JUDGMENT P.C. Saxena, Member. - These are two connected references made by the Additional Commissioner, Varanasi Division, Varanasi, in case under Section 229-B of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act. 2. The facts are briefly that a suit under Section 229-B of the U.P.Z.A. and L.R. Act had been filed by the plaintiff in 1963. Summons were issued to the defendants and these were returned with the report that they had been severed and purported to bear the thumb impression of the defendants. Soon thereafter a compromise application was filed purporting to bear the signature of the plaintiff and thumb impression of defendants and on February 24, 1964, the court passed a compromise decree. 3. About 7 years later on December 13, 1971, one of the defendants Parsu Ram moved an application under Order IX, Rule 13, C.P.C. and Section 151, C.P.C. praying for setting aside of the order and decree dated February 24, 1964 on the ground that he had never received any summons in the original case and had never signed any compromise in the case nor appointed any counsel to represent him therein. On May 30, 1972, the learned trial court passed an order to the effect that the application was within time and the opposite parties had not appeared in spite or due notice. The decree dated February 24, 1964 was set aside. Fresh notices were ordered to issue to the opposite parties to appear on June 30, 1972 for a fresh hearing of the original case. 4. A revision application against this order was filed before the Additional Commissioner and at the same time another application against the order dated May 30, 1972 was submitted to the trial court itself under Section 151, C.P.C. On July 26, 1972 the learned trial court rejected the application this order also a revision application was filed before the Additional Commissioner. 5. The Additional Commissioner has combined the two revisions and made a common reference recommending rejection of the two revision petitions mainly on the ground that the petitioner had not appeared in court even though the notice had been issued to him by registered post and the publication in the newspapers. 6. 5. The Additional Commissioner has combined the two revisions and made a common reference recommending rejection of the two revision petitions mainly on the ground that the petitioner had not appeared in court even though the notice had been issued to him by registered post and the publication in the newspapers. 6. It is clear that the order dated July 26, 1972 passed by the trial court need not be considered on merits since the revisionist had chosen to approach two different courts simultaneously for redress against the previous order. He moved the trial court itself for review of this order and also at the same time moved a revision application against this order before the Additional Commissioner. He should have chosen only one forum for redress of his grievance. I agree, therefore, with the rejection of his application under Section 151, C.P.C. by the trial court though only on the ground mentioned above and not for the reasons given by the trial court. 7. So far as the revision application against the order dated May 30, 1972 itself is concerned it must be held that neither the learened trial court nor the Additional Commissioner have viewed the matter in the correct perspective. The application as a result of which the decree dated February 24, 1964 was set aside, had been made under Order IX, Rule 13 as well as under Section 151, C.P.C. It is clear that there was no Rule 13, C.P.C. since the original order and decree dated February 24, 1964 had not been passed ex parte so far as the wording of the order itself was concerned. Even if it be found that a court had by error passed or failed to pass an ex parte order, the legal possession is that an order must be treated as ex parte on the basis of the wording used by the court in passing the order. Since the order dated February 24, 1964 was prima facie a compromise decree, it was not an ex parte order and, therefore. Order IX, Rule 13, C.P.C. did not apply to the facts of the case. Since the order dated May 30, 1972 passed by the trial court appears to have been passed under this provision of law it cannot be sustained. 8. The contention that the order May 30, 1972 was passed under Section 1951, C.P.C. cannot also be accepted. Order IX, Rule 13, C.P.C. did not apply to the facts of the case. Since the order dated May 30, 1972 passed by the trial court appears to have been passed under this provision of law it cannot be sustained. 8. The contention that the order May 30, 1972 was passed under Section 1951, C.P.C. cannot also be accepted. The allegation of the applicant was that he had no notice of the original proceedings and the compromise decree given by the court was based upon a forged document submitted by the plaintiff. The submission of a forged compromise document must be deemed to be a fraud on a court in legal terms and the court would be justified in setting aside the decree passed by itself by exercising its inherent powers under Section 151, C.P.C. provided that it is satisfied that a fraud had been committed upon itself. The order of the learned trial court dated May 30, 1972 gives no evidence that the matter had been considered in this light since no specific finding whatsoever has been given by the court to the effect that the compromise filed before itself had been forged that the decree was being set aside only for this reason. 9. The revision application against the order dated May 30, 1972 is accordingly allowed and the order of the learned trial court set aside. The case is remanded for a fresh decision in the light of the above observations after hearing the parties concerned. 10. This order will govern Ref. No. 738-739 of 1973-74/Ballia.