of the 3rd respondent recorded by the Specical Tahsildar for Inams Abolition, Bangalore, in the presence of the Special Deputy Commr. He has admitted that the' khata of Sy No. 65, is in the name of the father of the petitioners and that it was of the ownership of his grand-father Vomaiah and that his grand-father and the 3rd respondent mortgaged the property on account of some debt in favour of the father of the petitioners' and that the petitioners' father took out civil proceedings and then got the Khata made out in his name. He had asked for the registration of occupancy in his name. The father of the petitioners also has given the statement that Sy No. 65 came to his possession through Court proceedings and he requested the Special deputy Commr to register the land in his name. It was thereafter the special Deputy Commr rejected the claim for registration of occupancy as a permanent tenant in favour of the 3rd respondent in Case No. 43/56-57. Thus the rights of the 3rd respondent either as a owner or as a permanent tenant claimed before the Special Deputy Commr in respect of Sy No. 65 of Vijanapura village came to an end. With regard to Sy Nos. Thus the rights of the 3rd respondent either as a owner or as a permanent tenant claimed before the Special Deputy Commr in respect of Sy No. 65 of Vijanapura village came to an end. With regard to Sy Nos. 19/2 and 94 registration of occupancy rights in favour of petitioners' father had became final after the order was passed by the Special Deputy Commr for inams Abolition, Bangalore, in case No. 1 of 56-57 as the 3rd respondent had not preferred any appeal against that order. ( 36 ) BUT the contention of Mr. G. B. Raikar, learned Counsel for the 3rd respondent is that what the 3rd respondent agitated before the Special deputy Commr for Inam Abolitions is not relevant for the enquiry under the Land Reforms Act. Reliance is placed upon the provisions of S. 126 of the Act. It says :"for the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that the provisions of this Act in so far as they confer any right and impose obligations on tenants and landlords shall be applicable to 'tenants holding lands in inam and other alienated villages or lands and to landlords and inamdars holding lands in such villages or lands"he placed reliance on Ss. 4 to 9a of the Inams Abolition Act, 1954. It is clear from Ext. 'a' that the Special Deputy Commr for Tnams Abolition, bangalore, passed an order under S. 10 of the Tnams Abolition Act. That section deals with the determination of claims under Ss. 4 5 6 7 8 9 and 9a. It says :"the Deputy Commr shall examine the nature and history of all lands in respect of which a Kadim Tenant, a permanent tenant, a quasipermanent tenant, the holder of a minor inam Or an inamdar claims to be registered as occupant under Ss. 4, 5, 6, 7, and 9 or the holder of a minor inam claims to be registered as holder under S. 8 (or in respect of which any person claims to be continued as tenant under S. 9a) as the case may be. and decide In respect of which lands the claims should be allowed. "it is clear, therefore, that the claims of the 3rd respondent falling under ss. 4 to 9a, were examined and the petitioners' father was registered as an occupant of the lands. and decide In respect of which lands the claims should be allowed. "it is clear, therefore, that the claims of the 3rd respondent falling under ss. 4 to 9a, were examined and the petitioners' father was registered as an occupant of the lands. Therefore, there was nothing left for the 3rd respondent to agitate before the 2nd respondent-Tribunal. It is a relevant circumstance, which has get a bearing on the rights of the parties. This is one aspect of the matfer. ( 37 ) THE other aspect of the matter is the case as put-forth by the 3rd respondent before the Inams Abolition Deputy Commr, Bangalore, which has already been adverted to. He has claimed before the Special deputy Commr, that "the lands were of the ownership of his grand-father vomaiah and that they were mortgaged to the father of the petitioners and that in the Court proceedings the father of the petitioners got the khata made out in his name. His statement makes it abundantly clear that his claim before the Special Deputy Commr, Bangalore, was not as a tenant of any description falling under Ss. A to 9a of the Inams Abolition Act, but as the owner. Therefore, it is not open to the 3rd respondent, now having failed before the Special Deputy Commr for Inams Abolition, the revenue Appellate Tribunal and the High Court to turn round and say that he is claiming these three lands as a tenant under the provisions of the Land Reforms Act. When this is the factual position in respect of the right claimed by the 3rd respondent in these lands, surprisingly enough the 2nd respondent Tribunal has reached the conclusion that under S. 4 of the Act, the 3rd respondent should be treated as a deemed tenant. This conclusion is not only a patent error of law apparent on the face of the record as stated earlier but it is based upon no evidence. Further, the 2nd respondent Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain an application for registration of occupancy under S. 45 of the Act, when the claim of the applicant is based upon ownership. Therefore, the impugned order is one passed without jurisdiction as the Tribunal has no power to adjudicate upon the disputes between two owners. Further, the 2nd respondent Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain an application for registration of occupancy under S. 45 of the Act, when the claim of the applicant is based upon ownership. Therefore, the impugned order is one passed without jurisdiction as the Tribunal has no power to adjudicate upon the disputes between two owners. ( 38 ) FURTHER, the Tribunal has come to the conclusion that the 3rd respondent is continuously cultivating the lands for the past 40-50 years undisturbed. This is negatived by the fact that the 3rd respondent's' suit in OS. 936 of 1974 filed before the Addl Second Munsiff at Bangalore for perpetual injunction restraining the petitioners from interfering with the peaceful possession of the lands in question was rejected as per Ext. 'q' by the Munsiff. ( 39 ) FURTHER the 2nd respondent-Tribunal has accepted the pahanis for the years 1972-73 and 1973-74 as true and reference is also made to the index of lands. But the Index of lands is not forthcoming in the records produced before this Court. Law requires the Tahsildar to verify the contents of the application for registration of occupancy rights. No such report is forthcoming in the records of the Tribunal. The petitioners contention is that pahanis are fabricated documents. That contention appears to be true in view of the result of the proceedings before the special Deputy Commr for Tnams Abolition, Bangalore. Consequently, the presumption in law relating to pahanis stands rebutted. ( 40 ) THEREFORE, on a careful examination of all aspects of the case, it is not possible to sav that the 3rd respondent has established that he was the tenant of the three lands in question. ( 41 ) THUS, the imnugned order at Ext. 'l' not only suffers for want of jurisdiction, but, it suffers from the error of law apparent on the face of the recprd and is based upon no evidence and, therefore, the issue of a writ of certiorari is imperative. ( 42 ) IN the result, Ext. 'd' in writ petition 2117 of 1976 and Ext. 'l' in writ petition 3288 of 1976 are hereby quashed. These two writ petitions are allowed. Parties to bear their own costs. "on 20-10-1976 learned Advocate for the petitioners moved in the Court that the operative portion of the orders passed on 15-10-1976 in these writ petitions required certain modifications. 'd' in writ petition 2117 of 1976 and Ext. 'l' in writ petition 3288 of 1976 are hereby quashed. These two writ petitions are allowed. Parties to bear their own costs. "on 20-10-1976 learned Advocate for the petitioners moved in the Court that the operative portion of the orders passed on 15-10-1976 in these writ petitions required certain modifications. Heard the Counsel for the petitioners and the respondents 1 and 2. 3rd respondent's Counsel absent. "it is pointed out by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that in view of the result in WP. 3288 of 1976, the WP. 2167 of 1976 does not survive. In view of this submission, the order passed on 15-10-1976 at para 42, is modified as follows :"in the result, Ext. 'l', in WP. 3288 of 1976 is hereby quashed and the writ petition is allowed. In view of the result in WP. 3288 of 1976, the WP. 2167 of 1976 does not survive. Accordingly, it is disposed of. "this may be incorporated in the Writ Order that may be issued. --- *** --- .