JUDGMENT S.S. Ahmed, Member. - This is a reference made by the Additional Commissioner, Lucknow Division, by this order dated Oct. 7, 1972, recommending that the revision filed by Smt. Bindeshwari Devi and Tikaram against the order dated April 19, 1972, passed by an Assistant Collector 1st Class of Lucknow district in a suit u/s. 229-B/209 of the Z.A. and L.R. Act, be dismissed. 2. Smt. Bindeshwari filed a suit under the aforementioned section of the Z.A. and L.R. Act against Smt. Ram Devi and others. After the recording of evidence the case was fixed for arguments on March 24, 1972 when it was dismissed in default of parties. On March 28, 1972, the plaintiffs moved an application for restoration. This was duly supported by an affidavit but it was also dismissed in default on April 11, 1972. There after the plaintiff moved an application for restoration u/s 151 C.P.C. on April 19, 1972. This, too was supported by a proper affidavit. The trial court restored this suit by his order dated April 19, 1972 and it is against this order that the instant revision is directed. 3. The Additional Commissioner heard the parties and I have also given a hearing to the learned counsel for both the sides and have gone through the records of this case. 4. According to the learned counsel for revisionist Sec. 151 C.P.C. could not be invoked when there was a substantive provision of law under which relief could have been sought. Relying on the case of Nain Singh v. Kunwar Ji A.I.R. 1970 (S.C.) page 997, the learned counsel drew my attention to the pronouncement of their lordship, of the Supreme Court that the court cannot make use its of inherent power u/s. 151 where a party has remedy provided elsewhere in the law and the has neglected to avail himself of that remedy. The inherent power cannot be exercised as an appellate power. According to him O.IX R. 4 C.P.C. provides that where a suit is dismissed in default the plaintiff may (subject to the law of limitation) bring a fresh suit or he may apply for an order to set the dismissal aside. In the instant case the suit was dismissed in default and the application for restoration was also dismissed in default. In the instant case the suit was dismissed in default and the application for restoration was also dismissed in default. Thus the plaintiff had still one more remedy open to him namely, bringing a fresh suit but instead of availing of this provision he has invoked inherent powers of the court of getting the suit restored. This, in view of the Supreme Court case, referred to above, is quire erroneous and the impugned order of the trial court deserves to be set aside. 5. The learned counsel for the opposite party has contended, on the other hand, that the Supreme Court case is clearly distinguishable the present revision since O.IX, R. 4 provides for restoration of suits but not for the restoration applications which may have been dismissed in default. He has referred to various Rules of O.XLIII C.P.C. which provide for appeals but there is no provision for appeal in respect of the dismissal in default of applications for restoration. According to him, therefore, there was no remedy available to the O.P. and he had therefore, to fall back on the provisions of Section 151 C.P.C. to invoke the inherent powers of the court. Relying on the case of M.R.L. Society v. Moti Lal 1969 A.L.J. 1021, he has maintained that even if an appeal had been maintainable under any of the Rules of O. XLIII C.P.C., the aggrieved party could still move an application u/s. 151 C.P.C. In this case their lordships of Allahabad High Court have held clearly that the provisions of O.XLIII C.P.C. do not preclude applications u/s 151 C.P.C. Next, he has quoted the case of Sitaram Sahu v. Kedar Nath Sahu, in which their lordship of the Allahabad High Court have held that the revisionist powers of the court are discretionary but these powers should not be exercised in a case where the exercise of this powers was likely to cause injustice to a party. The learned counsel has, therefore, pleaded that in order to ensure that no injustice is done to the O.P. no interference in revision should be made to set aside the impugned order. 6. Giving any careful thought to the matter, I find that the interest of justice are Supreme. The learned counsel has, therefore, pleaded that in order to ensure that no injustice is done to the O.P. no interference in revision should be made to set aside the impugned order. 6. Giving any careful thought to the matter, I find that the interest of justice are Supreme. When a suit is dismissed ex-parte, justice and equity demand that the ex parte order should be set aside on such terms as the court deems fit if the court is satisfied that there were good and sound reasons which prevented the plaintiff from attending the court on the due date. It is in order to secure the ends of justice that courts have been invested with inherent powers u/s. 151 C.P.C. In the instant case if the plaintiff's application for restoration were to be rejected by allowing the revision, the ends of justice will be clearly defeated because the O.P. may not have, by this time the remedy to file a fresh suit as required by O. IX, R. 4. Thus, even if the criterion laid down in the Supreme Court case is applied, it would certainly be possible to resort to Sec. 151 C.P.C. for seeking the restoration of an application to restore the suit. 7. In the end I can do not better than reproduce the following para from the 1957 case of Allahabad High Court referred to above. "There is yet another ground why we felt inclined not to interfere with the order against which this revision has been filed. Our powers of revision are discretionary. It has been held practically in every court in India that the power should not be exercised in a case where the exercise of the power was likely to cause injustice to a party. If we were to exercise our discretion and interfere in this case, then the position would be that the plaintiff would be out of court......" 8. In the result, I accept this reference and dismiss the revision. 9. Let the file be returned to the trail court for proceeding further in the case.