JUDGMENT 1. - This second appeal by the defendant tenant is directed against the appellate judgement and decree for eviction passed by the District Judge, Jaipur, Jaipur City dated March 25, 1975. 2. The learned counsel for the appellant has confined his arguments in this appeal to two points only. His first contention is that the courts below have committed error in holding that the tenant has made material alteration within the meaning of section 13(1)(c) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter called as the Act). His second contention is that the trial court was not competent to hold a trial before registration of the plaintiff's institution under the Rajasthan Public Trusts Act, 1959. 3. The relevant facts giving rise to this appeal are that the plaintiff is an Institution known as Hindu Anath Ashram. One of the shops owned by the plaintiff was let cut to the defendant at the monthly rent of Rs. 55/-. The plaintiff instituted the suit on 1.7.1968 for eviction of the defendant appellant from the disputed shop. Prior to the institution of the suit, it was registered under the Rajasthan Societies Act, 1958 but it was not so registered under the Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959. During the pendency of the suit, the plaintiff's Institution got itself registered under the Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959 on October 3, 1972. 4. The plaintiff sought eviction of the defendant tenant on three grounds:- (1) Boanfide personal necessity. (2) Sub letting the part of the premises by the tenant. (3) Material alteration made by the defendant in the disputed shop. 5. The trial court held against the plaintiff on the question of bona fide personal necessity and about sub letting of the premises but it accepted the ground that the defendant had made material alteration in the suit premises without the permission of the landlord. It also held that since the plaintiff's Institution was got registered under the Rajasthan Public Trusts Act during the pendency of the suit, the suit was maintainable. 6. It also held that since the plaintiff's Institution was got registered under the Rajasthan Public Trusts Act during the pendency of the suit, the suit was maintainable. 6. It was averred in the plaint (1) that the defendant removed the doors of the shop, included the verandah situated in front of the shop by fixing shutters on the verandah, (2) that on the western side of the verandah the defendant made producing construction and (3) that the defendant constructed a small shop and closed it with shutters by demolishing wall under the stair case. The aforesaid allegations are contained in para 3 of the plaint which runs as under:- " 2- ;g gSa fd izfroknh us fcuk btktr oknh bl tk;nkn esa egRoiw.kZ rcnhfy;k vkfn djkyh gSaA nqdku ds fdokM+ o pkS[kV mrjodkj vkus dk cjkenk jksd fy;k gS vkSj ogka 'kVj yxk fy;k gSaA mDr cjkenk ds if'pe dh rjQ fudklw rkehj djokdj lcysV (Sublet) dj fn;k gSA rFkk mij dks tkus okys thus ds uhps dh nhokj rqM+okdj ,d NksVh lh nqdku 'kVj yxok dj cuokyh gSA vkSj mldh Hkh lcysV dj j[kk gS] izfroknh us bl izdkj fcuk btktr oknh mDr tk;nkn esa egRoiw.kZ rkehjkr djkyh gSa vkSj dqN v'ka orZeku esa nks O;fDr;ksa dks lcysV Hkh dj fn;k gSaA lkfod us izfroknh us fiNyk v'ka ,d vkpkj eqjcs okys dks lcysV fd;k Fkk] vkSj vc mlds LFkku ij cM+k idkSM+h okyk gyokbZ dk lcysV dj j[kk gSa] bl dkj.k oknh izfroknh dks viuk fdjk;knkj j[kuk ugha pkgrkA " The defendant in his written statement did not specifically deny making of the various alteration alleged in the plaint. He, however, pleaded that the alterations were not material and were made with the permission of the authorities of the plaintiff's Institution. He, however, pleaded that the alterations were not material and were made with the permission of the authorities of the plaintiff's Institution. Para No.3 of the written statement which contains the reply of para No. 3 of the plaint runs as under:- " 3- ;g fd okni= dh in la[;k 3 ftl izdkj vafdr gS Lohdkj ugha gSA izfroknh us tks Hkh ejEer o th.kksZ)kj edkukr o nqdkukr dk fd;k gS ;g oknh la[;k ds vf/kdkfj;ksa dks lgefr ls fd;k gS rFkk dksbZ ifjorZu ;k egRoiw.kZ jnkscny fdlh izdkj dk ugha fd;k gSaA nqdku o edkukr fcYdqy th.kZ voLFkk esa Fks rFkk izfroknh us djhc :i;s 9]000 ) [kpZ djds leLr edkukr dk th.kksZ)kj fd;k gS rFkk izfroknh us dksbZ Hkh Hkkx fdjk;s'kqnk lEefr dk fdlh dks Hkh lcysV ugha fd;k gS] u gh fdlh v'ka dk vkf/kiR; gh fdlh izdkj ls gLrkUrfjr fd;k gS Lo;a izfroknh gh nqdku ij vf/kdkj djrk gSA " In the pleadings of the parties various issues were framed. The issues relevant for the purpose of deciding this appeal are reproduced below:- "2. Whether the defendant has affected material alterations pleaded in para No. 3 of the plaint in the disputed premises? P. 3. If issue No. 2 is decided in affirmative whether the alterations were affected by the defendant with the permission of the plaintiff? D 8. Whether the plaintiff is not a registered institution under the Rajasthan Public Trust Act and, therefore, the present suit is not maintainable? D. 7. On consideration of the evidence lead by the parties, the trial court held that the alterations in the suit premises were made without the permission of the landlord. This finding was upheld by the lower appellate court. The learned counsel for the appellant has rightly not challenged the correctness of this finding before me. Dealing with issue No. 2 which is the most important issue in the case, the trial court observed:- "In this connection the allegations pertains to material alterations are levelled in para No.3 of the plaint. The learned counsel for the appellant has rightly not challenged the correctness of this finding before me. Dealing with issue No. 2 which is the most important issue in the case, the trial court observed:- "In this connection the allegations pertains to material alterations are levelled in para No.3 of the plaint. The allegations are (1) that the defendant has removed the doors of the shop, closed both the sides of Verandah fixed a shutter in the front side of the verandah, (2) in the western side of the shop, some opening projection has been made by the defendant, (3) under the stain case the wall has been broken and a gate has been opened in which a shutter has been fixed and thus a new separate shop has been made. It is alleged that all these alterations have been admitted by the defendant in his cross examination dated 9.2.1972. Thus so far as the factual position is concerned, it is admittedly clear and established as alluded to above." 8. The learned trial Judge then held all the alterations to be material and decided issue No. 2 in favour of the landlord. 9. Issue No. 8 was also decided by the trial court in favour of the plaintiff on the ground that the certificate of registration under the Rajasthan Public Trust Act was obtained by the plaintiff before the disposal of the suit. In the result the trial court decreed the suit. On appeal the learned District Judge Jaipur City affirmed the decree of the trial court and dismissed the appeal. It is in these circumstances that the tenant has come in second appeal to this court. 10. It is contended on behalf of the appellant that both the courts below misread the statement of the defendant dated 9.2.1972 in as much as the defendant nowhere in his statement admitted having closed western side of the verandah. Similarly it is argued that the defendant nowhere admitted opening of the gate by demolition of the wall under the staircase. The contention appears to be well founded. A careful reading of the statement of the defendant shows that the defendant did not admit construction of wall on eastern side of the verandah, nor he admitted opening of the gate by demolition of the wall under the staircase. The contention appears to be well founded. A careful reading of the statement of the defendant shows that the defendant did not admit construction of wall on eastern side of the verandah, nor he admitted opening of the gate by demolition of the wall under the staircase. What follows from the statement of the defendant is that he took on rent the disputed shop facing north with a verandah in its front. The eastern side of the verandah was probably closed at that time but its other two sides, western and northern, were admittedly lying upon open. In the year 1966 the defendant closed the western side of the verandah by wooden and glass planks and made a small cabin for the use of a betel shop with its door opening in the lane located on the western side of the verandah. In the year 1958 the defendant removed the doors of the shop and covered the northern side of the verandah by putting shutters on it. The defendant further repaired the window opening on the western side of the shop near the staircase. He removed the window by fixing shutters on it. 11. It is clear from the defendant's statement that the defendant closed the two open sides of the verandah and extended the shop by utilising the verandah into a shop. He also made a cabin on the western side of the verandah to be used as a betel shop. It further follows that the defendant repaired the window near the staircase and covered it with shutters with a view to use it for preparing and selling "Kachauri" and 'Samosa". There is no controversy that aforesaid changes in the demises premises were made by the defendant without the permission of the landlord. The aforesaid constructions and alterations stand proved by Ex.2 and Ex.8 besides the defendant's own statement. 12. The question which arises for determination is whether there acts of the defendant would bring the case within the mischief of section 13 (1)(c) of the Act. The aforesaid constructions and alterations stand proved by Ex.2 and Ex.8 besides the defendant's own statement. 12. The question which arises for determination is whether there acts of the defendant would bring the case within the mischief of section 13 (1)(c) of the Act. This section reads as under:- "13(1).-Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract, no Court shall pass any decree, or make any order, in favour of a landlord, whether in execution of a decree or otherwise, evicting the tenant so long as he is ready and willing to pay rent therefor to the full extent allowable by this Act, unless it is satisfied. (a) ......... (b) ......... (c) that the tenant has without the permission of the land lord made or permitted to be made any such construction as, in the opening of the court, has materially altered the premises or is likely to diminish the value thereof; or.... For the application of clause (c), three conditions have to be satisfied namely, (1) that the defendant has made a construction; (2) that the construction has been made without the permission of the landlord and (3) that such construction has materially altered the premises or such construction is likely to diminish the value of the premises. As already stated above there is no dispute that the record condition is satisfied. The dispute relates to the fulfilment of the first and third conditions. So far as the first condition is concerned, I have no doubt in my mind that the tenant had made constructions, changing of the verandah into a shop by closing down its western side by wooden and glass plan and its northern side by a shutter and making a cabin on the western side of the verandah are in my opinion nothing but constructions. 13. The next question that arises for determination is whether there construction amount to material alteration of the shop let out to the defendant. What amounts to material alteration has been laid down by the Supreme Court in Manmohan Das Shah and others v. Bishnu Das, AIR 1967 SC 643 . In that case section 3(1) (c) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act came for interpretation before the Supreme Court. The wordings of section 3(1)(c) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act are almost similar to the wordings of section 3(1)(c) of the Act. In that case section 3(1) (c) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act came for interpretation before the Supreme Court. The wordings of section 3(1)(c) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act are almost similar to the wordings of section 3(1)(c) of the Act. The relevant part of section 3(1)(c) of the U.P.(Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act reads as under:- "Subject to any order passed under sub-section (3) no suit shall, without the permission of the District Magistrate be filed in any Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation, except on one or more of the following grounds........ (c) That the tenant has, without the permission in writing of the landlord, made or permitted to be made any such construction as, in the opinion of the Court, has materially altered the accommodation or is likely substantially to diminish its value." In the case before the Supreme Court the tenant had lowered the level of the ground floor of the rented shops by excavating earth therefrom and putting up a new floor, and consequently lowering the front door and putting up instead a larger door, lowering correspondingly the height of the Chabutra so as to bring it on the level of new door step. He had also lowered the base of the staircase which entailed addition of new steps thereto and cutting the plinth band on which the door originally rested, so as to bring the entrance to the level of the new floor. A suit by the landlord for the eviction of the defendant on the ground of 3(1)(c) was decreed by the trial court and also by the first appellate court. On second appeal though the High Court agreed by the two courts below that the construction made by the defendant materially altered the accommodation, it dismissed the suit on the ground that the constructions were not likely to diminish the value of the accommodation. The Supreme Court held that the suit was liable to be decreed if the landlord established that the constructions made by the defendant materially altered the accommodation and he was not required further to prove that they were likely to diminish the value of the accommodation. The Supreme Court held that the suit was liable to be decreed if the landlord established that the constructions made by the defendant materially altered the accommodation and he was not required further to prove that they were likely to diminish the value of the accommodation. Their Lordships then considered the3 question whether the construction made by the defendants amounted to material alteration and observed:- "The expression 'material alteration' in its ordinary meaning would mean important alterations, such as those which materially or substantially change the front or the structure of the premises. It may be that such alterations in a given case might not cause damage to the premises or its value or might not amount to an unreasonable use of the leased premises or constitute a change in the purpose of the lease." The present case has to be judged in the light of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court. So far as the facts of the present case are concerned, I am definitely of the opinion that the constructions made by the tenant have materially and substantially changed the front as well as the structure of the shop. Closing of the two sides of the verandah has undoubtedly changed the front of the shop. Again removal of the doors of the shop and inclusion of the verandah in the shops are such acts which amount to structural changes in the suit shop. The mere fact that fixing of a wooden and glass planks, making of a cabin and fixing of shutters are acts which can be removed, does not alter the situation as almost any construction, permanent or temporary, can be removed. Since the Supreme Court has laid down the tests for judging whether the construction materially alters the accommodation or not, it is not necessary for me to consider the decisions of this Court, I may, however, refer to Khinvaram v. Lakhi Prasad, 1964 RLW 213 . In that case Bhargava J. observed that:- "In my opinion whether any material alteration has been made in the premises is a question of fact in each case depending upon the nature of the premises and nature, extent and effect of the constructions made therein. The alteration should be of structural nature and not merely of decorative nature. In that case Bhargava J. observed that:- "In my opinion whether any material alteration has been made in the premises is a question of fact in each case depending upon the nature of the premises and nature, extent and effect of the constructions made therein. The alteration should be of structural nature and not merely of decorative nature. Fixing a door to a room or to a garage by a tenant may not amount to material alteration within the meaning of section 13(1)(c) of the Act but the same will not be the case when an open verandah is converted into a closed room by fixing doors on the open portion. The character and shape of the premises in the former case remain unchanged while in the latter case the form and structure of the premises is changed." In Madhaval v. Smt. Govindi Bai, 1971 RLW 64 it was laid down that construction of a cabin in the leased out Chabutra in the facts and circumstances of the case will be deemed to have materially altered the leased out premises. 14. In my opinion, the constructions made by the defendant in the present case fall within the purview of section 13(1)(c) of the Act. 15. Coming to the second point my attention has been drawn to section 29 of the Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959 which runs as under:- "29. Bar against suits by unregistered trust- (1) No suit to enforce a right on behalf of a public trust which is required to be registered under this Act but has not been so registered shall be heard or decided in any court. (2) The provisions of sub section (1) shall apply to a claim of set off or other proceedings to enforce a right on behalf of such public trust." Section 29 provides that no suit by an unregistered Public Trust which is required to be registered under the Act shall be heard or decided by any court. This section does not prohibit institution of a suit by an unregistered Public Trust. According to this section the court is debarred from hearing and deciding the suit if such suit is filed by an unregistered public trust. In the present case the plaintiff institution got itself registered under the Rajasthan Public Trusts Act on 3.10.72 before the disposal of the suit by the trial court. According to this section the court is debarred from hearing and deciding the suit if such suit is filed by an unregistered public trust. In the present case the plaintiff institution got itself registered under the Rajasthan Public Trusts Act on 3.10.72 before the disposal of the suit by the trial court. It is true that by 3.10.72 the witnesses had been examined by the trial court. The examination of the witnesses at the most amounted to irregularity. There is nothing to suggest that this irregularity in any way prejudiced the defendant tenant or affected the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court. Section 99 Civil Procedure Code lays down that no decree shall be reversed or substantially varied nor shall any case be remanded in appeal on account of any misjoinder of parties or causes of action or any error, defect or irregularity in any proceedings in the suit, not affecting the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the court. The learned counsel for the appellant was not able to point out how the irregularity committed in this case affected the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the court. In absence of any prejudice to the defendant, I find no substance in this contention. 16. The result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. 17. The learned counsel for the appellant prays for leave to appeal to a Division Bench which is refused. *******