Judgment R.P.SINHA, J. 1. In this writ application the petitioner has prayed for quashing Annex. 3, the award dated 29th June, 1971 of the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Ranchi, and for reinstatement of the workman R. K.Sharma in service with all his past wages, other benefits and emoluments. 2. The petitioner in this case is the Sindri Cement Factory Workers Union, district Dhanbad which claims to look after the welfare of the majority of the workmen at Sindri Cement Works. The workman, R. K. Sharma (hereinafter referred to as the workman) has been a member of the Union and has been working at the Sindri Cement Works for the last several years as a fitter. He was granted leave from 23rd September, 1967 to 10th October, 1967. He went home where he fell ill and so he sent an application for extension of his leave along with a medical certificate and his leave was extended upto 22nd November, 1967. According to him, his illness continued and he sent a postcard praying for further extension of his leave on 23rd November 1967, and also a telegram on 30th November 1967. But he did not receive any information from the management. On 2nd December, 1967 he received an order. (Annex. 1) under the signature of the Manager of the Factory informing him that his lien to the service had automatically terminated on expiry of his leave on 22nd November, 1967. On receipt of the aforesaid order he sent a reply to the management on 8th December, 1967 regarding his prayer for extension of leave on account of continued illness On 26th December, 1967 he came to Sindri to resume his duty but was not allowed to join in view of the order of the management dated 2nd December, 1967 (vide Annex. 1). This led to an industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication to respondent No. 1, the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Chhotanagpur Division Ranchi, by notification dated 2nd April, 1968 (Annex. 2). By the award dated 29th June, 1971 respondent No. 1 held that the termination of service of the workman aforesaid was justified and that he was not entitled to any relief. As against the award aforesaid, the Sindri Cement Factory Workers Union has filed this writ application. 3. 2). By the award dated 29th June, 1971 respondent No. 1 held that the termination of service of the workman aforesaid was justified and that he was not entitled to any relief. As against the award aforesaid, the Sindri Cement Factory Workers Union has filed this writ application. 3. It has been contended by learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Union that the workman has been victimised for his trade union activities particularly for having represented the case of the members of the Union in conciliation proceeding. The award of the Labour Court has been challenged mainly on the ground that it has wrongly held that the termination of service of the workman was justified when there has been a flagrant violation of the Standing Order as well as the principles of natural justice in this case. It has also been urged that respondent No. 1, the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Ranchi, as constituted by the notification dated 13th January, 1967, ceased to have jurisdiction over the said court pursuant to the notification dated 12th April, 1971- It has been stated that by the notification dated 12th April 1971- the Government superseded the notification dated 13th January, 1967 as aresult of which Dhanbad ceased to be under the jurisdiction of Chhotanagpur Division, Ranchi. Hence, according to him, the award given by respondent No. 1 on 29th June, 1971 was a nullity. It was also urged that the correct provision of the Standing Orders of the management was not applied in the case of the workman in this case by the management as, according. to the petitioner, the workman should have been dealt with under Standing Order No. 15 (28) read with Standing Order No. 16 and not under Standing Order No. 9(3) of the Certified Standing Orders. 4. From. Annex. 2, the notification dated 22nd April, 1968, it. appears that under CL (c)of sub-s. (1) of, S. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, . 1947, the dispute between the workmen of the Union and the management, of the Associated Cement Company Limited, Sindri: Cement Works, Sindri was referred for adjudication.. :.to the Labour Court. Ranchi, constituted, by notification dated. 30th January, 1967- , Respondent No. 1, by notification dated. 9th January, 1970 (Annex. 7) was appointed as the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court at Ranchi, constituted By notification dated, 30th January, 1967. :.to the Labour Court. Ranchi, constituted, by notification dated. 30th January, 1967- , Respondent No. 1, by notification dated. 9th January, 1970 (Annex. 7) was appointed as the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court at Ranchi, constituted By notification dated, 30th January, 1967. By another notification dated 12th April, 1.971,.Government notification dated, 30th January, 1967 was superseded and Labour Courts . at the headquarters of Patna, Muzaffarpur, Ranchi. and Bhagalpur were constituted specifying the local limits of their jurisdiction for adjudication of industrial. disputes. In the case of East India Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. G. S. Verma;, (1973 Lab IC 1501 (Pat)) a similar question had arisen and it was held: "Having given my careful consideration into the question I am of the opinion that the appropriate Government has no power or jurisdiction to abolish a Labour Court duly constituted under S. 7 of the Act so far as the pending references and pending cases are concerned. The cancellation of a notification by which a Labour Court has been constituted by a subsequent notification and constitution of a. fresh Labour Court by that notification would not result in the abolition of the Labour Court constituted under the previous notification so far as the pending references and other pending cases are concerned. The new notification will operate from the date of that notification and the reference made and case filed on or from, the date of the new. notification will only be taken cognizance of by the new Labour Court or Courts, as the case may be, constituted under the fresh notification." So, in view of the decision referred to above, the impugned award cannot be held to. be a nullity. 5 It.was. urged on behalf of the petitioner that the workman should have been given. an opportunity, to explain the circumstances before -his. services were terminated by. the impugned order of the management. (Annex. 1).. The Presiding Officer of- the Labour- Court has, not accepted-the plea of - the workman that he had sent a postcard, praying for extension of leave after his leave had expired nor has. he believed that the workman had sent any telegram, as claimed by him. So. in absence of any evidence of the fact that the workman had applied for further extension of. leave his. case, has got to be treated on the footing that, his leave.expired on 22nd . he believed that the workman had sent any telegram, as claimed by him. So. in absence of any evidence of the fact that the workman had applied for further extension of. leave his. case, has got to be treated on the footing that, his leave.expired on 22nd . November 1967 and, according, to. Standing Order No. 9(3) he should have returned. within eight days of the expiry of the leave and should have given satisfactory explanation of his inability to return on the" expiry of the leave, or he "had to lose his lien on the appointment. Standing Order No. 9 (3) runs as follows : "9 (3) If a worker remains absent beyond the period of granted leave he shall lose his lien on his appointment unless (i) he returns-within eight days of the expiry of the leave and (ii) gives satisfactory explanation- to the authority who granted his leave - of his inability to return on the expiry, of the leave. In this case, in view of the finding arrived at. by respondent No. 1 that the workman had not sent any postcard or a telegram and since admittedly he had not returned within eight days of the expiry of his leave, the consequences of his acts and omissions, had to follow. In National Engineering Industries Ltd. v. Hanumari, (AIR 196.3 SC 33): (1968 Lab IC 3) the Supreme Court, has observed thus;- "......... When the standing order provides, that, a workman will lose his lien on his appointment in case he does not join his duty within 8 days of the expiry of his leave, it obviously means that his services are automatically terminated on the happening Of the contingency. We do not understand how a workman who has lost his lien on his appointment can continue in service thereafter. Where, therefore, a standing order provides that a workman" would lose his lien on his appointment, if he does not join his duty within certain time after his leave expires, it can only mean that his service stands automatically terminated when the Contingency happens-" Relying on the aforesaid decision- of the Supreme Court, this Court in Management of M/s. Shiva Flour Mills, BhagalPur v. The Workmen ( AIR 1970 Pat 273 ) has held: "... ...... ...... the termination of lien of the employee on his appointment is automatic on the expiry of his leave and the" period of eight days within which under C1. 9 of. the Standing Orders he is required to return and explain to the satisfaction of the Management his inability to return before the expiry of the leave. This Court in the case of Employers in relation to Digwadih Colliery of M/s. Tata Iron & Steel Co. v. Presiding Officer, Central Govt. Addl. Industrial Tribunal (C.W.J.C- No. 107 of 1968 decided on 30-4-1969 (Pat)) had followed the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of National Engineering . Industries Ltd. (supra). 6. On behalf of the petitioner, reliance was placed on two decisions of the Bombay High Court in Rambhuwal Thakur Prasad v. Phoenix Mills (1976-1 Lab LJ 93(Bom)) and in Smt. Kashibai Sachid-anand v. M/s. Hindustan Pencils Pvt. Ltd., (1975. Lab IC 1558 (Bom)). In the case of Rambhuwal Thakur Prasad (supra) the petitioner was employed as a weaver by the respondent-Textile Mills,. He was granted leave for thirty days from 16th August, 1967 to 15th September, 1967 and he proceeded on leave to his native place. Subsequently, he by his letter dated 14th September, 1967 applied for extension of leave for about 20 days and sent a medical certificate to the effect that he was ill. That application was received by the respondent Mills on 18th September, 1967. In that case it was apparent that the employee had made an application for extension of leave on 14th September. 1967 i.e. prior to the day on which the leave originally granted to him was to expire and that was accompanied by a medical certificate. In the present case, the workman, on the finding of the Labour Court, had not made any application for extension of leave be fore the extended leave had expired. So the case of Rambhuwal Thakur Prasad is clearly distinguishable from the present one. 7. In the case of Smt. Kashibai Sachid anand (1975 Lab IC 1558 (Bom)) (supra) the petitioner was employed as an operator with the respondent and she had gone on leave on 10th August, 1971 to 16th August, 1971 as she was pregnant. On 19th August, 1971 she gave birth to twins, one of which was born dead and the other died soon after; and she had a prolonged illness. On 19th August, 1971 she gave birth to twins, one of which was born dead and the other died soon after; and she had a prolonged illness. Her services were terminated on 2nd October, 1971 on the ground that she had over-stayed although she had pleaded illness in her explanation to the show cause notice. In her. case it appears, the condition of service was governed by the provisions of. Model Standing Orders. The relevant clause was "sub-cl. (4) of CI. 13 of the Model Standing Orders which was to the following effect: "A- workman remaining absent beyond the period of leave originally granted or subsequently extended, shall be liable to lose his lien on his appointment unless he returns within eight days of the expiry of the "sanctioned leave and explains to the satisfaction of the authority granting leave his inability to resume his duty immediately on the expiry of his leave." The language of the relevant order quoted above is quite distinct and different from the Standing Order with which we -are concerned in the instant case. In Standing Order - No. 9 (3) - with which, we - are concerned, the language used is if a worker remains absent beyond the period of granted leave he shall lose his lien on his appointment......... whereas sub-cl. (4) of CI. 13 of the Model Standing Orders (ibid) contemplates that a workman remaining absent beyond the period of leave originally granted or subsequently extended, shall be liable to lose his lien on his appointment ......... The expression shall be liable to lose his lien does not carry the same meaning as the expression shall, lose his lien. So, in my opinion, this case is also distinguishable, from, the present case. 8 It was also urged on behalf of the petitioner that. Standing Order No. 15(28) read with Standing Order No- 16. of the Management was applicable to the case of. the workman and not Standing Order No. 9 (3). I, however, find that Standing Order No. 9 deals with Leave Procedure and sub-cl. (3) specifically deals with such cases of workmen who remain absent beyond the period of leave granted and do not return within eight days of the expiry of the leave and give satisfactory. the workman and not Standing Order No. 9 (3). I, however, find that Standing Order No. 9 deals with Leave Procedure and sub-cl. (3) specifically deals with such cases of workmen who remain absent beyond the period of leave granted and do not return within eight days of the expiry of the leave and give satisfactory. explanation for inability to return in time whereas Order No. 15 gives the description of acts and omissions which come under the heading of misconduct. Item No. 28 of Standing Order No. 15 deals with overstaying the sanctioned leave without sufficient ground of proper or satisfactory explanation and Order No. 16 provides penalties including dismissal without notice, if found guilty of misconduct, defined in Standing Order No. 15, after enquiry. In my opinion, therefore, the proper Standing Order applicable in the instant case was Standing Order No. 9 (3) and not Standing Order No. 15 (28) read with Standing Order No. 16. Besides that, the Supreme Court, in the case of National Engineering Industries Limited, has clearly held in somewhat similar situation that in case of alternative provision, the employer was free to resort to any one of the provisions unless it is shown that resort to one particular provision was due to mala fide. The petitioner has not been able to prove mala fide against the respondents and, in any case, it cannot be said that Standing Order No. 9 (3) was not applicable on the facts and in the circumstances of the present case. 9. For the reasons stated above, I do not find any substance in any of the points urged on behalf of the petitioner. The application is, accordingly, dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs. S.SARWAR ALI, J. 10 I agree.