JUDGMENT 1. - This appeal has been filed by the Municipal Council, Alwar against the judgment of the Magistrate First Class, Alwar dated June 29, 1971, by which he acquitted accused Prabhu Dayal of the offence under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. 2. I have heard the arguments on behalf of the learned counsel for the appellant and seen the record. No one appears on behalf of the respondent, 3. The brief facts of the case are that Food Inspector Shambhu Datt P.W.l inspected the shop of the accused-respondent Prabhudayal in the town of Alwar on June 31, 1968 at 5.30 p.m. and purchased a sample of chilli powder and sent the same for chemical examination. The Public Analyst by his report Ex.P. 3 gave the opinion that it was adulterated. According to this report, the total has in the sample was 11.54 per cent, while it should not have been more than 8 percent and ash insoluble in Hydrochloric Acid was 5.62 per cent, while it should not have been more than 0.05 per cent. Thus, it was clear that the sample of chilli powder was in contravention of the standard shown in item No. A.05 05 01 of Appendix B attached to the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955, and therefore, it was an adulterated article of food. The accused took the plea that the powder in question was not meant for sale and he had told the Inspector that the same had been put aside so as to send it home and if the Inspector wanted, he could take sample from the other stock of chillies in the same shop. The accused further stated that he had told this to the Food Inspector when he took the sample. He also stated that he made a note (in Urdu) to this effect at A to B in Ex.P.l and also in Ex. P.2 which are respectively the intimation (in Form VI) and the memo of the purchase of the sample. 4. The learned Magistrate accepted the plea of the accused and also came to the conclusion that the fact that Ex.P.l does not bear the signatures of the witnesses shows that the `motbirs' arrived afterwards. P.2 which are respectively the intimation (in Form VI) and the memo of the purchase of the sample. 4. The learned Magistrate accepted the plea of the accused and also came to the conclusion that the fact that Ex.P.l does not bear the signatures of the witnesses shows that the `motbirs' arrived afterwards. The learned Magistrate disbelieved the statement of the Inspector that the purchase of the sample was made in the presence of the witnesses. He further observed that the Inspector gave no explanation as to what he meant by total ash and how he came to suspect that the chillies were adulterated. The learned Magistrate then, proceeded to acquit the accused. 5. The learned counsel for the Municipal Council Alwar submits that the acceptance of the plea of the accused and the rejection of the evidence of the Food Inspector were uncalled for. He further Submitted that the purchase of the sample by the Food Inspector was sale within the definition,given in the Act and therefore, even if the material was not meant for sale, it will be deemed to be a sale under the law. 6. Now, it is true that purchase of sample by the Food Inspector is sale within the meaning of the Act, but then Section 1G of the said Act empowers the Food Inspector to take a sample only if a person is selling the article. The question, therefore, is whether, when the accused said that the chilli powder in his shop was not meant for sale, his pica should be accepted on its fact value. Food Inspector Shambhu Duti., P.W.l has deposed that he purchased the sample in the presence of the two witnesses. The chilli powder was stored for sale and he could not say about what the accused wrote in Urdu on Ex.P.l and Ex.P.2 Puranchand P.W.2 did say that the sample was not taken in his presence though he signed the memo Ex.P. 2. The accused also produced in his defence two witnesses Birdhilal D.W.l and Jaimal D.W.2. Birdhilal deposed that when the Food Inspector was taking the sample then, the shop keeper was telling him that the powder was old and was being sent home. In cross-examination, he said that he did not see the chilli powder. To the same effect is the statement of Jaimal. 7. Birdhilal deposed that when the Food Inspector was taking the sample then, the shop keeper was telling him that the powder was old and was being sent home. In cross-examination, he said that he did not see the chilli powder. To the same effect is the statement of Jaimal. 7. From the aforesaid evidence, it is proved that the Inspector purchased the sample in the presence of the witnesses and in this respect the statement of the Food inspector has got to be believed and the statement of Puranchand that the bottles of the sample had already been filled in before he arrived at the spot, cannot be believed; If it were so, then he would not have put his signatures on Ex. P.2. Even the defence witnesses say that the Food Inspector took the sample. Now, if a person keeps a shop and stores material in his shop, then the natural inference is that the article is meant for sale. If one were not to hold otherwise, then it will be easy for any shop-keeper, whenever he is checked to come forward and say that the particular article in the shop was not meant for sale. The sample was taken at 5.30 p. m. and if the accused did not want to sell it, then he could have removed it from his shop any time during the day. Moreover, the accused simply said to the Inspector that the chilli powder was old and went on account of rainy season but it was found to have been adultrated not on account of high moisture content but on account of high percentage of infoluble ash and total ash. The learned Magistrate was, therefore, wrong in accepting the plea of the accused that the chilli powder was not meant for sale, and his judgment cannot be upheld. The admitted ignorance of the Food Inspector in respect of the meaning of total ash cannot impair the prosecution in face of the report of the public analyst. 8. Accordingly, I accept this appeal, set aside the impugned judgment, acquitting the respondent and convict him of an offence under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 16 of the aforesaid Act for storing and selling chilli powder which was substandard. The matter related to July, 1968 and it has dragged on for 7 years. 8. Accordingly, I accept this appeal, set aside the impugned judgment, acquitting the respondent and convict him of an offence under clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 16 of the aforesaid Act for storing and selling chilli powder which was substandard. The matter related to July, 1968 and it has dragged on for 7 years. I would, therefore, be inclined to take a lenient view in the matter of punishment, and would not like to impose the sentence of imprisonment but instead sentence the respondent to pay a fine of If it C500j and in default of payment whereof, to simple imprisonment for two month *******