Judgment 1. THE petitioner, an amusement Tax Inspector of the Calcutta Collect orate has, in this Rule, challenged the legality and propriety of the order dated August 6, 1974 of the respondent no. 1, the Commissioner of presidency Division, directing the compulsory retirement of the petitioner from service with effect from November 14, 1974 in the public interest under Rule 75 (aa) of the West Bengal service Rules, Part I. The petitioner has also challenged the action of the respondents in refusing to entertain his appeal against the said order. 2. MR. Maitra, learned Advocate for the petitioner has urged the following points:- (1) The respondent no. 1 was not the appointing authority of the petitioner and, as such, he had no authority to pass the impugned order; (2) the respondent no. 1 did not form any independent opinion as to whether it was necessary to retire the petitioner in the public interest, but ho acted as per the recommendation of the Review committee; (3) no notice having been served upon the petitioner as mentioned in the impugned order, the same is illegal and should not be given effect to, and (4) the respondents have illegally refused to entertain his appeal under section 16 (1) of the West Bengal Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1971. Regarding the first point, it is contended on behalf of the petitioner that under Rule 75 (aa) of the West Bengal Service Rules, Part I, it is only the appointing authority who can direct the retirement of a Government servant. There can be no doubt that the power under Rule 75 (aa) can only be exercised by the appointing authority. The question is, therefore, whether the respondent no. 1, the Presidency Divisional Commissioner, is the appointing authority of the petitioner. In the petition, there is no statement as to the authority who appointed the petitioner. The respondents have in their affidavit-in-opposition categorically stated that the respondent no. 1 appointed the petitioner as the Amusement Tax Inspector. This statement has not been denied by the petitioner, but his contention is that under column (2) of item no. In the petition, there is no statement as to the authority who appointed the petitioner. The respondents have in their affidavit-in-opposition categorically stated that the respondent no. 1 appointed the petitioner as the Amusement Tax Inspector. This statement has not been denied by the petitioner, but his contention is that under column (2) of item no. 10 of schedule I of the West Bengal Services (Classification, Control and Appeal)Rules, 1971, the appointing authority in respect of class III services to which the petitioner belongs is the ''head of offices belonging to West Bengal State service, Class I in respect of their own establishment or where there are no such officers, the officers just above the heads of Offices.'' It is argued that notwithstanding the fact that the petitioner was appointed by the presidency Divisional Commissioner, he can be retired from service only by the Head of the office of the Calcutta Collectorate, who is the Collector. This argument, in my opinion, has no substance at all. The words "appointing authority" have been defined in clause (II) of Rule 3 of the said Rules as follows :- "appointing authority" in relation to a Government servant means (i) * * * * (ii) * (iii) the authority which appointment the Government servant to such service, grade or post as the case may be, or, (iv) * * * * in view of the definition of the term appointing authority' as given in clause (iii) of Rule 3 (II) quoted above, the respondent no. 1 who appointed the petitioner is his appointing authority the Schedule to the said Rules have been framed for the purposes of Rules 6 (2), 9 (ii) and 15 (2) of which Rule 6 (2) is only relevant for our purpose. Under Rule 6 (2), all appointments to the West Bengal State Services, Class iii and Class IV, specified in the entries in column (1) of Schedule I shall be made by the authorities mentioned in the corresponding entries in column (2)of that schedule. Rule 6 (2) is, therefore, prospective and it has no retrospective operation. After the framing of the Rules, appointments to Class III and Class IV services shall be made by the appointing authorities as mentioned in column (2) of the schedule. The petitioner was appointed as an amusement Tax Inspector on July 23. Rule 6 (2) is, therefore, prospective and it has no retrospective operation. After the framing of the Rules, appointments to Class III and Class IV services shall be made by the appointing authorities as mentioned in column (2) of the schedule. The petitioner was appointed as an amusement Tax Inspector on July 23. 1941, and he was confirmed in the said post on September 1, 1942 by the presidency Divisional Commissioner. In my opinion, item no. 10 of the schedule referred to above has no manner of application to the instant case, and because of the definition of the term 'appointing authority', there can be no manner of doubt that the respondent no. 1, the presidency Divisional Commissioner, was the appointing authority of the petitioner and he was competent to exercise the power under Rule 75 (aa). In the view which I take and the above definition rule out the application of the decisions in Gurdial Singh Bawa v. The Director of Industries, Haryana, 1971 (1) S. L. R. Vol. 5, 161 and Nanak saran Srivastava v. State of U. P., 1971 (1)' S. L. R. Vol. 5, 169, strongly relied on by the petitioner. The contention of the petitioner relating to the first point is accordingly rejected. 3. IN considering the second point urged on behalf of the petitioner, it may be stated that the question of compulsory retirement of the petitioner was considered by a Review Committee. It appears from the relevant Government records, which have been produced before me on behalf of the respondents, that the majority members of the Review Committee recommended the retirement of the petitioner. On behalf of the petitioner, my attention has been drawn to paragraph 12 of the affidavit-in-opposition of the respondents to the petitioner's application for injunction. In that paragraph, it has been stated that the petitioner's case was considered by the Review committee and as per the majority opinion of the members of the Review committee, the Commissioner, presidency Division, decided to issue the aforesaid notice in the public interest. It has been strenuously urged by Mr. Maitra that the statements made in paragraph 12 indicate in clear terms that the respondent no. 1 did not apply his mind to the petitioner's case of retirement, but he acted as per the recommendation of the Review Committee. That is, however, not the correct position. It has been strenuously urged by Mr. Maitra that the statements made in paragraph 12 indicate in clear terms that the respondent no. 1 did not apply his mind to the petitioner's case of retirement, but he acted as per the recommendation of the Review Committee. That is, however, not the correct position. It appears from the records that in his order dated August 6, 1974, directing service of three months notice on the petitioner for the purpose of his retirement with effect from November 15, 1974, it was recorded by the respondent no. 1 that he accepted the majority opinion of the members of the Review Committee and decided to retire the petitioner from service in public interest in terms of Rule 75 (aa). This shows that the respondent no. 1 applied his mind to the question of compulsory retirement of the petitioner and he was satisfied that in the public interest the petitioner should be retired from his service. The statements made in paragraph 12 of the affidavit- in- opposition referred to above cannot, in my opinion, be interpreted to mean that the respondent no. 1 did not form any independent opinion as to the retirement of the petitioner. In any event, the respondent no. 1 having actually formed an independent opinion upon a consideration of the majority view of the Review committee as recorded by him in the said order dated August 6, 1974, the statements in paragraph 12 have no significance. 4. IN this connection, it may be stated that the Review Committee was formed in terms of the Administrative order No. 510-G. A. C. of the Government of west Bengal dated May 16, 1973, a copy of which has been kept in the records produced by the respondents. The executive instructions contained in the said Government order have been made to supplement rule 75 (aa). It has been held by the Supreme Court in Sant Ram Sharma v. The State of Rajas than and another, (1968) 1 S. C. R. Ill and Guman Singh v. The State of Rajas than, (1971) 2 s. C. C. 452, that such executive instructions can be issued by the Government for the purpose of supplementing the rules. It has been held by the Supreme Court in Sant Ram Sharma v. The State of Rajas than and another, (1968) 1 S. C. R. Ill and Guman Singh v. The State of Rajas than, (1971) 2 s. C. C. 452, that such executive instructions can be issued by the Government for the purpose of supplementing the rules. In Shri A.C. Bose v. Union of India and others (F. M. A. No. 432 of 1973 disposed of on November 26, 1973) a Bench of this Court consisting of the Chief Justice and Sabyasachi Mukherji, j. has laid down the same principle following the said Supreme Court decisions. In that case, it has been observed by the learned Chief Justice that in determining whether the order of compulsory retirement is justified, not only the provision of the rule, but also the directions and notifications of the Government issued from time to time to supplement the rule on matters on which the Rule is silent, have to be considered. Further, it has been observed by his Lordship that when an order for compulsory retirement is challenged in a court of law, the Court has the right to examine whether some ground or material germane to the issue exists although the Court is not interested in the sufficiency of those materials. In the instant case, in the said government order No. 510-G. A. C, one of the criteria that may be followed in considering the question of premature retirement of a person under Rule 75 (as)is as follows :- "in a case where there is a reasonable cause to believe that the officer concerned is lacking in integrity, it would be appropriate to consider him for premature retirement under the rule, irrespective of an assessment of his ability or efficiency in work." The record shows that the Review committee considered the service records of the petitioner. The majority opinion of the Review Committee is inter alia as follows :- "as regards point no. (ii) it appears that there are successive reports that the integrity of the officer is doubtful. The officer would have been proceeded against depart mentally had there been positive and concrete evidence against his integrity. On the other hand, there are definite remarks that this officer works as a tout of the licensees and that his exit from the department will increase realisation of taxes. The officer would have been proceeded against depart mentally had there been positive and concrete evidence against his integrity. On the other hand, there are definite remarks that this officer works as a tout of the licensees and that his exit from the department will increase realisation of taxes. This officer works in a revenue earning department and it seems that such an officer may not be kept in service at the cost of government revenue when he can be retired under the service rules." In view of the majority opinion of the Review Committee which was accepted by the respondent no. 1, there cannot be any doubt that there were existence of grounds or materials germane to the issue at the time the impugned order was passed by the respondent no. 1. There is, therefore, no merit in the contention of the petitioner that the respondent no. 1 did not form any independent opinion on the question of retirement of the petitioner in the public interest, but he acted as per the recommendation of the review Committee. The third contention of the petitioner is equally without any substance. It is said on behalf of the petitioner that although in the impugned order there is a direction for the service of a notice upon the petitioner, no such notice was served on him. The impugned order which was served upon the petitioner was itself a notice for three months. The petitioner was not directed to retire before the expiry of three months from the date of the impugned order. In my opinion, the impugned order or the notice is quite in accordance with rule 75 (aa). 5. THE last contention of the petitioner is that his appeal to the Finance commissioner and Ex-Officio Secretary, finance Department of the Government of West Bengal, under rule 16 (1) of the West Bengal Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1971, should have been disposed of in accordance with law. 5. THE last contention of the petitioner is that his appeal to the Finance commissioner and Ex-Officio Secretary, finance Department of the Government of West Bengal, under rule 16 (1) of the West Bengal Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1971, should have been disposed of in accordance with law. Rule 16 (1) is as follows:- "a Government servant may appeal against an order which- (a) denies or varies to his disadvantage his pay, allowance, pension or other conditions of service as regulated by any rules or by agreement, or (b) interprets to his disadvantage the provisions of any such rule or agreement, to the Governor as persona designates, if the order is passed by the Government and to the Government, if the order is passed by any authority subordinate to it." It is contended on behalf of the respondents that no appeal lies against an order of retirement under Rule 75 (aa)of West Bengal Service Rules, Part I and, accordingly, the appeal of the petitioner was not entertained. Mr. Maitra, however, submits that so far as the petitioner is concerned such an appeal lay, for the respondents have varied to his disadvantage one of his conditions of service within the meaning of clause (1) of Rule 16 (1) inasmuch as he was denied his earned leave due to him preparatory to retirement as provided in Rule 168 of the West Bengal Service Rules, Part I. I am afraid, in view of Rule 153, the petitioner cannot claim any leave as of right. Moreover, granting of leave preparatory to retirement under Rule 168 is also discretionary with the authority empowered to grant it. In my opinion, by refusing the petitioner leave preparatory to retirement the respondents did not vary the conditions of his service. At this stage, a significant fact may be noticed. In the petition of appeal which is an annexure to the petition, no complaint has been made by the petitioner about the alleged refusal of leave preparatory to retirement. The respondents have not also interpreted the provision of any rule to the disadvantage of the petitioner as contended on his behalf. I am of the view that the purported appeal which was preferred by the petitioner did not me at all and the respondents were justified in refusing to entertain the same. Mo other point has been argued on behalf of the petitioner. 6. I am of the view that the purported appeal which was preferred by the petitioner did not me at all and the respondents were justified in refusing to entertain the same. Mo other point has been argued on behalf of the petitioner. 6. ALL the contentions of the petitioner having failed, this Rule fails and is discharged. There will, however, be no order as to costs. As prayed for by Mr. Maitra, let operation of this judgment remain stayed for one week only from date so as to enable the petitioner to prefer an appeal against the judgment.