Judgment S.K.JHA, J. 1. This is an application for quashing the criminal proceeding against the petitioners in C. M. B. Case No. 68 of 1971/T. R. 592 of 1971 pending in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Dhanbad. The only point which has been raised in this application is that no cognizance could be taken under S. 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 hereinafter to be referred to as the Act, as there was no valid sanction accorded for the prosecution of the petitioners. When the case was placed for hearing before a learned single Judge of this Court, by an order dated 3rd April 1975 it was referred to Division Bench for a decision on the point as to whether a local authority could be prescribed by a notification issued in that behalf by the State Government or whether a notification prescribing a local authority could be treated as having the force of a Rule. Hence this case before us. 2. Before coming to the legal aspect of the case, it is worthwhile mentioning a few facts which are not in controversy. On the 30th December 1969, the Patherdih Washery Employees Co-operative Society Ltd. of which petitioner No.1, the Washery Manager, is the Chairman; petitioner No.2, the Assistant Mechanical Engineer is the Secretary: and petitioner No.3, the Washery Engineer, is the Treasurer, was inspected by the Food Inspector of Jharia Mines Board of Health who collected Haldi (turmeric) weighing 450 grams. It was sent to the Public Analyst; who reported that the Haldi in question contained excess of lead and did not conform to the prescribed standard. On the 9th April 1971 sanction was accorded by the Medical Officer of the Jharia Mines; Board of Health for prosecuting the petitioners. On the 4th August 1971 a complaint was filed by the Food Inspector of the Jharia Mines Board, a copy whereof has been marked Annex. 1 to the petition. On the 18th August 1971 cognizance was taken against the petitioners for an offence under S. 16(1) (a) of the Act. The petitioners challenged the authority of Jharia Mines Board of Health to accord any valid sanction: In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Jharia Mines Board, it has been asserted that on the 12th October 1955, vide Annex. The petitioners challenged the authority of Jharia Mines Board of Health to accord any valid sanction: In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Jharia Mines Board, it has been asserted that on the 12th October 1955, vide Annex. A, "Local area" was notified by a notification issued in this behalf by the State Government under S. 2 (vii) of the Act including the area under the jurisdiction of the Board. On the 6th June 1956, vide Annexure A/1 another notification was issued being notification No. V/E-04/56-165-HR by which the Governor of Bihar was pleased to prescribe all District Boards in the State, the Jharia Mines Board of Health, Dhanbad and the Hazaribagh Mines Board Hazaribagh which had- been declared to be local area under CI (vii) of S. 2 of the Act as local authorities within their respective jurisdiction for the purposes of the Act. This notification was issued in the purported exercise of the powers conferred by sub-cl. (2) of Cl. (viii) of S. 2 of the Act. Initially the bone of contention between the parties was as to whether the notification dated 6th June 1956 Annex. A/1 was validly issued under the provisions of S. 2 (viii) of the Act and whether it had any binding effect. Subsequently however, on 24th November 1975, the State Government in exercise of their rule-making power under S. 24 of the Act amended the Bihar Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1958 which were framed on the 2nd July 1958. By this amendment the rule was framed prescribing the Jharia Mines Board of Health as a Local authority and this amendment was also given a retrospective effect by a deeming clause end it said that all actions or proceedings taken at any time before the amended rule came into force would be deemed to have been taken by the Jharia Mines Board of Health inter alia, as a local authority. The question with regard to validity of the amendment of the rules on 24th November 1975 arose after a reference of this case to Division Bench. Therefore, initially the case had been referred by the learned single Judge merely for the purposes of a decision on the question as to whether Annex. A/1 the notification dated 6th June, 1956 could be validly held to have declared the Jharia Mines Board of Health as a local authority. Therefore, initially the case had been referred by the learned single Judge merely for the purposes of a decision on the question as to whether Annex. A/1 the notification dated 6th June, 1956 could be validly held to have declared the Jharia Mines Board of Health as a local authority. I shall deal with this aspect of the matter first before directing my attention to the arguments raised by learned counsel for the parties with regard to the amendment of the rules in November 1975. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that Annex. A/1 the notification dated 6th June 1956 should be held not to have been validly made as the local authority could not be prescribed by a notification of the State Government without framing a rule under S.24 of the Act. For the purpose of prescribing a local authority under S. 2 (viii) (2) it was incumbent to frame a rule in that regard under the rule-making power of the State Government under S. 24 of the Act and there having been no rule before the 24th November 1975, the Jharia Mines Board of Health could not be a local authority as envisaged by the Act. Learned! Counsel for the Jharia Mines Board on the contrary contended that a local authority could be prescribed by the State Government even by issuance of a notification in that regard. As a matter of fact this point has already been decided by a Bench of this Court in the case of Suleman Mian V/s. State, 1975 BBCJ 352 : (1976 Cri LJ 430), wherein it has been held that this very notification of the 6th June 1956 could not be held to have validly prescribed a local authority within the meaning of S. 2 (viii) (2). In Suleman Mians case it was held by the Bench that in view of the different provisions of the Act it was difficult to hold that when prescribed has been mentioned in S. 2 (viii) and the word prescribed has been defined in S. 2 (xii) to mean prescribed by rules made under this Act, the Local authority can be prescribed not by any notification. but by relevant rules to be framed by the State Government. Mr. but by relevant rules to be framed by the State Government. Mr. Tara Kumar Das, learned counsel for the Board argued that the aforesaid decision should not be held to be good law and he endeavoured to persuade us to refer this matter to a larger Bench for reconsideration of the point involved. I have given my anxious thought and full consideration to the matter and treating the case even as a matter of first impression as if the point were still res integra, I have not been able to satisfy myself with regard to the tenability of this contention. I am in full agreement with the ratio and the reasons given in the Bench decision in Suleman Mians case. In that view of the matter, it is not necessary for me to refer to those provisions in the Act by which certain things have to be done by the appropriate Government by issuance of a notification while others have to be done by framing the rules under S. 23 in the case of the Central Government and S. 24 in the case of the State Government. I must therefore, hold that the notification dated 6th June, 1956 Annex. A/1 could not be held to have validly prescribed the Jharia Mines Board of Health as the local authority within the meaning of S. 2 (viii) (2) of the Act, nor can it have the force of a Rule. As a matter of fact, in my view, the State Government themselves having felt the necessity for framing a rule in that behalf have subsequently done so by the amendment of the rules made on the 24th November 1975, a reference to which has been made by me earlier. 4. This then brings us to the next and more vital question which has now arisen in view of the amendment of the rules. As has been observed by me earlier, in the rules framed on the 2nd of July 1958, the local authority was not prescribed but it has been so done by the amendment aforesaid. The amendment as contained in the notification No. S. O. 1451 dated 24th November 1975 reads thus. As has been observed by me earlier, in the rules framed on the 2nd of July 1958, the local authority was not prescribed but it has been so done by the amendment aforesaid. The amendment as contained in the notification No. S. O. 1451 dated 24th November 1975 reads thus. "S. O. 1451-In exercise of the powers conferred by S. 24 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (XXXVII of 1954), the Governor of Bihar is pleased to make the following amendments in the Bihar Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1958 namely:- After R. 2 of the Bihar Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1958 published under notification No. V/R 1-101/58- 21544.H dated the 2nd July 1958, a new R. 2-A shall be inserted namely:- 2A (i) "Local authority" means in case of (a) A district Board ............... The District Board. (b) The area under Jharia Mines Board of Health ............... The Jharia Mines Board of Health. (c) The area under Hazaribagh Mines Board ............... The Hazaribagh Mines Board. (d) Bokaro Steel City ............... The Administrator Bokaro Steel Ltd. (e) A notified area .................. The Notified Area Committee. (f) A cantonment .................. The Cantonment Authority. (g) A municipality .................. Municipality Board. (h) Patna Municipal Corporation .................. The Administrator Patna Municipal Corporation. (ii) All actions taken, orders passed, proceedings commenced in pursuance of the Bihar Prevention of Food Adulteration Act and the rules framed thereunder by the local authorities specified above shall be deemed to have been done or taken in exercise of powers conferred by or under these rules as if these rules were in force on the day on which such things or action was done or taken or passed or commenced." So far as R. 2-A (i) is concerned, by itself it would not have adversely effected the case of the petitioners. The validity of sub-r. 2-A (ii) really falls for our serious consideration. The validity of sub-r. 2-A (ii) really falls for our serious consideration. It will be seen from the provisions of sub-r. (ii) of R. 2-A that all actions taken, orders passed and proceedings commenced in pursuance of the Act and the rules framed thereunder by the Local authorities specified in sub-r. (i) is to be deemed to have been done or taken in exercise of powers conferred by or under the amended rules as if these rules were in force on the day on which such things or action were taken or orders passed or proceedings commenced. If sub- r. 2-A (ii) were not there, the petitioners would have had nothing to lose, but the retrospective operation given to sub- r. 2-A (i) if held to be valid will certainly disentitle the petitioners to have any relief in this case. It was, therefore, vehemently argued by Mr. S. B. Sanyal, learned Counsel for the petitioners that the retrospective operation given under the provisions of sub-r. (ii) of R. 2-A was beyond the competence of the State Government in the purported exercise of their power as a rule-making authority under S. 24 of the Act. It was urged that there was nothing in S. 24 or for that matter in any other provisions of the Act which confer any express or implied power to the rule-making authority to frame a rule with retrospective effect. It was further argued that if this contention be not accepted then alternatively it should be held that this entire amendment of November 1975 is invalid for not being in consonance with the Act. In the view that I am going to take it is not necessary to decide for the purpose of this case the validity of the alternative contention. 5. Sec.24 of the Act reads thus: "The State Government may, after consultation with the Committee and subject to the condition of previous publication, make rules for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of this Act in matters not falling within the purview of S. 23." Sub-section (2) of S. 24 enumerates certain specific matters in regard to which the State Government may frame rules without prejudice to the generality of the power conferred under S. 24 (1) of the Act. The whole question to be decided in this case is as to whether there is anything in S. 24 which empowers the State Government to frame rules with retrospective or retroactive effect. The law in this regard is well settled. A rule-making authority is exercising a subordinate legislative power. It is well settled that the initial difference between the subordinate legislation and the statute laws lies in the fact that a subordinate law making body is bound by its terms of its delegated or derived authority and that a court of law, as a general rule will not give effect to the rules, thus made, unless satisfied that all the conditions precedent to the validity of the rules have been fulfilled (C. F. Craies on Statute Law 6th Edition, page 297). There are numerous decisions of the Supreme Court, wherein it has been held that rules cannot be made retrospective unless the language employed in the statutory provision empowers the authority concerned to make a rule or regulation with retrospective effect either in express terms or by necessary implication. Reference in this connection may be made to the decisions of Supreme Court in the case of the Income-tax Officer V/s. M. C. Ponnoose, ( AIR 1970 SC 385 ); Cannanore Spg. and Wvg. Mills Ltd. V/s. Collector of Customs and Central Excise, ( AIR 1970 SC 1950 ) and Hukam Chand V/s. Union of India, ( AIR 1972 SC 2427 ). The decisions are numerous and it is not necessary to multiply the list of cases. From a perusal of the language of S. 24 (1) of the Act, as quoted above there is nothing to suggest even by implication, not to talk of any express provisions to that effect that the rule-making authority namely, the State Government has been conferred the power to frame rules with retrospective effect. Learned counsel for the Jharia Mines Board of Health was not able to show to us any other provisions in the Act which may lead to an inference that the statute even by necessary implication confers such a power on the rule-making body. Learned counsel for the Jharia Mines Board of Health was not able to show to us any other provisions in the Act which may lead to an inference that the statute even by necessary implication confers such a power on the rule-making body. 6 For me reasons given above sub- r. (ii) of R. 2-A of the Rules as amended on the 24th November 1975 referred to above must therefore, be held to be beyond the competence of the State Government and as such that part of R. 2-A has to be struck down as invalid. Rule 2-A (i) by itself, if otherwise valid, must be held to have prospective effect only. 7. Before parting with the case, I think it necessary to refer to an argument made by learned counsel for the Jharia Mines Board of Health. It was submitted that assuming there was no rule even before November 1975, the notification dated 6th. June 1956, as contained in Annex. A/1 must be held to have the force of law as being in the purported exercise of the powers of the State Government under Art 162 of the Constitution of India. This argument has to be stated merely to be rejected. Article 162 lays down that subject to the provisions of the Constitution, the executive power of a State shall extend to the matters with respect to which the legislature of the State Government has powers to make laws. This general provision is hedged in by a proviso with which we are not concerned. The submissions made by learned counsel is based upon a misconception of the connotation of the terms "executive power" which is sought to be confused with the powers of a legislature. The executive powers connote the residue of Governmental functions that remain after the legislative and judicial functions are taken away. The executive functions comprise of the determination of policy as well as to carry out its execution, the initiation of legislation, the maintenance of order, and social and economic welfare: in fact carrying on or supervision of the general administration of the State. Reference in this connection may be made to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ramjawaya V/s. State of Punjab, (1955) 2 SCR 225 at p. 236: ( AIR 1955 SC 549 at p. 556). Reference in this connection may be made to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ramjawaya V/s. State of Punjab, (1955) 2 SCR 225 at p. 236: ( AIR 1955 SC 549 at p. 556). In exercise of its executive power, the Government may do any act provided it is not an act assigned by Constitution to any other authority or body such as the Legislature or the Judiciary etc. and secondly it is not contrary to the provisions of the Constitution. If there is an Act duly passed by a Legislature which confers a subordinate legislative authority on the State Government, such a legislative power cannot be exercised by way of exercising an executive power, for that would militate against the other provisions of the Constitution. There is thus no substance in this contention of learned counsel for the Board 8. For the reasons stated above, this application is allowed and the cognizance taken against the petitioners in the case aforementioned is quashed. SHIVESHWAR PRASAD SINHA, J. 9 agree.