Judgement JUDGMENT.:- This appeal is by the plaintiff, who lost in both the Courts below. The plaintiffs suit was for declaration of her 3 Annas 6 Gondas 2 Koras 2 Krantis share of the jote right in the land described in Schedule I, and for partition and for delivery of khas possession of the land described in Schedule II to the plaint (hereinafter referred to as `the suit land). 2. The material facts of her case, may be, briefly, stated as follows : That one Montaz Ali Choudhury, was the owner of the jote right of the property described in Schedule I to the plaint. Montaz Ali died leaving behind him his widow, four daughters and a brother, Washil Ali by name. Washil Ali died leaving his widow, Jamila Khatun Choudhury (defendant No. 6) and a step brother, Najib Ali Choudhury (defendant No. 7). The plaintiff purchased the suit land from defendants Nos. 6 and 7 by two deeds, Ext. 1 dated 29-3-60 and Ext. 2 dated 27-1-55, respectively and that she was in possession thereof and defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were in possession of the rest of the land left behind by Montaz Ali. 3. Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 filed a written statement and contested the suit. They have admitted the genealogy. They have also admitted that Montaz Ali was the jotedar of the land described in Schedule I. Their case is that the three of the daughters of Montaz Ali, namely, Tarunnessa, Kulsuma and Altabunessa sold their interest to their sister Khatibunessa. Washil Ali transferred his interest in the land and the houses to his nephew Masukuddin Choudhury by executing a registered Hiba-bil-Ewaz dated 27-9-1945 and put him in possession thereof. On 29-6-1952 Masukuddin, Jubeda Khatun and Khatibunessa sold their interests in the land to defendant No. 1 and put her in possession thereof. Since their purchase, defendants Nos. 1 and 2 have been in possession of the land purchased by defendant No. 1 by constructing houses thereon. They have denied that the plaintiff or her predecessors-in-interest was ever in possession of the land. 4. After the written statement was filed, the plaintiff amended her plaint and added a new para being Para 6A. Since their purchase, defendants Nos. 1 and 2 have been in possession of the land purchased by defendant No. 1 by constructing houses thereon. They have denied that the plaintiff or her predecessors-in-interest was ever in possession of the land. 4. After the written statement was filed, the plaintiff amended her plaint and added a new para being Para 6A. She has admitted that on 27-9-45 Washil Ali Choudhury executed a Hiba-bil-Ewaz in favour of Masukuddin Choudhury but she has alleged that defendant No. 6 filed Title Suit No. 42/53 in the Court of Munsiff, Karimganj for cancellation of the Hiba-bil-Ewaz and by a decree dated 31-5-58, the Court declared the said Hiba-bil-Ewaz to be null and void. 5. The learned trial Court dismissed the suit. On appeal by the plaintiff, his judgment and decree were affirmed by the District Judge. 6. The point that falls for decision in this appeal is whether the suit land had been validly transferred by Washil Ali by Hiba-bil-Ewaz to Masukuddin on 27-9-45. If the answer be in the affirmative, we need not examine the genuineness or otherwise or value of Ext. 2 dated 27-1-55 and Ext. 1 dated 29-3-60 the deeds of purchase by which the plaintiff has claimed to have acquired title to the suit land from defendants Nos. 7 and 6, respectively; for in that case, Washil Ali having validly transferred the property to Masukuddin on 27-9-45, defendants Nos. 6 and 7, predecessors -in-interest of the plaintiff, could not have inherited the property from Washil Ali, and, as such, they could not have any saleable interest in the suit land, and the plaintiff could have acquired no title to the suit land under Exts. 1 and 2. 7. Ext. A dated 27-9-45 is the Hiba-bil-Ewaz. To prove that Ext. A was a void document, the plaintiff has relied solely on Ext. 6, the certified copy of the judgment in Title Suit No. 42/53 in which the Hiba-bil-Ewaz was declared to be void by the Munsiff, Karimganj. Ext. C is the certified copy of the plaint in Title Suit No. 42/53. 8. Shri K.L. Jain, learned counsel appearing for the defendants-respondents, referring to Sections 40 to 44 of the Evidence Act, submits that Ext. 6 is irrelevant and not admissible. Ext. C is the certified copy of the plaint in Title Suit No. 42/53. 8. Shri K.L. Jain, learned counsel appearing for the defendants-respondents, referring to Sections 40 to 44 of the Evidence Act, submits that Ext. 6 is irrelevant and not admissible. On the other hand Shri S.K. Sen, learned counsel appearing for the appellants, submits that it is admissible under Section 43 read with Section 13 of the Evidence Act. 9. In this appeal I need not examine the rival contentions of learned counsel with regard to the admissibility of Ext. 6. I shall assume for the sake of argument but not decide that Ext. 6 is admissible, and proceed to examine its legal effect on defendants 1 and 2 who admittedly were not parties to Title Suit No. 42/53. "So far as regards the truth of the matter decided, a judgment is not admissible against one who is a stranger to the suit" (See Kesho v. Bahuria, 41 Cal WN 577 : (AIR 1937 PC 69) ). A judgment has two parts, substantive and judicial. "The law attributes unerring verity to the substantive, as opposed to the judicial portions of the record "(Phipson on Evidence : 11th Edition, page 533)." In the substantive portion, the court records or attests its own proceedings and acts. In the judicial portion, on the other hand the court expresses its judgment or opinion on the matter in question, and in forming that opinion it is bound to have regard only to the evidence and arguments adduced before it by the respective parties. Such a judgment, with respect to any third person, who was neither a party nor privy to the proceeding in which it was pronounced, is only res inter alios judicata; and hence the rule that it does not bind is not in general, evidence, against any one who was not a party or privy." (See Sarkars summary on the point in his Evidence 9th Edition, Page 397). 10. As admittedly defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were not parties to the suit in which the judgment (vide Ext. 6) was passed, it is not binding on defendants Nos. 1 and 2. The learned lower appellate Court has found that the plaintiff has adduced no other independent evidence to prove that the Hiba-bil-Ewaz was null and void. 10. As admittedly defendants Nos. 1 and 2 were not parties to the suit in which the judgment (vide Ext. 6) was passed, it is not binding on defendants Nos. 1 and 2. The learned lower appellate Court has found that the plaintiff has adduced no other independent evidence to prove that the Hiba-bil-Ewaz was null and void. A court always presumes the apparent to be the real unless the contrary is proved. The burden is upon him who alleges that the apparent is not the real to prove that the apparent is not the real. In the instant case Ext. A is a registered deed purporting to be a Hiba-bil-Ewaz for a consideration of Rupees 1,000/-. The Court, therefore, presumes that the suit land was transferred by a registered Hiba-bil-Ewaz for Rs. 1,000/- by Washil Ali on 27-9-45 to Masukuddin, who sold it to defendant No. 1 on 26-9-52. The plaintiff has failed to rebut that presumption. So she has failed to establish that her vendors, defendants Nos. 6 and 7, inherited the suit land from Washil Ali and that they (defendants 6 and 7) had saleable interest in the suit land. That being the position, it must be held that the plaintiff has failed to establish her title to the suit land. In my opinion, the learned courts below have committed no errors of law, in passing the impugned decrees. The appeal has no force and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.