TIMOTHY BANGARA v. SHARADA BAI — 1976 DIGILAW 181 (KAR)

( 1 ) THESE two revisions are filed under S. 50 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 and arise out of the two petitions HRC. 18/69 and 11/70 filed in the Court of the II Addl Munsiff, Udupi relating to separate but contiguous premises said to belong to the same landlord. Since the learned dist Judge while dealing with the two appeals has given a common judgment, it is considered convenient to decide both the revision petitions by a single judgment, ( 2 ) SHARADA Bai, the landlord, filed the petition HRC. 18/69 against timothy Bangava in respect of a hon-residential premises and the grounds elicited for eviction were classified under Cls (c) (d) (f) (h) and (i) of s. 21 (1) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 besides the ground under 1 (o) of Sec. 108 of the Transfer of Property Act. It was stated that the tenant erected on the premises a permanent structure without landlord's consent, that he was convicted of using the premises for immoral or illegal purpose, that he had unlawfully sub-let the whole or part of the premises, that the premises were required for carrying out repairs and that the premises were also required for a reasonable and bona fide need of the landlord. The tenant, inter alia, denied all these grounds set up by the landlord in support. of his case for eviction. It was further pleaded that the notice to quit was "invalid and even otherwise insufficient and bad in law'. The learned trial Munsiff disallowed the grounds put in Cls (f), (h ). and (i) hut upheld the grounds specified in Cls (c) and (d) namely, permanent structure having been made by the tenant without the consent and his conviction for using the premises for immoral or illegal purpose. It was also held that the notice to quit did not afford 15 clear days to the tenant to vacate and as such the said notice was invalid under S. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. At the same time, it was held that the tenant was a statutory tenant and as such the notice to quit was not required to determine the tenancy. As regards the grounds under Cl (o) of s. 108 of the Transfer of Property Act, the finding of the trial Munsiff was that the said ground was not made out. At the same time, it was held that the tenant was a statutory tenant and as such the notice to quit was not required to determine the tenancy. As regards the grounds under Cl (o) of s. 108 of the Transfer of Property Act, the finding of the trial Munsiff was that the said ground was not made out. Therefore, the petition of the lendlord was allowed. ( 3 ) THE second petition HRC. 11/70 was filed by the same landlord against Mrs. Bernard, the daughter-in-law of the respondent in HRC. 18 of 1969. The landlord took up the grounds under Cl (a) and (h) of S. 21 (l ). The learned trial Munsiff, however, considered that both these grounds were not made out and hence he dismissed the petition for eviction. ( 4 ) THE tenant in the two afore-mentioned petitions, however, filed two appeals before the learned Dist Judge. Mrs. Bernard, although the petition of the landlord against her was dismissed, yet filed the appeal, because her contention was that instead of her, Timothy Bangara who is her father-in-law was the tenant. The finding of the learned Munsiff was that Mrs. Bernard was the tenant and that her father-in-law was not the tenant. Mrs. Bernard was not satisfied with the decision of the learned munsiff. Hence, she filed the appeal before the learned District Judge. ( 5 ) THE learned Dist Judge, however, dismissed both the appeals. In the appeal from HRC. 18/69, the finding of the learned Munsiff on the question of notice was, that Timothy Bangara was a statutory tenant and hence a notice to quit was not required. The learned Dist Judge confirmed the finding of the learned Munsiff. However, he did not give any finding as to whether the notice to quit served upon the tenant was invalid for the reasons stated by the learned trial Munsiff. As regards the other pleas raised by the landlord and so decided by the learned trial Munsiff in the two petitions, the learned Dist Judge confirmed the findings of the learned munsiff. Against the two decisions of the learned Dist Judge, the present revisions are filed by the tenants. ( 6 ) CRP. 2760/74 pertains to HRC. As regards the other pleas raised by the landlord and so decided by the learned trial Munsiff in the two petitions, the learned Dist Judge confirmed the findings of the learned munsiff. Against the two decisions of the learned Dist Judge, the present revisions are filed by the tenants. ( 6 ) CRP. 2760/74 pertains to HRC. 18|69 and the learned Counsel contended that Timothy Bangara could not be considered a statutory tenant, in as much as, a fresh contract of tenancy was brought into existence after the termination of the original period of lease fixed under Ext. P1 dated 5-7-58. The learned Counsel pointed out the circumstance that certain repairs were done by the tenant. The landlord accepted these repairs and even agreed to make a deduction in the rent. In answer to this argument, the learned Counsel for the respondent-landlord pointed out S. 44 of the karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 which made a provision for repairs and improvements. Even a statutory tenant could avail of that provision and a deduction could be given by the landlord in the payment of rent. To me, it appears that it is not even necessary to give a finding on this part of the controversy. The plea regarding notice to quit in the counter petition of timothy Bangara was : "the notice to quit is also invalid and even otherwise insufficient and bad in law. " the tenant never specified how and in what manner the notice was in valid or otherwise insufficient and bad in law. It was not mentioned as to what was the date for the commencement of tenancy, whether the notice ended wi'h the month of tenancy or not, and whether 15 clear days were given to the tenant to vacate the premises. Nothing in that regard was pointed out by the tenant. It would have been better on the part of the learned trial Munsiff to get clarified the plea raised by the tenant, Even the landlord never chose to ask for more particulars. With this state of pleading, the learned trial Munsiff seems to have gone into a flight of imagination. He initially presumed that the notice must have been received by the tenant on a specific date so that the balance of the period before 30-4-69 was less than 15 days. His entire finding is governed by a surmise which was not called for. He initially presumed that the notice must have been received by the tenant on a specific date so that the balance of the period before 30-4-69 was less than 15 days. His entire finding is governed by a surmise which was not called for. In the own words of the learned Munsiff, the finding is : ," Even otherwise, without a notice Ext. P2 d. 6-4-69 it could be ordinarily presumed that if the notice was sent by registered post on 6-4-69, that the same must have reached the respondent before 14th April 1969. . . . . . . Ext. P2 is d. 6-4-69. It cannot be presumed as a matter of course that the notice was sent to the respondent on 6-4-69 in the absence of any evidence on the part of the petitioner to show that the notice Ext. P2 was in fact sent by post or registered to the address of the respondent on the date of Ext. P2. . . . . . . For the reasons stated above I come to the conclusion that there is no proof of a valid notice of termination in this case. "thus, the learned trial Munsiff presumed that the notice must not have been posted on 6-4-69 and that necessarily it must have reached the tenant aither 14th of April 1969 so as to give him less than 15 days to vacate the premises. It was even presumed that the notice was not sent on 6-4- 1969 although that date was shown in the notice itself. The learned Counsel pointed out that the tenant resided in the very same town and this presumption on the part of the trial Munsiff may be uncalled for. Besides, at the bottom of the petition an endorsement regarding the documents produced was made and ltem-3 indicated that a registered reply received by the petitioner's Lawyer from the respondent's Lawyer to the notice d. 6-4-69 was dt 12-4-69, meaning thereby that the reply was sent by the tenant to the landlord's notice on 12-4-69. This regis. ered reply remaineon the record till 3-11-71 when the said document was returned under orders of the Court. At any rate, there is an indication from ltem-3 of the list of documents produced on behalf of the petitioner, that the notice was served on the tenant before 12-4-69. This regis. ered reply remaineon the record till 3-11-71 when the said document was returned under orders of the Court. At any rate, there is an indication from ltem-3 of the list of documents produced on behalf of the petitioner, that the notice was served on the tenant before 12-4-69. If that was so, more than 15 days time was granted to the tenant to vacate the premises. In view of the state of pleading that existed on the record and other circumstances made out, the rinding of the trial Munsiff that the notice was invalid can hardly be sustained. The learned Dist Judge has not considered that finding. The notice Ext. P2, if served upon the tenant so as to grant him 15 days or more to vacate the premises could not be considered invalid on any other ground. As such, even if the tenant could be held not to be' a statutory tenant, the requirement of Jaw as to notice was satisfied. The tenancy contract was terminated in accordance with law. ( 7 ) AS regards the other two pleas that found favour with the Court below, at any rate, the plea under Cl (d) of Sec. 21 (1) was made out in favour of the landlord. As the decision of the learned Dist Judge points out, the tenant was found in possession of illicit liquor. He was fined rs. 200. In my opinion, that was a clear case of conviction of using the premises for immoral and illegal purposes. The argument of the learned counsel that there should have been a series of conduct showing immoral or iliegal purpose, does not hold good in view of the language of Cl (d) which besides dealing with the ease of a tenant guilty of conduct which is a nuisance or annoyance to the adjoining or neighbouring occupiers, also deals with the case of a tenant convicted of using the premises or allowing the premises to be used for immoral or illegal purposes. In the second category even a single conviction of using the premises or allowing the premises to be used for immoral Or illegal purposes will be considered sufficient. Therefore, the ground under Ci (d) of S. 21 (1) was made out. In the second category even a single conviction of using the premises or allowing the premises to be used for immoral Or illegal purposes will be considered sufficient. Therefore, the ground under Ci (d) of S. 21 (1) was made out. That being so, and the notice to quit being held valid for determination of tenancy, the order asking for eviction of the tenant could certainly be sustained. With that finding the revision CRP. 2760/74 is devoid of any merit and the same is dismissed. . . . . . . ( 8 ) AS to the other revision CRP. 2761/74 the only contention of the petitioner is that intead of herself, Timothy Bangara should have been held to be the tenant in the premises. The learned Counsel on her behalf argued that Exts. D4 to D8 which are Muncipal extracts showed the name of her father-in-law as the occupier of the premises. These documents were not considered by the Courts below and that these documents would prove that Timothy Bangara was the tenant. From the judgment of the learned Appellate Judge, however, it is found that the documents Exts d4 to D8 were duly considered and it was held that the said entries were made for the purpose of collecting revenue, namely, the taxes. It could thus be stated, as pointed out by the learned Counsel for the respondent, that instead of naming the lady, her father-in-law was specified as the person responsible to pay the revenue. Besides these documents, the learned appellate Judge also considered the other oral and documentary- evidence. It was held both by the learned trial Munsiff as also by the learned Dist Judge that as a question of fact. Mrs. Bernard and not her father-in-law was the tenant in the premises. If a. proper appreciation of evidence was made it is futile to argue in a revision that the finding of fact should be set at naught, simply because it is considered that some other finding could as well be arrived at on the same evidence. If two reasonable conclusions could be drawn on the same evidence, and the question was purely one of fact, it would not be a valid argument for interference in revision that any other Court left to itself may have arrived at a contrary finding. If two reasonable conclusions could be drawn on the same evidence, and the question was purely one of fact, it would not be a valid argument for interference in revision that any other Court left to itself may have arrived at a contrary finding. So long as the legality and correctness of the order of the learned Appellate Judge could not be questioned and the finding arrived at was appropriate and legitimate from evidence on record, hardly a case for interference in revision is made out. As such, I do not find any compelling reason to take a different view than what has been taken by the two Courts below. The revision CRP. 2761/74 is thus without any merit and the same is dismissed. ( 9 ) THE two revisions are thus dismissed. The tenants are however given two months to vacate the premises. No order is made as to costs. --- *** --- .