JUDGMENT S.S. Ahmed, Member. - This is defendant's second appeal, directed against the order of Additional Commissioner, Lucknow Division, dated 28-1-1971, dismissing the appeal filed by Radhey Shyam and another, against the order of Judicial Officer/Assistant Collector, 1st Class, Lucknow, in a case u/s. 229-B of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. 2. Kashi Prasad was the bhumidhar of the plots in suit and according to the plaintiffs who are the sons of Kahsi Prasad, this land was grove, Kashi Prasad was in possession on the said grove still he died during consolidation operations. The plaintiffs were minors then but they remained in possession after the demise of their father. However, defendant Nos. 1 and 2 took undue advantage of their minority and in collusion with the consolidation authorities, they got their names recorded under Rule 80 of the C.H. Rules in a fraudulent manner. The plaintiffs sought a declaration in their favour of the plea that their names had been wrongfully expunged as a result of fraud. The suit was contested b the defendants 1 and 2 on the ground that their father Rameshwar Prasad was tenure-holder of the plot in suit, that some 40 years ago, he planted some trees over the plots and remained in possession till his death, after his death, they came in possession of the grove but as they did not enjoy cortical relations with the lekhpal, their names were not recorded and that they got this mistake rectified during the consolidation operations when notices were issued to all concerned but no objection was filed and they were ordered to be recorded as sirdars with an enhanced land revenue. It was pleaded that they had, in any case, perfected their title by adverse possession and that the suit was bared by section 49 of the C.H. Act. 3. The suit was decreed and the defendant went up in appeal before the Additional Commissioner, who dismissed it. They have now come up in second appeal before this court. 4. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties and have also gone through the records of this case. 5. This appeal poses two neat and interesting questions of law. The suit was decreed and the defendant went up in appeal before the Additional Commissioner, who dismissed it. They have now come up in second appeal before this court. 4. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties and have also gone through the records of this case. 5. This appeal poses two neat and interesting questions of law. The first is what is the proper forum of decision of suits in which fraud is specifically pleaded and the second is whether a suit in which entries have been made in accordance with Rule 80 of the U.P.C.H. Rules can be considered to be barred by section 49 of the C.H. Act. 6. On the question of fraud the case law appears to be very clear. There seems to be a general consensus of opinion that the decree obtained by fraud are ineffectual and inoperative and the proper forum for of getting such decrees set aside is a civil and not revenue court. This is the view of the Allahabad High Court as laid down in the case of Uma Pandey v. Pursottam 1960 A.L.J. page 676. This has been endorses by another judgment of the Allahabad High Court (1966 R.D. page 174) that when a order is sought to be set aside on the grounds of fraud, the remedy does not lie before the consolidation courts but only by suit under the Specific Relief Act in Civil court. This view has also been adopted by Board of Revenue in the case of Mauja v. Raju 1973 A.W.R. (Rev.) page 18, in which a learned Member of the Board followed the High Court cases and has held that the suit for setting aside a decree obtained by fraud is cognisable by a civil court only. The learned counsel for the appellant had relied on tall theses cases and has maintained that the plaintiffs should have filed a suit in the civil court when they allege that the entry by defendants had been obtained in their favour, during consolidation operations, in an collusive manner and fraud. 7. The next point argued by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the suit is barred by Section 49 C.H. Act and that as a result of this bar the matter could not have been adjudicated after the consolidation operations were over. 7. The next point argued by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the suit is barred by Section 49 C.H. Act and that as a result of this bar the matter could not have been adjudicated after the consolidation operations were over. This point has very well been met by the learned counsel for the respondent who has pointed out that no sanctity can be attached to entries made in accordance with rule 80 of the C.H. Rules and that a suit for declaration can always lie. Relying on 1965 A.L.J. page 516, he has argued that when entries are made in accordance with rules 74 to 80, the remedy of a party aggrieved by such entries is to bring a regular suit in a court of competent jurisdiction to establish his title and that Section 49 of the C.H. Act does not come in the way of the such a suit. In the light of this authoritative pronouncement I have no hesitation in holding that the suit is not barred by Section 49 of the C.H. Act. 8. It is, however, the first question which really cuts at the very root of the plaintiffs case. The plaintiffs have clearly alleged fraud by making the averment that the entry in their favour was got expunged as a result of collusion with the consolidation authorities. 9. The foregoing discussion will show that although the suit is not barred by Section 49 of the C.H. Act, yet it is ineffectual and incompetent in so far as it was presented before a revenue court which has no jurisdiction to try it. The proper forum for the plaintiffs to seek reader of their grievance was a sit under the Specific Relief Act in a Civil court of competent Jurisdiction. Hence, it will be difficult to sustain the orders of the two courts. 10. In the result, the appeal succeeds and it hereby allowed. The orders of both the lower courts are set aside and the suit will stand dismissed throughout. 11. In the circumstances of the case the costs will be easy.