JUDGMENT : J.B. Mehta, J. The General Manager, Western Railway, has come in this appeal because the claim for compensation of the dependent-widow under the Workmen's Compensation Act, which had been rejected by the Commissioner had been fully awarded by the learned Single Judge. The claimants were the widow and the children of one David Macwan, who met with the alleged accident on July 22, 1967, at about 5.30 p m. The deceased Macwan was serving as a night-in-charge at Nadiad locoshed and his ordinary duty hours were from 8.0 p.m. to 8.0 a.m. On 20th and 21st July 1967 the deceased was on a scheduled rest and he had to resume his duty at 8.0 p.m. on July 22, 1967. According to the claimants, one Chhotubhai Vaghjibhai Patel, Ex. 19, was a fitter-in-charge in the locoshed at Nadiad and he was on duty during day time. The deceased night-in-charge had to do the same duty of supervision over the staff working in the locoshed during the hours of his duty. According to the claimants, there was a meeting of the supervisory staff to be held sometime on July 23, 1967 and as Chhotubhai had to make arrangements for the same, he was required to leave his place of duty around 4.0 p.m. and, therefore he sent Josephbhai Jacobbhai Macwan, Ex. 14, to the house of the deceased David Macwan asking him to come over to the locoshed and to take over duty from Chhotubhai Around 5.0 p.m. David Macwan, who was suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis before his death, vomited blood and fell down in the locoshed. Immediately information was sent to Chhotubhai, who came post-haste from his house to the locoshed and removed David in a car to Mahagujarat Hospital, where the doctor on duty pronounced him dead. The deceased having died by a personal injury suffered in an accident that arose out of and in the course of his employment, the compensation amount of Rs. 9,000/- was claimed from the Respondent. The plea of the Respondent was that the deceased David was not called to resume his duty by Chhotubhai at about 4.0 p.m. and there was nothing to show that strain of work aggravated the disease which resulted in his death. 9,000/- was claimed from the Respondent. The plea of the Respondent was that the deceased David was not called to resume his duty by Chhotubhai at about 4.0 p.m. and there was nothing to show that strain of work aggravated the disease which resulted in his death. According to the Respondent, the deceased died on account of the disease from which he was suffering and death was on account of natural cause and that it could never be said that he died on account of a personal injury suffered by him in an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. The Commissioner held that the claimants have failed to prove that the deceased David died as a result of personal injury caused to him by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, and so the claim for compensation was dismissed. The aforesaid finding was arrived at by the Commissioner because he disbelieved the case of the claimants that the deceased was called for duty and as he came to the conclusion that the deceased had come to the locoshed at 5.0 p.m. for personal work or was passing by the locoshed when he vomited blood and collapsed. The Commissioner accepted the evidence of Chhotubhai, Ex. 19, and Kantilal, Ex. 23. The Commissioner held that Laxmanbhai, Ex. 13 and Joseph, Ex. 14, were got up witnesses, who had come to oblige the claimants. He came to the conclusion that David did not meet with an accident in the course of his employment. The Commissioner did not go into the second question as to the compensation payable to the dependents. The learned Single Judge had held that this was a case where the Commissioner had misdirected himself and committed an error of law which resulted in gross injustice by disallowing the claim of compensation. The conclusion of the Commissioner was held to be perverse, against the weight of evidence and contrary to the evidence on record and it was found by the learned Single Judge that the deceased had been called for duty. The learned Single Judge further held that the deceased was suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis since one year prior to his death, which fact was undisputed in view of the evidence of Dr. Nicholos Fonseca, Ex. The learned Single Judge further held that the deceased was suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis since one year prior to his death, which fact was undisputed in view of the evidence of Dr. Nicholos Fonseca, Ex. 18, who had treated the deceased ; the learned Judge was satisfied as to the causal connection between injury and accident and accident and employment. In that view of the matter, the learned Single Judge allowed the full claim of compensation of Rs. 9,000/- with 6% interest and, therefore, the Respondent Railway has come in this appeal. 2. The learned Single Judge has in view of the fact that the deceased was suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis found the necessary causal connection and as per the settled legal position allowed the claim. The only short question which, therefore, arises is whether the learned Single Judge was entitled to interfere with the alleged finding of fact that the deceased had been called for duty at 4.0 p.m. on that day, in view of the special exigencies alleged by the claimants even though his normal duty was to start at 8.0 p.m. on July 22, 1967. It is this basic finding of fact on which the entire result would turn one way or the other. If, therefore, in arriving, at this finding of fact, the learned Commissioner has misdirected himself by an error of law, the error would be clearly a substantial question of law. 3. The test of a substantial question of law in such a context for entertaining an appeal under Section 30(1) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, would not be the narrow test of question of wide or general public importance adopted by their Lordships in Chunilal V. Mehta v. Century Spg. & Wvg. Company, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1314 in the context of Section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure. & Wvg. Company, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1314 in the context of Section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The legislature having enacted to provide an appeal under Section 30 and in a proviso having enacted that no appeal shall lie unless substantial question of law was involved in the appeal, it is obvious that the substantial question of law in this context has reference to the individual parties in the case and therefore, if the result of the error of law goes to the root so that there would be gross failure of justice by disallowing such a claim which ought to have been allowed, the error of law which has vitiated the judgment of the Commissioner could be clearly a substantial question of law under Section 30(1) of the Act. We agree with the reasoning in Jwali v. Babu Lal, A.I.R. 1958 All. 564 by a Division Bench consisting of Mootham C.J. and Srivastava, J. where it had been held that a wider construction must be given to the phrase, 'substantial question of law used in the proviso to Section 30(1) of the Act to cover a case in which even the Commissioner had clearly misdirected himself on a question of law as to whether a notice of claim as required by law had been served on the employer. 4. The next question which arises is, when the question is as regards the finding of fact, as to in what exceptional cases such a finding of fact would be vitiated by error of law. Admittedly, there was no direct evidence by any memo given to the deceased workman for calling him on duty. But still the workman could prove this case by relying on circumstantial evidence which would have to be weighed by due regard to all the relevant facts on the record for drawing legitimate inference from the evidence led. Mr. Bhatt in this context had relied upon the decision in Sri Meenakshi Mills v. I.T. Commissioner, Madras, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 49, where the controversy as to question of law in the Income Tax reference context has been well settled. At page 65, their Lordships had summarised the various propositions and. Mr. Bhatt in this context had relied upon the decision in Sri Meenakshi Mills v. I.T. Commissioner, Madras, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 49, where the controversy as to question of law in the Income Tax reference context has been well settled. At page 65, their Lordships had summarised the various propositions and. pointed out that when the point for determination was a mixed question of law and facts, while the finding of the Tribunal on the facts found was final, its decision as to the legal effect of those findings was a question of law which could be reviewed by the Court. In the next proposition it was held that a finding on the question of fact was open to attack under Section 66(1) as erroneous in law when there was no evidence to support it or if it was perverse. In the last proposition it was pointed out that where the finding was one of fact, the fact that it was itself an inference from other basic facts would not alter its character as one of fact. That is why at page 60 it was pointed out that the inferences from facts found need not necessarily be inferences of law but might be conclusions of fact, and such conclusions of fact could be attacked on grounds on which findings of fact could be attacked viz. there was no evidence to support them as for example, if the conclusion did not follow even if all the facts found were accepted. That is why it was held that in such cases such a finding of fact must be shown to be perverse or there being no evidence to support it or there being similar exceptional grounds. That is why at page 66, the first ground was gone into by their Lordship that the finding as to the Benami character had been leached by ignoring several matters relevant for such determination. In Somvanti v. Shri Ram, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 466 their Lordships in terms held that when a finding as regards possession had been arrived at by the first appellate Court without referring to the important pieces of evidence or by ignoring very important evidence on the record or by making far fetched inferences, such a finding of fact could not be regarded as binding upon the High Court in Second Appeal. 5. 5. In Hussainbhai Nabibux v. Modhia Chhotalal, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 2169, their Lordships referred even to the settled practice of the Supreme Court in appeals by special leave where the Court never embarked upon an inquiry into the correctness or otherwise of all conclusions of fact or even of law and reappraise the evidence for itself. Their Lordships pointed out that the Supreme Court might examine the evidence in those rare cases where there was misreading of evidence or where the effect of evidence had been seriously misunderstood or where important evidence making a fundamental difference in the ultimate conclusion had been completely ignored and it had led into injustice. Even in the context of Workmen's Compensation cases of unexplained disappearance of seamen, where this question has often arisen the same legal position is laid down in M. Mackenzie v. I.M. Issak, 1969 A.C.J. 422. It was pointed out that in a case of death caused by an accident the burden of proof rested upon the workman to prove that the accident arose out of employment as well as in the course of employment. But that did not mean that a workman who came to the Court must necessarily prove it by direct evidence. On the one hand the Commissioner must not surmise, conjecture or guess ; on the other hand, he might draw an inference from the proved facts so long as it was a legitimate inference. It was of course impossible to lay down any rule as to the degree of proof which was sufficient to justify an inference being drawn, but the evidence must be such as would induce a reasonable man to draw it. In that context the observation of Lord Birkenhead L.C. in Lancaster v. Blackwell Colliery Ltd., (1918) W.C. & I.R. 345 Co. had been approved as follows: "If the facts which are proved give rise to conflicting inferences of equal degrees or probability so that the choice between them was a mere matter of conjecture, then, of course, the applicant fails to prove his case because it is plain that the onus in these matters is upon the applicant. had been approved as follows: "If the facts which are proved give rise to conflicting inferences of equal degrees or probability so that the choice between them was a mere matter of conjecture, then, of course, the applicant fails to prove his case because it is plain that the onus in these matters is upon the applicant. But where the known facts are not equally consistent, where there is a ground for comparing and balancing probabilities as to their respective value, and where a reasonable man might hold that the more probable conclusion is that for which the applicant contends, then the Arbitrator is justified in drawing an inference in his favour." In this case the High Court had reversed the finding of the Commissioner, in the context of this missing seaman. Their Lordships did not hold that the High Court had acted without jurisdiction but after going through the facts it was in terms found that the Commissioner did not commit an error of law in reaching his finding. Even in Hindi Trading Company v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1858 their Lordships approved Denning L.J.'s observations in Regina v. Medical Appeal Tribunal, (1957) 1 O.B. 547, where the error of law as per settled position in Edwards (Inspector of Taxes) v. Bairstow, (1956) AJC 14 had been explained by holding that where a Tribunal comes to a conclusion, which could not reasonably be entertained by them if they properly understood the relevant enactment, then they fall into error in point of law. As per the settled legal position, the finding of fact in such a case, if it has been arrived at on the basis of circumstantial evidence, without considering material circumstances which ought to have been considered or ignoring material circumstances or on mere conjectures or far fetched inferences, could surely be said to have been vitiated by error of law, and a substantial question of law would be involved if such finding results in gross injustice by defeating the workman's claim which should have been allowed. 6. In the present case, the learned Commissioner, even without any evidence on record of such practice, insisted on the memo in writing, which surely would have been a direct evidence. He has disbelieved the claimants witness only on that score and made a conjecture that they are got up witnesses. 6. In the present case, the learned Commissioner, even without any evidence on record of such practice, insisted on the memo in writing, which surely would have been a direct evidence. He has disbelieved the claimants witness only on that score and made a conjecture that they are got up witnesses. The learned Commissioner never cared to consider that such was not the practice deposed to by any of the relevant witnesses. In such a temporary local arrangement for a few hours when any shift-in-charge is called to take over the charge to meet the administrative exigency, the written memo would be Unusual, and such exceptional practice should have been alleged and established. Without this basic fact, no conjecture can be made from the absence of such material or such memo being not produced by the claimants' witnesses. It is purely a conjectural finding to discard the claimants' witnesses on this ground. 7. The most material circumstance which was so eloquent to clinche the entire issue and to bear out the truth of the claimants' case and which would unmistakably show that in all probability Chhotubhai left locoshed at 4-00 p.m., had not been considered at all by the Commissioner. That circumstance appeared from the admitted facts in the evidence of Chhotubhai, Ex-19. A meeting of as many as 18 supervisors was to be held on July 23, 1967, where Chhotubhai was also to attend the same. Chhotubhai's letter Ex. 21, which he has written ; immediately on the death of this David Mac-wan in terms makes it clear that Chhotubhai had requested the Divisional Mechanical Engineer, Mr. Joshi, ' that because the night-in-charge, at Nadiad, David had vomited blood at 17.45 p.m. hours on July 22, 1967, in the shed and he was immediately taken to the Mission Hospital where the doctors declared that he had expired, in view of the sad incident, which had happened last evening, he should change the said supervisors' meeting to any other place than Nadiad. His letter is very eloquent because it is written after the fact of death was known. His letter is very eloquent because it is written after the fact of death was known. Therefore, before that sad incident happened the position was that Chhotubhai Was knowing that the meeting was to be held of all these 18 supervisors at this place on July 23, 1967, where this big boss was to come all the way from Baroda to Nadiad to preside over the meeting, Chhotubhai would have to make proper arrangements for this meeting. Therefore, the most natural inference was that Chhotubhai in order to make proper arrangements had to leave earlier on that day. Even Chhotubhai admits that he had left locoshed at 5.00 p.m. and had gone home on that day. Same is the version of another witness Kantilal, Ex. 23, who was also called there from home by witness Joseph, Exh. 14 at 5-30 p.m. After they came they took the deceased in a taxi to the hospital and at that time the wife of the deceased and Joseph were in the taxi. Witness Kantilal, Ex. 23, further brought out that the duties of night-in-charge David were similar to those of Chhotubhai. David did not come to perform duties during day time unless he was appointed in place of Chhotubhai and Chhotubhai was on leave. This witness further stated that David was under obligation to come to the office even during day time if he was called by Chhotubhai. He does not refer to any memo being given for such local arrangement to meet administrative exigency. Therefore, if these admitted facts were taken into account alongwith the aforesaid letter Ex. 21, it is obvious that Chhotubhai had to make arrangement for this meeting, where his boss was to attend on the next day and that meeting was cancelled after the death of the deceased and, therefore, Chhotubai would normally have left earlier and called the deceased on duty. Similarly, it was purely a conjectural finding by the learned Commissioner from the fact, that on the next day the doors of the stores had to be broken down because the key was missing, that this was supporting the version of Chhotubhai, on the ground that if David was called before 5-00 p.m. the key would be found with the lock of the stores of the locoshed. In this context the evidence is of Narsing Muljibhai, Ex. In this context the evidence is of Narsing Muljibhai, Ex. 17, who has deposed that this night-in-charge David, attended even during day time when Chhotubhai was busy or absent and the deceased therefore used to work even in day. He further deposed that the key of the stores remained with Chhotubhai, but on the next day after the incident the key of the stores was not with Chhotubhai and so the door of the stores had to be opened after breaking the latch. In his cross-examination he stated, that when the stores was closed in the evening by the fitter-in-charge he sent the key to the night in-charge on all this evidence, if it had been read by the learned Commissioner, no such conjectures could have been made because the key of the store either remained with Chhotubhai or it should have been at the house of the night-in-charge, if it had been sent as stated by Chhotubhai. The very fact that the key was not found at the house of the deceased but the store lock had to be broken open would clearly show that Chhotubhai had not explained how the key disappeared. Even the person who is alleged to have left the key at the house of the deceased has not been examined and, therefore, on a pure conjecture the Commissioner assumed that this circumstance supported Chhotubhai's version. The Commissioner even did not care to see that this was undisputed fact that this meeting was to be held on July 23, 1967, because even on that aspect he proceeded on the assumption, that if there was a meeting on the next day and if Chhotubhai had to make arrangement, it was official work and so, Chhotubhai would not depose falsely. That circumstance was totally neutual in view of the admitted fact that Chhotubhai has gone to his home at 5 00 p.m., which was only consistent with the claimants' version that Chhotubhai had to make arrangement. Duty of both the persons was similar and, therefore, to exclude the possibility of David having been called Chhotubhai came out with the suggestion that the loco shunter looked after the work in his absence, which was contrary to the very evidence which we have referred to not only of Kantilal, Ex. 23, but even of Narsing, Ex. 17 and Joseph, Ex. 14. 23, but even of Narsing, Ex. 17 and Joseph, Ex. 14. Therefore, even this circumstance has been considered ignoring all this relevant evidence on the record. On the other hand, so far as the claimants' witnesses are concerned, the Commissioner had assumed them to be got up witnesses only on the score that the written memo was not produced by them for showing that David was called. No such practice was ever alleged or proved and it is highly unnatural in such a casual on the spot arrangement. As far as the widow is concerned, she is disbelieved only because she did not produce the memo from the fitter-in-charge and she did not give the name of the person, who came to call her, when in fact the same person Joseph was examined. As regards Laxmibai, she is held to be a got-up witness ignoring the fact that she was not a relative of the deceased and she was the mukadam working under this deceased and she deposed her presence on that day as the contractor's employee and she gave even the name of contractor Sharma. Even Chhotubhai, Ex. 19, did not deny her presence, but attempted to say that it was not true that on the day of the incident David had assigned work to Laxmibai, because his case is that they did not assign work directly but give instructions to the contractor. When the contractor's record had not been produced nor the contractor had been examined, Laxmibai could not be said to be a got up witness when her whole evidence is so natural and does not suffer from any infirmity whatever and Chhotubhai even does not deny that she was not a mukadam in his department. Even as regards Joseph, his evidence clearly establishes his presence. Joseph admittedly came to call Chhotubhai, Ex. 19, at his house. Joseph had called even Kantilal from his house and informed him that David vomitted blood. If Joseph could be sent immediately to the houses of these persons, how he was a got up witness, when he was called by Chhotubhai to send for David to come to duty. The reasoning given by the Commissioner was the same conjectural reasoning that Joseph had not produced the written memo, when there was no such case of practice of a written memo being given. The reasoning given by the Commissioner was the same conjectural reasoning that Joseph had not produced the written memo, when there was no such case of practice of a written memo being given. Therefore, on a clear conjectural reasoning, these three claimants' witnesses are said to be got up witnesses and their evidence has been disbelieved, even though they completed the whole link which clearly established that the deceased had been called for duty on that day, even though no written memo was given. Even the natural probability was in favour of that version in view of these circumstances, especially when the locoshed is not a place where one would like to go earlier for passing his time as alleged. Therefore, this is a fit case where in view of the exceptional circumstances where all the material evidence which made a fundamental departure had been ignored by the learned Commissioner, and the relevant evidence having not been looked into, such conjectural finding of fact was rightly held to be vitiated by the error of law. Such exceptional case would clearly fall within the ratio of Edwards (Inspector of Taxes) v. Bairstow, (1956) A.C. 14 where their Lordships in terms held that in such cases where appeal lay if the decision was positively wrong in law, the appeal Court should not impose any exceptional restraints upon themselves, because they were dealing with cases that arose out of facts found by the Commissioners. Their duty was no more than to examine those facts with a decent respect for the tribunal appealed from and if they thought that the only reasonable conclusion on the facts found was inconsistent with the 'determination came to, to say, so without more ado. Therefore, the learned Single Judge had rightly held that it was both the duty and power to interfere with such gross finding of fact which was clearly vitiated by an error of law in view of these exceptional circumstances because the material evidence making a fundamental difference had been ignored or misread and the determination had been arrived at clearly contrary to the whole evidence. Therefore, Mr. Bhatt could hardly allege that there was any jurisdictional error in interfering with the aforesaid finding of fact. Mr. Bhatt did not raise any other controversy in the view of the settled legal position as regards the work connected injury in such cases. Therefore, Mr. Bhatt could hardly allege that there was any jurisdictional error in interfering with the aforesaid finding of fact. Mr. Bhatt did not raise any other controversy in the view of the settled legal position as regards the work connected injury in such cases. Therefore, on the aforesaid reasoning the learned Single Judge rightly awarded the entire compensation amount of Rs. 9,000/- with 6% interest. In that view of the matter, this appeal must fail and is, therefore, dismissed with costs.