Judgment :- 1. The tenants are the revision petitioners before me against whom an order of eviction was passed by the Rent controller on two grounds—(1) that they had committed wilful default, and (2) that the need of the landlord for additional accommodation was bona fide. This order of eviction was confirmed by the lower Appellate Authority. Aggrieved by this concurring order, the present revision petition has been preferred. 2. Mr. K. Venkataswami, counsel for the revision petitioners, urges that in the instant case on IIth May 1970 there was a dissolution of the partnership, and therefore they issued a notice on 21st June 1970, enquiring whether the landlord would receive the rent for the building annually or monthly. This was under Ex. A.5. Then a reply emanated from the landlord, dated 16th July 1979. But, there was no indication as to law the landlord proposed to receive the rent. Therefore, they were under the impression that the rent would be received annually as was done before. But suddenly the landlord filed on 16th October 1970 a petition for eviction on two grounds as mentioned above. The Rent Controller came to the conclusion that the recitals found in Exs. B-1 to B-3 would clearly go to show that the tenancy is only a monthly tenancy and the rent has been paid yearly once. Notwithstanding this, he would characterise the evidence of R.W. 1 as being interested. To cap all he would Bay there was supine indifference This finding was based on the following sentence: “Normally one would expect that a person who is doing business in a rented building would deposit the entire arrears in order to show his bona fide case, if the landlord filed petition on the ground of wilful default”. I am afraid, the learned Rent Controller has not chosen even to look into the counter statement of the tenants in which they took a categorical stand “though rent is payable only yearly from 11th May 1970 those respondents have deposited into court Rs. 600 being the rent of half year from 11th May 1970 till 10th November 1970, and there is no arrear at all The petitioner demanded Rs. 600 being the rent of half year from 11th May 1970 till 10th November 1970, and there is no arrear at all The petitioner demanded Rs. 2,400 as rent per year and as these respondents refused to pay so much the petitioner has filed this application with fall of false allegations.” Having regard to these clear averments, it is impossible to hold as to how it could be said there was only an interested testimony of R.W. 1. Nevertheless, what Mr O.V. Baluswami, learned counsel for the landlord would contend is, if there was a case of yearly tenancy, unless there was a registered deed as required under S. 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, such a lease cannot be pleaded. That may be so . But where the landlord, albeit the tenancy was from month to month was in the habit of receiving rents annually as evidence from Exs. B-1 to B-5, there can be no question of any wilful default, the question being not of default, but whether it is wilful. If really the landlord was interested in the payment being made monthly, certainly it was his duty to reply so when specifically he was asked under Ex. A.5 by the tenant as to how the landlord proposed to receive the rent. Therefore, I should necessarily hold that the tenants were lulled into the belief that the rent was required to be paid only at the end of the year for 12 months. This is also clear from the stand taken in the counter statement in paragraph 9, which I have extracted above. Therefore, this finding relating to wilful default has to be necessarily set aside and it is accordingly act aside. The appellate authority states: ‘Thus while the tenancy was monthly, the respondent in spite of a notice did not care to pay the rent month after month, but asserted mala fidely that they are entitled to pay rent once a year. As their claim is found to be false it follows that the default in payment of rent in spite of demand was only the result of supine indifference.” I see no justification for this finding, As I observed earlier, it is because the tenants were lulled into the belief that the rent was required to be paid only at the end of the year, they did not pay it. Though it may amount to merely committing default, there is nothing to say that it would amount to wilful default. 3. One other ground remains to be noted viz,, the bona fide requirement of the landlord for additional accommodation. As regards this finding, the argument of the learned counsel for the revision petitioners is, neither the Rent Controller nor the Appellate Authority has taken note of the proviso occurring under S. 10(3)(c) which reads: “Provided that, in the case, of an application under Clause (c) the Controller shall reject the application if he is satisfied that the hardship which may be caused to the tenant by granting it will cut-weigh the advantage to the landlord.” In support of this argument, the learned counsel relies on a decision of Ramaprasada Rao, J. reported in K.A. Loganatha Naicker v. Bolasundara Mudaliar 8 L.W. 609. 4. This argument is countered by Mr. O.V. Baluswami by contending that in effect and substance, the Rent Controller has token note of the proviso since be had held “Once the landlord bona fide requires the portion in the occupation of the tenant for his additional accommodation, the fact that the tenant cannot get in alternative accommodation alone, cannot be the basis to reject the landlords claim. I hold that the claim made of the petitioner herein for additional accommodation is bona fide and satisfied the requirement of S. 10(3)(c) of the Act.” Therefore, the learned counsel argues, it is not correct to contend that the Rent Controller was obvious of this proviso. As far as the appellate Authority was concerned, for reasons best known to the tenants they did not raise this, and therefore, there was no necessity on the part of the Appellate Authority to give a finding. Here again, I am afraid I cannot accept the contention advanced on behalf of the landlord. When admittedly evidence had been let in, it was incumbent on the part of the Rent Controller to have applied his mind to the proviso extracted above. Here again, I am afraid I cannot accept the contention advanced on behalf of the landlord. When admittedly evidence had been let in, it was incumbent on the part of the Rent Controller to have applied his mind to the proviso extracted above. Ramaprasada Rao, J. has held in Loganatha Naicker v. Balasundara Muiallar 87 L.W. 609 as follows: “In an application for additional accommodation under S. 10(3)(c) of Madras Act IS of 1960, the crucial aspect which could be characterised as a special incident in matters arising under the section is that there should be a categorical finding by the statutory authorities that the hardship which may be caused to the tenant by granting it will outweigh the advantage to the landlord. The special prescription is not to be considered as otiose or as an irrelevant appendage in the statute. It has been specially provided for, so as to avoid unnecessary hardship to the tenant, as in the case under consideration, the landlord is only seeking additional accommodation in the same premises, whether for residential or non-residential purposes. Therefore, it becomes absolutely imperative for the authorities, in cases coursing under S. 10(3)(c) of the Act, to give a specific finding whether the hardship which the tenant is likely to suffer would outweigh the advantage to the landlord or vice versa . Unless this aspect is noticed and ad judged upon by the statutory Authorities, there is no complete enquiry as the statute contemplates in regard to the petitions arising under S. 10(3)(c). 5. This decision clearly applies to this case, and Mr. K. Venkataswami is, therefore, right in his submission. This necessitates me to remand the matter to the Rent Controller for considering the hardship that might be caused to the tenants at is required under the proviso. I make it clear that I am not interfering with the finding about the need of the landlord for additional accommodation. It is only concerning the applicability of this proviso the matter is remanded. It will be dealt with on its merits, It will be open to the parties to let in such oral or documentary evidence as they may deem fit. With these observations, the matter stands remitted to the Rent Controller for fresh disposal. It is only concerning the applicability of this proviso the matter is remanded. It will be dealt with on its merits, It will be open to the parties to let in such oral or documentary evidence as they may deem fit. With these observations, the matter stands remitted to the Rent Controller for fresh disposal. It is needless for me to observe that having regard to the matter being of the year 1970, the Rent Controller shall dispose of the same within three months from the date of receipt of the records.