( 1 ) IN these two writ petitions filed under Art. 226 and 227 of the Constitution, the decision of the Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter to be referred aa the Tribunal dated 30-8-1973 (Ext. H) is sought t6 be quashed, and a writ in the nature of Certiorari is claimed in that respect. The case of the petitioners is, that they purchased the disputed lands under registered sale deed as long back as in 1963 from one Chikka Chowdappa and obtained actual possession and on the basis of such purchase they applied for registration of their rights under the Mysore (Pereonal and miscellaneous) Inams Abolition Act 1954 (hereinafter to be referred as the -Inams Abolition Act) to the Special Deputy Commissioner for Inams Abolition the Respondent to the petition. The respondents 1 to 5 did not claim to be made parties to that application and the Special Deputy Commr considering the rights claimed by the petitioners, as established registered their claims against the survey numbers as Kadim tenants under S. 4 of the inams Abolition Act. In fact, as a result of the sale effected in favour of the petitioners by Chikka Chowdappa, a suit OS. 257 of 1960 was filed in the Court of the II Munsiff, Bangalore. The dispute was taken up to the high Court as a second appeal was filed, but the title of the petitioners was maintained. After a period of 14 years, that has elapsed from the date of the order made by the Special Deputy Commr which was dated 25-10-58, the Respondents 1 to 5 preferred an appeal before the Tribunal which is the 8th respondent to the petition, challenging the correctness of the said regfetiation on several grounds. The appeal was filed on 4-9-72 under S. 26 of the Inams Abolition Act. Assistance was sought by the respondents 1 to 5 under S. 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay which was obviously of near about 14 years. The Tribunal condoned that delay as it was stated that the respondents 1 to 5 came to know about the registration made by the Special Deputy Commr from the written statement filed by the petitioners in OS. 289/72 which was instituted by the respondents 1 to 5 against the petitioners in the Court of the II Munsiff, Bangalore. That was a suit for injunction. 289/72 which was instituted by the respondents 1 to 5 against the petitioners in the Court of the II Munsiff, Bangalore. That was a suit for injunction. It, was further contended before the Tribunal that from the date of knowledge the appeal was filed and it was well withim time and there was no delay. It was only by way of abundant caution that the application under S. 5 of the Limitation Act was given by the respondents 1 to 5. The Tribunal accepted the plea of the appellant-respondents and held that the appeal was within time. Along with that petition for appeal, an application was also filed by the respondents 1 to 5 saying that certain documents were necessary to be gone into in order to prove their own title. These documents were bounded in two books and permission was sought for the production of such additional evidence. The petitioners at that time objected that the additional evidence could not be entertained and that the documents relied upon were disputed, controversial and did not come from proper custody. They further contended that the documents could only be accepted after proper opportunity was given to. the petitioners to contest their validity. They also asked for copies of such documents. According to the petitioners, Regln. 16 of the Mysore Revenue Appellate tribunal Regulations was relied upon by the respondents 1 to 5 to enable them to produce such documents. It was contended, that the statutory requirement enjoined the respondents to give prior copies of such documents and to afford proper opportunity to. rebut these documents. The petitioners' case is that the objections in this regard submitted by them remained undecided. The Tribunnal proceeded to consider the case on merits and by the help of these documents ultimately arrived at the decision that a right was made out in favour of the Respts. Besides, according to the petitioners, the respondent-appellants were not the persons aggrieved, as they had not claimed any right in their favour under S. 10 of the inams Abolition Act nor could they file an appeal under S. 28 of that Act. Further according to the petitioners, the appeal was entirely time barred and could only be entertained within 30 days from the date of 'the decision, of the Special Deputy Commr. Further according to the petitioners, the appeal was entirely time barred and could only be entertained within 30 days from the date of 'the decision, of the Special Deputy Commr. The limitation could not be claimed from the date of knowledge and at any rate, S. 5 of the Limitation Act did not apply to the proceedings before the Tribunal. It is further contended that the arguments were not even heard on merits by the Tribunal. Rather, the arguments proceeded on the bare question of limitation :and despite that, the decision was given "on merit against the petitioners. In short, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to entertain the appeal beyond time at the instance ot the respondents is questioned, and the decision of the Tribunal allowing the appeal dated 30-8-73 (Ext. H) is sought to be quashed. ( 2 ) THE respondents have controverted the allegations of the petitioners on every ground. It is submitted that the title as well as possess sion always vested with the respondents. They were in possession and were using the disputed land for a purpose which is non-agricultural. The respondents were not made parties to the registration proceedings before the special Deputy Commissioner. It was only on 23-6-72 when the written statement was filed by the petitioners in the injunction suit OS. 289/72 that the respondents came to know about the registration made in favour of the petitioners. On that very day, they applied for a certified copy of that decision. The certified copy was obtained by them on 1-9-72 and on 4-9-72 the appeal was filed before the Tribunal. As such, according to the respondents, the appeal was well within time as the limitation commenced from the date of knowledge and not from the date of decision. Besides, there were ether sufficient grounds for condonation of delay and S. 5 of the Limitation act very much applied to the proceeding before the Tribunal. It is contended that the permission was sought to produce the documents before the Tribunal in order to show thait the respondents wer the absolute owners and had complete interest in the properties. No doubt objections were raised by the petitioners as regards these documents, but they did not insis upon being heard on such objections, nor did they object at the appropriate time when the Tribunal considered these documents and arrived at the decision. No doubt objections were raised by the petitioners as regards these documents, but they did not insis upon being heard on such objections, nor did they object at the appropriate time when the Tribunal considered these documents and arrived at the decision. It is also contended that the Tribunal possessed inherent power to accept the documents necessary for deciding the appeal. It was submitted that the respondents were the persons aggrieved and they could prefer the appeal under S. 28 of the Inams Abolition Act. Even otherwise, the petitioners had full opportunity to refer to these documents and they could raise their own contentions in rebuttal to that evidence. In short, it is contended that the decision of -the Tribunal cannot be assailed on any of the grounds submitted by the petitioners. ( 3 ) FROM the state of pleadings delineated above, inter alia, three questions at once arise. The very first question related to the locus standi claimpd by the respondents 1 to 5 being the persons aggrieved for filing the appeal before the Tribunal. The second question pertains to the period of limitation within which that appeal could be preferred. The third question which is by far more important, refers to the procedure adopted by the tribunal while admitting the additional evidence. At first, I propose to deal with the third question relating to the admission of documents by the Tribunal. ( 4 ) THE relevant statutory provision for the documents to be admitted by the Tribunal is Regn. 50 made by the Karnataka Revenue Appellate Tribunal in 1969. This regulation, besides dealing with the cases where the Court refuses to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted cr where the Tribunal requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, makes the following provision :" A party desiring to adduce additional evidence shall file an application stating the evidence proposed to be adduced supported by an affidavit giving the grounds therefor, and shall serve copies of such application and affidavit on the oppoiite party. "although the application seeking permission to file documents (Ext E) given by the respondents mentioned Regulation 16 made by the Tribunal in 1958, yet, that regulation was not pertinent as the Regulations of 1953 were superseded by the Regulations of 1969 which is so clear from Regulation 1 (b) of the Regulations of 1969. In the affidavit accompanying ext. 'e' it was abated by the respondent-appellants that the documents were necessary for establishing the rights of the appellants as owners of the properties and to show that the present petitioners had no right, title or interest in the properties on the date of the order made by the Special Deputy Commr. As such it was staged that the appellants were justified to produce the documents shown in the list of the appeal. But along with the affidavit, obviously, no such list was appended. The objections (Ext. 'f) submitted by the present petitioners no doubt indicated that thaw documents were not genuine and that opportunity was to be granted to tort their genuineness. This could be done only by recording evidence and by examining witnesses. It is contended by the petitioners that the application seeking permission to file the documents did not even comply with the Regulation 16 as no copies of such documents were given to the petitioners who were the respondents in the appeal. The objections were not decided by the Tribunal. Rather the judgment (Ext. 'h'), indicated that the documents were considered on merits and it was held that no right or title vested in the petitioners and the respondents 1 to 5 were in possession and the registration of Kadim rights made in favour of the petitioners was illegal and as such was to be set aside. Under Regulation 50, the application seeking to produce additional evidence itself required the description to be given of the evidence proposed to be adduced, and supported by an affidavit. No such evidence was described in the affidavit accompanying Ext. 'e'. Moreover, the petitioners very much objected to the genuineness of the documents. They suggested for the opportunity to rebut them. In fact, the objections called for a decision; nevertheless, the Tribunal chose to entertain and consider the documents straightaway. No such evidence was described in the affidavit accompanying Ext. 'e'. Moreover, the petitioners very much objected to the genuineness of the documents. They suggested for the opportunity to rebut them. In fact, the objections called for a decision; nevertheless, the Tribunal chose to entertain and consider the documents straightaway. It would be an elementary principle of natural justice that if the tribunal wanted to give opportunity to the respondents to produce additional evidence, It should have given opportunity to the petitioners to rebut that evidence. The genuineness of the documents was being questioned. The petitioners wanted to adduce evidence. Nevertheless, the Tribunal chose to consider these documents and their conclusion was materially affected to the prejudice of the petitioners. It was not only required of the Tribunal to have given due notice to the petitioners as to what additional evidence was being procured, they were further required to give them due opportunity of rebutting that evidence by producing their own documents. Even witnesses could be produced in support or by way of rebuttal of these documents. That is so indicated by Regulation 50 and it is abundantly clear that the said statutory provision was violated. This decidedly vitiated the decision of the Tribunal and the same will have to be set aside. ( 5 ) THE petitioners relied on Natha. Singh v. Fnl Commr, Taxation, punjab, AIR 1976 SC 1053 . Their Lordships were considering Order 41, Rule 27 CPC and in that connection observed; that the discretion given to the appellate court to receive and admit additional evidence is not an arbitrary one but is a judicial one circumscribed by the limitation prescribed in the provision. If the additional evidence is allowed to be adduced contrary to the principles governing the reception of such evidence, it will be a case of improper exerciss of jurisdiction and the additional evidence so brought on the record will have to be ignored. Mutatis mutandis these observations will apply with reference to Regulation 50 and if the additional evidence was slowed to be adduced contrary to the principle governing that regulation, the same will have to be ignored. Mutatis mutandis these observations will apply with reference to Regulation 50 and if the additional evidence was slowed to be adduced contrary to the principle governing that regulation, the same will have to be ignored. ( 6 ) AS regards the other two questions relating to the respondents 1 to 5 being the persons aggrieved or not under S. 10 for an appeal under s. 28 Of the Inams Abolition Act, and the point relating to limitation and the application of S. 5 of the Limitation Act to a proceeding before the tribunal, in my opinion, the decision can only be arrived after consideration of several facts for which definite evidence could be adduced by either party. It was contended on behalf of the petitioners that the respondents 1 to 5 could not be considered as persons aggrieved by a decision under s. 10 of the Inams Abolition Act. The Deputy Commr under S. 10 deftermines claims under Secs. 4 5 6 7 8 9 and 9a but the case of the respondents upon their own saying, does not fall under any of these provisions. They do not say that their rights needed registration under either of these sections. Rather, they claimed that they were using the disputed land for non-agricultural purposes. It is therefore manifest that these respondents could not have filed an application under S. 10 for determination of their claim. It would therefore be incorrect to say that any decision was made against these respondents under S. 10 for which an appeal is provided under S. 28. In reply to this argument, the learned Counsel for the respondents 1 to 5 points out that under S. 28 any person aggrieved by a decision of the Deputy Commr under S. 10 could file an appeal. The respondents 1 to 5 were the persons aggrieved not because their own right was not determined under S. 10 but because a" right was determined in favour of the petitioners which ran counter to the right claimed by the respondents 1 to 5 in the land in dispute The argument proceeds, that even if the respondents 1 to 5 had no right of their own to be determined by the Deputy Commr under S. 10, still they are persons aggrieved because the right has been determined in favour of the petitioners which goes to prejudice the right claimed by the respondents. It is further submitted and almost conceded in the other side, that a person aggrieved, even though not a party in the proceeding before the Deputy Commr, could prefer an appeal under S. 28. The respondents referred to S. 13 of the Inams Abolition Act which only declares that if a land is used for non- agricultural purposes, after conversion from agricultural purposes, the holder of such land is entitled to keep the land as such provided such a conversion was not void or illegal under any law in force at that time. The learned counsel urged that in view of S. 13 the respondents 1 to 5 derived a right to keep the land which was so converted by them for non-agricultural purposes, but for that they have further to prove that the conversion was not void or illegal under any law in force at the time. All this decidedly requires some evidence to be adduced as to when the conversion took place, and as to whether the conversion was not void or illegal under any law in force. In case, upon consideration of such evidence the lespondents 1 to 5 can prove that in fact the agricultural land was converted by them for non-agricultural purpose, and that the said conversion was not void or illegal under any law in force, they may be entitled to a right under S. 13 although that section does not prescribe as to the manner in which that right is to be declared or protected under the Inams abolition Act. Even then, perhaps they may be in a position to contest the claim of the petitioners to the extent that the right claimed by the petitioners under S. 4 may not be determined and recognised under S. 10. As I have stated above, all this depends upon evidence to ba adduced. It will be open to the Tribunal to decide as to whether th* right claimed under S. 13 can at all be set up in reply to the right claimed by the patitioners under S. 10. If that right could at all be set up by the respondents, it would then be for the tribunal to decide how far the right claimed by the petitioners was to be defeated. In this Court, while deciding the writ petition, it may not be proper to call for such evidence. If that right could at all be set up by the respondents, it would then be for the tribunal to decide how far the right claimed by the petitioners was to be defeated. In this Court, while deciding the writ petition, it may not be proper to call for such evidence. ( 7 ) AS regards the question pertaining to limitation, there is some discrepancy as to the date of knowledge, on the part of the respondents 1 to 5. In their affidavit to Ext. E, the respondents submitted that the knowledge of the order made by the Special Deputy Commr was obtained by them on 6-4-72 during the suit ' filed by the respondents against the petitioners. However, in their affidavit filed with Ext. C, the application under s. 5 of the Limitation Act, the contention as regards the date was that the written statement was filed on 23-6-72 and on that date, they acquired knowledge about the order made by the Special Deputy Commr. Thereafter, they applied for a certified copy on the very same day and obtained that copy on 1-9-72. They filed the appeal thereafter on 4-9-72. The tribunal in its judgment, however, mentioned that the respondents obtained knowledge of that order on 1-9-72 which is the date when they received the certified copy of the order. Presumably, the Tribunal so held because the certified copy was required to be produced along with the appeal and the certified copy was obtained on 1-9-72 and hence according to the Tribunal that could be the date of knowledge for the Order appealed against. There ia no doubt a confusion aa regards the three dates 6-4-72, 23-6-72 and 1-9-72 and it would be again a question of fact to be decided upon evidence, as to when the respondents got knowledge of that order. There is another controversy which need be decided, as to whether the limitation commenced from the date of, decision or from the date of knowledge and much has been atated before me in favour of and against that view. There is another controversy which need be decided, as to whether the limitation commenced from the date of, decision or from the date of knowledge and much has been atated before me in favour of and against that view. As the factual poeition regarding the date of knowledge can only be ascertained by evidence, the Tribunal has to go into that question and in case the Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the date of knowledge gives limitation for appeal, it has to ascertain as to what that date of knowledge will be in the case of the respondents. It was strenuously argued on behalf of the petitioners that S. 5 of the Limitation Act has no application to a proceeding before the Tribunal. This question is again left open to be decided by the Tribunal. ( 8 ) SINCE the decision of the Tribunal is to be set aside on the ground that additional evidence was accepted in disregard of Regulation -50 and in violation of a principle of natural justice causing prejudice to the petitioners, the impugned judgment of the Tribunal is set aside. The case is remanded to the Tribunal and they shall decide in the first instance as to whether the respondents 1 to 5 were the persons aggrieved to file the appeal. In case they could do so, the Tribunal will have to decide if S. 5 of the limitation Act was applicable and if the appeal could be held to be within time. If both the questions are decided in favour of the respondents, the tribunal will have to consider if the additional evidence can be produced and as to what opportunity is to be granted to the petitioner to rebut that evidence. Thereafter, with prior notice to both the panties arguments are to be heard on merit with reference to the additioral evidence which may or may not be permitted and only then the decision on merit can be given. ( 9 ) THE two writ petitions are therefore allowed and the judgment (Ext. 'h') of the Tribunal is set aside. The can is remanded to the Tribunal for a decision in accordance with law in the light of the observations made above. in the special circumstances, however, no order ie made as to coste. --- *** --- .