( 1 ) THOSE two revisions under S. 50 of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 arise out of the judgment of the Addl Dist Judge, Bijapur and since a common question of law and fact arise in both these cases, they can be disposed of by a single judgment. ( 2 ) SRISAILA Mallappa filed two petitions HRC Nos. 62 and 65 of 1969 in respect of premises in which the petitioners are tenants, for their eviction under S. 21 (1) (h) on the ground of his personal requirements. The trial Court allowed the two petitions and accepted the plea of the landlord. However, during the pendency of the petitions the trial Court did find that the petitioner-tenant committed default in payment of rent even though the deposit made by the tenant was accepted and hence no order was passed under S. 29 (4 ). After the two petitions were allowed by the trial Court, the petitioner-tenants came in appeal before the learned Addl dist Judge and at that stage a specific prayer was made by the landlord under S. 29 (4) that since the petitioner-tenants failed to deposit the rent and to show sufficient cause for not stopping the appeal proceedings, the order was required to be passed asking the petitioner-tenants to deliver possession. This plea found favour with the learned Addl District Judge and an order of eviction was passed against the petitioner-tenants. Thereafter the petitioner-tenants filed the present two revisions under Section 50 of the Act. ( 3 ) IN the present revisions, the Court has to deal primarily with the judgment of the learned appellate Judge in order to satisfy itself as to the legality or correctness of that judgment. 8. 29 (4) no doubt gives power to the appellate Judge to stop all further proceedings and to make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession, provided the rents are not paid within the time and in the manner prescribed. The learned appellate Judge was categorical in the opinion that arrears had fallen due and that the petitioner-tenants being defaulters right from the beginning did not pay the rent due within time and in the manner prescribed. The learned appellate Judge was categorical in the opinion that arrears had fallen due and that the petitioner-tenants being defaulters right from the beginning did not pay the rent due within time and in the manner prescribed. The learned Counsel for the petitioner-tenants contended that the learned appellate judge took into consideration the default committed by the petitioner- tenants during the stage the petitions were pending before the trial Court that, no doubt, the learned appellate Judge did, but he was justified in doing so , in asmuch as he found that arrears had fallen due even at the appellate stage and the indulgence once shown to the petitioner-tenants before the trial Court to deposit the rent beyond time could not grant him a privilege to make every time a deposit beyond time and not in accordance with the manner prescribed. In this connection the observation of the learned appellate Judge is pertinent. In the appeal arising from HRC 62 of 1969 he made the following observation : again during the pendency of the appeal he committed default. He did not pay the rent from 18-10-1972 when the appeal was filed up to 15-9-1973 on which date he paid Rs. 300 towards rent and thereafter he did not pay any rent. " in the appeal arising from HRC 65 of 1969 the learnned Judge made the following observation : " Next point to be seen is whether the tenant appellant has paid to the, landlord or deposited with this Court all arrears of rent due in respect of the premises up to the date of payment. As stated earlier the tenant in his objections filed on 29-8-1974 has admitted that. he did not pay the rent in the years 1972-73 and 1973-74 on or before 15th of may 1973 and 15th of May 1974. What he has stated is that he has paid water tax of Ra. 50 once and Rs. 72 at another time, i. e. , in all rs. 122 and he deposited Rs. 650, on"29-8-1974. The record of the trial court reveals that on the previous occasion- namely on 11-9-1970 the landlord-respondent had made an application to the Court that the tenant appellant was in arrears of rent to the extent of Rs. 50 once and Rs. 72 at another time, i. e. , in all rs. 122 and he deposited Rs. 650, on"29-8-1974. The record of the trial court reveals that on the previous occasion- namely on 11-9-1970 the landlord-respondent had made an application to the Court that the tenant appellant was in arrears of rent to the extent of Rs. 425 as on 1-9-1970 ( 4 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioners was unable to point out as to how these two observations made by the learned appellate Judge were incorrect. That being the finding against the petitioner-tenants they certainly committed default in making the deposit of rent within the time and in the manner prescribed. It has been rightly held by the Court below that once the tenants committed default to make the deposit beyond time and outside the manner prescribed they could not do to at other Subsequent occasions. The requirement of law under S. 29 (2) is, that the deposit of rent under sub-sec (1) is to be made within the time and in the manner prescribed and in case any deposit is made against that provision, it would be held that the tenant committed default in the payment of rent and unless sufficient cause to the contrary is shown, all further proceedings are to be stopped and the court is justified to make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession. In this view of the matter I do not think any exception can be taken to the finding of the learned District Judge. ( 5 ) THE learned counsel further pointed out, and an interlocutory application is also made in that behalf, that the site of the disputed premises was under lease with the landlord and that the lease period having expired a notice is given by the Municipal council to resume the site along with the construction. The learned Counsel contended that it would be a subsequent event to be taken notice of by the Court and that would disentitle the landlord to seek eviction of the tenant. Firstly, my own doubt is, as to whether this can at all be considered a subsequent event. It is stated by the learned counsel that the period of lease expired in 1965 and the tenancy started long after that year. Firstly, my own doubt is, as to whether this can at all be considered a subsequent event. It is stated by the learned counsel that the period of lease expired in 1965 and the tenancy started long after that year. As such the plea if at all, was open to the tenant even on the very date the petition was filed in the court. Even otherwise the plea could have been taken at the earlier stage. Since it was not taken before the trial Court or before the appellate Court, and the plea is obviously governed by facts to be proved or disproved, it cannot be agitated for the first time in revision. That apart, once the tenant accented the respondent to be his landlord then, on the principle underlined under S. 116 of the Evidence Act during the continuance of the tenancy he cannot deny the title of the landlord. The learned counsel for the respondent further contended that a question of title between the landlord and the Municipal Council cannot be gone into and decided in the present petition. In view of all this, I do not think the plea taken up by the learned counsel should at all stand in the way of the court while granting relief to the landlord. ( 6 ) THE landlord-respondent also filed an interlocutory application in crp. 2290 of 1974 to the effect that the tenant committed further default in payment of rent and as such under S. 29 (4) the revision itself could not be heard and the proceedings should be stopped. I do not think it at all necessary to enter into that controversy so long as the order of the learned appellate Judge is maintained, and the eviction made by the learned trial judge, stands. ( 7 ) IN this view of the matter, the two. revisions are without any force and the same are dismissed. The petitioner-tenants are granted 3 (three) months' time to vacate. No order as to costs. --- *** --- .