ABIRCHAND GULABCHAND JAIN v. MANIK RAMNARAIN TAILOR
1976-12-21
S.M.N.RAINA
body1976
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : ( 1. ) THIS is a second appeal arising out of a suit for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from constructing the second storey on their respective plots overlooking the house No. 309 belonging to the plaintiff. ( 2. ) THE plaintiff owns a house No. 309 in Chandiganj Maihar. It is double storeyed house and the plaintiff and members of his family live on the first floor the ground floor being in occupation of the tenants. In front of this house on the other side of the road the defendants have constructed their shops with the consent of the Municipal Committee. As the defendants wanted to add a second storey to this shop, plaintiff filed the suit. ( 3. ) THE case of the plaintiff is that his house is standing there for the last 40 years. As the construction of the second storey over the shop of the defendant would infringe his right of privacy, he filed this suit for permanent injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with the aforesaid right. ( 4. ) THE defendants contended that the plaintiffs residential portion is about 24 to 25 feet high and as the construction of the defendant is only 13 feet high, there is no question of any infringement of the right of privacy over his residential portion. The fact that the plaintiff has a right of privacy was also denied. ( 5. ) THE trial Court decreed the claim on the ground that the construction of the windows by the defendants above height of 13 feet would infringe the right of privacy of the plaintiff. The defendants were, therefore, ordered not to build their shop and other construction higher than 13 feet. It was further directed that any portion of defendants construction beyond 13 feet height shall be demolished. Two of the defendants, namely, Manik and Ramlal preferred an appeal which was allowed by the learned Additional District Judge and the decree of the trial Court was set aside. Being aggrieved thereby the plaintiff has preferred this second appeal. ( 6.
It was further directed that any portion of defendants construction beyond 13 feet height shall be demolished. Two of the defendants, namely, Manik and Ramlal preferred an appeal which was allowed by the learned Additional District Judge and the decree of the trial Court was set aside. Being aggrieved thereby the plaintiff has preferred this second appeal. ( 6. ) IT appears that in the trial Court, the plaintiff had also claimed a right of easement for free access of air to his house and his contention was that this right was also going to be infringed by the construction of second storey by the defendants; but it seems that this plea was not seriously pressed even in the trial court, and, in any case, it was not pressed before me. The only question that remains for consideration in this case is whether the plaintiff has a right of privacy and the said right has been infringed by the defendants. ( 7. ) IN the plaint it has not been expressly pleaded that in the town of maihar and in the locality where the houses of the parties are situate, there is a customary right of easement of privacy. The trial Court, therefore, did not frame any issue on this point. When the case went up in appeal for the first time the first appellate Court framed the following additional issue. "whether in the town of Maihar and in the locality where the houses of the parties are there is a local custom of parda in the residential houses. " this issue was remitted to the lower Court for additional evidence. After recording the additional evidence the trial Court gave a finding in favour of the plaintiff. This finding was accepted by the learned Additional District Judge but he dismissed the suit mainly on the ground that there would not be any substantial infringement of the right of privacy of the plaintiff by keeping the window in the house of the defendants also. The learned Additional District judge further observed that the plaintiffs females used to observe parda system in the strict sense of the term. ( 8. ) RIGHT of privacy is not recognised generally as a right of easement which can be claimed any where in India.
The learned Additional District judge further observed that the plaintiffs females used to observe parda system in the strict sense of the term. ( 8. ) RIGHT of privacy is not recognised generally as a right of easement which can be claimed any where in India. It is, however, an easement which may be acquired by virtue of a legal custom under section 18 of the Easements act. (Vide-IIIustration (b) to section 18) or by grant. Such a customary right is generally recognised in territories where Mahomedans mostly reside and where women strictly observe parda. A customary right of privacy exists in the State of Utter Pradesh; but so far as the State of Madhya Pradesh is concerned the custom has to be strictly proved. It must be borne in mind that the custom pertains to a locality and not to a particular community. In order to establish such a custom it is not merely sufficient to prove that ladies of particular community strictly observe parda. It must also be established that the right of privacy is recognised in such a town by showing that owners of land in the town or in a particular area are under an obligation not to make any construction on such land overlooking the residential apartments of the owners of adjoining lands and any infringement of such a right has been considered as an actionable wrong. Since there has been considerable enlightenment in all sections of the society during the last 25 years, the women folk belonging to almost all the communities in India are now going out in the open tor the purpose of education and also for taking up various jobs. Thus the parda system is disappearing fast and is now confined to very few families of certain communities who are extremely orthodox and conservative rigidly adhering to ancient ideas of seclusion of females. In view of this, whenever a question arises whether a local custom of privacy exists in a particular town or area, the matter must be closely examined to see whether it is conclusively established by evidence on the point. ( 9. ) IT is significant that no judgment of any Court has been brought to my notice in which such a local custom in the town of Maihar may have been recognised. In fact such a custom was not at all pleaded in the plaint.
( 9. ) IT is significant that no judgment of any Court has been brought to my notice in which such a local custom in the town of Maihar may have been recognised. In fact such a custom was not at all pleaded in the plaint. No doubt some evidence was led by the plaintiff to establish such a custom when an issue on the point was remitted to the lower Court; but the evidence is for from satisfactory. Plaintiff Abirchand (P. W. 1) merely stated that parda is observed in his family. He stated as under in paragraph 12 of his deposition : he made the following statement in paragraph 13-In paragraph 14 he stated as under : it is thus clear that all that the plaintiff wanted to state was that the ladies observe Parda; but be did not say anything about any customary right of ease ment of privacy according to which nobody could build on his own land so as to overlook the residential apartments of others. I am, therefore, of the view that even though the Courts below have held that the custom had been proved, the evidence was utterly insufficient to prove a custom of this nature. Apart from this even if such a custom is held to be proved an injunction cannot be granted unless it is established that there has been a substantial infringement of the right of privacy. Vide Keshav Sahu v. Dasarath Sahu and others, (AIR 1961 Orissa 154. ). The learned Additional District Judge after considering the evidence on record has held that no such infringement of right of privacy was proved in this case. This is a finding of fact based on appreciation of evidence and there appears to be no justification for interference with it in second appeal. ( 10. ) NO other point was pressed before me. ( 11. ) THE appeal, therefore, fails and is hereby dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.