Order: Accrsed 1 to 4 in C.C. No. 1 of 1974 on the file of the Court of the Trainee, II Class Magistrate, Paramakudi, who were convicted for offences under sections 426 and 447, Indian Penal Code, and sentenced each to pay a fine of Rs. 20, in default to suffer simple imprisonment for one week on each count, and which convictions and sentences were also confirmed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ramanathapuram at Devakottai in C.A. No. 60 of 1974, are the revision-petitioners . 2. The case arose out of a private complaint filed by the complainant (P.W. 1). The crux of the prosecution case was as follows: The father of the complainant is in Malaysia. They have got an ancestral house in Pandiyur facing south. There is a vacant space belonging to the complainant and his father, South of it, and on the southern end they have also constructed a. cattle shed and put up fence on three sides of the vacant site. Muthuvarma Nadar the owner of the house west of the complainant’s house, had constructed a pial closing the Mamool pathway. Due to this, the Panchayat Board President requested the complainant to allow a pathway through the vacant space in front of his house. The complainant and his father were not willing. Then, the President, through the Sub -Inspector of Police, Nainarkoil, compelled the complainant’s father to pass a letter agreeing to leave to pathway by threat and coercion. Later, his father issued a lawyer’s notice to the Sub-Inspector and to the President. On 15th December, 1973, the four accused trespassed into the site belonging to the complainant and removed the fence and caused damage, in spite of the complainant’s protests. Therefore, on 17th December, 1973, the present complaint was filed. 3. The complainant examined P.Ws. 1 to 4 including himself and marked Exhibits P-1, P-1A and P-2 to P-4. The accused, when examined denied the occurrence or their taking part therein. They did not examine any witness on their side. They marked Exhibit D-1, a letter written by P.W.1’s father to accused 1’s father in 1968 to show that the pathway was in existence south of his house. 4. The trial Magistrate, on an appreciation of the entire evidence, both oral and documentary, and other materials on record, found the revision-petitioners guilty of the offences and convicted and sentenced them as mentioned above. 4. The trial Magistrate, on an appreciation of the entire evidence, both oral and documentary, and other materials on record, found the revision-petitioners guilty of the offences and convicted and sentenced them as mentioned above. On appeal, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate has confirmed the convictions and sentences. 5. Mr. Santhanam, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners, would contend that the trial Court has failed to note that the prosecution has utterly failed to prove the case through documentary and oral evidence that the property is question belonged exclusively to the respondent complainant and the Court below ought to have held that it was a case of bona fide assertion of rights and as such no question of an offence under section 447 would arise. Both the Courts below have very carefully and meticulously analysed the oral evidence in conjunction with the documents filed on the side of the complainant and accepting the same, has come to the correct conclusion that the respondent-complainant had been in exclusive possession and enjoyment of the land in dispute. As regards the right of pathway I do not find any acceptable evidence in support of the defence that the pathway existed prior to P.W. 1 (complainant) or his father putting up the fence. So far as the letter under Exhibit D-1 dated 9th January, 1968, alleged to have been written by P.W. 1’s father, is concerned, as the lower Court has held, there is no admission to the effect that the pathway existed south of the house of P.W. 1. On the other hand, a leading of Exhibit D-1 would show that he was only posing a question to accused 1’s father as to whether any pathway could have existed in that place at all. If really a pathway was in existence and was in use by the villagers, there could not have been any necessity for the villagers to send Exhibit P-2 and any necessity for the panchayatdar to make arrangements for passing a resolution to have a pathway in the site of P.W. 1 as stated in Exhibit P-2. A scrutiny of Exhibits P-1 to P-4 would show that P-.W. 1’s father had been denying the existence of any pathway in front of his house. Therefore, the only document viz., Exhibit D-1, on which the accused has sought to place reliance, cannot be of any help of the prosecution. A scrutiny of Exhibits P-1 to P-4 would show that P-.W. 1’s father had been denying the existence of any pathway in front of his house. Therefore, the only document viz., Exhibit D-1, on which the accused has sought to place reliance, cannot be of any help of the prosecution. The next question is whether the accused at the time when they tried to put up a pathway, had any dominant intention to cause any annoyance or they went there only for the purpose of asserting their bona fide right of pathway and only in exercise of the honest enforcement of the right of pathway, they removed the fence. Mr. Santhanam, appearing for the petitioners, would contend that even assuming that the prosecution case is true, it should be held that the petitioners did so only under the bona fide exercise of their right of pathway. He would rely on a catena of decisions for the proposition that if the action of the petitioners is under a colour of right or in other words under a bona fide claim, the entry cannot be dishonest and that it is immaterial whether the claim is good or bad, though in deciding as a question of fact whether the claim was a bona fide one, it may be material to consider whether or not there was any right at all: vide Srinivasalu Reddiar v. Govinda Gounder1, Harihar Narain Singh v. Bankey Singh2and Raina v. The Crown3. 6. Now, I shall deal with the question whether the accused entered into the land under the bona fide right of pathway. The accused, in their section 342 statement, have not put forth any case that they entered into the site only to enforce the right of their pathway. There is no evidence to that effect or any circumstances to infer that they got a right of pathway through the disputed space, except some vague suggestion made to the witnesses during the cross-examination. There is no evidence to that effect or any circumstances to infer that they got a right of pathway through the disputed space, except some vague suggestion made to the witnesses during the cross-examination. In a decision of the Supreme Court in Mathuri and others v. State of Punjab1, their Lordships while dealing with the ingredients to make out an offence under section 441, Indian Penal Code have observed that the Court has to take into consideration all relevant circumstances including the presence of knowledge that the natural consequences of the entry would be such annoyance, intimidation or insult and including also the probability of something else than the causing of such annoyance etc., being the dominant intention which prompted the entry. The facts of the present case unequivocally and clearly show that the accused, without having any regard to the complainant’s rights and also without having any bona fide right, have entered into the land which was in the physical possession and enjoyment of P.W. 1 and committed the offence of trespass. Mr. Santhanam, appearing for the petitioners, brought to my notice the decision in Kuppammal v. Muppatha Gounder2in which K.N. Mudaliyar, J., has observed that in cases of offence under section 441, Indian Penal Code the ultimate question is whether the accused committed the offeree of trespass with the dominant intention to intimidate, insult on annoy or whether there was at least a fair pertence of right or colour of legal right, if not a bona fide claim of right. Section 441, Indian. Penal Code, according to the learned Judge, speaks of the main intention in the action of the accused and not only the subsidiary intention that may also be present. Relying on this observation, it was contended that in the present case, even if the petitioners have not proved their bona fide claim of right, there is at least a fair pretention of right or colour of legal right. I am unable to agree with the contention of the learned Counsel, as the facts of present case establish that the dominant intention of the petitioners was only to annoy, intimidate or insult the respondent, There is absolutely no trace of evidence even to show that the petitioners acted under the fair pretence of right or a colour of legal right. The plea of bona fide claim only arises in cases where the trespass is not of an aggravated kind and is supported at least by a plausible show of title or by such circumstances as would justify an inference that the petitioners’ intention was not to commit an offence or to insult, intimidate or annoy the person in possession, but merely to vindicate what they conceived to be their legal right. 7. For the reasons stated above 1 do not find that the claim of the defence that the accused entered into the land under any right or colour of right whatsoever, can be accepted. On the other hand, I find that the petitioners, with the knowledge that they have no right to enter into the property, have committed the offence to trespass and mischief. Hence, I do not find any substance in this revision petition and it is accordingly dismissed, confirming the convictions and sentences passed against the petitioners-accused.